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Abstract
This dissertation examines the responses of the Muslim community in Meerut 
city, in western Uttar Pradesh, India, to the rise of militant Hindu nationalism 
and to the anti-Muslim violence that shook Meerut in April-May 1987. I show 
how Meerut Muslims engaged in adaptive economic and political strategies in 
the wake of the 1987 violence and how these strategies culminated in a new style 
of participatory politics. This emerged under the leadership of the hitherto low 
status Qureshi (butcher) community. I show how Qureshi political activism has 
worked to create a Muslim political community which can be mobilised in terms 
both of civic and Muslim identities. I also demonstrate how Muslim political 
leaders have engaged in an instrumental politics of vote-trading with Hindu low- 
caste political parties. Both communities are exploiting new possibilities for 
representation in an era of multi-party coalition politics at state and national 
levels.
My account of the ‘new Muslim politics’ in Meerut examines how Islam is 
understood alongside civic, or even secular, accounts of what it means to be a 
Muslim in contemporary India. More generally, my discussion of the 
production of ethnic peace in Meerut since c.1990 allows me to contribute to an 
ongoing debate on the causes and differential geography of‘communal’ violence 
in India. I do not attempt to adjudicate between the competing accounts of 
‘votes and violence’ offered by Steven Wilkinson, Ashutosh Varshney, Paul Brass 
and others. Instead, I seek to build on their work by offering a more considered 
discussion of Muslim political agency in the face of provocative militant 
Hinduism. Behind concerted campaigns for security and survival, the ‘new 
Muslim politics’ mirrors a commitment to the goals of respect and dignity that is 
also to be found among the region’s poorest Hindu communities and the 
Scheduled Castes (dalits).
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Prologue
Overview
One of the most surprising features of the Indian political landscape since 1980 
has been the resurgence of Hindu nationalism and the rise to national power of 
the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the late-i990s. After approximately thirty 
years in the wilderness following Independence and perhaps more so after the 
assassination of Mahatma Gandhi, a political grouping which rarely took more 
than seven percent of the popular vote in the 1950s, ’60s and ’70s, when it was 
led by the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, found itself winning close to a quarter of the 
popular vote in the General Elections of 1998 and 1999.
Since around 1990, a huge body of literature has grown up with the express aim 
of understanding the ideological and organizational features of Hindutva and 
the Sangh Parivar — the so-called family of Hindu nationalist organizations that 
is directed in some degree by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). This 
literature stands in stark contrast to work produced just a few years earlier in 
which there is barely a mention of militant Hinduism in discussions that 
otherwise demonstrate an acute grasp of India’s political economy (see for 
example Kohli 1990). Much of this new literature has also confronted the 
violence that is at the heart of Hindutva politics and which is directed 
overwhelmingly against India’s Muslim communities. Such violence ranges 
from depictions of Indian Muslims as fifth columnists or even agents of 
Pakistan, all the way through to closely organised attacks on Muslim religious
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sites (as at the Babri Masjid in December 1992), property and life. In one of the 
worst such incidents in the 1980s, an outbreak of so-called Hindu-Muslim 
violence in Meerut city, western Uttar Pradesh, in 1987 left over 170 people 
dead. I say so-called, because three-quarters of the dead were Muslims and 
many of these people died at the hands of the police.
This dissertation, which is focused on the city of Meerut, inevitably takes shape 
against these fast emerging literatures on the dynamics of Hindu nationalism 
and the causes and geography of communal violence. I review key parts of these 
linked literatures in Chapter One. I also make it clear later in the dissertation 
that I am more sympathetic to the accounts of the timing and geographies of 
‘communal violence’ that have been produced recently by Paul Brass (2003) and 
Steven Wilkinson (2004) — accounts which emphasise the political logics that 
stand behind the creation of what Brass calls ‘institutionalised riot systems’ — 
than I am to Ashutosh Varshne/s (2002) claim that ‘ethnic’ (religious) conflicts 
peak in those Indian cities which lack a dense network of associational life 
bridging between Hindu and Muslim communities.1 However, it is not my main 
purpose in this work to adjudicate carefully between these competing 
arguments, or to set up rigorous empirical tests of their major claims. As I say, I 
am largely persuaded by Wilkinson’s arguments that electoral calculations and 
government will stand behind most outbreaks (or non-outbreaks) of communal
1 This dissertation is mainly concerned with violent conflicts between Muslims and Hindus in 
urban north India. These conflicts have generally been described as ‘communal’, or conflicts 
between religious communities. Varshney and Brass both often use this term. Varshney’s 
preferred term for the violence I discuss here, however, is ‘ethnic’, which is also the preferred 
terminology of Steven Wilkinson. Unless otherwise stated, I use ‘ethnic’ and ‘communal’ as 
interchangeable terms; I also generally follow the preferred usage of any author I am referring 
to.
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violence in India. I also accept that minority communities are protected against 
the violence unleashed behind such ‘calculations’ to the extent they make their 
numbers tell in the electoral arena. Muslims in western Uttar Pradesh have 
been doing this for the past two decades by entering into electoral pacts with 
parties that began life as vehicles for the advancement of some of the region’s 
poorest Hindu communities and also its Scheduled Castes. I am referring here to 
the Bahujan Samaj Party and to the Samajwadi Party.
Instead, the major purpose of this PhD thesis is to show precisely how the 
Muslim community of Meerut city has engaged in a series of adaptive economic 
and political strategies that have had the effect of making one of India’s most 
dangerous cities rather safer for them. The thrust of my work, then, is micro 
rather than macro. The principal methods I use are historical/ethnographic 
rather than quantitative or based on formal political models. My major 
arguments, to anticipate, are twofold. I seek to show, first, that it is not possible 
to understand new forms of assertion and tactical political engagement within 
Meerut’s Muslim communities unless we understand that key economic and 
political powers were transferred in the 1980s and 1990s from hitherto 
controlling high status groups like the Syeds and Sheikhs toward lower status 
Qureshis. Second, I show how key Qureshi leaders in Meerut in the 1990s were 
able to translate new forms of economic and educational wealth into distinctive 
forms of political capital. The real achievements of men such as Haji Akhlaq and 
Shahid Akhlaq was to rally the broad Muslim community in Meerut behind an 
instrumental politics of vote-trading even as they updated appeals to forms of 
identity rooted in Islam. It is now quite common to talk about the ‘modernity of 
tradition’, and this is partly what I write about here. My major contribution,
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however, or so I hope, is to show in some detail how an emerging post-c.1987 
Muslim politics in Meerut city has welded together in new and productive ways 
(albeit ways that are also contested) what can be called a secular logic of ‘group 
citizenship’ to new inflexions within Islamised politics.
Given that the focus of this dissertation is as much on ‘How’ as on Why 
questions (allowing that these always overlap), the rest of the thesis is organised 
as follows. Chapter One reviews the growing literature on the re-birth of Hindu 
nationalism in India and on the mainsprings of communal violence. I suggest 
that one possible weakness in this literature is its under-theorisation of the 
politics of resistance to violence, or more specifically of the ways in which 
minority communities are not simply the victims of political calculations made 
within or by majority communities. Chapter Two moves from the national stage 
to the political histories and geographies of Uttar Pradesh, especially western 
Uttar Pradesh, and of Meerut city more specifically. I accept Steven Wilkinson’s 
claim that the political geographies of communal violence in India cannot wholly 
be understood at the city level: for Wilkinson, state-wide political considerations 
are more important. I nevertheless contend that Muslim political agency is best 
explored at this spatial scale and with close reference to local historical contexts. 
To clarify, I am not arguing that Meerut is the only city in western Uttar Pradesh 
which has become safer for Muslims since the early 1990s. Rather, I am 
suggesting that if we want to understand how Muslims themselves have been 
active in bringing about a less threatening political landscape, we need to do this 
deep within a city’s walls, as well as in its immediate environs. Chapter Three 
concludes Part One of the thesis with a largely descriptive account of the 
deployment of Hindu and state violence against Muslims in the April-May ‘riots’
of 1987 in Meerut city. These events represented a tragic end-point to an earlier 
regime of politics in western UP — one which saw Muslims largely dependent on 
a Congress Party that was now unable or unwilling to protect them against 
resurgent Hindutva forces.
Part Two of the thesis is focused on Muslim responses to organised Hindu 
violence after 1987. Chapter Four documents important changes in the relative 
economic and political standing of different social groups within Meerut’s 
Muslim community. In particular, I look at the causes and patterns of social 
mobility among various low-status Muslim groups, most notably the Qureshis 
(the butchers). I also examine the ways in which these communities have sought 
to transfer their new economic wealth both into circuits of cross-community 
political capital and into forms of Islamisation that continue to demarcate 
Muslim from Hindu. Chapters Five and Six examine how significant political 
campaigns were waged in the 1990s and early 2000s by Haji Akhlaq and his son, 
Shahid Akhlaq. Both men surged to positions of political power at this time, the 
former in the UP Legislative Assembly and the latter in Lok Sabha. But why, 
and how? I consider in some detail how these muscular Qureshi leaders were 
able to appeal to their Muslim ‘co-ethnics’ without consistently reminding their 
new allies among Meerut’s Backward Castes of the glories of Mughal rule, or 
worse of Pakistan and Partition. In short, I consider here and in a brief 
Conclusion (Chapter 7) what it means to be a Muslim now in Meerut. I also 
reflect on how a more assertive Muslim identity has been produced in the period 
of coalition politics that India has lived with since the collapse of the Congress 
Raj in 1989.
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Fieldwork and Research M ethods
Before I begin, let me also say something here about the fieldwork that lies 
behind this study and about my own experiences in India and positionality. This 
dissertation takes the form of an in-depth single case study that is largely based 
on ethnographic materials and semi-structured interviews. The study also 
draws on official publications, local historians’ writings, family histories, caste 
(biradari) archival records, and newspapers written in English, Hindi or Urdu. 
Although the main subject of the study falls in the field of political science, my 
aim has been to examine issues of religious identity and community politics by 
means of historical, anthropological and sociological research that links events 
in one locality to others at different spatial scales.
My fieldwork began in mid-Januaiy 2001 with a visit to Delhi. After that I 
visited India several times for three to six months at a time, before basing myself 
in Meerut city for 16 months from January 2003 until the end of May 2004. In 
total I spent over two years in India. In 20011 visited a number of major cities 
and towns in Uttar Pradesh2 in order to choose a city or cities for my study. My 
leading research question was a deceptively simple one: why were some Indian 
cities more peaceful than others even though where they had almost identical 
socio-economic characteristics? I should add that I was formulating this
2 The cities I visited were Meerut, Aligarh, Moradabad, Mathura, Agra, Saharanpur, Kanpur, 
Lucknow, Allahabad and Varanasi. I visited most of them more than twice as the second round 
of visit always provided a better vision of a city in comparative perspective and a settling effect of 
my newly acquired knowledge about it.
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question a few years before the major works of Brass, Wilkinson and Varshney 
came out.
In each city I conducted interviews with state as well as district government 
representatives, and also with political and business leaders, journalists and 
political activists. My aim was to acquaint myself with Hindu-Muslim relations 
in the city, with riot histories, and most importantly with local official and 
unofficial structures and mechanisms for maintaining law and order involving 
civil society actors. These latter structures and mechanisms included quasi­
official Peace Committees at the locality-, ward- and city-levels, all of which 
involved citizens and which police officials called ‘community policing’ at the 
time. My aim was to study how civil society actors were engaged with the state 
in riot prevention, control and post-riot reconciliation.
Interviews with the District Magistrate (DM), Deputy Inspector General of
Police (DIG), Senior Superintendence of Police (SSP), Station Officers, and
people of various ranks underneath them, helped me to understand official
views of Hindu-Muslim relations and joint efforts to maintain law and order
within the context of north Indian society. In each city I interviewed at least ten
to fifteen top government representatives and politicians and another dozen
non-state actors across different walks of life. Meetings with new people
through the networks of the local administration often removed my position of
impartiality and appeared to place me in the state camp, which was powerful
enough to significantly alter the nature of my later interviews. In these
interviews I noticed that my interviewees’ words and attitudes appeared to have
more constraints attached to them on some occasions.
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I finally chose Meerut as my research site because of its distinctive and puzzling 
record of high frequency Hindu-Muslim violence up to the end of the 1980s, 
followed by a period of dramatically reduced ethnic violence. I decided to adopt 
a single case rather than a cross-case study because of the need for ethnographic 
depth over a controlled period of time. The primary focus of my fieldwork in 
Meerut, beginning in January 2003, was to explore what had been happening in 
the Muslim community, particularly among low-status Muslim groups like the 
Qureshis that became the dominant political force in the city after the early 
1990s. I began my fieldwork in Meerut with interviews with local government 
representatives and local politicians (former MLAs and MPs). Initial contacts 
with local government representatives, including the DM and DIG, were 
essential in order for me to obtain official recognition and possibly protection as 
a researcher who aimed to study Hindu-Muslim relations and violence in the 
Meerut city. From these initial contacts I gradually established my own 
networks among ordinary citizens. A snowballing list of respondents was 
extended to include political activists, business leaders, journalists and 
academics. These interviewees represented different fields close to or within the 
power structures of Meerut society. They had detailed knowledge of the 
functioning not only of their own field but of the entire city (at least from their 
own perspectives). My interviewees in this general category numbered around 
30, and I conducted interviews more than once with some of them. But this list 
of early respondents includes very few Muslims.
As far as my principal target group was concerned — low-status Muslims in 
general and the Qureshis in particular — I initially gained access to many 
members of the more economically advanced and visible Ansari community.
But when it came to the Qureshis it was very difficult to obtain initial contacts. 
A breakthrough came three months into my stay, when I met Shahar Kaji (a 
religious judge) in his house not far from the Jama Masjid in the Old Town; 
through him I was able to get the first contact with the Qureshi community. 
Shahar Kaji became my central contact through which to approach the key 
Qureshi political leaders in Meerut, including Yusuf and Yaqoob Qureshi, and 
the then-Mayor, Shahid Akhlaq. Another important contact was Mr. Abdul 
Wahaf (Doulla), the head of the Meerut government slaughterhouse, who 
introduced me to the localities of the Qureshi butcher community. I could find 
no detailed maps of the Old Town which would give me a good sense of the 
location of each locality; for this I needed Doulla’s help.
The only official map of the city I could find was one produced in 1974 by the 
military, in which the Old Town is shown in miniscule proportions. In Delhi as 
well as in Meerut I was told in specialised book shops that there was no better 
map than this. I therefore collected many hand-drawn maps, mainly from police 
officers and other people I asked to draw maps for me. I also drew maps myself 
by walking throughout the Old Town with Doulla or other Muslim respondents. 
In this way I gradually built up a sense of the location of each locality and the 
geographic expansion of the area. I also collected data on the socio­
demographic composition of the Qureshi community and their surrounding 
neighbourhoods through interviews with Muslim residents of different 
communities. While each locality forms an independent space of defined social 
boundaries containing dense and intimate networks (Kumar 1988; Mann 1992), 
the south end of the Old Town, and the areas surrounding the Kotwali police
station, appear to form an entity woven by common and complex threads of the
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history, demography and, most importantly, religious life shared by a larger 
group of Ajilaf or artisan Muslims in Meerut city.
I should say that my fieldwork in the Old Town was based on ‘purposive’ 
sampling rather than on truly random or more ‘scientific’ stratified sampling 
method (Mitchell 1967: 31). Fieldwork is often messy and requires the field 
researcher to be flexible and pragmatic. In order to define the ‘facts’ of the case, 
I used multiple sources of evidence, comprising semi-structured and open- 
ended interviews, direct observation of inter-personal interactions, and general 
observations of physical artefacts of cultural features and other operations of 
everyday life (Yin 1998:230-233). The array of my findings from these methods 
has been backed up by secondary sources including local writings, newspapers 
and archival records. Among Muslim respondents I conducted about 80 
interviews. I also conducted a focused survey to inquire about experiences of the 
1987 violence, specifically focusing on Muslim victims in Hashimpura and 
Maliana village.
The topic of Hindu-Muslim violence in general and the 1987 violence in Meerut
in particular was an extremely difficult one to research. Many respondents
either refused to talk, fell silent or changed the subject. It needed a large
amount of time and effort, as well as patience, to collect interview data on this
topic. In this particular survey I managed to collect 15 responses from Hindus
and 11 from Muslims. In order to obtain these, my Hindu assistants (pretending
that they were Muslim) and I had to contact at least 40 respondents in each
community. In a few instances respondents who had finished interviews with us
returned a little later on with more substantial information about their
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experience of the 1987 violence. At these second interviews we were just quiet 
listeners to energetic accounts that almost took the form of a confession. Often 
these respondents said that they wanted to let the world know what happened in 
1987. Needless to say, these responses are the ones I cite most in my thesis.
As time went by, many people, both Hindus and Muslims of different walks of 
life, came to talk to me, especially after a local Hindi newspaper carried my 
name as a Japanese researcher visiting Meerut. From that time on, about five 
months after starting my life in Meerut, I almost did not need to introduce 
myself. Many people that I encountered in the city seemed to recognise me. 
Sometimes I just sat in a public space such as the office of Municipal 
government, and local politicians came by and talked to me. They said again 
that they wanted their story to be known outside India, in Japan or in the UK. 
This, I thought, was very different from western society where people usually 
attend this kind of meeting only after making appointments. In these random 
interviews I acquired information of significant value to my research. It is, 
therefore, not only that I sought respondents for interviews, but rather that the 
field was coming towards me, often with important information.
I rented a flat at the top of a house constructed by the owner in a Christian
colony in Meerut. I chose this colony because my respondents, both Hindu and
Muslim, tended to ask me as their first question ‘where I put up?’ The Christian
colony was the best choice that I could think of as I thought that since it was
neither Muslim or Hindu it would help to make my residential identity slightly
more ambiguous. The area I lived in was close to Police Line and not far from
Bagum Bridge (Bagum Puri); these form boundaries between the main busy
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Hindu market streets that go down toward the Old Town and the relatively quiet 
residential areas of Civil Line and Police Line. The area is almost the beginning 
of the vast cantonment that stretches towards north-east and west Meerut (see 
Map 3.1).
The sensibility and consciousness typically shared by Meerut inhabitants, and 
Indians more generally for that matter, about my ethnic as well as gender 
background — in a word, my ascriptive location — accompanied me throughout 
my fieldwork. Although I am a Japanese woman, I dressed in Salvar-khurta, 
the long top and loose trousers, with a chadar to cover my head and upper body, 
the typical everyday dress of ordinary Muslim women. As I moved into the Old 
Town, it was very important for me to become one of them, at least in 
appearance. My Hindu assistants also had to pretend that they were Muslim 
when they accompanied me in the Old Town for interviews; in the Hindu 
localities outside the Old Town they returned to being Hindus with Hindu 
names.
My male Hindu assistants were of limited use in some interviews, particularly
when I wished to meet my interviewees' family members. They drove away
female members of Muslim families because of their gender. When I went on
my own, almost all the members of an extended family of three generations
came out to see me. I soon found that my respondents’ teenage grandchildren
could act as able translators, at least where they were attending English medium
schools. This was the marker of upward mobility for a family whose elders had
no command of English. These occasions also provided me with good
opportunities to observe and converse with female members of the family, few of
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whom one would come across outside Muslim households. Even if one did 
encounter them, they seemed to shut off the outside world with their black outer 
garment, the burqa. My gender in this case, therefore, worked to expand the 
range of my respondents.
I was aware that being an outsider and a female also imposed certain constraints 
on my respondents’ answers and stories. I recognised that if I were an insider 
the content of my respondents’ talks would be different, to varying degrees, and 
that I might be missing out on certain aspects. However, I was also aware that 
there were things that my respondents told me because I was an outsider with 
no competitive interests or connections to their society. These were things that 
they might never have told people from their own society.
Over a period of six months or so I came to hear the same repeated answers to
questions. I also started getting a feeling for the society that I was studying.
One of the most powerful messages of the Meerut Muslim society was how
deeply religion is embedded into the everyday life of ordinary Muslims. It
became intriguing for me to explore the role of Islam, the unique and powerful
aspects of a religiously-based identity and the relationship between religion,
society and politics. I attended many social events both in private and public
spaces where women were not allowed. These were among the best events to
observe ‘the political’ as it was performed in the public arena. At wedding
ceremonies of Qureshi politicians, for example, I was allowed to present myself
in the formal marriage proceedings where there were no other female attendees.
In these proceedings, politics inevitably appeared in juxtaposition with religion.
Powerful men led by the high-status Muslim priest, usually ulama, prayed on
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the stage facing Mecca during the ceremony. These men were selected because 
of their qualifications as ‘men of religion’ as recognised by the ulama, and other 
men attending in the room observed their public performance of religious rites 
with respect and admiration. When I attended the wedding of the daughter of 
Haji Raes, a renowned Qureshi politician, I saw these religious rites performed 
by the leading Qureshi figures in Meerut, including Yusuf and Yaqoob Qureshi 
and Haji Raes himself.
This thesis, to recap, aims to tell the story of one low-status Muslim community 
in Meerut city. The weakness of a single case study in comparison with a large- 
N study is of course the difficulty in defining to what extent the findings can be 
generalised to produce a robust theory. I believe, however, that a single N study 
which is set in the context of a broader theoretical and regional literature 
remains the most appropriate way for one researcher (as opposed to a team of 
researchers) to understand the sorts of questions around identity formation, 
religiosity and politics that are my object here. Many intriguing questions 
emerge ‘along the way’ in fieldwork when the very field opens itself up with its 
own energy and speaks to the researcher, guiding her to knowledge grounded on 
and generated from itself.
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Chapter 1: On the Causes and Geography o f Communal
V iolence in  India
[T]he long-term trend toward dispersion and the ‘normalisation’ of the Muslim 
vote, that is, its distribution over a number of political parties according to social 
position and ideological inclination was abruptly reversed in the 1989 and 1991 
Elections as Muslims in large numbers chose to vote en bloc against the BJP or 
against Congress (Hansen 1999:152).
1.1 Introduction
The immediate starting point for this thesis is my observation, echoed above in 
part by Thomas Blom Hansen, that since c.1990 Muslim voters have been 
moving away from the Congress Party in north India as they have sought to 
protect themselves against resurgent and often violent forms of militant 
Hinduism. The fact that Muslims in Meerut have made effective alliances with 
low-caste Hindu groups and their political representatives can be made to 
explain, to a large degree, why organised violence against Muslims in Meerut 
declined sharply in the 1990s and into the 2000s. What I primarily seek to show 
is how and in which terms and with what precise consequences, different actors 
within Meerut’s diverse Muslim communities were able to effect these new 
political transactions.
A less immediate starting point for my work is the observation, popularised 
recently by Ashutosh Varshney among others, that communal — or what he calls
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‘ethnic’ — violence in India has not only ebbed and flowed sharply over time, as 
Hansen also indicates, but also across space. Most victims of Hindu-Muslim 
‘riots’ or violence are killed or injured in cities, and then mainly in a small group 
of cities (as I discuss in more detail later in this chapter). Some of India’s states 
have also been more prone to vicious outbursts of communal violence than 
others. Gujarat comes to mind in recent times, but if we go back to the 1960s 
(Ranchi) or 1970s (Jamshedpur), the state of Bihar, including that part of it 
which is now Jharkhand, saw repeated instances of communal rioting in a way 
that happily has not been mirrored since c.1990.
Before turning, then, to Meerut, or even to Uttar Pradesh (see Chapter 2), it is
important that this thesis first addresses itself to more general bodies of work on
the changing historical geographies of Hindu-Muslim violence in India.
Accordingly, section II of this chapter reviews some key factors in the political
development of colonial India that laid the foundations for communalism and
Hindu nationalism in more modern times. I consider here not just the well-
known stoiy of British ‘divide and rule’ policies, but also the formation of what
Nicholas Dirks (Dirks 2001) has called ‘the ethnographic state’, or the sharp
delineation of community groups in the Census and other technologies of
government. I also review some work on the formation of organised political
groupings within what become more sharply defined ‘Hindu’ and ‘Muslim’
communities, including those linked to the Aligarh movement on the one hand
and the Sangh Parivar on the other. In section III I then discuss some of the
more significant work that has emerged in recent decades on the mainsprings,
significance and content of communal violence in independent India, and most
especially since 1980. Above all, I focus on work by Ashutosh Varshney, Steven
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Wilkinson and Paul Brass, although I also refer to work by Asghar Ali Engineer 
and Veena Das, among others.
1.2 The Construction o f Communalism in Colonial India
India's Muslim population today numbers over 140 million, making it third in 
size to that of Indonesia and Pakistan.3 Half of this Muslim population lives in 
north India and West Bengal, particularly across the Indo-Gangetic plain and 
centring around the Ganges and Jamuna rivers — the traditional seats of lasting 
Muslim power. The Muslims came to India in three major waves. After the first 
military invasion in AD 711 in Sind by the Arabs, the Slave Dynasty initiated by 
Turkish descent marked Islamic power’s permanent foothold in India in 1206. 
This was followed by the Delhi Sultanate, which originated in the Turkish and 
later Afghan invasions. The Sultanate succeeded in expanding its power over 
the vast northern Indian plains and also moved southward to most parts of 
central India during the 13th to 16th centuries (Troll 1986).
The Mughal empire which followed the Delhi Sultanate began with the capture 
of Kabul by the Turk, Babur, a descendant of Genghis Khan, in 1526. The great 
Mughal dynasty was largely shaped by Mongol and Turkish military powers. It 
came to occupy a vast territoiy under Akbar (1542-1605), running at the time of 
his death from Afghanistan in the east to Orissa and south to the Deccan 
plateau. Of course, these long centuries of Mughal rule were often challenged by
3 India’s Muslim population as recorded in the 2001 Indian Census report is 138,188,240, or 
13-43 percent of the total Indian population.
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Hindu insurgencies. Among them, the Marathas became a major threat and 
permanently weakened the political foundation of the Mughal dynasty in the 
18th century. By the 1740s, the Mughals had been reduced to a collection of 
factions of the nobility who were fighting among each other just as European 
inroads into South Asia were gathering pace. When the British East Company 
conquered Bengal and Bihar after the battles of Plassey in 1757 and Buxar in 
1764, the fallen empire lost most of its heartland to the British. Awadh (Oudh) 
was the major state in the area and the home domain of the failing empire. Its 
ruler, the Nawab of Awadh was defeated by the British East Company in 1764 
and was forced to cede to the company a large part of his territory in 1801 (Bayly 
2000 (1983): 1). The Company finally annexed its whole territory in 1856. In 
1877 the North-Western Provinces and Oudh had emerged by combining the 
administrative offices of the North-Western Provinces and the region of Oudh, 
which was renamed as the United Provinces of Agra and Oudh in 1902, and 
today is Uttar Pradesh.
The fall of the Mughals and the conquest of the British meant the old ruling 
community (the ‘Muslims’) and their subordinates (the ‘Hindus’) became 
nominally equal subjects under a new political regime. All subjects strove to 
adapt their way of life, social position and political relations to the new ruler, 
according to the perceived rules of the new system. A section of progressive 
Muslim elites started a socio-educational reform programme in the latter half of 
the 19th century. Muslims were seeking socio-economic survival under the 
British system, whose presence was firmly established after the Revolt of 1857-8
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by the primacy of its military power.4 The programme was also a response to 
intensive economic competition with the Hindus, some of whom had been 
flexibly and rigorously adjusting themselves to the new education system 
installed by the government of the East India Company. Muslims were falling 
behind in this competition, in part because traditional Islamic learning was an 
obstacle to adjusting quickly to a more secular education system. Many Muslims 
saw little compatibility between western and Islamic education. English 
education became another hurdle for them, while elite Hindus demonstrated far 
more enthusiasm for learning English (Seal 1973:11-17).
But not all Muslims reacted in this way. Muslim socio-educational reform was 
initiated by the ‘Aligarh Muslims’ — those who centred around the circle of Syed 
Ahmad Khan and who proposed a new interpretation of Islamic faith and law.5 
The Aligarh Muslims sought to spread and institutionalise higher-level western 
education among north India’s Muslim community. The programme was 
underpinned by the assumption that Muslims would have more to gain from 
collaboration with British power than from resistance (Metcalf 1965). The 
reform programme, later known as the ‘Aligarh movement’, became a key centre 
for Muslim politics in the late-i9th and early 20th centuries. It sought to
4 The Revolt, or insurgency among the Sepoys against the British, started in the cantonment 
area in Meerut city in 1857. It had a critical impact in initiating and shaping the fundamental 
modernism and ideological themes of the Aligarh movement. For a concrete and detailed 
analysis of the impact on individual Muslim elites, see Robinson (1993). The British conceived 
that the uprising was largely a conspiracy among the Muslims (Metcalf 1965).
5 Muslims reacted to the modem western system in a variety of ways, and many were opposed to 
Syed Ahmed’s modernist rationalism. The most extreme reaction came from the traditionalist 
theologians of the seminary of Deoband, founded in 1867 in Muzaffamagar. For detailed 
profiles of other Muslim reactions, see Ahmad and von Grunebaum (1970).
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negotiate Muslim interests in exchange for ‘unquestioned loyalty’ to the colonial 
power. British patronage and protection greatly enhanced the movement. The 
Aligarh Muslims established the Anglo-Muhammadan Oriental College (Aligarh 
Muslim University) in 1875 in Aligarh in western UP, and their own political 
party, the Muslim League, in 1906.
Syed Ahmed’s reform programme also marked a founding moment in what later 
was most often called Muslim communalism. It represented the first attempt to 
create a ‘Muslim’ community out of mere ‘collections of different interests’, or as 
a consolidated political force (Robinson 1974: 28). From the beginning, the 
Aligarh Muslims saw themselves as a separate and distinct political force, 
distancing themselves from the incipient nationalist movement, as represented 
by the Indian National Congress. This separatist orientation, however, which 
was partly forged amid socio-economic and political competition with Hindus, 
was developed most significantly within the broader structures of imperial rule 
in India, or in regard to Britain’s ‘divide and rule’ policy. The colonial 
government conceived India in terms of separate religious groups, as I explain 
further below. By endorsing the Aligarh movement financially and politically, 
the British sought to place a system of control over potentially their most 
dangerous and yet also important political ally (ibid. 126-131). The Indian 
National Congress (INC), founded in 1885, on the other hand, stood in 
opposition to the British and sought to represent (and create) a unified Indian 
identity. A triangular political situation was thus established in which the 
colonial government generally allied with the Muslims to counter the nationalist 
aspirations of the Congress and its major sponsors, the Hindus.
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1.2.1 Technologies o f rule
Various modern institutions of governance and control installed by the colonial 
government played a critical role in the growth of communalism. Newly 
representative — if heavily circumscribed — systems of modem government had 
considerable influence in politicising Indian subjects. Self-government 
institutions provided Indians with a means to organise themselves in formal 
politics and to promote their interests at different spatial scales. At the same 
time, the system of separate (religious) electorates installed by the British from 
1909 contributed greatly to the growth of communal identities (Page 1999).
British census operations, which began in 1872 and which sought to enumerate 
indigenous groups by religion and caste, formed another technology of 
government that helped to build a sense of separate identity among several of 
India’s major political communities (Kaviraj 1997: 328). David Washbrook 
points out that the British set up a system of representation based on 
‘difference’, in which the governed could only represent particular, sectional 
interests, with the colonial state alone being seen to be capable of representing 
the whole of Indian society (Washbrook 1997:40).
1.2.2 Hindu revivalism
Against this background of ‘communalism born of colonialism’ — 
notwithstanding that the former has earlier roots, as Chris Bayly reminds us 
(Bayly 1985) — Hindu revivalism and indeed nationalism were forged as yet
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another response to the challenges of colonial modernity, including the spread 
of western education and Christian missionaries. The latter group in particular 
developed a powerful machinery of polemics against Islam, Hinduism and other 
indigenous religions. The popularisation of communal identities also owed 
much to the emergence of Hindu revivalism, which succeeded in attracting 
widespread popular support through traditional cultural idioms (Andersen and 
Damle 1987:16).
Among ‘Hindus’ (or those in the process of becoming Hindus), the most 
dynamic reaction to the challenge of western civilisation was the rise of a 
revivalist Vedic sect known as the Arya Samaj, founded by Swami Dayanand 
Saraswati in 1875 in the Punjab. The Samaj preached against several practices 
of orthodox Hinduism, including untouchability and the subjection of women, 
and promoted the pure teachings of the Vedas. The proselytisation of the Hindu 
faith to Muslims was one of the Samaj’s most important activities and was 
widely practised in north India.6 The Aiya Samaj was the most important Hindu 
revivalist organisation to lay the foundations of Hindu nationalism in India. The 
Samaj’s Hinduist ideology — based on inherent ethnic pride, stigmatisation of 
the Other and emulation of the Semitic religions — was inherited by forms of 
Hindu nationalist thought which gathered force in the 1920s and 1930s, as I 
explain further below (Jaffrelot 1996 (1993): 16-27).
6 The Arya Samaj of course provoked reaction from Indian Islam mainly from the Deoband 
seminary and the Ahl-I hadith, the neo-traditionalist Islamic school of thought. The Ahl-I 
hadith was also opposed to the rationalistic modernism of the Aligarh movement (Ahmad and 
von Grunebaum 1970: 6).
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The Arya Samaj spearheaded two of the most prominent revivalist movements 
of the last decades of the 19th centuiy. One was the cow protection movement, 
which aimed to stop the sacrificing of cows during the Islamic annual festival of 
the Baqr Id in north India. The cow protection movement stirred religious zeal 
among the ‘lower strata* of Hindus in small towns across Punjab and the United 
Provinces (UP). The movement resulted in a number of serious communal 
clashes and reached an early peak in 1893 with large-scale violence in eastern 
UP (Pandey 1999 (1990): Chapter 5).
A second movement featured political agitation among Hindus for the 
replacement of Urdu by Hindi as the administrative language of state. Urdu had 
been the court language of the Muslims during the Mughal empire. It was the 
language of the Muslim elites. On the other hand, many Hindus spoke various 
dialects of Hindi. Although these languages are nearly identical in grammar, 
they differ in specialised vocabulary with Urdu retaining Persian, Arabic and 
Turkic influence while Hindi relies heavily on Sanskrit. These languages are also 
different in script — Urdu is written in the Persian script while Hindi is written 
in the Devanagari script. Much of the attack on the Persian script came from 
Hindus who wished to break the firmly-guarded system of patronage of 
government jobs available only to Urdu-speaking elites. The language 
controversy ended with the victory of the Hindus when the colonial government 
issued the Nagri Resolution in 1900, ordering the use of both Urdu and Hindi as 
official languages.7
7 The propagation of Hindi invited essentialist and stereotypical images of the Muslims. Muslim 
depictions by nationalist writers and educators in the press were products of the imagination in
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At the turn of the century, another important Hindu leader was deep within the 
ranks of the Congress Party — Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Tilak was described from 
early on as an ‘extremist’ in his militancy against the British, as well as against 
the Muslims. Tilak became aware of the mobilising power of popular religious 
symbols from the time of the cow protection movement. He organised Hindu 
folk festivals using religious symbols in the Marathi-speaking part of Bombay 
Province. One was to worship the Hindu God, Ganesh, and the other, the 
Maratha king, Shivaji, who fatally weakened the Mughal empire. These festivals 
did much to contribute to the propagation of an exclusive political identity 
among Hindus and worsened communal relations in what is today called 
Maharashtra.
Peter van der Veer has argued that Hindu revivalist movements, particularly the 
cow protection movement, also laid the foundation for religious (Hindu) 
nationalism in British India (van der Veer 1996 (1994): 66). Hindu money­
lenders and merchants who had acquired wealth and political power were an 
important medium both for Hindu revivalism and nationalism. They were also 
the most fervent supporters of the early Congress. These ‘Hindu rich men’ 
helped to ensure that Congress ideology reflected much of the revivalist view, 
which also helped the Party to gain political influence (Bayly 1973; 1975: 16, 
123).8 Religious differences between Hindus and Muslims were increasingly
constructing and inventing separate identities. These images continue to be used by the press 
and Hindu nationalists in contemporary India (Amin 2005).
8 The myth of medieval ‘Muslim tyranny* and Hindu ‘national’ defence was largely developed
and endorsed by Congress nationalists in the late 19th century. At the local level, the Hindu
revivalist and later nationalist movement often shared the same cadre in the Congress until the 
late 1930s when Hindu Mahasabha was formally expelled from Congress (Basu et al. 1993:4).
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brought into play in municipal politics in the context of changing local power 
structures. As electoral competition intensified the communal divide was 
sharpened in many UP towns. It was in the trading centres of north India that 
assertive Hindu revivalism developed most strongly and was brought into 
national politics by the Hindu Mahasabha from the first decades of the 20th 
century onwards.
1.2.3 The birth o f Hindu nationalism
The 1920s saw a renewed cycle of Hindu-Muslim violence, especially in north 
India. Among many triggering events during the 1920s, the Khilafat? most 
powerfully prompted the process of Hindu identity-building. Hindu nationalists 
began to construct a concept of Hinduism in a more organised and articulate 
form. A militant Hindu discourse emerged to consolidate Hindu culture and 
strength in order to cope with the challenges of modernity. The publication in 
1923 of Hindutva: Who is a Hindu? by V. P. Savarkar, a Maharashtrian 
Brahmin, set the ideological foundation of much Hindu nationalism in India. 
Savarkar constructed ideas of Hindutva (Hinduness), based on a perceived 
sense of Hindu (temporary) ‘inferiority’ and vulnerability vis-a-vis Muslims. 
Hindu vulnerability was conceived to be derived from the internal division of the 
Hindu community by caste and as a result of ideas of non-violence. For their
9 Eminent Muslim leaders launched the Khilafat movements to restore the Caliphate, the Sultan 
of Turkey, and to preserve his religious authority. The Muslims pressured the British, who were 
taking the leading role in the peace negotiations following the First World War settlement in 
1920. The movement ceased after the sudden abolition of the Caliphate by the Turkish National 
Assembly in 1924.
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part, the Muslims exemplified religious strength through extra-territorial 
loyalties of the kind most powerfully shown during the Khilafat.10 Savarkar 
defined India as a Hindu nation and refused to accept the existence of an Other 
within the eternal socio-cultural territory of India. According to his Hindutva 
ideology Muslims were alien to India, since their religious precepts were 
developed outside South Asia. Muslims and other minorities could expect to 
become Indian citizens only through assimilation into Hindu culture and under 
Hindu tutelage (Jaffrelot 1996 (1993): 16-29).
The RSS was founded in Nagpur by Dr. Keshav Baliram Hedgewar in 1925 as a 
catalyst for Savarkar’s concept of Hindutva. It incorporated a tradition of 
muscular and spiritual training for Hindu youth in order to create the ‘new 
man’, a selfless patriot who would play a leadership role in promoting the 
progressive re-organisation of the Hindu community. The RSS sponsored a 
wide range of activities, including the organisation of country-wide Hindu 
networks, the rescue of Hindus in communal strife and reconversion from 
‘forced conversion’ to Islam (Hansen 1999: 93,248 615).
The Partition of India in 1947 increased the pronounced hostility of Right-wing 
Hindus towards Muslims. The RSS regarded Partition as the result of mistaken 
soft treatment of Muslims, notably by Gandhi but also by Nehru. The 
organisation was allegedly involved in the assassination of Gandhi in 1948 and
10 Ambedkar concedes that Pan-Islamism lead[s] every Mussalman in India to say that he is a
Muslim first and Indian afterwards. It is this sentiment which explains why the Indian Muslim 
has taken so small a part in the advancement of India but has spent himself to exhaustion by 
taking up the cause of Muslim countries’. He asserts that between 1912 and 1922 during the
Khilafat ‘Muslims did not bother about Indian politics in the least’ (Ambedkar 1941: 297).
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was banned for a short time in response to this allegation. After the ban was 
lifted, the RSS began creating semi-autonomous affiliates to develop its image 
and overcome public criticism. These are referred to as the ‘sons’ (Sangh 
Parivar) of the RSS, the ‘mother’ organisation. The most important branch of 
the Sangh Parivar was for a while the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) founded in 
1964. The VHP continues a mission begun in the 1920s to produce a ‘Hindu 
nation’ by consolidating ‘Hindu society’ and various Hindu organisations and by 
establishing a global Hindu network. Its activities include reconversion and 
teaching Sanskrit to the poor. The VHP is a transnational and overtly political 
organisation, pursuing and embodying an aggressive Hinduism that surpasses 
even that of the Arya Samaj (ibid. 107). It came to play a critical role in the 
disputes around the temple/mosque in Ayodhya in the 1980s and 1990s.
1.2.4 Endgames o f empire and the partition o f India
The Muslim League first appeared in 1906 as an antithesis to the Congress, 
which sought to represent all Indians as belonging to one nation. Initially, 
however, the League’s political position was not necessarily developed in 
opposition to Congress, as it sought to advance Muslim interests within the 
framework of a single nation and a multicultural polity. Nevertheless, periods 
of co-operation between the League and the INC were limited — peaking 
perhaps in the defence of the Caliphate — and were not much observed after the 
mid-i920s. The political distance between the two parties grew steadily amid
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rising communal tension and as the Hindu Mahasabha gained a stronger 
position within the Congress Party (Sarkar 2001 (1983): 235-237,356-357).11
After the overwhelming victory of the INC in the 1937 Provincial elections, the 
Muslim League, now led by Mohammad Jinnah, constructed itself afresh as an 
all-India political force against Congress and went on to win an impressive 
victory in the elections in 1946. The League fought the election on the sole basis 
of ‘Pakistan’. This victory set the electoral basis for the partition of British India 
in 1947 into the independent states of India and Pakistan. When Jinnah claimed 
to realise that the Congress Party was not in a strong position to safeguard 
Muslim interests under a proposed federal scheme that had been taking shape 
from the mid-i930s, and observed that no settlement regarding power-sharing 
was possible, the partition of India became inevitable. The 1946 election 
strikingly revealed the prevalence of intensive communal voting that appeared 
to go beyond the sole effect of the logic of separate electorates (ibid. 427). The 
election reflected the depth of communal feelings at a popular level. This soon 
manifested itself in inflamed levels of communal violence that quickly spread 
over a wide area, starting with the Great Calcutta Killing in August 1946.
The Partition riots in 1946-1947 probably killed almost a million people on both 
sides of the divided territories (Butalia 1998: 3). The phenomenal scale of
11 In 1928-1929, for example, the Congress lost its last chance to abolish the Muslim separate
electorates, a compromise offered by Jinnah. It made, instead, a number of concessions to the
aggressive communal views of the Hindu Mahasabha in drafting the Nehru report (Hasan 1979: 
267). In return, Jinnah revived his demand for separate electorates in his famous Fourteen
Points. The breakdown of negotiations over the abandonment of the separate electorate was a 
‘milestone along the way to the partition of India’ (Hardy 1972: 213).
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communal killing and a mass exodus of people12 marked the discontinuity of 
Muslim existence in India and the birth of a new Muslim community in the new 
independent India. Mere figures are unable to express the depth and extent of 
the impact of this extraordinary human tragedy on the new nation, its people 
and society. The horrors of Partition have become part of a submerged 
collective memory of the Indian nation and ‘an unwritten epic’ of South Asia 
(Nandy 2001: 99).
1.2.5 Hindu nationalism and the politics o f communalism in post­
colonial India
After Independence Indian Muslims faced a substantially different political 
situation, not to mention living reality, as a national minority grouping. They 
had lost the great Muslim populations which had formed majorities in West 
Punjab and East Bengal, and became a much smaller and politically weaker 
constituency within India. They also lost their privileged minority position in 
the earlier representative system, marked as it was by a separate electorate and 
reserved seats. They were now organised into the general electorate for the first 
time under a universal franchise. The large majority of Muslims were illiterate 
and underprivileged. The All-India Muslim League, which had led the way to 
the creation of a new Muslim country, disappeared from the political scene in
12 One figure says that 12 million people crossed the border in the three months between August 
and November 1947 (Butalia 1998: 76).
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north India.^ So did much of the prominent Muslim leadership — its ‘modern’ 
leaders — in the large-scale exodus to Pakistan. Had they remained in India, 
laments Mushirul Hasan, leaders of that calibre would have been able to lead the 
masses in a much better way, and would have encouraged modern education 
and other necessary social reforms (Hasan 1997: 186-195). The leaders who 
remained in India were ‘far smaller men’ than those who took the ‘mantle’ of 
leaders in the Pakistan movement (Noorani 2003:1). Indian Muslims, in other 
words, were dramatically reduced to a leaderless and economically and socially 
fragmented community whose security was constantly threatened by Hindu 
resentment about the founding of Pakistan. Rather ironically, most Muslims 
now had to look to the Congress Party for economic advancement and social 
protection.
The Congress party leadership, especially Jawaharlal Nehru, made great efforts 
to overcome communalism by promoting a modernising project based on liberal 
democracy and secularism. The leadership believed that the state and economic 
development would work to eliminate traditional identities of caste, religion and 
ethnicity. By the 1970s, however, it was clear that the expected erosion of these 
identities was not taking place. Instead, religion, ethnicity and caste remained 
essential to the working of India’s modern political system. John Zavos has 
shown that the British colonial state was preoccupied with religion, believing it 
to be the ‘motor force of Indian civilisation and social relations’ (Zavos 2000:
*3 The former politicians in the Muslim League who remained in India were politically divided 
among themselves and had no political organisation. The politicians of the Muslim League were 
discredited by their past associations and had lost motivation after the establishment of 
Pakistan. Even on issues of Muslim minority rights in India, many of these former political 
leaders sided with the Congress after Partition (Austin 1966: 9 6134).
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36). As a result, the British elevated religion as the legitimate ground for the 
representation of political interests of Indian subjects. Zavos’ observation on the 
mobilising power of religion in Indian politics proved to be the case after 
Independence. The ascribed identities of ethnicity, religion and caste all turned 
out to be useful tools for mobilising social groups, particularly the 
underprivileged classes to participate in Indian political life through political 
parties. ‘Identity politics’ remains essential in India’s modern electoral politics 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 1967: 24).
Based on the main ‘lesson’ of Partition — that communalism would ‘kill’ the new 
country — India adopted a constitution that defined it in practice as a secular 
republic. The Constitution of 1950 was a realisation of a nationalist conception 
of India that embraces all religious, ethnic and linguistic identities under one 
overarching Indian national identity. The Constitution uniquely underlines the 
importance of religious faith among the Indian population, as well as the claims 
of religious minorities, by according all religions equal status and recognition. It 
seeks to achieve unity amidst many religions by granting all individuals equal 
citizenship. Based on these premises, every citizen is expected to participate in a 
plural political democracy based on a secular identity as an Indian.
The Indian Constitution does not advocate secularism in order to separate
religion from the state in the strictest of senses. The contradiction in India’s
concept of secularism lies in the fact that the Constitution guarantees equal
citizenship and justice to all individuals, and at the same time grants collective
rights to cultural groups in charge of their own personal law (Rudolph and
Rudolph 1987:40). There have been many instances of state involvement in the
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affairs of religious establishments since 1950. Most notably, the Hindu Code Bill 
of 1955 attempted to reform some (allegedly) pre-modem Hindu practices such 
as polygamy according to religious norms and to ‘secularise the public domain of 
personal law’ (Chatteijee 1995: 25). However, this effort at reform was not 
applied as strongly to other religious groups, including Muslims, prompting 
Hindu nationalists to lay the charge of government-sponsored ‘pseudo- 
secularism’ (or ‘pampering’ of the Muslim minority).
1.2.6 Hindu nationalism in the 1980s
The issue of a uniform code vs. the Personal Law of religious/cultural 
communities was revived most aggressively at the time of the Shah Bano affair 
in 1985. The Supreme Court’s historic verdict concerning maintenance 
payments to a Muslim divorcee suggested that Indian civil law should override 
Muslim Personal Law, but this ruling was overturned by the government of Rajiv 
Gandhi as it strove to pass the Muslim Women’s (Protection of Rights on 
Divorce) Bill in May 1987. At this time, Rajiv Gandhi was keen to court the 
Muslim vote. Both verdicts touched the very sensitive area of Muslim cultural 
rights. The Shah Bano affair provoked an unprecedented scale of protests among 
Muslims who viewed the Court’s judgement as a violation of their cultural 
rights,^ while the Women’s Bill outraged the Hindu Right wing on the grounds 
that India’s secular policy was weak and only good for communally-biased 
‘minority appeasement.’
h In Bihar, for example, 400,000 people gathered for the protest, while Bombay saw a rally of 
300,000 people gathering for the Muslim cause (Engineer 1987c: 36).
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Hindutva rhetoric is based on a clever semantic reversal. It has challenged 
Nehru-style secularism (which in practice had come to offer some special 
protection to Islam and Muslim Indians) by recourse to the same underlying 
discourses of equality and fair representation, but this time in order to justify its 
logic of Hindu majoritarism (Morey and Tickell 2005: xviii). The Shah Bano 
affair reminded some Muslim scholars of the Khilafat movements in the 1920s, 
in that it demonstrated the mobilising power of religious symbols (Hasan 1989). 
For militant Hindus, however, the Shah Bano affair helped the BJP to use 
communalist ideas in its election campaign, for which they were magnified and 
sharpened, and were linked particularly to the agitation around the mosque in 
Ayodhya from 1986 onwards. Muslim politicians and religious leaders 
responded equally aggressively to the Hindu plan to destroy the Babri mosque, 
built by the first Mughal ruler, Babur in the 16th centuiy. The politics of religious 
identity, promoted by Tilak nearly a centuiy before, returned to the political 
arena now in very aggressive forms.
The RSS, and the broader collective of the Sangh Parivar, which also comprised 
the BJP, VHP, Bajrang Dal (the VHP youth organisation) and the Hindu 
Mahasabha, orchestrated a temple agitation campaign. The campaign drew on 
an earlier round of religious processions which had mobilised one version of 
Hinduism (or a Hindu imaginary strongly indebted to the iconography of Lord 
Rama) across the length and breadth of India. It aimed to arouse a renewed 
sense of Hindu religious unity as the basis of a new/old political community 
(van der Veer 1987; Jafffelot 1996 (1993): 360).
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State-controlled television broadcast an 18-month-long series on the 
Ramayana, the epic of Lord Rariia, which penetrated the eveiy day life of a mass 
public. The programme depicted a simplified version of a militant and virtuous 
Rama avenging India CBharat) against the alien Other (Manuel 1996: 130). 
Hindu nationalist ideology thus permeated not only Indian politics and religion 
but also the much broader field of the media and popular culture; it acquired a 
normality and acceptability that it had not been accorded before (Hansen 1999). 
The BJP expanded and came of age amid a series of well-organised campaigns 
that sought to appropriate and reinterpret Rama-related imaginary. After it was 
born as a reincarnation of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh in 1980, the BJP won only 
two seats in the Lok Sabha in the 1984 elections. However, within seven years it 
became the second largest political party in India in the 1991 General Elections. 
This was a dramatic rise considering that in preceding decades no Hindu 
nationalist party, particularly the Jana Sangh in north India, had been able to 
become a significant national political force. This was partly because the 
majority of Hindus did not share the Party’s convictions, but also because of 
what Bruce Graham calls, ‘the essential bond’ between Hindus and the Congress 
Party (Graham 1990: 255-256).
During the 1980s communal ideology played increasingly strongly within Indian
politics and was associated once again with rising levels of inter-community
antagonism and acts of violence. But how do we explain the sudden and
dramatic rise of the Hindu Rightist party, the BJP, within such a short period of
time? Communal violence does not appear much in the official records of the
1950s and 1960s. Scholars in general credit the ability of the Congress Party,
whose secular and centrist stance was said to provide a stabilising effect on the
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new democracy. Myron Weiner notes, for example, that the Party was good at 
incorporating new groups and elites into its organisation, accommodating 
diverse groups and interests in order to manage political conflict (Weiner 1987: 
21).
From the mid-1960s, however, suspicion about Muslims’ loyalty to India revived 
in reaction to a series of events in Kashmir that resulted in the Indo-Pak War in 
1965 (Puri 1993; Pandey 1999). Hindu communalism, led by the RSS and its 
political associate, the Jana Sangh, was resurgent in the susceptible ground of 
nationalist feelings amid India’s war efforts. Communalism began taking a toll 
of lives and property in various parts of the country. The worst came in the 1969 
violence in Ahmedabad, when more than 1,000 people were killed amidst 
turmoil caused in part by the split in the Congress Party. ^
Death and destruction of property started to increase again after 1969. The 
1970s were relatively calm with regard to communal relations, although the 
authoritarian Emergency regime set up by Indira Gandhi was destabilising 
enough to shake the basis of the Indian polity, and some serious communal 
conflict did occur during this period. The sterilisation policy for birth control, 
the most notorious policy of the regime, alienated most Muslims from the 
Congress Party. Indeed, the policy helped to decisively alter the historical 
relationship nurtured between Congress and the Muslims. From the end of the 
1970s, the state forces’ anti-Muslim partisanship, particularly those of the 
Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC), became increasingly a prominent
The majority of victims were Muslim (Shah 1991 (1984): 191).
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phenomenon, one first seen in communal violence in Varanasi in 1977, in 
Aligarh and Biharshariff in 1978 and again in Jamshedpur in 1979. These events 
were followed by the unprecedented scale of the PAC firing upon Muslims in 
Moradabad in September 1980.16 A similar scene was repeated twice in Meerut 
in 1982 and to a much larger extent in 1987 (see Chapter 3).
The 1980s were marked by a dramatic rise in the level of communal strife in 
north India. The death toll of the decade was quadruple that of the 1970s, rising 
to more than 7,000 ahead of the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya 
(Ludden 1996:16). Varshney points out that after the mid-late 1970s there was 
a clear rising curve of Hindu-Muslim violence, peaking in 1992 at the all-India 
level. The temple agitation provoked a much larger number of incidents, both 
rural and urban, than in previous years (Varshney 2002: 95-96). It is worth 
recalling that at Independence the Congress leadership sought to build a new 
nation by embracing its enormous religious and cultural heterogeneity through 
the promotion of universal citizenship rights, democracy and equality. Indian 
politics in the 1980s, however, seemed to exemplify the exact opposite, with 
rising religious and cultural chauvinism and aggressive attacks on religious 
minorities, as well as growing intolerance among a large section of the Indian 
middle-class.
16 The famous ‘pig riot’ began when a pig wandered around the mosque during the Muslims’ Id 
prayer. An altercation between the attending policemen and Muslims developed into the police 
firing in the closed mosque. It killed over 50 Muslim worshippers on the spot. The PAC was also 
accused of participating in looting, burning shops and killing civilians during the incident 
(Hasan and Saberwal 1991 (1984): 209-227).
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Atul Kohli has offered one well-known explanation for the rise of social conflict 
in the 1980s. Kohli maintains that the political system in India changed in the 
1970s and 1980s because of the collapse of a hitherto strong ‘Congress system’. 
The Congress, a mainly centrist and secular party under Jawaharlal Nehru, had 
for two decades followed inclusive and encompassing policies in order to attract 
and hold a strong support base made up of diverse social groups from the 
extremes of the social order. Its main supporters were composed on the one 
hand of elite, land-controlling castes at the top (often Brahmins and other 
Forward castes), and on the other hand of impoverished and disadvantaged low 
caste groups, including the ex-untouchables and Muslims. The Congress system 
relied on the power of local elites who organised votes for the Party in exchange 
for patronage. This meant that the Congress Party had to reflect the interests of 
local elites in state policies, and the Party had limited control over the extent and 
pace of change in the local power structures. According to Kohli, these pillars of 
the Congress system worked in the 1950s and early-i96os but had all but 
collapsed by the 1980s. The Congress Party could no longer accommodate and 
manage the diverse interests that made up its constituency, especially with the 
lower castes and classes increasingly asserting themselves amid a successful 
democratic expansion. The organisation of the Congress Party was further 
weakened when Indira Gandhi adopted a more personalised form of rule. The 
authority pattern of the Party changed so much that it lost its capacities for 
conflict resolution or for responding to the growing discontent of large sections 
of civil society (Kohli 1990).
Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss suggest that the failure of the Congress
system lay at root in the many contradictions of Nehru’s modernising project. In
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some senses this was a narrow elite project that failed to engage India’s masses, 
and into which resulting vacuum strode the forces of Hindutva (Corbridge and 
Harriss 2000). The ideological gap between the elite project and the Indian 
population had steadily widened as Nehru’s proposed project of socialist 
economic planning, development and poverty alleviation ran out of steam after 
the Third Five Year Plan period (1961-66). The weakness of the Nehruvian 
model was aggravated rather than strengthened by his successor, Indira Gandhi. 
The 1971 General Elections, which brought Gandhi an overwhelming victory 
after the ‘liberation’ of Bangladesh, not only legitimised her political position in 
the Congress Party vis-a-vis her rivals, but also encouraged her to continue her 
populist strategy for responding to competing mass demands amid increasing 
resource scarcity. Indira Gandhi later sought to remain in power by making 
empty populist promises rather than by reforming the system of governance or 
the economy. Congress increasingly relied on the Nehru family reputation. The 
social discontent generated by unfulfilled expectations meant that Indira Gandhi 
finally had to resort to the authoritarian Emergency regime to control the crisis 
from 1975 to 1977. Weak and fragmented opposition parties also accelerated 
this systemic crisis, which led on from the Emergency to the troubling decade of 
the 1980s (Brass 1994 (1990): 75).
New forms of communalism in the 1980s arose in the midst of a struggle to 
reconstruct the Indian polity as new groups joined the competition for power. 
Thomas Blom Hansen (1999) sees this as a time when majoritarian Hindu 
activism gave voice to deeply held grievances against the state and the Congress 
Party among a frustrated Hindu middle class. The ruling Congress Party under 
Rajiv Gandhi in the 1980s failed to produce a coherent ideology of rule. Rather,
25
the Party operated in an opportunistic and incoherent manner, exploiting for a 
while the absence of a strong opposition. The Congress Party under Rajiv 
Gandhi increasingly abandoned its ‘traditionally* secular outlook in favour of the 
sort of communal idioms that Indira Gandhi had misused during the crisis in 
Punjab. The Party created a series of historical milestones as it set about 
politicising religious identity, with its populist techniques oscillating oddly 
between pro-Hindu and pro-Muslim policies. Among them, the Shah Bano 
verdict, and the unlocking of the Babri Masjid in 1986 for Hindu worshippers, 
gave critical impetus to Hindu fundamentalist organisations, including the VHP, 
and set the political scene for further fragmentation. In place of a weakened 
Congress Party, the BJP emerged as a solid competitor, courting tens of millions 
of popular votes and making itself into a powerful social and political movement.
In August 1990, the National Front coalition government led by V.P. Singh 
decided to act on several key recommendation of the Report of the Second 
Backward Classes Commission (generally known as the Mandal Report, 
commissioned in the late-i970s and later ignored by Indira Gandhi’s 
government when it was completed in 1980) by allocating new quotas in 
government jobs and education for the Other Backward Castes (OBCs). This 
caused a storm of protest among those urban upper castes whose dominating 
position now came to be threatened — and whose antipathy to the rise of 
subaltern castes the Hindu Right sought to exploit by forging a sense of Hindu 
unity against non-Hindus (especially Muslims).
It was against this background that the VHP and BJP decided to begin a
campaign for the construction of a Ram temple in Ayodhya on 30 October 1990,
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and for this purpose they organised another procession to cany bricks to the 
temple site. From this period until the General Elections in May 1991 the 
country was almost torn apart by social disorder. Indian politics began to 
polarise around the mandir (temple) versus Mandal issues, and the country was 
convulsed with both inter-caste (anti-Mandal) and communal (anti-mandir) 
violence. The pilgrimage procession with bricks started in August 1990 with an 
appeal by BJP President L.K. Advani for Hindu unity and later covered 10,000 
kilometres before reaching the proposed construction site in Ayodhya. As a 
result of numerous communal clashes on its way the pilgrimage largely 
succeeded in polarising Indian politics on communal rather than caste-class 
lines (Rudolph and Rudolph 1993).
The destruction of the Babri mosque on 6-7 December 1992 was achieved by
VHP kar sevaks (volunteers), who were more or less given a free hand by the
BJP chief minister of UP, Kalyan Singh, to raze the mosque to the ground. A
frenzied Hindu mob also set out to destroy Muslim houses in Ayodhya and
damaged 23 mosques and Islamic educational institutions (madrasahs and
mazars) in the town, in the process killing more than a dozen Muslims (Nandy
et al. 1995: 197-198). All of these assaults took place in the sight of fully
equipped paramilitary forces that were present at every strategic point,
including the entrance to the ‘disputed structure’. As many as 195 companies
had been drawn from different states by the central government at the discretion
of the UP state government out of concern for the security of the mosque.
However, these companies were not utilised by the state government when the
assault began (Government of India 1993: 27). Indeed, the UP Chief Minister
prevented central government troops from moving in until the demolition of the
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mosque was complete. The Congress government at the centre also delayed 
responding to the ongoing destruction. The event was a triumphant act of 
Hindu militancy against both Islam and Indian secularism.
The destruction plunged large parts of India into an orgy of retaliatory ethnic 
violence. It spread quickly to affect as many as 15 states of the country.^ More 
than 2,500 people were killed, 95 percent in urban areas (Mathur 1994: 350). 
The destruction also had an international impact, affecting neighbouring 
Pakistan and Bangladesh, Iran, the United Kingdom and Nepal. It resulted in a 
spate of attacks on Hindu establishments and property and angry 
demonstrations by the Muslim populations of these countries. Both Hindu and 
Muslim religious organisations were banned immediately after the event in 
India, including the VHP, RSS and Bajrang Dal. President’s rule was imposed in 
Rajasthan, Himachal Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh on 15 December 1992.
1.3 The Causes and Geography of Communal Violence
As we have seen, Partition made Indian Muslims much more vulnerable than 
they had been in the colonial period. They were deprived of national-level 
leadership, their political party and strong Muslim majority states. The security 
of the Muslim minority was now greatly dependent on the Congress Party and 
its political hegemony. Accordingly, Muslim voters were co-opted under the 
Congress Party system. This mode of political integration had considerable
17 By 7th December violence had already spread in UP, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, 
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Punjab, Bihar, West Bengal and Delhi (ibid. 33).
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implications for the social and political organisation of Muslims at ground level. 
The political integration promised in the Constitution — based on equal rights 
under a ‘secular’ identity — turned out to be a far cry from the political reality 
surrounding many ordinary Indian Muslims. In particular, weak Muslim 
leaders were not able to voice the grievances of an impoverished community. 
They were treated as little more than a ‘symbol of minority participation’ in 
politics in order to prove the Congress Party’s ‘secular impartiality’ (Wright Jr. 
1966:110-131; Shakir 1980; Graff 1987,1992).
As a result, Muslims were constituted largely as passive agents in the process of 
political contestation. Further, they were discriminated against in educational 
opportunities, quotas for government jobs, representation in central and state 
governments and in police and army recruitment systems (Hasan 1988).18 
Muslims have continuously been the victims of ethnic violence since the early 
1960s, when a new wave of communal violence began after Independence. 
Unsurprisingly, there had been growing dissent among Muslims against the 
Congress Party (Hasan 1988; Puri 1993: 2142-2143). Yet although it was not 
ideal, Congress hegemony limited the extent of communal violence toward 
Muslims more in the 1960s and 1970s than it did in the 1980s, when the Party 
started to decline in stature and standing.
During the time when the Congress Party maintained its one-party dominance, 
its secular ideology and centrist position were mainly strong enough to contain 
Hindu nationalist forces such as the Jana Sangh or the Hindu Mahasabha. As
18 ‘Sachar Committee Report’, The Hindu, 8 December 2006 (The Hindu (New Delhi)).
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Bruce Graham notes in his study of the Jana Sangh in north India, the Congress 
Party maintained an iron grip on the majority of Hindus, relegating the Jana 
Sangh to the background of the mainstream political scene (Graham 1999:225). 
Violence towards Muslims accelerated, however, with the decline of the 
Congress Party in the 1980s and 1990s, and with the growth of the BJP, a 
reincarnation from 1980 of the Jana Sangh. This in turn reminded some 
Muslims of how the Congress Party had failed to protect many of them (to put it 
mildly) during the Emergency years.
In the second part of this dissertation I examine how India’s Muslim
communities, and especially some parts of Meerut’s Muslim community, have
become active agents in their own political empowerment — and protection —
during the eras of coalition and subaltern politics that took fuller shape
nationally from circa 1989. Before I turn to this task, however, I need to not
only describe the location of Muslim households and political development in
Uttar Pradesh and Meerut up to c.1987-91 (my task in Chapters 2 and 3,
focusing especially on the anti-Muslim violence that shook Meerut of April-May
1987), but also to put in place a review of an emerging academic literature on the
causes and geography of communal violence in post-1980 India. I do this below
less in general terms than by means of a close analysis of the work of a small
number of key authors in the field of political science — namely, Paul Brass,
Steven Wilkinson and Ashutosh Varshney. I focus mainly on these three authors
since this dissertation is guided by and built on the questions raised by their
work. I also briefly review works of Asghar Ali Engineer and Veena Das as this
dissertation is methodologically guided by their approach, based mainly on
empirical data and ethnographic explorations. Das’ anthropological approaches
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are particularly relevant as they are often centred around the effects of violence 
on victims rather than the causes of violence, which I try to follow in this 
dissertation.
1.3.1 Political and socio-economic approach
It is important to note the numerous contributions of Asghar Ali Engineer to our 
understanding of ethnic violence in India, even if this corpus of work tends to 
have been overshadowed of late by debates between Varshney, Brass and 
Wilkinson. Engineer has been a prolific and long-term researcher on Hindu- 
Muslim relations and communal violence in India. His numerous reports on 
incidents of communal violence are regularly published in the journal Economic 
and Political Weekly, and are based on his own analysis of broader political 
developments in the country as well as on ethnographic evidence which is placed 
within specific historical contexts. Engineer’s observations are usually based on 
fieldwork conducted immediately after the relevant incident. His contribution 
to our understanding of communal violence is derived in part from his 
considerable knowledge of the social fabric of the ‘local’, by which I mean the 
economic/industrial and power structure, intricate networks within and 
between localities, as well as small incidents that indicate personal animosities 
among families, castes and communities.
Although Engineer’s analysis places emphasis on the role of politicians at local, 
state and national levels, and the mainly political motives behind incidents of 
violence, he also points out the importance of socio-economic factors at any
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given site of violence (Engineer 1991 (1984): 2 9 5 ) . In his analysis of the 
Bombay-Bhiwandi riots of May 1984, for example, Engineer first places the 
event in a broader context of political change.20 The Congress Party was then in 
the process of abandoning minorities as it sought instead to win the support of 
the middle and backward Hindu castes. The ruling Congress and the state 
government consequently positioned themselves as being silent spectators in the 
face of the mounting militancy of Shiv Sena, largely because they had come to 
believe that they could not afford to alienate the Marathas. But Engineer also 
draws attention to growing economic prosperity among local Muslim weavers, 
who were largely migrants from Uttar Pradesh. Many of those weavers had 
come to own powerloom factories and had become increasingly visible in the 
town’s economic life. In addition, coming from the lower ranks, many Muslim 
weavers appeared to be religiously conservative. They spent a large proportion 
of their acquired capital on religious rituals, a fact exploited by Hindu communal 
organisations like the Shiv Sena to paint Muslim weavers as religiously 
aggressive and fundamentalist. Powerloom factories owned by UP Muslims 
were among the main targets of destruction during the violence that Engineer 
describes (Engineer 1984).
Engineer’s main causal variables are tested by Wilkinson in his regression analysis, as 
discussed below.
20 Bombay-Bhiwandi riots first took place in Bhiwandi, the centre of the powerloom weaving 
industry in Maharashtra, from 17 to 27 May 1984, and then spread into other environs including 
Bombay. The incident killed between 258 and 500 people and left more than 50,000 homeless. 
The gap in the number of casualties came from a number of the people who were missing 
(Engineer 1984).
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Engineer is one of a small number of Muslim academics and writers who have 
provided powerful insights into the nature of Muslim leadership, Muslim 
‘communalism’, and the acute socio-economic problems shared by large 
numbers of Muslim households. Emphasising as he does both the economic and 
political mainsprings of ethnic violence, Engineer’s work has partly laid the 
ground for the more openly theoretical arguments of scholars who have followed 
in his wake, including Steven Wilkinson and Paul Brass.
1.3.2 Electoral incentives for ethnic violence
Wilkinson’s major contribution, like that of Ashutosh Varshney (with whom he 
shares a large database which he and Varshney constructed together), has 
arguably been to explain both violence and the absence of violence, in his case 
with reference to the electoral calculations of the ruling party of a state, or the 
party that controls the police. Wilkinson (2004) suggests that electoral 
competition among political parties is the most important variable in explaining 
ethnic violence both at state and town levels. He notes that ‘...the fact that peace 
at the local level is often the norm when larger theories of ethnic conflict might 
predict violence alerts us to the weakness of many of the general explanations’ 
for ethnic violence (Wilkinson 1995: 27).
Wilkinson contends that scholars commonly tend to think that every socio­
economic characteristic shared by riot-affected towns — such as Moradabad, 
Aligarh, Meerut and Ahmedabad — is equally important in other towns and thus 
‘causes’ ethnic riots (Wilkinson 1995; 2004:37). Wilkinson’s main criticism of
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most existing explanations of Hindu-Muslim violence in India is then, firstly, 
that scholars have tested the importance of socio-economic variables in a single 
or, at best, a few cases, which he calls ‘an unrepresentative sample’ (Wilkinson 
2004:37), rather than by means of a sample of all towns. Secondly, he suggests 
there is a methodological fraud where existing studies lack structured 
comparisons of both peaceful and violent towns. Towns with the same socio­
economic characteristics that have generally been peaceful have too often been 
ignored (ibid. 37).
For his part, Wilkinson uses a data set composed of monthly observations of 
violence/non-violence regressed against other variables for the period from 1970 
to 1995 for 167 towns and cities in UP with populations of 20,000 or more. The 
total number of observations in his data-set amounts to around 40,000 (ibid. 
37). The socio-economic variables that Wilkinson considers as possible 
predictors of Hindu-Muslim violence (or riots) include economic competition in 
the ethnic division of labour between Hindus and Muslims, the demographic 
balance, the presence of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Pakistan to India, and 
previous violence in a town.21 According to his tests, most of these variables are 
statistically not significant except for demographic balance and past violence. 
The electoral competition variables that he tests for, on the other hand, are 
highly significant. Wilkinson maintains that the likelihood of violence increases 
sharply as elections approach (ibid. Chapter 2). Town-level electoral 
competition among political elites and parties aiming to represent the same 
ethnic group encourages politicians to mobilise target voters by using ‘ethnic
21 Meerut satisfies all these variables.
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wedge issues’ to increase the salience of ethnic identity (ibid. 23). Anti-Muslim 
mobilisations thus might make use of accusations of cow slaughter, with Hindu 
reactions often leading to violent exchanges between the two communities.
Wilkinson’s main argument, however, is that it is the electoral calculations of the 
state government which most clearly determines whether riots occur. If the 
state government is dominated by politicians or parties sympathetic to Hindus, 
violence will most likely be tolerated and riot control action delayed, resulting in 
grave consequences and large Muslim death tolls. On the other hand, if the 
overall electoral system in a state is sufficiently competitive that coalitions with 
minority-supported parties are required there is a high possibility that the state 
government will intervene to stop or prevent precipitating events.
Since the decline of the Congress Party after c. 1989 there have been increased 
numbers of political parties in the electoral contests of most north Indian states. 
Electoral competition intensifies with the growth of the effective number of 
parties contesting the election. This situation should significantly increase the 
importance of Muslim minority votes.22 Accordingly the ruling political party
22 Wilkinson lists three reasons why Muslim, and not Hindu, votes become pivotal after the 
emergence of a multi-party system. Firstly, the rise of the lower and middle-caste parties 
augmented the salience of the intra-ethnic cleavages among the majority community. These 
parties are keen to seek minority support, rather than that of their own ethnic group, with which 
they are in competition for scarce resources. Secondly, Muslims’ demands in exchange of their 
votes focus on security, which is relatively inexpensive for political parties. Wilkinson concedes 
that Muslims make fewer demands in general on other political issues, such as government 
employment, than most of the main Hindu majority electorates, partially because of their 
relative economic and educational backwardness. Thirdly, security is not too costly to provide 
and does not pose threat to the majority’s own sense of physical security, as Muslims are the
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must negotiate or form coalitions with minority supported parties, regardless of 
the party’s own ideological preferences. The best hope for minorities wanting to 
be protected from violence, Wilkinson maintains, is for there to be three or more 
parties in a state electoral competition where minorities are perceived to be key 
marginal voters (ibid. 138). Wilkinson’s model suggests that a shift from two- 
party to eight-party elections is associated with a decline in the predicted 
number of episodes of ethnic violence per month from 0.07 to 0.01 (ibid. 152).23 
On the other hand, a more dangerous situation for minorities is where there is 
bipolar fractionalisation of parties in a state, in which only fewer than 3.5 
effective parties are in real electoral competition. The anti-Muslim violence in 
1987 in Meerut seems to offer an example of this. This incident took place when 
the ruling Congress and the rising BJP were in sharp competition for Hindu 
swing votes, with both parties striving to establish their credentials as a ‘Hindu’ 
party, or at least as a party mainly for Hindus.
Wilkinson also challenges the consociational thesis of Arend Lijphart (1977), 
who has suggested that a power-sharing mechanism was in place during the 
years of Congress rule from 1947-1966 which helped to maintain low levels of 
ethnic violence. Lijphart explains higher levels of ethnic violence after this 
period, particularly in the 1980s and 1990s mainly with reference to the decline 
of a Congress governing system that fostered power-sharing with minorities. 
Wilkinson suggests that Lijphart ‘miscoded’ the Congress system from 1947 to
demographic minority nearly everywhere with veiy limited representation in the police, 
paramilitary forces or army (ibid. 144-145).
23 As of February 2002, there were only five major states where two parties shared more than 75 
percent of the vote (fewer than 3.24 effective parties). In other major states, there are at least 
three major parties competing for power (ibid. Table 5.1.: 143).
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1966, and argues that this system did not in fact work for higher levels of 
Muslim participation in government jobs and power structures. Wilkinson 
contends that lower castes and Muslims were largely excluded from political 
power and government employment during this period. India was in fact more 
consociational during the colonial period, when consociational principles of 
minority proportional representation in politics and employment were observed 
by both central and provincial governments (ibid. 104). Wilkinson also 
maintains that, after 1967, with the Congress losing its power in many states, 
there was growing political competition for the votes of India's lower castes and 
minorities among political parties. These changes have made India’s political 
structure more ‘consociational’ as the formerly underprivileged communities 
and classes gained more access to the political sphere and government 
resources. In short, the more consociational colonial (1919-1947) and post- 
Nehru (1967-1995) periods appear to have had higher levels of ethnic violence 
than did the non-consociational period of Nehruvian rule (ibid. 127). Wilkinson 
maintains that ‘[s]ome of the states with the lowest levels of Muslim 
proportionality in the administration and cabinets [eg. West Bengal and Kerala] 
have done quite well in controlling levels of communal violence [and better than 
more ‘consociational Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh]’ (ibid. 128).
Wilkinson’s careful discussion of consociational power-sharing theory is
insightful in showing that minority proportionality in the police or the state
government (as cabinet ministers) does not always lessen — or predict
statistically — levels of ethnic violence across India’s states. His discussion
sensibly indicates that the recruitment of Muslims into the police or the
administration is not in itself an appropriate means by which to gauge the
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effective level of inclusion of Muslims in India’s political life. Wilkinson 
distinguishes between two conceptions of minority representation: on the one 
hand, ‘the tangible and narrow’ representation afforded by increased numbers of 
Muslim recruits in the police or the government, and on the other, the more 
significant matter of effective political representation that incorporates ‘the 
concerns and interests of minorities’ and which protects them against 
majoritarian violence (ibid. 134).
Wilkinson accepts that where substantial political representation is achieved by 
Muslims there might indeed be a connection between levels of minority 
proportionality in state government and levels of ethnic violence (ibid. 134). His 
model, however, falls short of explaining precisely how the substantial political 
incorporation of minorities works to reduce levels of ethnic violence and how 
this agency is made manifest.
Wilkinson’s model quite properly seeks to explain an observed diminution in
Hindu-Muslim riots in India after the mid-1990s with reference to changes in
the electoral strategy of state-level political parties as they sought to attract more
Muslim votes in a more competitive political environment. Nevertheless, there
is a tendency in his model, as in many such macro-models, to position India’s
Muslims as passive receivers of the security offered by the majority parties in
exchange for their votes. Muslims then Ibid low’ in terms of what they demand
from those parties. What Wilkinson’s model does not explain so well is how it is
that different political parties now campaign for the Muslim vote. Nor does his
model have much to say about the agency of different Muslim political
groupings in seeking to animate or exploit the changing political landscape that
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Wilkinson describes so well. Who consolidates the Muslim votes to be directed 
to a particular party? And how does this interface work in the light of Muslims’ 
own political organisation and identity?
1.3.3 Institutionalised riot systems
From a similar but perhaps rather wider perspective, Paul Brass argues that 
communal violence in India is a construction of political elites. Ethnic violence 
takes place particularly within the context of competitive electoral politics or 
intense political mobilisation. The persistence of ethnic violence is explained 
through the functional utility of historical Hindu-Muslim opposition and 
violence, which have served to fulfil the political aims of both groups, as well as 
of secular and communal political parties.
Paul Brass’s recent work (Brass 1997,2003,2006) on ethnic violence in India is 
a culmination of his long-term scholarship on Indian politics over a period of 40 
years. It is based on his longstanding view of communalism and the apparent 
historical enmity between Hindus and Muslims in north India. Brass has been a 
principal advocate of a constructivist view in studies on ethnicity, nationalism 
and conflict. He maintains that ethnicity is socially constructed. Violent conflict 
that appears to be ethnic in nature is actually the result of manipulation of 
symbols by elites for their own political or material benefit (Brass 1979,1991).24
24 For the renowned debate with Francis Robinson, see (Brass 1979) and (Robinson 1979). 
Brass’ ‘constructivist’ position is challenged by Robinson’s ‘primordialist’ view of the Muslim 
mobilisation for the separatist movement in 19th century India.
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Brass views violence as a production directly involving human agency. The 
production is mainly planned and organised by what Brass calls an 
‘institutionalised riot network’. This is a network of power relations among 
politicians, the police and criminals, who all benefit from the use of force and 
v io le n c e .^  The network functions to keep Hindu-Muslim sentiment and 
antagonism alive in everyday life. When the time is right, it transforms a 
precipitating incident into full-scale ethnic violence by provoking counteraction 
from the opposing group in order to generate an exchange of aggressive 
counteractions between antagonists.26 Brass argues that neither a pre-existing 
history of communal antagonism nor the tension of immediate circumstances 
provides a satisfactory explanation for the outbreak of large-scale ethnic 
violence. The decisive factor is the pre-planned and organised actions of the 
human agency that activates the historical communal enmity. This is where 
Brass’s work adds significantly to Wilkinson’s similar but more formal thesis, 
and it is a line of approach that I hope to explore in the second half of this 
dissertation (albeit with an emphasis on Muslim agency).
Brass’ interest lies in explaining when, how and where enmity can be ‘ignited’ to 
trigger ethnic violence. Moreover, the dynamic process of the ‘production’ of 
violence involves political intention, elements of both spontaneity and planning 
and explanation or interpretation of incidents of violence after their
25 The power relations are shown in his rich ethnographies of four cases of police-public 
confrontations in UP (see Brass 1997: 58-203).
26 For this, see Brass’ analysis of the case in Kanpur (Brass 1997:204-259). Through an analysis 
of a causal sequence of a full-scale rioting, Brass indicates that engineering a reaction from one 
group and a counter-reaction by another is the key factor in producing large-scale violence (ibid. 
12).
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occurrence.2? This production mechanism for large-scale Hindu-Muslim 
violence has been institutionalised in riot-prone cities such as Aligarh and 
Meerut in western UP. Because of the long-term presence of institutionalised 
riot systems (IRS), ethnic violence has become endemic and a recurrent feature 
of life in these cities. Moreover, the presence of the IRS and those involved in it 
are well-known to the local authorities. It is ultimately a political decision at 
state level whether to prevent or to let loose the production process that leads to 
violent conflict, much as Wilkinson maintains. Brass emphasises the important 
role played by ‘agents’ and ‘specific persons, groups organisations and state 
agents who actually inaugurate and sustain riotous events’ that are not shown, 
for example, in Wilkinson’s large-N statistical model (Brass 2004: 8).
Brass explains geographic and temporal variances in violence with reference to 
the existence or absence of the IRS in specific towns, most notably with 
reference to Aligarh.28 Brass emphasises that his close and ‘refined’ approach 
offers a more finely-tuned eye on events than that of classifying an entire city as
27 Brass observes that contested interpretations of an incident appear among the actors involved. 
In the case of Kanpur, where a precipitating event — the murder of a BJP politician — did not 
evolve into a large-scale Hindu-Muslim violence, contested interpretations of the murder case 
appeared among the district authorities and the teams of the Central Bureau of Investigation 
(CB) and the state government’s Criminal Investigation Department (CID) after the incident. 
The district authorities under the Mulayam Singh Yadav government firmly denied the 
possibility that this incident was linked to the communal issue, while the CB and CID 
maintained otherwise (Brass 1997: 245).
28 In spatial terms, violent incidents are concentrated in only 29 (12 percent) of the city’s 241 
mohallas (localities) (Brass 2004: 162). In terms of time, there was no violence in Aligarh 
between November 1980 and 1990 December or in December 1992 after the Ayodhya incident. 
Also, the local administration successfully contained the precipitating event following large-scale 
violence in neighbouring Muzaffamagar in October 1988 (ibid. 104-107).
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riot-prone and seeking to compare it with other equally large units (ibid. 38).29 
This approach effectively localises the significance of the violence and enables 
the identification of underlying issues that make violent incidents endemic to a 
particular locality.3°
1.3.4 Inter-communal civic engagement
Ashutosh Varshney (2002) departs from the previous two authors in shifting 
attention from the state and elite to the role of non-state actors and mechanisms 
in civil society. Civil society, as Varshney defines it, is ‘the part of our life that 
exists between the state...and families...that allows people to come together for a 
whole variety of public activities, that [are] relatively independent of the state’. 
Civil society or ‘civic life’ is not necessarily ‘non-political,’ but it is a ‘non-state’ 
space of collective activities. Civil society therefore includes trade unions and 
political parties that are highly political, because their activities may also provide 
social platforms that bring people together (ibid. 4).
Varshney’s unit of analysis is the town level, notwithstanding that he shares a 
common dataset with Wilkinson. Like Wilkinson, Varshney notes that ethnic 
violence in India is generally an urban phenomenon, which is largely
29 In this, Brass criticises Varshney. Varshney’s paired comparison, according to Brass, blurs the 
gaze of the researcher rather than refining it, with much emphasis on non-violence (ibid. 38).
30 Use of the mohalla-level data enabled Brass to conduct an analysis of longevity, concerning the 
relationship between elections, economic factors and violence in the particular mohalla over a 
period of time.
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concentrated, he says, in only eight cities.31 Varshney argues for the importance 
of civic networks and organisations in which Hindus and Muslims can be 
brought together in daily life and share economic, cultural and social needs with 
the effect of forging inter-ethnic understanding and solidarity. This integrative 
civic structure creates a ‘bulwark’ that can withstand communal shocks from 
exogenous events, just as it undermines any attempt to promote ethnic 
polarisation. Varshney maintains that the cadre-based Congress Party and 
Gandhian popular political mobilisations in the 1920s, constructed and 
institutionalised such civic patterns in some cities more than in others. The 
movement converted the pre-existing ‘master narrative’ of the town into an 
institutionalised form of politics by introducing large numbers of mass-based 
civic organisations (ibid. 132). The master narrative comprises the pre-existing 
social structure, based either on inter-ethnic or inter-caste hierarchy and 
antagonism. Varshney also argues for the importance of economic practices on 
the ground, which in turn may (or may not) provide for ‘mass-based’ civic 
engagements in the most important industries of a city (ibid. 175-178).
Three sets of paired comparisons of violent and peaceful towns, with similar 
Hindu-Muslim population ratios and other controlled variables, are at the core 
of Varshney’s study. The first pair of study towns, Aligarh and Calicut, shows 
the stark contrast in consequences that a different master narrative can make. 
Having communalism as the dominant political narrative, Aligarh has developed 
very little integrative civic structure and hence has a fragile local mechanism for
31 These cities are Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta, Aligarh, Meerut, Hyderabad, Ahmedabad and 
Baroda. They comprise only 18 percent of the urban population and only 5 percent of the total 
population of about a billion (Varshney 2002: 91-107).
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maintaining or promoting peace.32 On the other hand, in Calicut, lower-caste 
movements and politics aiming to end caste injustice facilitated a large arena for 
lower-caste Hindus and Muslims to come together. In Varshney’s view, this 
accounts for the flourishing of inter-ethnic civic organisations in the town, and 
hence low levels of violence. The second pairing of Lucknow and Hyderabad 
again offers a neat comparison between the two master narratives. While 
Lucknow has a Muslim sectarian divide between Sunnis and Shias, Hyderabad 
has a communal divide as its master narrative. The Lucknow case also shows 
the importance of inter-ethnic economic interdependence in contributing to 
creating peace. The Hyderabad case, on the other hand, indicates the limited 
ability of inter-ethnic elite associations in the face of the larger force of 
communalism dominating its town politics.
Throughout his case studies, Varshney emphasises the importance of the mass- 
based organisation as a stronger bulwark than elite associations for communal 
peace. The last pairing, Ahmedabad and Surat, is examined across time. 
Situated in Gujarat, both cities were peaceful up to the late-i96os, both being at 
the centre of an earlier Gandhian movement for Hindu-Muslim unity, and both 
had flourishing civic organisations, including trade unions and business 
associations. Yet Ahmedabad experienced a chronic cycle of communal violence 
after 1969 while Surat only witnessed large-scale communal violence in 
December 1992, after over 60 years of enduring peace. Varshney explains both 
cases with reference to the erosion of local Congress Party organisations and the
32 Peace Committees, for example, created by both citizens and the administration are often 
intra- rather than inter-religious, based on lack of trust (Varshney 2002:124).
44
decline or collapse of civic organisations, including most notably strong labour 
unions.
Varshney’s principal contribution is his study of the absence, rather than the 
presence, of violence — and this is the cue that I try to follow here. Why did so 
many towns not experience Hindu-Muslim violence after the provocations of 
December 1992? Why did the state turn out to be effective in preventing 
potential violence in many towns at the time? If violence and non-violence are 
studied together, Varshney suggests, a different conclusion will be reached (ibid. 
286-289). Although Varshney’s explanation stresses the role of non-state 
actors, inter-ethnic civic engagement works best in ‘synergy’ with state actors. A 
biased police force or ineffective administration can work better with the ‘right 
kind of institutional pressures’ from below, that is, the kind of civic structure 
that makes the state more accountable (ibid. 296). When no such support 
exists, the ablest state officer may fail to exert effective action to stem sources of 
potential violence that include tension, rumour or provocative action by 
communal parties and elements (ibid. 123,289). Further, the political parties’ 
local attitudes, Varshney argues, will vary depending on the structure of local 
civic life. Communal parties would not dare to challenge local peace if there is a 
‘thick’ civic engagement that makes a strong support base for the local 
administration.33 Varshney’s explanations for an absence of violence thus stress 
a combination of state and non-state activities. In this ‘synergy’ of the state and 
non-state, however, Varshney emphasises the importance of the latter in forging
33 In Calicut in 1989-1992, for example, the BJP at such a critical moment of Hindu-Muslim 
confrontation did not even initiate the polarising process, although this would have been in its 
political interest, for ‘it would not like to be blamed for undermining local peace’ (ibid. 126).
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inter-ethnic civic engagements that can effectively reduce the largely (or 
otherwise) negative influence of political actors, including political parties.
Varshney’s argument ultimately has a problem of‘endogeneity’, in my view; that 
is to say, it is not clear whether peace leads to enhanced inter-ethnic civic ties 
and/or whether such ties are the independent variables that lead to peace, as 
Varshney claims. In establishing his position, Varshney needs to argue that 
violent incidents did not break inter-ethnic civic organisations, even as the 
weakening of the latter invited violence. Varshney argues that the erosion of 
Congress organisations which ‘caused’ the 1969 violence in Ahmedabad began 
much earlier than 1969 and for reasons that were nothing to do with ethnic 
violence. The causal sequence is, therefore, that the deepening fragility of civic 
organisations led to communal violence, not vice-versa (ibid. 266). Varshney’s 
explanation for this causal sequence, however, appears to be insecure, as he 
provides very little information about the kind of norms and networks the civic 
associations display or on how they facilitate interaction, negotiation and 
reconciliation between the two communities. The explanation of how, where 
and to what extent these engagements create a positive political outcome and 
contribute to peacemaking, and the workings of democracy more generally 
seems to be largely missing from these ‘social capital’-style arguments (Putzel 
1997). Further, Varshney explains very little about the interaction between civic 
organisations and local state authorities, and how synergy can be created 
between them.
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1.3*5 An anthropological approach to violence
Anthropological approaches to social violence may not offer the kind of‘causal 
analysis’ of violence attempted by Varshney or Wilkinson. Violence is rather 
analysed in local terms, and a view and understanding of the state from the 
ground up are introduced through local discourse and narratives. Veena Das 
(1990, 1996), for example, shows the pattern of violence in the uneven 
distribution of rioting in the colonies of Sikh concentration in south Delhi during 
anti-Sikh riots in Delhi in 1984. This distribution may not be satisfactorily 
explained by general theories. The dynamism of specific, ongoing local issues, 
including local power relations, must be linked to the national narrative of major 
confrontation in order for local latent conflict or ‘diffused hostilities’ to be 
translated into major violent conflict (Das 1996). Contiguity between local 
issues and the master narrative is the basis of local understanding or ‘public 
consciousness’ of the violent conflict taking place. Thus, ‘while the kind of 
violence encountered by the Sikhs...may be narrated as part of a national or 
regional history, it may also be simultaneously understood within a different 
sequence of events that have local relevance’ (Das 1990:13). Local knowledge of 
violence comprises, therefore, both national- and local-level narratives. An 
anthropological approach that emphasises the ‘local’ already implies that an 
entangled mixture of the ‘national’ and the ‘local’ sometimes leads to less or no 
violent confrontation.
Some recent anthropological literature on violence attempts to reconceptualise it
based on the analysis of society in transition following an incident of violence, or
more precisely during the transition from the moment of active killing to low-
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intensity peace. Violence is to be explained not only through past or present 
narratives of hate or politics but also through the sequence of events, changes 
and transformations that follow the incident. Fixing their gaze on suffering 
victims and communities on the ground, anthropologists have explored how 
these entities try to cope with loss, recover both physically and psychologically 
and reconstruct a community. Communities have to overcome or find solutions 
through their own understanding of the meaning of suffering in a wider context. 
Communities have to reconstruct their lives in ways that make sense in terms of 
their understanding of the external world.
Veena Das and Arthur Kleinman (2001) call this process the ‘project of re­
creating “normality”’. In this context, the concept of ‘space of time’ becomes 
crucial. Space of time is not our more usual sense of time, but is time closely 
linked to an event of violence that evolves into a space of transformation. Here, 
the ‘everyday’ is not taken for granted, but is rather viewed as the ‘social place’ 
where victims struggle to rebuild and restore normal life, and resist oppressive 
policies and injustice (Das 1998,2007; Das and Kleinman 2001). The notion of 
violence is extended to include not only acts of violence, but also the effect of 
violence on individuals, family life and communities that continues to exist and 
afflict them long after the act of violence itself has ceased. The transition 
process also includes the way violence produces ‘subjectivity’ in people affected 
by it, and how subjectivity changes through experiencing violence. In studying 
violence, one cannot ‘draw a sharp line between collective and individual 
experiences of social violence. ...Violence creates, sustains, and transforms their 
interaction, and thereby it actualises the inner worlds of lived values as well as
the outer world of contested meanings. ... Multiple forms and dynamics of social
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violence animate local worlds and the individual lives in them’ (Das and 
Kleinman 2000: 5).
The end of a violent event can be the beginning of a new phase of life. By placing 
themselves at the very site of transition, anthropologists are sometimes in a 
position to view violence in a wider societal context. They observe a particular 
interface being created between different ‘entities’ such as the state and civil 
society, Hindus and Muslims, administration and victims, and so on — as I shall 
strive to do here. Each entity is being shaped more clearly in the process of 
interaction, but at the same time the complexity of creating the process itself 
paradoxically reveals the ambiguous and unclear positions of each entity in 
relation to violence. State actors indicate various alignments regarding violence, 
and Das is sceptical of a model of ‘clear binary opposition’ between the state and 
society in understanding violent conflict (Das 2003: 295; 2007: 205-221).
Some of these state actors, however, are part of the violence itself, as much 
direct perpetrators of brutal violence as an invisible entity affecting the everyday 
life of the ordinary. Das and others (eg. Spencer 2003) do not see a rupture in 
the presence of the state between everyday life and the moment of collective 
violence, but see the continuity of its ubiquitous presence as a powerful social 
force affecting local life. Local processes of reconstruction of communities 
especially highlight the presence of the state, with its constantly changing face 
and role, juxtaposed with local communities (Das 1996: 200).
The study of violence from the perspective of sufferers and victims brings
insights into what is needed for reconciliation, recovery and peace. It reveals the
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various strategies that survivors use to revive and reconstruct the economy, 
social life and normality. Victims’ coping strategies show how they manage to 
appropriate and reinvent the traditional and cultural practices and 
understanding, opening up possibilities for a new and better life (Das et al. 
2000; Das and Kleinman 2001; Das 2003). This turns our attention to the 
transforming power of violence; how violence can become an opportunity to 
remake local society through new consciousness, renewed identity and new 
forms of solidarity (cf. Balandier 1986). This aspect of the anthropological 
approach makes us aware that there are different potential responses to 
violence. In localities or cities where violence is cyclical, it is almost 
automatically assumed that vengeance and hatred will produce a response of 
retaliatory violence. The heterogeneity of the local structure, however, can 
provide a possibility for non-engagement in violent acts. It may depend on new 
visions, organisations or imaginary of the ‘local’ who reconstruct their world 
after violence.
1.4 Conclusion
There appear to be at least two important points evolving in the recent literature 
on understandings of ethnic violence in contemporary India. The first is that 
violence has come to be viewed to a large degree as an engineered operation. 
That is, ethnic violence is planned or ‘produced’, rather than arising in 
spontaneous, sporadic acts of mob violence largely induced by ethnic hatreds 
and religious passion. Violence is no longer seen as a manifestation of a
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communal ideology, which itself is presented either as a disease of civil society 
(Chandra 1969; Rajgopal 1987) or as a pathology of modernity/colonialism 
(Pandey 1998). Violence has to be ‘organised’ by the political elite, and may or 
may not be prevented by the state government depending on its political 
orientation or electoral calculation.
The second important advancement in the literature is that Wilkinson, Brass 
and Varshney have all paid at least some attention to the importance of the 
question of non-violence. In their pursuit of the causes of violence, these 
authors explain non-violence as either the absence of cause or as a consequence 
of a state government decision.
Both Wilkinson and Brass predict a reduced level of ethnic violence in the 
future, pointing to the rise of backward caste parties as an important variable in 
altering the mapping of electoral politics. Within this context Wilkinson clearly 
explains that the new political structure, in which Muslim votes are in demand, 
is a precondition for lower levels of ethnic violence in India. That Muslim votes 
have become pivotal in electoral competition, particularly since 1992, is now the 
reality of high politics in India. The major questions arising from this 
background are: what the workings or mechanisms of reducing the frequency of 
ethnic violence are in this new political structure, which is indeed more 
favourable to Muslims. Both Wilkinson’s and Brass’ theses seek an answer in 
terms of the electoral calculations of parties in given political structures. This 
implies, however, that if the political structure changes again, and Muslim votes 
are no longer needed, that Muslims might face the same dangerous situation
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that existed prior to the 1990s, when Hindu parties did not hesitate to create 
anti-Muslim mobilisation in order to kill Muslims.
My concern, in short, is that in much of the existing literature Muslims are 
treated as victims and simple targets of Hindu mobilisations. They are the 
‘dependent variable’, passive and innate. Brass and Wilkinson certainly offer 
considerable insights when they suggest that north India’s Muslims are better 
placed now than twenty years ago, not least because of the alliances they have 
made with various subaltern parties (such as the Bahujan Samaj Party in UP). 
What is missing from these accounts, however, is a different sort of absence than 
the one identified by Varshney and Wilkinson — the absence of ethnic violence 
in most of India’s towns and cities and from its countryside. This thesis offers 
an alternative and complementary explanation of the absence of violence within 
one of India’s most riot-prone zones. My focus is much more on Muslim 
political agency and the means by which new political coalitions have been built, 
contested and understood by different groups of Muslims and Hindus in Meerut 
since c.1990.
Before I turn to this task, however, which is mainly the subject matter of the 
second half of this thesis (Chapters Four to Six), I first discuss the patterns of 
ethnic violence which shook Meerut, and Meerut’s Muslims in particular, up to 
the eariy-i990s, including the anti-Muslim violence of 1987.
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Chapter 2: Political Geography and M uslim  Politics in
Uttar Pradesh
For a community to think that its interests are different from that of the country 
in which it lives, is a great mistake. Assuming that we agreed today to the 
reservation of seats, I would consider myself to be the greatest enemy of the 
Muslim community because of the consequences of the step in a secular and 
democratic State. Assume that you have separate electorates on a communal 
basis. Will you ever find a place in any of the Ministries in the Provinces or in the 
Centre? You have a separate interest. Here in a Ministry or a Government, based 
on joint responsibility, where people who do not trust us, or who do not trust the 
majority, cannot obviously come into the Government itself. Accordingly, you 
will have no share in the Government. You will exclude yourselves and remain 
perpetually in a minority. Then, what advantage will you gain (Sardar Patel 
quoted in Noorani 2004: 5-6)?
2.1 Introduction
What might be called the new life of Muslims in post-Independence India took 
shape in a changed political environment that took aim at the very idea of a 
separate Muslim political identity. Sardar Patel, the first Home Minister in the 
Government of independent India, had a reputation for being more sympathetic 
to militant Hinduism than either Gandhi or Nehru, but his remark quoted 
above, made to the Constituent Assembly (1946-49), was nonetheless broadly 
the view of the Congress by the time that Independence — and Partition — 
arrived. Patel was speaking back sharply to the demand of India’s remaining 
Muslim leaders for the continuation of a separate Muslim electorate (and thus a
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self-consciously ‘Muslim’ political leadership). The thinly veiled threat that is 
also apparent in Patel’s remarks speaks to the fact that Congress leaders were 
still unsure during this turbulent period about how to incorporate Muslims in 
the political field as the equals of Hindus.
In Chapter One I discussed the broad historical geographies of Hindu-Muslim 
violence in India up to the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 1992. In this 
chapter, I seek to complement this analysis in some degree while turning my 
attention from the national scale to the life worlds of Muslims, most of all, in the 
erstwhile United Provinces — later Uttar Pradesh — and most especially in 
western Uttar Pradesh and the city of Meerut. The state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) 
has long been one of the most dangerous states in India in terms of Hindu- 
Muslim communal violence, rivalling states like Gujarat and Maharashtra (see 
Figure 2.1).
Figure 2.1 Deaths per m illion in u rb an  rio ts w ith one o r m ore 
deaths, 1950-1995
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Source: Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002), p. 97 (Varshney 2002).
54
Within the state of UP, moreover, the western part is home to some of India’s 
most notoriously riot-prone cities, including Aligarh and Meerut (Lambert 
1951)-34
Given the specific nature of Hindu-Muslim relations and politics in UP, and 
indeed in selected parts of UP, the rest of the chapter is organised as follows. 
Section II is focused on the political history of UP as a whole, before and after 
Independence in 1947. I establish the centrality of the state in politics in India, 
and note the importance of UP both within Indian National Congress and 
Muslim League politics. Most of all, I provide important background to the rise 
of militant Hindu forces in UP after Independence, and to strategies for the 
incorporation of Muslim political leaders — and a broader Muslim vote bank — 
into the state Congress Party. Section III then examines some of the same issues 
at the city scale, providing important information along the way on the living 
conditions of many Muslims in Meerut ahead of the major Hindu-Muslim 
violence that rocked the city in 1987. I further suggest that Muslim politics in 
this period continued to be framed with reference to an occasionally crude 
assertion of a separate and distinctive Muslim identity. This led to clashes both 
with the Congress leadership and latterly, more dangerously, with Muslim 
antagonists within a re-emergent camp of Hindu nationalists.
34 Meerut ranks fourth in the total number of casualties of communal violence that took place 
from 1950 to 1995, only below the three metropolitan cities of Bombay, Ahmedabad and 
Hyderabad. Aligarh ranks fifth, following Meerut (Varshney 2001: 372).
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2.2 A Brief Political H istory of U ttar P radesh
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The state of Uttar Pradesh emerged in 1950 out of the United Provinces of Agra 
and Oudh (see Map 2.1). Notwithstanding the loss of the Uttarakhand region in 
2000, UP is still home to India’s largest provincial population, standing in 2001 
at 166 million people, or about 16 percent of the entire population of the
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country.35 The political importance of the state and its significant influence in 
all-Indian politics are evident in the fact that 80 of the 545 seats in the Lok 
Sabha, or slightly less than one-sixth of the total number of members, are rooted 
in UP. Because of this, political changes in UP affect New Delhi with a greater 
magnitude than those in any other state. UP continues to occupy a central 
position in the calculations of all of India’s national political parties, either 
acting alone or in terms of alliance-making (Hasan 1996: 58).
The political importance of the state at the all-Indian level also derives from the 
fact that UP formed the centre of lasting Muslim power in the Indo-Gangetic 
belt, the legacy of which still affects the development of post-Independence 
politics in north India. Muslim ‘separatist’ politics began in UP under British 
rule, and from here the Muslim League drew a critical part of the electoral 
support which brought it to all-India importance in the 1930s (Robinson 1974). 
Muslims in UP still compose 18.5 percent of the total population of the state. 
Muslim households are especially to be found in the western part of the state, 
where many large towns were once closely associated with the rise and fall of the 
Mughal empire. These towns had flourished as former capitals of Islamic rule as 
well as centres of British government. The concentration of Muslims in present- 
day UP, therefore, serves in part as a reminder to both Muslims and Hindus of 
the historical influence of Islamic power in this part of India (ibid. 13).
35 Census of India, 2001 (Census of India 2001).
57
2.2.1 Political geography in UP
Prior to Independence the United Provinces was already a stronghold of the 
Indian National Congress. After Independence, Congress maintained its 
extremely strong position in the state from the first General Elections of 1952 to 
the third General Elections of 1962. Its hegemonic position came from a support 
base formed largely of Brahmins (and some other high castes), Scheduled Castes 
and Muslims. Political support from Muslims and the Scheduled Castes was 
particularly vital because these communities formed the largest minorities in the 
state (Brass 1985:195; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987: i82-i 88).36 The Congress 
Party maintained its dominant position in UP into the 1980s, but from the time 
of the 1967 General Elections fell into a period of (punctuated) relative decline 
that became much more evident in the 1990s, by which time it faced challenges 
from the B JP and from various ‘subaltern’ political parties. In the first decades 
after Independence, UP’s Muslims and Scheduled Castes were largely inducted 
into UP (and Congress) politics as clients of the state’s dominant upper-caste 
communities. The so-called ‘Congress system’ of this time was based across 
north India on the domination of government at different spatial scales by 
traditional landowning castes like the Brahmins and Rajputs (Meyer 1969; 
Hasan 1996) (see Table 2.1).
36 The Scheduled Castes and the Muslims form 21.1 percent and 18.5 percent respectively of the 
UP population (Census of India 2001).
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Table 2 .1  Uttar Pradesh Lok Sabha election results, 1 9 5 2 - 2 0 0 4
Party 1952 1957 1962 1967 1971 1977 1980 1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004
Turnout {%) 38.40 47.80 5100 54-50 46.00 56.40 50.00 55.80 5130 49.24 46.50 55-49 53-53 48.16
INC 53-00 46.30 38.20 33.40 48.60 25.00 35.90 5103 31.77 18.28 8.14 6.02 14.72 12.04
BJS/BJP 7-30 1480 1760 22.20 12.30 6.42 7.58 32.83 33-44 35.80 27.64 22.17
SP 20.84 28.70 24.06 26.74
BSP 2.18 9-93 8.70 20.61 20.90 22.08 24.67
JD 35.30 21.62 4.26 0.47 0.09 0.00
CPI/CPM
combined 0.30 1.70 3 6 0 4.50 3-90 1.20 1.70 1.68 1.81 1.77 1.04 0.41 0.31 0.15
JD (United) 0.59 0.80
Rashtriya Lok 
Dal (RLD) 4-49
Sources: The data from 1952 up to 1998 is from Kanchan Chandra, ‘Post-Congress Politics in Uttar Pradesh: The ethnification of the party system and its consequences’ in Indian 
Politics and the 1998 Election, edited by Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 24 (Chandra 1999). The data for the elections after 1998 is from 
the official reports published by the Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp (Election Commission of India Webpage).
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UP politics formed a pivotal part of this ‘Congress system’ (Kothari 1964), and 
upper-caste dominance provided strong motivation for non-upper caste groups 
to challenge the supremacy of the Congress Party from the late 1960s (Hasan 
1996:60). Over the longer term, the Party’s decline can primarily be attributed 
to the failure of its Brahmin leadership to adapt to a changing political economy 
in UP, where lower castes and classes were increasingly mobilizing in their own 
right as their economic status improved in the 1970s and 1980s (as for example 
through the Green Revolution) (Hasan 1998).
Among the main political forces now in opposition to the Congress in UP, Hindu 
Rightist organisations have a long history dating back to the late 19th century. 
The United Provinces was a focus for many cow protection movements during 
the period from c.1880-1920 and these prompted a number of violent 
encounters between Hindus and Muslims not only in the western part of the 
region but across the Provinces more broadly (see Pandey 1999 (1990)). These 
and other incidents produced fertile ground for the growth of already existing 
Hindu nationalist forces, such as the Arya Samaj, as well as for the birth of new 
organisations like the all-India Hindu Mahasabha in c.1915. The Hindu 
Mahasabha enjoyed its greatest visibility in UP in the late 1930s and 1940s 
under the presidency of V.D. Savarkar. It failed, however, to build an effective 
party organisation, and its electoral efforts saw little success either side of 1947.
The RSS leadership reconsidered its role in Indian politics after Independence,
and particularly after the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi. The RSS’ main
leader, Madhave Sadashiv Golwalkar, was not willing to allow the RSS to enter
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directly into politics. His solution was to spin off a new affiliate to the RSS, 
which was structurally distinct from the organisation but allied to it in terms of 
orientation. Members of the RSS, led by a young Atal Bihari Vajpayee entered 
into negotiations with a Bengali politician, S.P. Mookeijee, who had just 
resigned from Nehru’s cabinet, and together they formed the BJP’s predecessor, 
the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (the BJS or Jana Sangh) in 1951. Mookeijee aimed to 
place the Jana Sangh at the centre of organised political opposition to the 
Congress Party (Graham 1990). The considerable resentment apparent among 
some Hindus in UP after Independence — as a consequence of the partition of 
India — fed the Party’s quick growth in the 1950s and 1960s. The migration of 
Hindu Punjabi and Sindhi refugees from Pakistan into many of the larger cities 
and towns of UP also greatly enhanced the Jana Sangh’s electoral support base. 
UP was one of the states, following Madhya Pradesh — the so-called ‘cradle’ of 
electoral Hindu nationalism (Jaffrelot 2005: 238) — in which the Jana Sangh 
recorded a degree of electoral success, particularly in cities with large Muslim 
populations (Baxter 1971 (1969): 234).37 The Jana Sangh emerged in the 1962 
UP Assembly elections as the largest opposition party to Congress, gaining more 
than 15 percent of the vote and winning 49 seats in the State Assembly (see 
Table 2.2).
37 The state of Rajasthan and the then-region of Chhattisgarh in Madhya Pradesh are identified 
as the emerging areas of electoral strength of the Jana Sangh in the 1960s by Bruce Graham 
(Graham 1990:226). Uttar Pradesh was not in general a stronghold of Hindu nationalist parties 
until the 1990s. But the BJP came to power in the 1991 General Elections and onwards because 
of the Party’s electoral success in UP (Jaffrelot 2005: 238).
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Table 2 . 2  Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assem bly Election Results, 1 9 5 2 - 2 0 0 2
1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1974 19 77 1980 1985 1989 1991 1993 1996 2002
Turnout (%) 52.7 6 3 4 51.4 54.6 54 56.9 46.1 4 4 9 45-7 51.3 _ 57-13 55-73 53-8
Congress vote (96) 47-9 42.4 36.3 32.2 33-7 32.3 31.9 37-7 39-3 31.6 17-59 15-11 29.13 8.99
Seats 430 430 430 425 425 424 424 425 425 421 419 422 424 403
INC 390 286 249 199 211 215 47 309 269 94 46 28 33 25
Indian National 
Congress Urs 10 13
CPI . . 9 14 13 4 16 9 7 6 6 4 3 1 O
CPM . . 1 1 2 1 2 3 1 1 4 2
BJS/BJP 2 17 49 98 61 16 11 16 57 221 177 174 88
Janata Dal (JD) __ _ 15 12 5 1 . . 204 92 27 7
Janata Party (JP) _ _ __ 352 4 20 1 34 1 0 1
Lok Dal-B (LKDB), 
(LKD until 1985, 
BKD until 1974) 98 106 59 84 2 O 2
Socialist Party 19 24 44 13 5 . . „
Praja Socialist 
Party (PSP) 1 44 38 11 3
BSP 12 67 67 98
SP 109 110 143
RLD 14
Sources: The data for all elections up to 1989 is from Zoya Hassan, ‘Party Politics and Communal Mobilisation in Uttar Pradesh’ in Quest of a Secular Symbol: Ayodhya and after, 
edited by R. Ghose (Bombay: Indian Ocean Centre, 1996), p. 58. The data for all elections after 1991 is from the official reports published by the Election Commission of India, 
httv://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp.
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It did even better in 1967. As I explain in more detail later in this chapter, the 
UP Congress adopted a series of policy measures that had significant 
implications for local Muslim communities post-1947. Many of these were 
concerned with the cultural and religious symbolism of the Muslim community, 
and as such they struck at issues that had been contested in the public realm in 
north India for over a century. Many of these policy initiatives had the effect of 
making ethnic and religious cleavages more intense. Muslim leaders and 
organisations naturally arose in protest against these policies, not least in the 
1960s, but this in turn invited a Hindu backlash and gave further mileage to the 
campaigns of the Jana Sangh. The Party continued to be aggressively involved 
in anti-Muslim or communal mobilisations, some of which escalated into large- 
scale Hindu-Muslim violence in north India in the 1960S.38
The Jana Sangh, however, never became a major threat to the ruling Congress 
Party, even though it had some degree of electoral success in north India 
between 1951 and 1967. Bruce Graham’s study (1990) of the political growth of 
the Jana Sangh reveals how the Party’s communal appeals did not have much 
success during the first decades following Independence. This is because the 
ruling Congress Party itself played the role of principle defender of the Hindu 
cause. The Jana Sangh’s limited electoral success throughout the Congress’
38 These included the Aligarh-Meerut-Moradabad riots of October 1961, which resulted in 36 
deaths and were considered the worst riotous event after Independence at the time. This 
incident was followed by others in Jamshedpur in 1964, in Ranchi (Bihar) in 1967 and in Meerut 
in 1968. Among them, the Ranchi violence was particularly severe with 184 people dead. The 
incident was closely related to the declaration of Urdu as the second official language of the state 
of Bihar (Brass 1974: 219-220).
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heyday also reflected the electoral strength of the Congress Party with its 
resources and organisation. The Party’s hegemonic strength demonstrated how 
little mobilising power the Hindu nationalist appeals had for ordinary (non­
elite) Hindu voters in the Hindi heartland.
Political forces from the Left, on the other hand, had considerable presence in 
UP politics before the 1967 General Elections. The principal leftist parties were 
composed of various socialist parties that had their origins in the Congress 
Socialist Party, but which had formed separate parties in 1948. Merging and 
splitting amongst themselves, the Praja Socialist Party (PSP) and the Samyukta 
Socialist Party (SSP) emerged with some electoral strength in the 1960s. 
Following the split of the Congress Party in 1969, and Indira Gandhi’s renewed 
advertising of her own socialist credentials, the socialist forces fell into a gradual 
decline, and to some degree were even replaced by new opposition parties 
emerging from the farmers’ movement that also emanated from western UP.
The peasant-proprietor castes of western UP were among the first to challenge
Congress hegemony in the state. The impetus for political mobilisation against
upper-caste dominance lay in the significant economic rise of these agrarian
middle castes, particularly empowered by zamindari abolition in the 1950s and
1960s and then by the Green Revolution, and yet also angered by what they saw
as urban bias in India’s development policies. The most consolidated challenge
came under the strong leadership of a Jat politician, Chaudhury Charan Singh.
Singh dominated the Congress District organisation in Meerut from the early
1940s and eventually defected from the Congress Party in 1967 before organising
the Bharatiya Kranti Dal (BKD) in 1969 (Brass 1965; Jha 1979; Brass 1983:301-
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334)- The BKD represented not only the interests of the agrarian middle castes 
but also ‘rural’ interests opposing ‘urban’ dominance (Brass 1983: ibid.). The 
formation of the BKD marked the first concrete expression of the middle and 
upper-middle castes’ protest against the political dominance of Brahmins (and 
urban elites more generally) within the Congress Party.
The rise of the BKD was arguably also the beginning of an ‘identity politics’ 
based on ‘horizontal’ forms of mobilisation that differed significantly from the 
Congress system of‘vertical’ mobilisation. Vertical mobilisation is based on the 
traditional structures of hierarchy in Hindu society in which dominant castes or 
local elites mobilise political support from their dependants (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1967). Under forms of horizontal mobilisation, lower caste groups and 
communities make political alliances ‘sideways’ in order to exploit the greater 
numerical strength of the non-Forward Castes. Political parties and caste 
associations play a critical role as agents of horizontal mobilisation (ibid.). 
Studies of caste associations have aimed to show how caste groups are 
transformed into larger ethnic blocs on the basis of (allegedly) common 
ideologies, identities or interests that range from the ritual to the educational, 
economic and political (Rao 1979).
Another important social group in terms of its population size, as well as of its 
structurally similar position in society to that of many low-status Muslims, is the 
Scheduled Castes (or the former ‘untouchable’ castes). Their persistent social 
movements against landlordism have formed a critical stream in the political 
landscape of UP before and after 1947. Their protest movements developed into 
a major political movement, ‘Ambedkarism’, named after Dr. Bhim Rao
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Ambedkar, the main leader of India’s Depressed Classes from the 1920s to the 
1950s. Ambedkarism progressed steadily among educated and socially-aware 
sections of the Scheduled Castes and started taking shape in terms of political 
mobilisation and activism. One of its manifestations was the formation of the 
Republican Party of India (RPI), notably among the Jatavs (Chamars) of Agra, in 
western UP in 1958 (Lynch 1969: 95-128; Lerche 1999:187, 206) shortly after 
Ambedkar’s death. Chamars, who were traditionally leather workers, are the 
most numerous as well as the most politically conscious group among UP’s 
Scheduled Castes. They are also the largest single caste (jati) grouping in UP. 
The RPI aimed to eliminate caste-based inequality and discrimination and to 
establish the rights of Scheduled Castes as equal citizens within the new republic 
of India. It succeeded in gaining electoral strength between 1962 and 1967 in 
western UP, but in the long run, as we shall see, it did not prove to be the main 
political vehicle for the political mobilisation of the Scheduled Castes in UP or 
across northern India.
Social movements among the Scheduled Castes can also be seen in terms of the
emergence of a class movement, albeit one which is not disassociated from the
impact of democratic elections and the adult franchise. The extension of the
right to vote to social groups regardless of their socio-economic status or
political influence offered them a new political resource (Hardgrave and
Kochanek 1986 (1970); Mitra and Singh 1999). India’s largely illiterate
electorate, which included Muslims, had a high voter turnout rate of 46-48
percent in the first two General Elections. This rose over 60 percent by 1967,
reaching a level equal to the average voter turnout in the United States, and it
remained consistently above 55 percent in consecutive General Elections
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between 1962 and 1998. By 1989, voter turnout was higher in rural than in 
urban areas. India’s most disadvantaged groups, including the Other Backward 
Classes and the Scheduled Castes, are more likely to vote than are upper-caste 
Hindus (Yadav 2000).
Democratic elections in India continue to be a major vehicle for social change, in 
the sense of breaking the traditional social order under the impact of 
competition prompted by electoral politics. Frankel and Rao (1989, 1990) 
explain this dynamic process of transformation with reference to the combined 
effects of economic change, social reform and political mobilisation within a 
framework of political regionalism. Their rich ethnography shows how the 
principle of universal adult franchise empowered the relatively powerless at the 
bottom of the pyramid. The bottom layers quickly learned how to pool their 
collective voting strength and to use it as a political resource. Their learning 
process is buttressed by a generalised notion of citizenship, as opposed to the 
feeling of mere subjecthood, as well as by a growing belief in their entitlement to 
‘equalit/ and a higher standard of living (Mitra and Singh 1999: 20-26). The 
‘language of right’ has permeated deep into Indian society, where it is steadily 
altering the nature of interactions between the rulers and citizens.
Before picking up on this broad subaltern narrative, however, let me now 
reconsider the position of UP’s Muslim communities before Partition and the de 
facto declaration of India from 1950 as a secular state. The United Provinces 
before Partition was a major area of Muslim demographic and political 
ascendancy. The Muslim League succeeded in establishing a strong support 
base among the UP Muslim constituency, mainly by exploiting Muslim
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grievances about their status as the Provinces’ largest minority (Puri 1993: 
2141). However, UP remained with India after 1947 and was not ceded to 
Pakistan. Thus the Muslims in UP who spearheaded the Pakistan movement 
were left in a not dissimilar Hindu majority state, but this time as a much 
weaker minority. The states of UP and Bihar were affected more than most 
other states by the repercussions of Partition. They suffered not only from the 
ferocity of the Partition riots but also from the enormous exodus of Muslims to 
Pakistan, including a considerable ‘skimming off from the professional classes 
that continued until the early 1960s (Hasan 1990: 51). A large majority of 
Muslims in Uttar Pradesh therefore were drawn from the lower ranks, and they 
had to face an increasingly volatile situation in a Hindu-dominated independent 
India without strong political leadership of their own. Muslims also lost their 
reserved seats and separate electorates, and needed to be organised for the first 
time into the general electorate under the principles of universal adult franchise. 
In this context, Muslims mainly looked to the Indian National Congress of 
Jawaharlal Nehru as their protector, and supported the Congress Party in 
exchange for security. The Congress Party thus played one important role in the 
integration of the Muslim community into the political structure of the new 
nation. Another — which was linked — was played by the Constitution of India. 
Muslims’ rights to self-regulation were condensed in the community’s persistent 
demand to maintain their Personal Law vis-a-vis a unified civil code. Muslim 
Personal Law is based on the Islamic legal code, shariat, which governs life­
cycle events such as marriage, death, divorce and inheritance. The maintenance 
of Personal Law has comprised the core of many key Muslim political demands 
in post-independent India, and in the process has provided a focal point for
Hindu nationalist attacks on the Congress government (or Party) for its alleged
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‘pseudo-secularism’. As we shall see throughout this thesis, negotiations around 
Muslim religious and civic identities have been key to the politics of Muslim 
(and indeed non-Muslim) groups in UP, as elsewhere in India after 1947. What 
is remarkable about the post-1987 period in Meerut, however, is the changing 
basis on which this dual identity is constructed and contested (see Chapters 5 
and 6).
2.2.2 UP Congress policies concerning Muslims in UP
Notwithstanding official all-India protection of Muslim cultural rights after 
1947, it needs to be pointed out that the UP Congress Party — in key respects the 
Muslims’ main protector in the state — itself took a lead after Partition in 
circumscribing some key moments (or areas) in the cultural or religious rights 
(and rites) of UP Muslims. G.B.Pant, the first UP Chief Minister, moved his 
government in September 1949 to adopt Hindi as the state’s only official 
language and to drop the option of Urdu as second official language. These 
decisions culminated in the UP Official Language Act of 1951. UP has the largest 
Urdu-speaking population in India, and Urdu is the single largest minority 
language, spoken by over ten percent of the population of the state (Brass 1974: 
179-180). This legislation excluded Muslims from key opportunities in 
government employment or recruitment to the police force. The enactment also 
meant that Muslim children were deprived of adequate facilities for education 
through the medium of Urdu.
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The UP Congress Party also concerned itself with the prohibition of cow 
slaughter for religious (Islamic) sacrifice. The cow protection movement has a 
long history in north India, as we have already seen (Chapter l), linking back to 
forms of Hindu revivalism that emerged in the last decades of the 19th century. 
Prolonged debates between secularists (including Nehru) and Hindu 
nationalists and traditionalists within the Congress39, notably during the time of 
the Constituent Assembly, resulted in an ambiguous phrase that recommended 
the prohibition of cow slaughter in Article 48 of the Constitution, but only at the 
level of the ‘Directive Principles’ — in other words, it was offered as guidance to 
the state governments of the Indian Union (Graham 1990:147). In July 1949, 
several district boards in UP decided on an outright ban, with other important 
districts, including Meerut, following suit by the end of the year. Acts at the 
district level became UP Acts in 1955.
Another Congress policy concerned the 1951 Amendment Act of the Aligarh 
Muslim University (AMU), an act that aimed to reduce the university’s ‘minority 
character’ and to secularise its mandate. The 1951 Amendment included the 
abolition of compulsory religious education, opened the governing body to non- 
Muslims and the affiliation of the university with predominantly Hindu colleges 
in Aligarh town, and finally proposed dropping the term ‘Muslim’ from the 
university’s name (Brass 1974:223-224). The 1951 Act was followed by a further 
amendment in 1965, which prompted a long-term counter agitation among 
Muslims in north India. The dispute was only settled after the Janata
39 For a definition of Hindu nationalists and traditionalists that coexisted in the Congress Party 
see (Graham 1990: 5-7).
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Government, the first non-Congress government in UP, reopened the issue in 
1978, and when the Congress government under Indira Gandhi responded with 
a new amendment Act in 1981, under the terms of which the status of a minority 
institution was accorded to the university, with 50 percent reservation granted 
to Muslim students (ibid. 231-232).
Muslim discontent over the problem of Urdu and other matters related to UP 
Congress policies prompted the formation of an openly anti-Congress Muslim 
organisation, the All-India Majlis-e-Mushawarat, in 1964 (Ahmed 1967). 
Muslim discontent had begun to express itself in 1962 in a few areas of the state, 
but now it was more widespread. The Majlis aimed to raise awareness of 
Muslim problems and called for adequate safeguards for the Muslim 
community. Specifically, they directed attention to the importance of relief 
provisions for victims of communal violence, a constant monitoring system in all 
dimensions of the community life to be taken up to the authorities, and 
protection of religious and social lives of the community (Shahabuddin 2003).
The Majlis refrained from direct involvement in party politics but indirectly 
supported non-Congress candidates in constituencies throughout the state. The 
UP Majlis was established in Lucknow in June 1968 as a splinter group from the 
all-India Majlis and aimed for more direct participation in politics by contesting 
elections. But as a political party it was not well-organised and attracted only 
extremely conservative elements (Quraishi 1971; Ahmed 1967).4° The Party was
40 Imtiaz Ahmed points out that the all-India Majlis eventually came to undertake electoral 
activity prompted by the refusal of the Congress Party to accept their mandates (Ahmed 1967).
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largely viewed as one of Muslim militancy, exclusively supporting the Muslim 
cause. The Majlis, for example, supported the movement to retain the minority 
character of the AMU. Mushirul Hasan has written that the organisation was 
‘stigmatised as a sinister, incipient revival of the old Muslim League’, 
legitimatising Hindu communalism in UP and deepening a sense of insecurity 
among Muslims (Hasan 1990: 58). The conservative movement of the Majlis 
was among the first initiatives made by post-1947 Muslim political and religious 
leaders to consolidate the Muslim community as a political force. The Party 
contested the 1969 mid-term Assembly election and the 1971 General Elections 
in UP without success and faded away quickly after its founder’s death in July 
1974.41
After the Emergency regime of 1975-77, a shift in the Congress Party towards 
Hindu majoritarianism made for more dangerous conditions for Muslims in UP. 
In the 1984 General Elections (following the assassination of Prime Minister 
Indira Gandhi by two of her Sikh bodyguards), the Congress election campaign 
of her elder son, Rajiv Gandhi, adopted the two principal slogans of ‘One 
Country’ and ‘Security’. Paul Brass has observed that in UP the Congress 
campaign ‘nearly exclusively’ focused on national security issues bound up with 
so-called internal and external enemies. Economic issues were sidelined and the 
needs or demands of minority groups receded into the background. Some 
Congressmen speculated during the campaign about the adverse effect on the 
Muslim vote of police and PAC killings of Muslims in recurring riots in the years
41 The founder of the UP Majlis was Dr. A.J. Faridi, a politician-cum-physician who was actively 
involved in politics for the Muslim cause. Brass calls his politics ‘Muslim militancy’ (Brass 1974: 
243).
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leading up to 1984. Some Congress candidates indicated awareness of the 
potential loss of Muslim votes for the first time (Brass 1986:663). Although the 
Congress Party increased its vote share by 15 percent in UP overall, it no longer 
enjoyed a monopoly of the minority vote. The available aggregate data indicate 
that Muslim support was sharply divided during this ‘Rajiv-wave’ election .^2
2.2.3 Political formations among UP Muslims
The participation of Muslims in Indian political life can reasonably be seen from 
two separate perspectives in this period — those of the Muslim elites and those 
of the Muslim masses. As far as the Muslim elites were concerned, they were 
well represented under the Congress system of elite incorporation. The 
grievances of the ordinary Muslim population, however, were in general not 
represented in the political sphere. There were two reasons for this. First, 
Muslim politicians in the ruling Congress Party generally came from the old 
landlord class, itself equivalent to the Hindu higher castes (Wright Jr. 1964, 
1966), and there was a persistent perception gap between the leaders and the 
electorate regarding Indian social and political realities. The elite tended to have 
different views from those of the Muslim masses, many of whom were facing 
problems arising from the scarcity of state resources for their households. 
Second, the problem of Muslim representation reflected the objective
42 Six out of seven Lok Sabha constituencies where Muslims formed more than 50 percent of the 
population returned non-Congress candidates. In 22 constituencies, where Muslims comprised 
between 20 and 50 percent of the population, Congress candidates were elected. In the 
remaining 42 constituencies, where Muslims constituted a sizable minority, non-Congress party 
candidates were returned (Shakir 1990:105).
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circumstances of the Congress Party, which was still primarily a secular party 
made up largely of Hindu supporters. Muslim politicians had little power or will 
to address under such circumstances acute problems of low economic 
development, or the poor educational attainment of large sections of their 
community.
Some Muslim intellectuals were aware of this discrepancy between elite Muslim 
politics and the reality faced by the vast Muslim population on the ground 
(Engineer 1980; Zakaria 2004: 228-229). One critic, Moin Shakir, noted in 
1980:
Muslim leaders are highly educated, their spokesmen in Parliament are on a par 
with the high-caste members in terms of educational qualifications, occupational 
affiliations and places of residence. Consequently they are not the persons who 
voice the real grievances of the communities (This includes minority Muslim, as 
well as SC and STs). [T]heir representation...has been quite ineffective in 
influencing the legislative process. The ruling class is always ready to 
accommodate this leadership of the minorities for maintaining the appearance of 
“consensus”. The so-called Muslims’ politics is dominated by all sorts of non­
issues like the protection of Muslim Personal Law and the minority character of 
AMU. These are the issues which divert the attention of the masses from the real 
issues. The most important issue is of changing the system of which no Muslim 
leader speaks (Shakir 1980: 221).
If the Congress system failed to engage the vast majority of Muslims in Indian 
political life, equally important was that Muslim political formations were often 
highly fragmented. Major religious-political organisations were divided on 
ideological lines and pursued separate goals. Mushirul Hasan comments:
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The supposedly monolithic structure of Muslim leadership and organisation did 
not exist either at the national or the local level. It is hard to discern a common 
pattern or a unified structure of political activity amongst Muslims (Hasan 1990: 
58).
These organisations acted as intermediaries who conveyed and channelled 
Muslim grievances at the parliamentary level, albeit to little effect. At the time 
of elections, these organisations negotiated their support with various regional 
and national parties (Graff 1992: 215).
The fragmented character of Muslim organisations points to another important 
dimension of the broader Muslim political formation. It was difficult to develop 
community consciousness and a sense of belonging among the Muslim masses. 
This is manifest in the general pattern of Muslim party voting (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1987: 47). Although most Muslims voted for Congress prior to the 
1989 General Elections, many observers have pointed out that Muslim votes are 
nonetheless divided among different parties, something which works to the 
advantage of the Hindu parties, particularly the BJP. A key issue for Muslim 
politicians, therefore, has been how to create a Muslim political community out 
of this fragmentation, or how to effectively translate the numerical importance 
of Muslims into political power. I consider this point further when I turn to 
Muslim voting patterns in Meerut.
Asghar Ali Engineer (2005) points out another key dimension of Muslim politics
when he maintains that it has to be a large extent centred around cultural and
religious issues, not least because these issues are useful for the Muslim leaders’
own political ends. Engineer’s main point is that large segments of the Muslim
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masses are comprised of people who are religiously conservative and only 
minimally literate, and that some Muslim leaders have sought to appeal to their 
constituency in emotional or cultural terms.
Another pivotal issue facing the Muslim community as a whole concerns its 
socio-economic condition. Muslims are among the most impoverished 
communities in India (ActionAid India et al. 2007). The Sachar Committee 
Report, issued in autumn 2006, suggested that the average economic condition 
of Muslims was just above that of the Scheduled Castes and worse than that of 
the OBCs .43 The extremely low educational attainment of many Muslims was 
also a key factor in their severe under-representation in both public and private 
employment markets. Muslims have been discriminated against in terms of 
educational opportunities, as can be seen in the Hindi-only policy of Congress, 
quotas for government jobs, representation in central and state governments 
and police and army recruitment systems. In 1950 the UP state government 
approved the persistent demand of Hindus in UP for the reduction of the 
number of Muslim police officers who made up almost a half of the entire police 
force, in order to weaken the Muslim influence in the police, the main arm of the 
state (Brennan 1996). Muslims’ socio-economic problems have almost never 
been adequately addressed by the ruling Congress or non-Congress state 
governments in UP or elsewhere (Engineer 1995a: 3130).
43 ‘Sachar Committee Report’, The Hindu, 8 December 2006 (The Hindu (New Delhi)).
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2.2.4 Hindu-Muslim violence from the 1960s to the 1980s
Against this backdrop of weak Muslim politics, the changing state of the 
Congress Party and the overall economic weakness of large parts of north India’s 
Muslim population, it is perhaps not surprising that UP — itself the heartland of 
the Pakistan movement — should prove itself to be a fertile setting for anti- 
Muslim violence either side of 1947. Muslim communities in UP remained weak 
in macro-political terms, but strong enough culturally and geographically to 
make their presence felt as a significant — and significantly visible — non-Hindu 
minority group. Muslim demands for protection of their cultural symbols 
sometimes triggered Hindu communalism, or gave it an excuse. Anti-Muslim 
sentiments revived in intensity among many Hindus during the Indo-Pak Wars 
of 1965 and 1971. This period was followed by a destabilising pre-Emergency 
period which saw increasing clashes between Muslims and the police force and 
the Provincial Armed Constabulary (PAC). Following the 1972 amendment of 
the AMU Act (1951), for example, some Muslim demonstrators were killed by 
the police and the PAC in Aligarh, Firozabad and Varanasi in 1974. State forces 
were also ‘communalised’ during the Emergency regime under Indira Gandhi 
between 1975 and 1977. There were repeated incidents of police firing targeting 
Muslims under the pretext of the family planning scheme (Shakir 1990). Some 
Muslims were even killed by police during the Emergency in Meerut city (Brass 
1985: 183)44 These incidents were only a prelude to those during the post- 
Emergency period and onwards to the height of the communal politics of the 
1980s. While an increasingly large number of Muslims came to feel threatened
44 Amar Ujjala, 13 March 2004 (Amar Ujjala (Meerut)).
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by the menace of Hindu communalism, ‘secular’ Muslim politicians generally 
did not or could not represent the Muslim cause. The powerlessness of Muslim 
politicians in the Congress Party became increasingly evident throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. In many cities, including Moradabad and Meerut, ruling 
politicians were ineffective in protecting Muslims from attacks by the PAC. 
Indeed, the political system itself seemed to play a role in encouraging violence 
and the large-scale killing of Muslims (see Figure 2.2).
Figure 2.2 Total deaths in rio ts per year in U ttar Pradesh, 1950-1995
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Source: Ashutosh Varshney, Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India, (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2002), p. 99.
2.3 M eerut City
As might be expected, many of Meerut’s political structures and contests since 
Independence have mirrored those in UP more generally — but not entirely.
78
There are also important differences that need to be observed and taken into 
account.
Map 2.2 U ttar Pradesh and  M eerut D istrict
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With a population just over one million, Meerut is one of the largest cities in 
western UP. The city has served as the administrative, political and educational 
centre of the Division of the Upper Doab region since colonial times (see Map 
2.2). Situated in the fertile soil of Upper Doab, the Meerut economy is based on, 
among other things, agricultural processing industries (Khan and Lai 1973). The 
Doab region, particularly the north part, has well-organised irrigation and canal 
systems. Also the region’s landholding structure, consisting of a relatively high 
proportion of independent and small-scale peasant proprietors, has brought a 
much higher potential for commercial farming than is the case in eastern UP 
(Brennan 1977).45*
Meerut’s industrial profile has also been rapidly changing since the city was 
included into a large industrial zone being constructed under the so-called 
National Capital Region policy (NCR).46 The NCR has its origins in the 
recommendations of the first Master Plan of Delhi in 1962 to develop a 
metropolitan region around Delhi in order to divert the increasing pressure of 
an incoming (migrant) population. The NCR has brought Meerut city a number 
of new features in order to boost its economy, including the construction of a 
new bypass road branching out from the old Delhi-Dehradun highway in order 
to divert heavy traffic from the congested city centre. The new areas along the 
bypass road have seen a construction boom which has largely catered to
45 Interview with the District Agricultural officer on 2 August 2003.
*For interviews conducted during my fieldwork, see Fieldwork and Research Methods in 
Prologue. Interviews were conducted in Meerut unless otherwise indicated.
46 The NCR includes satellite towns of Ghaziabad, Noida and Gurgaon in Haiyana.
8 0
commuters to Delhi (Sinha 1994:39).47 The city population more than doubled 
in size between 1981 and 2001 (see Table 2.3).
Table 2.3 Decennial population growth in the Meerut Municipal 
Corporation area, 1981-2001
Year Population
Decennial Percentage 
increase
1981 512,317
1991 753,667 47.1
2001 1,074,229 42.5
Source: Office of the Commissioner of Meerut Division, 2 April 2003 (Government of Uttar Pradesh 2001).
Part of this growth was fuelled by the NCR project and also by migrants of new 
richer farmers and Muslim workers from nearby villages. These migrants came 
in search of jobs or for the education of their next generation. Many residential 
colonies have been constructed in the outskirts of the city in order to 
accommodate the incoming population.
Despite its size, Meerut is more like a sprawling semi-modern town than a 
modern industrial city. A few tall buildings and shopping malls in its centre now 
make for a striking contrast with the Old Town at the south end of the city, 
which maintains the more static older structures of heavy Islamic influence. The 
Old Town is the original part of the city and still provides the residence area for 
the majority of the city’s large Muslim population (see Map 2.3).
47 Interview with a Hindu, possibly a Punjabi, owner of a successful textile firm living in the new 
colony along the bypass road on 7 April 2003.
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2.4 Local Politics in M eerut City, 1951-1986
The Indian National Congress (INC) was the dominant political force in both the 
Lok Sabha and Assembly constituencies in Meerut city and District during the 
first three General Election periods (for details of different constituencies in 
Meerut District, see Appendix 2.1. The Meerut-Mawana Lok Sabha 
constituency is largely coterminous with Meerut District, but takes in some 
small areas from Muzaffamagar and, later, Baghpat Districts. Meerut District in 
turn fields five Assembly seats, including that of Meerut city). Benefitting from 
the large Muslim and Scheduled Caste populations in both the District of Meerut 
and the city, the electoral power of the Congress Party in the Meerut 
constituencies was one of the strongest in UP. Muslims comprised 33 percent of 
the Lok Sabha constituency of Meerut District, and the Scheduled Castes, 19 
percent.48 In the city Assembly constituency, or municipal area, Muslims have 
always maintained 35 percent or above. In 2001, the Muslim population 
reached as high as 48 percent, while the Scheduled Castes comprised 18 percent 
of the city population.49
After Independence, the Congress Party fielded two of the most powerful 
Muslim politicians left in UP after 1947, Shahnawaz Khan and Mohsina Kidwai, 
in the Meerut Lok Sabha constituency. These politicians dominated the Lok
48 The Lok Sabha constituency figures came from ex-MP, Mr. Harish Pal’s election data. 
Interview on 25 April 2004.
49 The population data for the municipal area in 2001 came from the office record of the 
Commissioner of Meerut Division. Interview on 2 April 2003.
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Sabha seats from the first General Elections in 1952 to the eighth General 
Elections in 1984. As for the Assembly seat of the Meerut city constituency, 
Congress fielded either Hindu Bania (commercial/business caste) or Brahmin 
candidates. The one exception to this general trend was a Muslim candidate 
who stood for the Assembly seat in 1977. This followed the major defeat of the 
Congress Party in the preceding Lok Sabha election of 1977.
Although western UP as a whole had never contributed significantly to the 
electoral strength of Hindu Rightist parties before 1993 (Duncan 1997:982), the 
Jana Sangh remained a strong political force in the Meerut city constituency in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The Party dominated the Assembly election from 1967 to 
1977 with its candidate Mohan Lai Kapoor. Kapoor was a Punjabi Kayastha and 
member of the RSS. He was a central figure of a thriving Hindu nationalism in 
Meerut city. The continued strength of the Hindu Right in the city was further 
sustained by the presence of large numbers of migrants coming from West 
Punjab after 1947, pouring into the city amidst the carnage of the Partition riots 
(see Tables 2.4 and 2.5).
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Table 2.4 Elected persons, Meerut—Mawana Lok Sabha constituency,
1952-1989
Year Winner Caste/Community Party
Votes
Polled
% of Total 
Valid Votes
1952 Shahnawaz Khan Muslim INC 125,288 59-90
1957 Shahnawaz Khan Muslim INC 158,280 65.70
1962 Shahnawaz Khan Muslim INC 133472 52.90
1967 Maharaj Singh Jat SSP
Congress
146,172 49.14
1971 Shahnawaz Khan Muslim (I) 180,181 5102
1977 Kailash Prakash Bania BLD-JNP
Congress
253,035 6335
1980 Mohsina Kidwai Muslim (I)
Congress
179,004 42.15
1984 Mohsina Kidwai Muslim (I) 238,236 50.36
1989 Harish Pal Gujjar JD 312,856 58.47
Source: Election Commission of India,http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp
Table 2.5 Elected persons, M eerut city Legislative Assem bly 
constituency, 1952-1989
Year Winner Caste/Community Party
Votes
Polled
% of Total 
Valid Votes
1952 Kailash Prakash Bania INC 26,542 60.34
1957 Kailash Prakash 
Jagdish Saran
Bania INC 27,059 51.14
1962 Rastogi Bania INC 18,026 31.71
1967 Mohan Lai Kapoor Punjabi BJS 26,905 42.82
1969 Mohan Lai Kapoor Punjabi BJS 25,735 34-21
1974 Mohan Lai Kapoor Punjabi BJS 31,508 40.71
1977 Manzoor Ahamad Muslim Congress
Congress
42,004 5351
1980 Manzoor Ahamad Muslim CD 32,407 45-80
1985 Jai Narain Sharma Brahmin Congress 48,517 47-75
1989 Laxmi Kant Vajpay Brahmin BJP 46,317 37.32
Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp
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Meerut received the largest number of Partition refugees in UP during the 1940s 
and 1950s. The Punjabis are mostly urban settlers and are oriented toward non- 
agricultural occupations. The Punjabi immigrants who settled in Meerut were 
skilled workers in sport goods manufacturing — cricket balls, nets, bats, and so 
on — and started their businesses upon their arrivals0 Sports goods 
manufacturing had grown by 2000 into one of the most successful and rapidly 
growing export industries in Meerut.51 These Punjabi migrants usually support 
Hindu nationalist organisations and parties and their growing economy had a 
critical bearing on the remarkable growth of the BJP in the city in the 1980s 
(Engineer 1982). The following table shows the scale of migration in Meerut in 
comparison to Kanpur in 1961 (Table 2.6).
Table 2.6 Partition refugees from  W est Pakistan to M eerut D istrict 
in  com parison with Kanpur District, 1951-1961
Meerut (%) Kanpur (*)
Urban settlers 35,904 95.60 27,501 99-40
Rural settlers 1,648 0.44 143 0.06
Total number of 
refugees 37,552 27,644
Source: Census of India, 1961 Part I-A (1) General Report on the Census, Table 5.15 Migrants from 
Pakistan, p. 428 (Census of India 1961).
5° Interview with a Punjabi owner of a successful cricket goods manufacturing firm on 3 April
2003.
s1 Interview with Mr. A.N. Singh, additional Director of the Meerut District Industries Centre on
28 March 2003.
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Meerut also had a traditional presence of the Arya Sam aj,52 which in turn 
contributed to the steady growth of Hindu Right forces in the city. The Meerut 
Arya Samaj attracted many Jat members from the colonial period onwards, as 
well as many of the city’s Congress District Committee m em b ers .53 These 
Congressmen, or many of them, shifted their allegiance to the Jana Sangh after 
Nehru’s death in 1964. The Arya Samaj contributed to the strengthening of the 
Jana Sangh and the B JP by virtue of its capacity for organising large processions 
and other public events, particularly in the period preceding elections, along 
with the Hindu Mahasabha, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and other 
related organisations.54 Many ordinary Muslims might have identified Congress 
itself at times as a Hindu Right organisation, given that many of its members 
were from the RSS and the Jana Sangh (Graham 19903.55
Paul Brass, in his study of the Congress organization in Meerut District in the 
early 1960s, found very little political representation of Muslims, or indeed of 
the Scheduled Castes, in the District Congress Committee. Brass observes:
Muslims and Chamars, though numerically the largest communities in the 
district, have very little representation in the local Congress in proportion to their 
population and almost no real influence despite the fact that in Meerut as in most 
other districts excluding Aligarh, these two communities are considered major 
Congress supporters in the General elections (Brass 1965:146).
52 The Meerut Arya Samaj was established in 1878 by Dayananda Saraswati, the original founder 
of the Arya Samaj in Mumbai.
53 Charan Singh was also a member.
54 Interview with a senior Arya Samajist and publisher in Meerut city on 20 April 2004.
55 This point was mentioned by some Muslim respondents including Hakim Saffudin, the 
chairman of finance on the Municipal Board from 1950 to 1971 and a renowned Unani doctor. 
Interview on 25 November 2003.
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Ordinary Meerut Muslims had little direct participation in state and national- 
level politics because the Muslim politicians elected from the Meerut 
constituencies were not from among the ranks of the majority Muslims. 
Shahnawaz Khan and Mohsina Kidwai did not ‘belong to’ Meerut District and 
were hardly present in Meerut. They were in the city ‘only during the election 
campaign’, according to some of my Muslim respondents. Both of these Muslim 
MPs were cabinet ministers who had high credentials as ‘secular’ and 
‘nationalist’ Muslims who did not particularly represent the issues concerning 
local Muslims. According to Theodore Wright, who studied Muslim Congress 
politicians at that time, Shahnawaz Khan was an ‘unimpeachable nationalist,’ so 
that it was not possible for Khan to ‘act only as a Muslim’ — he ‘must take a 
nationalist perspective’ (Wright Jr. 1966: 128). There seemed to be a gap 
between the elite politicians and the electorate, and this condition continued 
until the end of the 1980s.
Reflecting their marginalized position in city politics, Muslims forged a political 
alliance with the Scheduled Castes from time to time in order to increase their 
political representation. These communities, however, did not make their 
coalition stand as an independent political force, but rather depended on co­
optation by the Congress or other parties. One such example was the election of 
the Municipal Board in 1964. The RPI made an alliance with Muslims under the 
watchful eye of the Congress Party, with Congress symbols and emblems being 
used for the election campaign. The RPI was very successful in combining the 
votes of the largest caste and minority group and won 22 out of 40 seats. The 
majority of elected Muslim councillors were from the lower ranks of Muslims,
and included Qureshi (butchers), Ansari (weavers) and Saiffie (blacksmiths)
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(Chauhan n.d.: io).s6 Muslims and the Scheduled Castes were already moving 
away from the Congress, albeit in slow and fragmented movements. The 
Emergency regime of Indira Gandhi critically changed the Muslim-Congress 
relationship, to the extent in which it would never return to the former state. 
The Scheduled Castes also saw their emancipation movement geared up to a 
new stage during the 1970s in protest against increased levels of caste violence. 
This accelerated the momentum to become a separate political force from the 
Congress, which still largely embodied a system of upper-caste dominance.
If we look at the electoral history of the Meerut Assembly constituency from the 
perspective of the Hindu electorate, we see that the Congress Party has been 
steadily losing support from each major religious constituency since around 
i960. The largest Hindu population in the city, the Chamars, was shifting its 
allegiance steadily to its own parties after the 1950s, first to the RPI, and much 
later and more forcefully in the 1980s to the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP). A 
substantial part of the Hindu trading classes, including the Punjabis in the city, 
diverted their support to the Jana Sangh. In the meantime a large portion of the 
agrarian middle castes left the Congress and focused on supporting the BKD. 
The remaining support base consisted of a small proportion of high-caste 
Hindus, including Brahmins and Rajputs. As far as the Muslim electorate was 
concerned, its long-term allegiance to the Congress seems to have steadily 
eroded over this period, as ordinary Muslims became disillusioned by the Party's 
failure to protect their livelihoods and personal security. When the Congress
s6 Interview on 12 April 2004 with an Ansari ex-councillor elected in the 1964 Municipal 
election.
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itself became more of a Hindu majoritarian party in the 1980s this had 
significant implications for Muslim security in Meerut.
An electoral history of the Meerut Assembly constituency decade by decade 
provides more insights into this larger trend of the steady decline of the 
Congress Party in the city. The electoral records also indicate the degree of 
strength of opposition parties at different times. Assembly election results in the 
1960s indicate that opposition parties were increasingly cutting into the 
Congress base. The major opposition to Congress then comprised the Jana 
Sangh and the Socialist Parties. The top three contestants — the Congress, the 
Jana Sangh and the Socialist Parties — fought a close battle in the Assembly 
elections of 1962,1967 and 1969. The Jana Sangh beat the Congress in the 1967 
election. Given the close contest among the parties, the electoral victory of the 
Jana Sangh greatly benefited from a Muslim vote divided between the Congress 
and other parties fielding a Muslim candidate. The Muslim candidate for the 
SSP, Abdul Majid Ansari, obtained a substantial Muslim vote in the first two 
elections, which had the effect of weakening the Congress, a pattern repeated in 
later years (see Table 2.7).
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Table 2.7 Election results for M eerut city Legislative Assem bly
constituency, 1967 (top four candidates)
Candidates Caste/Community Party Votes Polled
% of Total Valid 
Votes
Mohan Lai Kapoor Punjabi BJS 26,905 42.82
Abdul Majid Ansari Muslim SSP 17,553 27.97
Jagdish Saran Rastogi Bania INC 15,829 2519
A.K. Mujti n.a. IND 1,646 2.62
Source: Election Commission of India, State Election, 1967 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, 
Detailed Results, p. 79 of 84 (Election Commission of India 1967).
Most of the elections held during the 1960s were preceded by major incidents of 
Hindu-Muslim violence which greatly enhanced the prospects of some political 
parties, as we know already from Brass and Wilkinson. The first major violence, 
in October 1961, was probably helped by the Jana Sangh’s contest in the 
forthcoming 1962 Assembly elections.57 Violence originally took place on the 
occasion of student union elections in Aligarh Muslim University in Aligarh 
District and spread to other districts in western UP. In Meerut city, it began on 
4 October and continued for almost two weeks, leaving 18 people dead, 30 
injured and 511 arrested.s8
57 The Jana Sangh had contested in the Meerut City Assembly constituency since as early as the 
first Assembly election of 1952 although the Party got only marginal votes before the 1962 
Assembly election. In the 1962 election with Mohan Lai Kapoor it finished as a runner-up for 
the first time, obtaining slightly over the quarter of the valid vote (25.83 percent).
5fl Meerut Local Intelligence Report, non-dated (translated from Hindi) (Government of Uttar 
Pradesh n.d.). The local Intelligence Office in Meerut is under the jurisdiction of the state 
government in Lucknow. It worked closely with the local administration including the Senior 
Superintendence of Police (SSP). The office kept a ‘Communal Register’ based on the 
information gathered by local intelligent officers under cover. The register existed separately
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Another violent event took place in 1968 before the mid-term elections in 1969. 
It was triggered by a large protest movement led by the Jana Sangh against a 
joint conference organized by the Congress and the the Jamait-ul- Ulemae-Hind, 
which was inviting Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, the Prime Minister of 
Kashmir, to be its main speaker. The Jana Sangh alleged that the Party’s 
founder, S.P. Mookeiji, had died in a Kashmir jail as a result of Abdullah’s 
conspiracy. Abdullah was a highly popular Muslim leader at that time, and the 
conference was expected to have a large Muslim audience, with Shahnawaz 
Khan, ex-MP, presiding. On 28 January, the day of the conference, the Jana 
Sangh took a large procession through the city and reached the conference site, 
the Faiz-a-am College, where their activists started shouting slogans. This led to 
brick-batting between the Jana Sangh processionists outside the gate and the 
conference workers inside. The violence continued until 4 February and 
resulted in 12 deaths, all Muslim, with 71 injured and 148 arrests. The Muslims 
were killed mainly by police firings.59
Paul Brass emphasises political calculation and the instrumental use of Hindu- 
Muslim violence by political leaders at all levels and of different persuasions, 
including so-called secular nationalists (Brass 1997:269-270). He refers to the
from the communal registers kept in each police station in Meerut. The one in the Intelligence 
Office seems to have relatively more thorough data than those kept at each station office because 
the latter was based on people’s claims while the former was based on information gathering 
effort by professional intelligent officers. However, it must be treated with caution as official 
records of those incidents in India, as many writers in this field pointed out, often underestimate 
the figures and could be misleading.
59 The number of deaths is based on the Meerut Local Intelligence Report. The accounts of the 
incident were based on interviews with the then manager of the Faiz-a-am College on 5 March 
2004 as well as with other Muslim attendees at the conference.
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‘replacement of blame’ used by almost all parties, including the Congress Party, 
for reasons of electoral gain (ibid.). The 1968 violence might be seen as a case in 
which the ‘secular’ Congress and its ‘secular’ politicians organised a sort of 
conference that was most likely to invoke mobilisations by the Hindu Right 
wing, leading to communal violence. The resulting violence would then give rise 
to the ethnic polarisation of the electorate which would benefit all parties 
involved, except the Muslims who most likely would face death either by Hindu 
rioters or by the police. In this case, too, the Congress was mindful that it had 
lost ground in the General elections of 1967, and that Shahnawaz Khan, who 
presided over the conference, had lost his seat to the SSP in the same election 
(see Table 2.8).
Table 2.8 Election results for M eerut—Mawana Lok Sabha 
constituency, 1967 (top four candidates)
Candidates Caste/Community Party Votes Polled
% of Total Valid 
Votes
Maharaj Singh Bharti Bania SSP 146,172 49.14
Shahnawaz Khan Muslim INC 107,276 36.06
S.K. Tyagi Tyagi BJS 24,403 8.20
M.M.P. Singh n.a. IND 19,612 6.59
Source: Election Commission of India, General Elections, India, 1967, Detailed Results, p. 66 of 79 
(Election Commission of India 1967).
The 1969 mid-term poll was recalled by many of my respondents as ‘communal’, 
in the sense that Hindu and Muslim communal parties dominated the electoral 
contest. The preceding event of violence greatly enhanced the communal 
polarisation of the city electorates, and the Muslim Majlis, a Muslim communal 
organisation, decided to contest the election in Meerut shortly before the
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election. After the violence in 1968, many Muslims were frightened by the 
increasing strength of Hindu Rightist organisations in the city and indicated the 
depth of their fear by their gravitation towards a communal candidate of their 
own. The Muslim Majlis candidate, Basir Ahmad Khan, appealed exclusively to 
the Muslim masses in his electoral campaign. Khan’s campaign was essentially 
composed of old Islamic symbols to remind the Muslim electorate of the 
glorious past of Islamic rule — and their plight deprived of those Islamic values 
and religious rights. Khan organised many religious meetings called Awaz 
(‘voice’, or ‘everybody speaks’) in different places, inviting women and illiterate 
people in particular to listen to his religious and political preaching. A Muslim 
respondent told me:
Basir Ahmad Khan was clever, using religious feelings to gain power...he used
religion for his own sake. Educated Muslims did not follow him. The 1969
Assembly was the first religion-based election. Khan made it communal.60
The election ended with the defeat of the Majlis by a small margin of 2,500 
votes. The defeat essentially derived from the split of the Muslim votes among 
the Majlis, Congress and the BKD (which had nominated a Muslim candidate) 
(see Table 2.9).
60 Interview with a Muslim Ansari lawyer and a former election advisor of Manzoor Ahamad, ex- 
MLA, on 1 February 2004. The description of Basir Ahmad’s election campaign is based on this 
interview.
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Table 2.9 Election results for M eerut city Legislative Assem bly
constituency, 1969 (top four candidates)
Candidates Caste/Community Party Votes Polled
% of Total 
Valid Votes
Mohan Lai Kapoor Punjabi BJS 25,735 34-21
Basir Ahmed Khan Muslim IND 23,259 30.92
Shakuntla Pundikaksh Brahmin INC 17,340 23.06
Nazir Ahmed Ansari Muslim BKD 5,036 6.69
Note: Basir Ahmad Khan, the candidate of the Muslim Majlis, was registered as an individual candidate in 
the election commission list.
Source: Election Commission of India, State Election, 1969 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, 
Detailed Results, p. 76 of 81 (Election Commission of India 1969).
It was notable, however, that the Majlis did attract substantial support from the 
Muslim electorate with its communal appeal, and almost won the election. After 
his defeat, Basir Ahmad established another Muslim communal party, a branch 
of the Indian Union Muslim League, and contested the 1971 Assembly election, 
losing by a large margin. It is important to note that these communal 
organisations or parties were hardly popular among Muslims in Meerut. After 
the 1971 elections, the Majlis and the Muslim League both quickly faded from 
the Meerut political scene. In retrospect, the 1969 Assembly seemed to be as far 
as a Muslim ethnic party could go. According to a leading Muslim intellectual, 
Muslims learned from this experience that a Muslim party aimed solely at 
Muslim interests would not gather enough momentum to win the election. It
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would be important for Muslims to make an alliance with another numerically 
strong caste or religious community.61
Political developments during the decade of the 1970s were centred around the 
Emergency and the historic defeat of the Congress in 1977. The Meerut Lok 
Sabha constituency in 1977 followed the general pattern in north India wherein 
the Janata Party — a strange and unstable combination of the Hindu Right, 
socialists, and the BKD — easily defeated the Congress after gaining 63.35 
percent of the vote share. The defeat caused in no small part by the defection of 
Muslim voters to the Janata Party. Various policies under the Emergency, 
particularly family planning and forced sterilisation policies, had, as elsewhere, 
given rise to strong resentment among the Muslim electorate in Meerut.
In the Assembly election held a few months later, however, the Congress 
sustained its seat by fielding a new type of Muslim Congress politician, Manzoor 
Ahamad. According to a BJP ex-MLA, the Congress Party chose a Muslim for 
the Assembly seat in order to ‘please’ the Muslim electorate after the Emergency 
(see Shakir 1990).62 Ahamad was a veteran Congress politician who had had a 
long career as an MLA before shifting his electoral battleground to Meerut city 
from his original constituency of Kithor, 25 km east of Meerut.63 Manzoor 
Ahamad was a very popular leader among large sections of Muslims. Although 
he was an ‘outsider’, Ahamad rented a house in the heart of the Old Town and
61 Interview with Professor Shahabbudin Ansari, a respected Muslim academic on 14 January, 
2004.
62 Interview with Mr. Amit Aggrawal, ex-MLA, on 16 April 2004.
63 Interview with Manzoor’s son, Mr. Shahid Manzoor, MLA, on 20 August 2003.
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spent a large amount of time in the city. Ahamad knew the art of political 
craftsmanship for mobilising voters. Although Ahamad’s caste background was 
Muslim Tyagi, one of the land-owning castes, he succeeded in creating an image 
of a socialist Muslim representing the poor and the downtrodden.
Ahamad associated himself with the Scheduled Castes and low-status Muslims. 
He took a Scheduled-Caste assistant with him everywhere he went and was 
known for his ‘big drama* public performances, holding babies and hugging 
children in Scheduled Caste constituencies.^ He established a good rapport and 
a political base particularly among the Ansari community, the largest Muslim 
community in the city. Many local leaders among the Ansaris exercised their 
influence in their community to mobilise support for Ahamad, becoming 
political intermediaries linking him with local Muslims. In exchange for these 
activities the Ansari leaders enjoyed Ahamad’s patronage and protection.^ In 
this style of electoral campaign, Ahamad succeeded in winning the 1977 and 
1980 Assembly elections consecutively. Ahamad stopped the dominant 
presence of the Jana Sangh in the Assembly seat, and the Hindu Right forces did 
not re-emerge in formal politics until the 1989 Assembly election in Meerut.
The revived electoral strength of the Congress was also evident in elections in 
the first half of the 1980s. Mohsina Kidwai seized the Lok Sabha seat in both 
1980 and 1984, while the Congress won the Assembly seat in 1980 with Manzoor 
Ahamad and with Pandit J. Narayan Sharma in 1985. These election results
64 Mr. Harish Pal, ex-MP on 25 April 2004.
65 Ansari supporters of Mr. Manzoor Ahamad on 28 November 2003 and 1 February 2004.
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show that despite Muslims’ discontent with the Congress Party and the latter’s 
increasingly hostile posture to the Muslim community during and after the 
Emergency, there were still many Muslims who supported the Congress. I often 
came across an expression of a special sense of attachment to the Congress Party 
among Muslim respondents as a source of hope and progress which reached 
back to an earlier Congress under Jawaharlal Nehru. On the other hand, I also 
heard negative comments about Congress ‘lip-service’ policies and empty 
promises. These mixed views towards the Congress among the Muslim 
electorate were a persistent feature during the old regime and led to the growing 
fragmentation of Muslim votes throughout these years.
2.4.1 Grass-roots efforts at political representation among non-elite 
M uslims
From the end of the 1970s there were sporadic attempts among a small section 
of low-status Muslims to increase their effective political representation. 
Although these attempts were small-scale and hardly successful, they showed 
that a section of low-status Muslims was conscious of the representation 
problem caused by the structural division between themselves and Muslim elite 
politicians under the Congress regime. It is important to note that these 
attempts were different from past efforts at consolidating Muslim votes, because 
they were not through co-optation by the political parties but via initiatives 
among local Muslims as an autonomous political force. These sporadic 
initiatives emerged at a grass-roots level and showed signs of change in Muslim 
politics. Shortly before the 1980 Assembly election, for example, Yusuf Qureshi,
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a lawyer and representative of the political organisation of his community, the
Qureshi Council, reportedly declared:
The Congress never gives the ticket to the backward communities. Congress 
belongs to the elite, but the Lok Dal gives the ticket to the weaker sections of the 
society and backward people. So we will support Charan Singh.66
The Lok Dal candidate was Abdul Majid Ansari, who was a leading lawyer, a 
socialist and political activist.^ Ansari contested for various socialist parties in 
the Assembly elections in 1962,1967 and 1974 but never achieved office. The 
Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), for which he stood in 1980, was a merger between the 
BKD and SSP. The 1980 election took the form of a straight contest between 
Manzoor Ahamad for the Congress Party and Mohan Lai Kapoor for the BJP. 
The Congress won with small margin of slightly over 3,000 votes (see Table 
2.10).
Table 2.10 Election results for Meerut city Legislative Assembly constituency, 
1980 (top four candidates)
Candidates Caste/Community Party Votes Polled
% of Total Valid 
Votes
Manzoor Ahamad Muslim Congress (I) 32,407 45-80
Mohan Lai Kapoor Punjabi BJP 29,023 41.02
Abdul Majid Ansari Muslim JND (SC) 6,648 9 4 0
Kazi Zaheer Alima Muslim IND 1,821 3-07
Source: Election Commission of India, State Election, 1980 to the legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, p. 
109 of 116 (Election Commission of India 1980).
66 Dainik Prabhat, 28 May 1980 (Dainik Prabhat (Meerut)).
67 Abdul Majid Ansari was actively involved in the first Muslim-Chamar political alliance under 
the RPI in 1964 mentioned above. Ansari was one of the elected councillors of the Municipal 
Board in 1964.
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Yusuf Qureshi’s declaration of support for Majid Ansari of the Lok Dal/the 
Janata Party underlined his electoral strategy of consolidating votes among 
Muslims against the Congress Party candidate, Manzoor Ahamad. Yusufs call 
for the consolidation of the Muslim vote was particularly directed at the Ansaris 
and Qureshis, the two largest Muslim communities, and to the Scheduled 
Castes, as Majid was contesting from a Scheduled Caste constituency. It was 
apparent from the election result, however, that a large proportion of Muslim 
and Scheduled Caste votes went to Congress, with Yusufs efforts being 
practically ignored on all sides. The Congress Party was in a particularly strong 
position in this election as it succeeded in drawing heavy support from the 
Scheduled Castes and Tribes at the national level (Brass 1994 (1990): 248).
The 1980 electoral result showed the limited influence of Qureshi political 
leadership at the time. The election was another example of the Muslims’ 
inability to develop a strong anti-Congress posture or to forge a solid common 
political identity as a Muslim community. Yusuf Qureshi’s initiative in 1980, 
however, might be seen as the forerunner of the emerging political alliance 
between the Qureshis and the Scheduled Castes, especially with the Chamar 
community that I discuss in Chapter Five. This political alliance became 
increasingly important for the Qureshis in finding political ground and space in 
local politics.
The first initiative between the two communities, however, took place slightly
earlier than Yusuf Qureshi’s public call for the consolidation of Muslim votes in
1980. The initiative was seen at the grass-roots level shortly before the 1977
Assembly election. I explain this with the help of the small episode below, which
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indicates both a demographic and social proximity between the Qureshi and 
Scheduled Caste communities, particularly the Chamars.
2.4.2 Dr. W ahid Qureshi’s initiative in the 1977 Assem bly 
election68
A Qureshi doctor contested the Assembly election of 1977. His support for 
Scheduled Caste communities in a personal capacity culminated in his 
contesting the Assembly seat. This was the first time in Meerut’s history that the 
name of a Qureshi had appeared on the list of Assembly election candidates. Dr. 
Wahid Qureshi belonged to a wealthy family that owned land within and outside 
Meerut city. His family migrated to Meerut in the 1950s from a nearby village 
and settled in a locality called Purwa Ilahi Baxi or alternatively the ‘ Jatav Gate’, 
where a large number of Jatavs or Chamars lived adjacent to the Qureshi 
community. It was located on the south edge of the Old Town.
Dr. Qureshi’s clinic was called ‘Darmarath Ausdhalaya’ (Charity Hospital)6? 
and the name was written in Hindi rather than Urdu so that it would be 
identifiable by his Hindu patients, who were mostly from the Scheduled Castes. 
Dr. Qureshi gave free consultations to residents in the area, especially those 
from the Scheduled Caste communities. He donated his land to those who could 
not afford to have a house. Subsequently, a Scheduled-Castes colony was
68 Interview with Dr. Wahid Qureshi on 18 March 2004.
69 Dr. Wahid Qureshi was a local doctor who practiced not only Unani but also Ayurvedic 
medicine and allopathy (conventional/western medicine) according to patients’ need.
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constructed which he named ‘Ambedkar nagar’ after the respected political 
leader of the Scheduled Castes.
The 1977 election marked an historic defeat of the Congress Party both at the 
centre and the state. Dr. Qureshi’s participation in the contest was rather a 
symbolic one, signifying the personal amicable relations between himself and 
the Scheduled Caste communities. Dr. Qureshi contested the election for the 
Congress for Democracy (CFD) which was created by a defected senior member 
of the Cabinet, Jagjivan Ram, with a broad national following of the Scheduled 
Castes in the revolt against Mrs. Gandhi shortly before the election. The CFD 
eventually decided to contest the election under the same electoral symbols and 
Party flag as the Janata coalition (Frankel 2005: 569) (see Table 2.11).
Table 2.11 Election results for M eerut city Legislative Assem bly 
constituency, 1977 (top six candidates)
Candidates Caste/Community Party Votes Polled
% of Total Valid 
Votes
Manzoor Ahamad Muslim Congress (I) 42,004 5351
Mohan Lai Kapoor Punjabi BJS 34,903 44.46
Deena Das Gupta Gupta HMS 773 0.98
Rajendra Kumar n.a. IND 321 0.41
Moh'd Sharif Siddiqui Muslim IND 291 0.37
Abdul Wahid Qureshi Muslim IND 206 0.26
Note: Dr. Qureshi contested the election on behalf of the Congress for Democracy.
Source: Election Commission of India, State Election, 1977 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, p. 
83 of 88 (Election Commission of India 1977).
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A local newspaper carried news that a representative from the Scheduled Castes 
community had offered Dr. Qureshi 501 rupees as a symbol of their support^0 
Dr. Wahid Qureshi ultimately came in sixth with 206 votes. This small but 
symbolic initiative of forming a political alliance between two very marginalised 
communities must be seen against the background of the renewed vigour of 
political mobilisation among the Scheduled Castes from the late 1970s onwards 
in UP. During this period there was a new form of political mobilisation among 
the Scheduled Castes, or more specifically among the Chamars. Inter-caste 
violence, especially between Jat landowners and the Scheduled Castes in Meerut 
District, increased in intensity in the 1980s (Pai 2002). This accelerated the 
momentum of political activism among the Chamars in western UP in general 
and in Meerut in particular. A senior ex-MLA from the Chamar community 
recalled: ‘There were many attempts to create a coalition between lower-status 
Muslims and the Scheduled Castes [in Meerut, but the distance between the two 
communities] increased, as there was much Hindu-Muslim violence in the city\ 
‘Higher-status Muslims never allowed Muslims in the lower rank to go 
forw ard ’, 71 and this was also the case for the upper-caste Hindus and the 
Scheduled Castes. The class issue brought the two most downtrodden 
communities together to make a political alliance across ethnic boundaries. A 
coalition with the Scheduled Castes increasingly became part of the strategy for 
the political mobilisation of low-status Muslims.
7° Dainik Prabhat, 23 May 1977.
t1 Interview with Mr. Raviti Saran Morya, ex-MLA on 17 March 2004.
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2.5 Conclusion
The history of Meerut electoral politics after Independence largely illustrates the 
marginalised position of ordinaiy Muslims in city politics. Meerut Muslims 
were mostly treated as passive voters for a ruling Congress machine. Local high- 
status Muslims in Meerut, on the other hand, were generally not politically 
active (Khan and Kidwai not being from Meerut), and Muslim politicians from 
the lower rungs were never able to obtain tickets to contest elections from the 
Congress.72 Those who contested elections from the non-Congress parties were 
hardly ever successful prior to 1993.73 While many Muslim respondents from 
the lower ranks expressed increasingly negative views of the Congress Party, 
based largely on promises that had never been fulfilled, it was also the case that 
Muslims were not able to grow a sense of solidarity among themselves as a 
unified force against the Congress. The Muslim vote was frequently split 
between two parties and candidates, to the advantage of a third candidate, often 
from the Hindu Right, who then won the election.
Insofar as Muslims did engage the organised polity as a collective force in the 
1960s or 1970s they often did so by deploying what Anthony Smith calls ‘ethno-
T2 Interviews with a former political advisor to Manzoor Ahamad on 1 February 2004, and other 
Muslim respondents.
73 There was one exception to this. Nazir Ahmad Ansari, a BKD candidate was successfully 
elected to office in the 1974 Assembly election in the adjacent Sardhana constituency. Ansari 
was a leading lawyer and had contested in the 1969 Meerut City Assembly constituency for the 
BKD and finished fourth. He came from a prominent family that had played the leadership role 
in village politics (Pradhan) in the village Panchayat for generations. It might be fair to assume 
that his family background linked him to Charan Singh and made his candidacy for the BKD 
possible.
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symbolic repertoires’ (Smith 1998:224), wherein minority groups seek to assert 
separate group rights and identity. Such assertions of separateness — as, for 
example, that of the Majlis — drove the Muslim community further away from 
the majority society and helped provide fertile soil for Hindu nationalists 
seeking to deploy communal violence for their own political reasons. It was 
perhaps predictable that in Meerut city and District, even more so than in other 
parts of UP, a vicious cycle of riot productions emerged that linked Hindu- 
Muslim violence to the political cycle and left poor Muslim households 
increasingly vulnerable as the Congress Party moved further to the Right. As I 
explain in the next chapter, things got much worse in the 1980s, making it even 
more urgent to explain and understand the main tale of this thesis, the relative 
calm of the 1990s. Before I turn to this task, however, the events of the 1980s lie 
before us in Chapter Three, and most especially the Muslim killings in May 1987.
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Appendix 2 .1  The M eerut District constituency for the Lok Sabha 
election
In Meerut District there are five constituencies for the State Legislative 
Assembly which form one large constituency for the Lok Sabha election, called 
the Meerut-Mawana Lok Sabha constituency (see Table 2.12).
Table 2.12 Five Legislative Assem bly constituencies in M eerut 
D istrict, 2003
Constituency Voters
Kithor 239,060
Hastnapur 233,507
Meerut Cantonment 301,986
Meerut city 295,725
Kharkhauda 214,171
Total 1,283,449
Source: Local Office of Amar Ujjala newspaper in Meerut.
Two more Assembly seats in Meerut District, Sardhana and Siwalkhas, go to 
different districts on the occasion of the Lok Sabha elections (see Table 2.13).
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Table 2.13 Two m ore Legislative Assem bly constituencies in M eerut
D istrict, 2003
Constituency Voters
Sardhana 258,829
Siwalkhas 275,376
Total 534,205
Source: Local office oiAmar Ujjala newspaper in Meerut.
Sardhana goes under Muzaffarnagar District and forms one Lok Sabha seat. In 
the same way, Siwalkhas goes under the new Baghpat District (carved out from 
Meerut District in 1998) and forms one Lok Sabha seat. One of the five 
Assembly seats in Baghpat District, Bamawa, is divided between Meerut and 
Baghpat Districts on the occasion of the Assembly elections, and about 81,000 
votes are counted under Meerut District. The total number of voters in Meerut 
District is 1,899,407.74
74 Interview with a local veteran journalist of Amar Ujjala newspaper in Meerut on 15 April
2004.
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Chapter 3: Bare Life? Anti-M uslim V iolence in  M eerut 
and the Events o f April-May 1987
Dipesh Chakrabarty...has recently argued that the term “communalism” to 
describe ethnic relations in India should in fact be replaced by “racism”...for 
example, informal unwillingness to sell property to Muslims — to which one 
could add references to Muslims as dirty or having too many children...One can 
also link Indian Muslims ...to outsiders, secretly privileged and powerful, in short, 
the language once used of European Jews. In all these cases minorities are forced 
to play roles not of their own choosing, not least that of foil against which the 
unity of others — Hindus, the nation — can be constituted, and injustices of class 
and wealth obscured. The history that identifies Indian Muslims as aliens, 
destroyers, and crypto-Pakistanis, with its profound moral and political 
implications for citizenship and entitlements, is critical in sustaining that role. It 
presumably cannot be successfully challenged until, as has happened only 
partially and very recently in US in relation to African-Americans, the social and 
political interests that sustain belief in fundamental difference are changed 
(Metcalf 1995: 962-963).
3.1 Introduction
In Chapters One and Two I tried to give a sense of some of the fundamental 
problems that have faced Muslims in India, as well as in Uttar Pradesh and in 
Meerut, since Independence/Partition. At the heart of these problems are long­
standing patterns of political dependence (notably on Congress Party patrons) 
that have done little to alleviate persistent discrimination against Muslims in 
private and public sector labour markets, including in relation to government 
jobs, and in the sphere of education. Divisions within the Muslim community
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have only added to a perceived ineffectiveness of Muslim political leaders, not to 
say a sense of their apparent passivity in the public sphere. Worse, the 
surrounding political situation became increasingly dangerous for Muslims in 
UP from the time of the Emergency to the 1980s and early-i990s.
In this Chapter I provide a close reading of the ethnic violence that engulfed 
Meerut city and surrounding areas in April-May 1987, and which was directed 
above all at local Muslims in Meerut. As Barbara Metcalf explains above, in her 
presidential address to the (American) Association for Asian Studies in the mid- 
1990s, India’s Muslims by the 1980s were increasingly being defined as 
outsiders, and not infrequently as dirty or menacing threats to the bodily 
integrity of an avowedly Hindu nation (rashtra). As is well known, violence 
against minority groups is often first made possible by processes of ‘Othering’, 
which render those populations as foreign, if not indeed as foreign bodies (in the 
doubly valent sense of an alien infection). In a large degree it was the political 
and cultural Othering of Meerut’s Muslim populations which laid the foundation 
stone for the mass killing of Muslims by the PAC in May 1987. By the same 
token, it was the chilling ferocity of the 1987 violence, and the failure of the 
Congress Party to support its Muslim voters, that encouraged many among 
Meerut’s Muslim populations to adopt new strategies for political empowerment 
and protection at the end of the 1980s and into the 1990s. The dynamics of this 
new Muslim political agency are mainly described in the second part of this 
thesis, in Chapters Four to Six, but I end this chapter by pointing towards the 
new forms of political engagement that would be developed post-1987 within 
Meerut’s Muslim populations.
109
3.2 Communal V iolence in M eerut after Independence
Writing about ethnic violence is never an easy matter. Much has been written 
about the rise or re-emergence of Hindu nationalism in India in the 1980s, and 
about its controlling ideology of Hindutva, but we know rather less about the 
political violence that communalist politics has spawned, and even less so about 
the perspectives of its victims, whether Hindu, Muslim or Sikh.
There are, however, some important exceptions to this rule. Stanley Tambiah’s 
research (1996) on anti-Sikh violence in Delhi in October 1984 following the 
assassination of Indira Gandhi comes quickly to mind, along with Salman 
Rushdie’s (1991) harrowing essay on the Sikh victims of a pogrom planned by 
Congress Party workers across the city. We know that violence is never as 
random as many news reports are inclined to suggest. Work and organization go 
into these awful outbursts of seemingly uncontained aggression, an observation 
that is very clearly underlined in Amrita Basu’s (1997) careful ethnographic 
exploration of the Bijnor riots of October 1990. Basu, like Wilkinson and Brass 
(see Chapter 1) is mindful of the fact that most ward- or town-level episodes of 
communal violence have links to political calculations that take shape at state 
and possibly also national levels. Basu also remarks on what she considers a 
general tendency among media and scholarly circles to show a bias against 
Muslims (Basu 1997: 405-406), and this question of the ‘politics’ of writing 
about ‘communal violence’ is also to the fore in the recent work of Gyanendra 
Pandey, including his essay on the communal violence that took place in 
Bhagalpur in Bihar in October-November 1989 (note also Chakrabarty’s
110
suggestion that the word ‘racism’ should replace ‘communalism’ in reference to 
Hindu-Muslim interactions).75
Pandey points up a ‘homogenising’ tendency in ‘the historiography of sectarian 
strife’, including those models of communal violence that are rooted in ideas 
about economic or political competition. For Pandey, this kind of 
historiography neglects those critical aspects of violence which comprise ‘history 
or notions of honour, or the centrality of religion or people’s attachment to 
particular cultural and religious symbols’ (Pandey 1998: 17). Indian 
historiography, the central theme of which has always been the nationalism of 
the Hindu majority, according to Pandey, has had the Brahmanical Hindu 
middle class as its leading actor. The remaining ‘fragments’ of Indian society, 
including its religious minorities and its (numerically dominant) backward caste 
communities, are often nowhere to be found in this historiography. This state- 
centred explanation of violence provides little room, Pandey suggests, ‘for the 
emotions of people for feelings and perceptions — in short, little room for 
agency’ (ibid. 18).
In this chapter I draw on Pandey’s insight to emphasize the importance of 
understanding violence from the perspectives of its victims, or the forgotten 
‘fragments’. I neither describe the violence of April-May 1987 as an end in itself, 
nor do I seek a complete explanation for why the violence took place in Meerut. 
Rather, I seek to explain how Muslims were caught up in the violence and how
75 The Bhagalpur violence in October-November 1989 left more than 1,000 Muslims dead. It 
was the largest-scale Muslim killing during the decade.
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they came out of it to reconstruct their lives and communities. My major 
purpose, in other words, is to illuminate those Muslim perceptions and feelings 
that set the foundation for the emerging new sense of Muslim ‘agency* that is the 
subject of the chapters in Part Two.
In the following section I first briefly review academic literature on communal 
violence in Meerut city. I then go on to a close description and analysis of the 
violence in April and May 1987.
3.2.1 Academic literature on communal violence in Meerut
Meerut has been scarred by many incidents of Hindu-Muslim violence since 
Independence, just like many towns and cities in north India. It is a mistake to 
assume that communalism withered away in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s only to 
appear again in the 1980s (see Chapter 2). Key incidents prior to the 1980s 
occurred in Meerut in 1961, 1968 and 1973. The scale of killing in these 
incidents, however, was much smaller than those after the 1980s (see Table 3.1).
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Table 3.1 Hindu-Muslim violence in Meerut city after Independence
Year Date Incidents Official death toll Unofficial estimates
1961 5-8 October Curfew 6/10 -16/10 18 17*
1968 28-30 January Curfew 28/1 - 4/2 12 17*
1973 11-Dec Curfew 11/12 -  29/12 7
1982 7-11 September Large rioting involving murder 11*
29-30 September- 
1 October
As above plus mass 
murder of Muslims 31* 85*
1986 14-Feb Muslim protest led to sporadic violence
no death, 24 
injured
1986 20,26-28 February
Curfew after several 
incidents of stabbing 6
1986 2-4 March Curfew after several incidents of stabbing 3
1987 April-July Large rioting (see below)
172 (Hindu 41, 
Muslim 131) 163/329*
1988 14-15 April One killed by police firing
1988 12-Aug One killed by police firing 1
1989 21-Jan Tension
1989 3 and 24,29,30 April No curfew
1989 15 June, 21 July Minor incidents
1989
14, 23 August, 5 
October, 9 
December
Minor incidents 1*
1990 20,31 January Minor property dispute
1990 26 April, 11 May, 17 and 25-26 June
Arson, looting 
targeting Hindu shops, 
no curfew
1990 24 October, 2-5 November
Two injured by 
stabbing, curfew on 2 
November, arson and 
looting
12* 16*
1990* 12-13 December 1* 4*
1991 20-28 May Election violence 31
1991 12-13 June 1
Sources: Meerut LIU Report. * Data from Brass, P. (2004) 'Development of an Institutionalised Riot 
System in Meerut City, 1961-1982’ in Economic and Political Weekly (vol. 39, no.44,30 October 2004), 
pp. 4839-4848 (Brass 2004).
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Fewer than 20 people were killed during the 1961,1968 and 1973 outbreaks of 
violence. On the other hand, the casualties of the September-October 1982 
violence have been estimated at 50 to 8o76
Stanley Tambiah in his monumental study of ethnic violence in south Asia 
describes Meerut as a city marked by ‘intermittent ethnic riots’, juxtaposing it 
with Colombo, the centre of recurrent and the most vicious ethnic riots in Sri 
Lanka (Tambiah 1996: 214). Intermittent ethnic riots occur, according to 
Tambiah, in a series with antecedent violence influencing the unfolding of 
subsequent ones (ibid.). Tambiah conceives that this recurrent state of violence 
is enacted less in forms of economic, class or other social conflicts, but more as a 
‘force and agency* that has obtained a ‘self-legitimating sphere of social 
discourse and transaction’ in its own right that directs and shapes political 
actions (ibid. 223).
Tambiah’s conception concerning the chronic state of ethnic violence or what he 
calls ‘routinisation’ of violence has a striking resonance in Paul Brass’ work on 
the ‘Institutionalised Riot System’ (IRS), and Brass uses Meerut as the principal 
site to verify and exemplify its existence (2004). Based on an extensive 
interview with an eye-witness, Brass explains the 1961 violence in the city as the 
moment of the inception of the Meerut IRS. Brass argues that the IRS in Meerut 
was implanted by a Hindu student who had come from Aligarh. The 1961
76 The wide difference in official figures of the number of dead probably came from the fact that 
it did not include those 30 Muslims who were killed by the PAC in the Old Town. This same 
practice of omission of the Muslim mass killing was repeated in the 1987 state- appointed 
Inquiry Report.
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violence began in Aligarh and spread to different towns in western UP. The 
incident in Aligarh began with the severe beating of this Hindu student, Iqbal 
Singh, and several other Hindu boys, by Muslim students in the aftermath of a 
contentious Aligarh Muslim University Students’ Union election. While the 
quarrel triggered rioting in Aligarh, according to Brass, Singh left Aligarh and 
came to Meerut where his father was stationed as a police officer in the Kotwali 
Police. Brass conceives that the violent incident in Meerut began in a similar 
manner as in Aligarh, that is, Hindu students from the local colleges were 
contacted and aroused by Iqbal Singh who was bent on revenge, and set out in a 
procession towards an old Muslim inter-college marching through Muslim 
localities. Brass maintains that the ensuing violence was deliberately triggered 
by the provocative Hindu procession rather than being spontaneous mob 
violence, which indicates signs of planning and organisation. The processionists 
included local politicians and key figures of the administration who all took the 
side of the Hindus and duly attacked Muslims. Brass maintains that the IRS 
usually functions in close connection with elections. In this case the timing of 
the riot was only four months before the third General Elections to be held in 
February 1962. The broader political implication of the riots in 1961 was, 
according to Brass, to increase both the Hindu and Muslim votes against the 
Congress in order to make the Jana Sangh the chief beneficiary (Brass 2004: 
4843). The candidates of the Jana Sangh between 1952 and 1962 polled poorly 
because the Congress Party dominated the Meerut City constituency. In the 
February 1962 Legislative Assembly elections after the September-October riots, 
the Hindu militant parties (the Jana Sangh and the Hindu Mahasabha) did 
succeed in increasing their votes by swallowing the Congress vote (see Chapter 
2).
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According to Brass the IRS transplanted in Meerut from Aligarh grew steadily 
over the coming decades, and the full development of the Meerut IRS was seen 
in the 1982 violence, twenty years later. Brass notes that the progression of the 
Meerut IRS is observed in terms of the growing scale of police involvement, the 
larger spatial expansion of violence and the increase in numbers of casualties 
and degrees of atrocities committed during the event in 1982. Further, Brass 
claims that the 1982 violence had set ‘the great trial run’ of the riot system that 
worked during the May 1987 violence (ibid. 4843). While there were many 
repertoires seen in 1982 that reappeared in the 1987 violence, the mass murder 
of 29 to 30 unarmed Muslims by the bullets of the Provincial Armed 
Constabulary (PAC) in 1982 was in particular a ‘rehearsal’ for the larger scale 
Muslim massacre to be seen in 1987. Brass maintains that the 1987 violence was 
the ‘culmination of a quarter century of development of the Meerut IRS’ (ibid.).
Brass discerns that the IRS was constructed by various Hindu nationalist figures
and organisations including the VHP and the RSS for their vested political
interests. The existence of powerful Hindu militant organisations in Meerut is
the consistent theme in the writings on communal violence in Meerut city. N. L.
Gupta points out, for example, the high popularity (and strength) of the Hindu
militant organisations in Meerut politics that include the RSS, Jana Sangh and
Hindu Mahasabha prior to the 1968 violence in the city (Gupta 2000: 36).
While those Hindu militant organisations gathered force in the mid 1960s in
Meerut and elsewhere, according to Gupta, Muslims were divided among
themselves because of the significant split within the Jamait-ul-Ulemae-Hind
that yielded another Muslim communal organisation, the Mojlis-e-Mushawarat
in 1964. Gupta describes how rigorously political campaigns were waged by the
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leaders of the local RSS and the Hindu Mahasabha, using the media and forming 
rallies with inflammatory posters and leaflets, in order to oppose the visit of 
Sheikh Abdullah (the Prime Minister of Kashmir) to Meerut city. Abdullah was 
invited jointly by the Congress Party and the Jamait-ul-Ulemae-Hind. This 
would eventually lead to the collective violence in 1968 (Gupta 2000: 37) (see 
Chapter 2). Donald Horowitz, on the other hand, points out that the violence in 
1968 in Meerut was preceded by the 1967 General Elections that indicated 
Muslims were shifting away from Congress candidates. Horowitz rightly 
observes that the changes in the Congress Party votes have recurrently been 
associated with violence occurring thereafter (Horowitz 2001:335). This will be 
the case again seen in the 1987 violence described below.
Meerut is also often seen as a ‘typical’ town which has all the socio-economic
characteristics observed in the ‘riot-prone’ cities and towns in India. These
characteristics were identified by several Indian scholars including Asghar Ali
Engineer. These are essentially 1) middle-sized towns with a histoiy of
communal violence; 2) with the proportion of Muslims being more than 30
percent; 3) a section of Muslims being generally well-to-do and in competition
with Hindu traders (Engineer 1987b, 1991 (1984), 1995b; Shakir 1991 (1984);
Ghosh 1987; cf. Wilkinson 1995). Asghar Ali Engineer refers to these
characteristics in his analysis of both the 1982 and 1987 violence in Meerut
(Engineer 1987b, 1991 (1984)). Engineer observes that in 1982 a section of
Muslims in the handloom industry and brass band manufacturing were quite
prosperous. The Hindu traders, Banias, who controlled the handloom industry,
formed the ‘bedrock’ of the RSS and also financed the local VHP. According to
both Engineer and Paul Brass, the organisation was particularly active in Meerut
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in 1982. Engineer emphasises that the VHP was trying to woo the Scheduled 
Castes to fight against the Muslims in order to split their votes which were 
normally exercised in favour of the Congress. The Sangh Parivar also carried out 
aggressive anti-Muslim propaganda in the Scheduled Caste localities. Such 
tactics, Engineer notes, ‘keep Harijans away from the Muslims and wreck efforts 
at unity between the two’ groups (Engineer 1991 (1984): 273). As a 
consequence, significant numbers of Valmikis (sweepers) were recruited by the 
RSS to fight against Muslims (Engineer 1982: 1803). The recruitment of the 
Scheduled Castes by upper-caste Hindus at the time of the violence was an 
important feature that was repeated during the 1987 violence.
The violence in September-October 1982 is relatively well documented by 
several authors (Chishti 1982; Engineer 1982,1991 (1984); Khan 1992; Brass 
2004). The incident began after a long dispute over property rights between a 
Muslim lawyer and a Hindu resident in March 1982 took on a religious 
dimension. The seeds of collective violence were sown when Muslims objected to 
the tolling of a bell at the time of Iftaar dinner during Ramadan. The bell had 
been installed in the temple built on the disputed property, which was allegedly 
a Hindu holy site. With the intervention of the local administration a time for 
the bell was fixed, but it continued to ring during Muslim prayer time. The 
murder of the priest of the temple finally triggered rioting between Hindus and 
Muslims. The event was concluded by the above-mentioned mass killing of 
Muslims that included children and women by the PAC in a closed building in
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the Old Town (Brass 2007 (2004): ioi-ic>5).77 The 1982 violence preceded 
elections to the Municipal Council, and occurred at a time when the BJP was 
trying desperately to expand its influence in Meerut. According to Engineer and 
others, the key political figures of the BJP, including ex-MLA Mohan Lai 
Kapoor, and cadres of the VHP and the RSS were actively involved in the 
violence. The election was consequently countermanded. On the Muslim side, 
on the other hand, Imam Bukhari of Jama Masjid in Delhi visited Meerut several 
times during the built-up phase of the violence. The Congress (I) incumbent 
MP, Mohsina Kidwai, and ex-MP, Shahnawaz Khan were also involved in 
creating reactionary Muslim response to Hindu provocations (Engineer 1991 
(1984): 280).
Dildar Khan’s study of the 1987 violence in Meerut is based on his survey data of 
‘perception’ and ‘allegations and apprehensions’ of both Muslim and Hindu 
respondents that provide an interesting perspective to the actual event of 
violence. While Khan reveals neither in which part of the city the survey was 
conducted nor the number of respondents and their caste or community 
background, the survey data sensibly reveals historical antagonism between 
Hindus and Muslims in Meerut, as well as a sense of insecurity widely shared 
among the Muslims, particularly on account of the presence of the PAC in the 
Muslim-majority mohallas (Khan 1992:457-463). In analysing the causes of the 
1987 violence Khan emphasises the economic competition between the Hindu 
traders and Muslim new merchant-manufacturers in the artisanal industries,
77 Interview with Mr. Yusuf Qureshi, president of the District Congress Committee at the time of 
interview, on 18 March 2004. Also, see ‘The PAC: Ghosts of Meerut’, Economic and Political 
Weekly, 28 November 1987, p. 2031 (Economic and Political Weekly (New Delhi)).
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particularly the powerloom industry which was worst hit during the 1987 
violence. Khan notes that the trading and marketing of finished products both 
in the textile and scissor manufacturing industries were dominated by Banias, 
Jains, Rastogis and Marwaris. Khan also reports that shortly after the 1982 
violence a small number of Ansaris and Saifies (carpenters/scissor 
manufacturers) began to emerge in the cloth, yarn and scissors trades in an 
attempt to break the Hindu dominance. The economic competition was further 
accelerated when some of the Hindu traders and suppliers of raw materials 
established their own powerloom units (ibid. 467). Some Muslim manufacturers 
believed, according to Khan, that this was a conscious attempt by Hindu traders 
to displace Muslims from the textile industry. Khan concludes that those who 
instigated the violence in 1987 were local community leaders, traders and 
merchant manufacturers, seizing the opportunity to give their economic 
antagonism a communal colour.
Asghar Ali Engineer, on the other hand, provides the detailed accounts of the
political situation in Meerut as an important background to the violence in
April-May 1987. Engineer conceives the Babri mosque/Ram janambhoomi
issue formed the underlying cause of the 1987 violence. The Babri Masjid rally
held in Delhi in March to April 1987 significantly augmented communal tension
in the city. Engineer also points out that there was the power struggle between
Hindu and Muslim politicians within the ruling Congress. It was mainly derived
from the high percentage of the Muslim population in the city, which made it
difficult for the Hindu Congress candidates to obtain the ticket. Many Congress
MLAs were encouraging the mobs to loot and burn during the violence,
according to Engineer’s many eye witnesses. Also, it is reported that a large
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section of Muslims were ‘totally alienated’ from the ruling Congress, and even 
the current Muslim MP, Mohsina Kidwai, was largely elected by non-Muslim 
votes in the 1984 Lok Sabha. It is alleged, according to Engineer, that UP Chief 
Minister Veer Bahadur Singh ‘wanted to teach these Muslims a lesson for not 
voting Congress’ (Engineer 1987b: 22). Also, due to the rise of the middle castes, 
the Brahmins were beginning to loose their grip on political power. Engineer 
points out that they were hence attracted more toward religio-political 
organisations such as the VHP. Finally, Engineer maintains that the progress of 
democratic politics brought ever greater political consciousness and increasing 
assertion to the weaker sections and minorities on the one hand, and more 
ruthlessness and a greater degree of corruption among the upper and stronger 
sections of society on the other (ibid. 20).
Among the important features seen in the ethnic violence in May 1987, the
massacre of a large number of unarmed Muslims by the PAC made the Meerut
violence particularly distinct from other similar incidents triggered by the
Ayodhya agitation in other towns and cities in UP during this period. Veena Das
conceives that the 1987 violence in Meerut was a type of state violence under the
legitimacy of the modern state apparatus. The so-called ‘legitimate force’ of the
state transmutes itself into brutal terror particularly when the state forces are
used to control expressions of discontent (Das 1990: 24). Das also points out
that more people are usually killed in police violence than in communal clashes
during the so-called communal violence in India. The violence came to be seen,
according to Das, as not only involving the two communities of Hindus and
Muslims but also the community versus the state. It is particularly the case in
India because the perpetrators of such violence, the state forces, tend to go
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unpunished and enjoy impunity (ibid. 19). After the 1987 violence, the 
commandant of the 44th Battalion of the PAC who led the Muslim massacre, for 
example, was suspended for one day and reinstated next day (Engineer 1987b: 
31). The ostensively biased local administration and the police who turned a 
blind eye to the killing spree of Hindu rioters or became active participants in 
rioting on the Hindu side were commonly observed in those incidents in 1961, 
1968, 1982 and 1987. None of the officials and their men have ever been 
punished by the state or central government. On these occasions, Muslims are 
described as fighters in the initial stage of the violent incident only to become 
the object of massive retaliations from the Hindu side with the aid of the local 
administration and police forces in the later stages. The majority of the victims 
were usually from the Muslim side. It is notable that both the 1982 and 1987 
violence ended with the Muslim massacre by the PAC.
This general observation however does not seem to be the case in 1990. In his
contribution to N.L. Gupta’s volume on communal riots in India, Devendra
Singh, a local trade unionist, provides an interesting observation of the city from
August to October 1990, the period of arguably the most inflammatory and
dangerous communal situation in UP. Singh describes how frequently Hindu
ceremonies and other similar events were held in Meerut in support of the
temple construction in Ayodhya and the BJP-led procession, rath yatra. The
leaders of Hindu militant organisations including the VHP and the Shiv Sena
were actively spreading communal propaganda through the Bajrang Dal. In
spite of these activities, however, Singh explains how the city of Meerut
remained ‘an isolated island of peace’ surrounded on all sides by curfew and
riot-affected cities—notably Delhi, Muzaffamagar, Aligarh and Bijnor (Singh
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2000: 207). Singh also provides a detailed account of sporadic violence in the 
form of arson, looting and stabbing that took place at different spots of the city 
for 2-5 November 1990. The local administration however quickly imposed a 
curfew on 3 November when the military flag march went through sensitive 
localities of the city (ibid.). Singh’s description suggests the presence of a very 
efficient administration in contrast to the one we saw prior to the 1990s. The 
series of sporadic incidents in November 1990 in the end did not lead to the 
eruption of large-scale ethnic violence.
A similar instance occurred in May 1991 on the day of the General Election. 
Asghar Ali Engineer describes this incident as election violence (Engineer 1992). 
Violence began with booth-capturing?8 by B JP workers, which was followed by 
an altercation in the area of the election booths. The most gruesome event took 
place in a cinema hall where Muslim labourers were locked in while watching a 
film and massacred by Hindu BJP workers. The incident left 31 dead, 108 
injured and led to over 1,000 arrests .T here  were many Muslim eyewitnesses 
who saw injured Muslims bleeding and running in the streets to escape from 
Hindu BJP workers. The Election Commission of India countermanded both 
the elections for the state Assembly and for the Lok Sabha. According to Asghar 
Ali Engineer, the pre-poll analysis had estimated the high probability of a 
Muslim candidate, Ayuub Ansari, from the Janata Dal, winning the election. The 
BJP workers, therefore, created turbulence in order to effect the
78 Booth-capturing means that workers hired by a political party prevent voters casting their vote 
at the booth.
79 The Meerut Local Intelligence Unit Report (hereafter, Meerut LIU Report) unless otherwise 
indicated (Government of Uttar Pradesh n.d.).
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countermanding of the elections (ibid.). Yet again, this incident did not lead to 
the eruption of large-scale ethnic violence. The following chapters in Part Two 
explain why and how a more peaceful Meerut appeared in the 1990s in contrast 
to the previous decades, focusing mainly on the story of changing Muslim 
politics and its agency.
3.2.2 Build up to the 1987 violence, 1984-1987
After the General Elections in 1984, the Ayodhya controversy had coloured 
public discourse in large degree, and this was reflected in the local scene in 
Meerut. The populist techniques of the new Congress Prime Minister, Rajiv 
Gandhi, were increasingly revealed after the historic verdict of the Shah Bano 
case on 23 April 1985. After the reopening of the Babri Masjid in 1986, anti- 
Muslim rhetoric was actively promoted by a number of Hindu militant 
organisations that began mushrooming in Meerut. Many of my respondents 
remarked that polarisation between Hindus and Muslims was rapidly advanced 
by the various activities of communal organisations of both communities during 
this period.
Leaders of Hindu militant organisations, including the RSS and VHP, organised 
many mass rallies in the city in the mid-1980s.80 Arya Samaj activists appealed
80 The president of the Akhil Bharatiya Vidhyarthi Parishad, another Hindu nationalist 
organisation, reportedly said that what was anticipated was not just a riot but a war waged 
against the creation of a new Pakistan. The war was to be fought on the strength of (Muslims’) 
petro-dollars and at the instigation of a neighbouring country. Radiance, 17-21 June 1987 
(Radiance (New Delhi)). Radiance is Muslim weekly periodical published in New Delhi.
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for the formation of a consolidated body of Hindu nationalist organisations to 
create a joint programme to promote the cause of the Ram temple 
construction.81 The Babri Masjid Action Committee (BMAC) of Syed 
Shahabuddin opened a branch in Meerut during the same period. These 
organisations addressed a number of small meetings at the mohalla level as well 
(Akbar 1988:156). Also, the local administration banned the Janaki Rath Ram 
(Hindu religious procession) organised by the VHP from entering the city on 18 
February 1986.82
The unlocking of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya on 1 February 1986 sparked a 
series of minor communal clashes in many cities in UP. On 14 February 1986, 
the BMAC called for an all-UP bandh (strike) to protest against the opening of 
the gate of the mosque two weeks earlier. In Meerut, tension mounted on the 
day of the strike. Shops were closed in Muslim localities and black flags flew on 
the rooftops, while in Hindu localities saffron flags were raised. The local 
Muslim League organised a petition against the unlocking of the Babri Masjid 
site and presented it to the District Magistrate (DM). The Meerut Local 
Intelligence Unit (LIU) Report notes that, after visiting the DM’s office, Muslim 
League members began shouting provocative slogans such as ‘Allah-O-Akbar' 
(Allah is great). On the same day 200 Muslim youths organised a procession 
through Hindu market areas during which time Hindu youths taunted Muslim 
youths with: ‘Have you got your Babri back?’83 This comment triggered an
81 Dainik Prabhat, 22 February 1986 (Dainik Prabhat (Meerut)).
82 Dainik Prabhat, 18 February 1986 (Dainik Prabhat (Meerut)).
83 Interview with Mr. V.K.B. Nair, then Superintendent Police (SP) in Meerut on 11 January 
2001, Lucknow. He was in this position from January 1986 to 22 May 1987. At the time of
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altercation that was followed by a wave of sporadic violence — stabbing, arson 
and stone pelting. Similar scenes occurred in many cities in UP on the same day 
and continued until early March.8^
New Muslim leaders, including Imam Bukhari and Syed Shahabuddin,85 
successfully encouraged Muslims to be more aggressive and assertive both in 
their public stance and in their demands. In Bukhari’s huge rally at the Boat 
Club in New Delhi on 30 March 1987, both leaders made inflammatory 
speeches, implicitly calling Muslims to violent action to defend themselves 
against ‘Hindu majoritarian aggression’. Their calls for violent protest resonated 
with many young people who were attending the rally on that day from Meerut 
city (Akbar 1988:156). The Shahabuddin-led BMAC had actively been involved 
in the build-up phase by organising small meetings at the mohalla level prior to 
the April-May violence in Meerut city that occurred only a few weeks after the 
rally in Delhi. Both leaders frequently visited the city during the same period 
(Engineer 1987b).
interview he was Additional Director General of Police, CBCID (Crime Branch Crime
Investigation Department) in Lucknow.
Hindustan Times, February to March 1986 (The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)).
85 These leaders emerged onto the national stage on the occasion of the Shah Bano affair in 1985. 
Bhukari was Shahi Imam of Jama Masjid in Delhi. Shahabuddin was a diplomat turned 
politician. They were known for their conservative and aggressive stance during the period 
leading up to the demolition of the Babri Masjid.
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3*2.3 The events o f April-May 1987
After the rally in Delhi, rumours were rife and tensions were building in 
Meerut.86 There were rumours not only of a Muslim resurgence but also that 
Pakistanis were infiltrating Meerut with sophisticated weapons in order to 
destabilise the entire country .87 Two weeks after the rally in Delhi, communal 
violence engulfed the city on the eve of the Muslim religious festival of Shab-a- 
Barat, a celebration which includes competitions with fireworks and crackers. 
On 14 April 1987 a group of young Muslims competed with one another to throw 
firecrackers onto the Muslim side of the Shah-Peer Gate in the middle of the 
preparations for the festival (see Maps 3.1 and 3.2 in Appendix 3.1).
Somehow their firecrackers fell on a Hindu shop and burnt blinds. A verbal 
quarrel followed which quickly turned into stone-throwing between two groups. 
A witness to the incident commented that Muslim youths at this point started 
shouting anti-government slogans, demanding as well that the Babri Masjid 
should be taken back. Police firing followed and two to five Muslim boys were 
killed on the spot. After this incident, rioting spread to different parts of the Old 
Town. The event left 12 to 14 people dead across both communities. Fifty-two 
shops were burnt down, and a curfew was imposed from 16-27 April (Meerut 
LIU Report). The April violence, however, did not come to an end because the
86 This section is based on a local witness’s statement during interview on 30 December 2001. A
different report of this starting scene says that the firecracker fell on a constable who was drunk,
and as a result started blindly shooting. Mainstream, 18 July 1987 CMainstream (New Delhi)).
Also, see New Age, 31 May 1987 (New Age (New Delhi)).
8? Radiance, 21-27 June 1987.
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tension did not fully recede until after another event of violence that occurred 
within less than a month. The two consecutive events of violence might be seen 
as one large and prolonged event in which the one in April was the basis of the 
more disturbing events of May 1987.
The second phase of this violence began on 16 May, with the worst of it ceasing 
around 30 May 1987. The May violence of 1987 was one of the most chilling 
examples of Hindu-Muslim (or anti-Muslim) violence in India since Partition. 
For seven days, arson, stabbing, looting and killing continued largely unabated 
despite the apparently large-scale deployment of police and paramilitary forces 
by the state government from May 19 onwards.88 On 23 May the army was 
called into the city. Yet Meerut continued to simmer with recurrent incidents of 
sporadic killing, explosions and stabbing for well over five m on th s.8  ^ The curfew 
was not lifted completely until 6 September 1987. Official figures at that time 
listed 172 deaths (Hindus 41, Muslims 131), with 623 houses, 344 shops and 14 
factories destroyed, looted and burnt; the number of wounded was estimated at 
just 200, which is clearly not accurate, and the number of arrests at 4,500.9° 
What distinguishes the May violence from numerous other similar incidents at 
the time was the extent and ferocity of the attacks by state forces on Muslims. 
The aggression of the Hindu police and the PAC was unprecedented, even for
88 Fifty gazetted police officers and more than 60 companies of the PAC, the Central Reserve
Police Force (CRPF) were brought into service on 19 May. ‘Justice Out of Sight’, Frontline, 7-20
May 2005 (Narrain 7-20 May 2005).
89 The Riot Registers at major police stations including Civil Line, Lisari Gate, Delhi Gate, and 
Kotwali show that these incidents continued until the end of September, 1987. A local 
historian’s monograph records the prolonged atmosphere of fear and terror throughout the rest 
of the year (Mittal and Gupta 1987).
9° Meerut LIU Report.
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this region of western UP which had seen many police and PAC atrocities and 
killings of Muslims prior to April-May 1987.91
It should be noted that the official death toll did not include deaths from a major 
massacre of Muslims by state forces during the violence (Engineer 1988). 
Government records have been loathe to reveal state involvement in incidents of 
so-called communal violence. Unofficial estimates of the April-May violence 
range from 163 deaths to 329 deaths (Brass 2004, and see Table 3.1). Once 
again, the large majority of casualties were Muslims. Muslims also suffered 
much greater loss to their property and business establishments than Hindus. 
The following sub-section provides a description of the major incidents of the 
May violence from 15 to 23 May 1987, followed by some observations about what 
the violence signified to Muslim victims.
3.2.4 15-23 May 1987
Sporadic violence began in the evening of 15 May when a couple of bombs 
exploded in different parts of the Old T ow n.92 Stone-throwing, stabbing and 
fighting erupted sporadically in several places in the Old Town.93 On the 
evening of 16 May a Hindu was shot dead near the Kotwali police station. 
Several Muslims were arrested on the spot. However, the murder prompted a
91 Recruitment to the PAC is dominated by the upper castes and backward castes, and there are 
very few Muslims in its ranks (Hasan 1998: 42).
92 This part is largely based on the People’s Union for Civil Liberty (PUCL) Report on Communal 
Incidents at Meerut, April-May, 1987, unless otherwise indicated (PUCL 1988).
93 Meerut LIU Report.
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search operation for a Muslim culprit on the evening of 18 May by the police and 
the PAC. The target sites were the Hashimpura locality and adjacent areas, all of 
which were densely populated with Muslim weavers.
In the early hours of 19 May 1987, the PAC, accompanied by the local police, 
conducted a house search for a Muslim culprit twice in this locality. It was the 
month of Ramadan, and state forces interrupted the holiest hours of the Islamic 
religious calendar. Each time they met with firm resistance from Muslim 
residents. During the second round of the house search, a PAC commandant 
demanded that all residents come out of their houses or face being shot. The 
PAC allegedly took up positions on the roofs of Hindu houses at one end of the 
road and began to fire indiscriminately at the houses of Muslim residents. The 
police firing went on for three hours and resumed the next morning. The PAC 
was allegedly accompanied by Hindu goondas (criminals) who systematically 
carried out looting, arson, torture and killing (Engineer 1987a). The house 
search continued into the early morning of 19 May, until eventually Muslim 
resistance turned into mob violence that spread quickly to other parts of the city.
Below are some accounts by Muslim eyewitnesses of the house search in the 
early hours of 19 May: 94
94 The following narratives are from interviews on 15 and 16 April 2002 in Meerut with Muslim 
victims in Hashimpura and other areas in the Old Town where the PAC conducted a house 
search. I have copied the Muslims’ narratives from my fieldwork notes without any English 
editing. They might appear grammatically incorrect but they seem to carry more authenticity 
left as they are. Most of these narratives were translated from Hindi into English by my field 
assistants during the interviews.
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l. An Ansari school teacher who lived in Ansar Gali adjacent to Hashimpura:
On 17th [19th] Ramadan, at 1 am about 700 people were arrested from our 
mohalla. Police broke the doors and even arrested the old persons and children. 
Even mad people were arrested. In the morning we all gathered before [Jama] 
Masjid. At that time a jeep came in which S.O. [Station Officer] Kotwali, D.P. 
Singh, was sitting. The jeep crushed eight to ten people, and one was killed. And 
after police started firing, nine people were killed [two women and seven men]. 
The injured were 30, in which 15 were women, by the police firing. We entered 
into our gali [alley]. We were sealed in this mohalla. My house was partially 
burned because our mohalla was attacked by Hindus. They threw burning tyres 
and clothes [onto our houses]. We tried to drag the injured into houses, who had 
been fired at while gathering in the gali.
2. An Ansari advocate who lived in Lisari Gate near Hashimpura:
People were beaten so badly. I saw with my eyes. I lost my desire to be alive. I 
kept thinking watching sky whether I will be alive until evening or not. Army was 
all around with guns. So I still face this fear.
...There was smoke all around, firing and ablaze were all around. One incident 
happened in this mohalla. There was a Hindu ex-army man, Mr. Sharma. He 
and his family were burnt alive by a mob because he could not maintain good 
relations with Muslim neighbours. In this colony Muslim set Hindu shops on fire 
in reaction to Imylian [adjacent to Hashimpura] incident. Then I saw all around 
smoke and firing and helicopters were hovering on our head, army was all 
around, beating and arresting people.
In this colony all Hindu houses were burned, and residents were killed. I tried to 
save some Hindus in my home who were working nearby. It was a personal 
relationship. That is why I saved them. During riots identity became very 
important issue, who Muslim is and who Hindu is. Like, for example, the PAC 
used to beat people, knowing their name. If he is Muslim, he has to face beating. 
If he is Hindu, he is set free. Army and police were taking out people from their 
home, and beating them like animals. Many were arrested and taken to different 
places...
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Muslim women and children created a human barricade to prevent the PAC 
leaving with their arrested husbands and fathers and looted personal items. The 
barricade was their strongest expression of protest against the arrests, beatings 
and looting. The police jeep mentioned above, however, ran through the 
barricade and killed several women and children. This appears to be one of 
many incidents that led to mob violence spreading to other parts of the city. 95 
On the other hand, constant calls through nearby mosque loudspeakers warned 
that Islam was in danger and that Muslims should resist the police during the 
house search operation. These calls continued throughout the night, until 
eventually Muslims came out of their houses and started throwing stones at the 
police.
3.2.5 The Massacre in Hashimpura
Three days later, while the communal carnage in the city was still at its peak, a 
mass killing of Muslims took place in Hashimpura, in an extension of another 
round of house search operations looking for illegal weapons and Muslim 
criminals. 96 On 22 May, the 41st Battalion of the PAC returned and surrounded 
the locality and forced all male residents out of their houses into the main road. 
The house-to-house search was about to begin again, but this time it was 
different from previous searches. The instructions from a PAC commandant 
were more specific and orderly. He told Muslims to come out of their houses 
and to line up on the street. Those over 50 years of age and younger than 10 to
95 ‘Meerut: The madness and the method’, Link, 31 May 1987 (Link (New Delhi)).
96 This section is based on the PUCL report 1988 unless otherwise noted.
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12 years were all moved to one side of the street. All the others, 42 mostly young 
men, were instructed to board a police lorry. Another group of 324 were 
arrested and taken away by other police vehicles.
The 42 young men were taken to Muradnagar, near the Ganga Canal 20 km 
away from the city, where they were reportedly shot dead one by one and thrown 
into the canal. Their bodies were found downstream after a few days.97 The 
other group of 324 persons were taken to the Civil Lines Police Station where 
they were severely beaten. Subsequently some were shifted to Fatehgarh jail, 
where some were killed by police torture. An Amnesty International Report 
observes that those who were arrested encountered beating, lynching and 
torture. Many Muslims were killed in police custody. 98 a  Muslim victim 
describes what he and his brother had to face in the jail:
One of my brothers was killed in police line; he had been beaten very badly. 
Police soldiers urinated in the mouth of Muslims. Several beards were taken out 
from their faces. When we were taken to the jail, our bones were broken and we 
were not given food to eat. Beating and torturing continued till the city came back 
to calm. After three months we got bail and came out from the jail. But many 
cases still continue."
The state forces at this point were clearly operating outside the law. Their 
operations consisted of indiscriminate and arbitrary arrests, holding people
97 Three people survived and one managed to report to the police station where the story of 
massacre was disclosed.
98 UN Human Rights Commission and Amnesty International published a report after sending 
an investigation team to Meerut, both of which made allegations of‘extra-judicial killings by the 
PAC’ (Noorani 1987).
99 Interview with an Ansari labourer on 15 April 2002.
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without trial, firing on crowds, instigating arson and looting and finally causing 
the ‘disappearance’ of men. The victims’ families were almost never able to get 
compensation since it was particularly difficult to prove torture in jail. In 
addition, police officers were granted ‘sovereign immunity’100 by the Indian 
government, which had effectively given them a free hand in their dealings with 
Muslim prisoners.101
Many of these selected male Muslims were key sources of earnings for multi- 
generational families. The loss of these men, and of their ‘lost’ offspring of the 
coming generation came to symbolise a threat to the very integrity of the Muslim 
community in Meerut, and to its potency (see Tambiah 1990: 746).
The Hashimpura house search and massacre was followed by another incident 
of Muslim killing in Maliana village the following day. On 23 May 1987 at 2:00 
pm, the PAC, led by senior officers, including the commandant of the 44th 
Battalion, entered Maliana, a village about 10 kilometres away from Meerut 
city.102 There the PAC took up positions around the village and on rooftops and 
announced that they would carry out a search operation. The PAC warned that 
firing would start if the residents did not come out. When the residents came 
out, however, the PAC reportedly began firing on them indiscriminately. The 
Scheduled Castes, including Chamars, hired from Multan nagar near Maliana,
100 A doctrine precluding the institution of a suit against the sovereign (government) without its 
consent.
101 ‘The Police: No help for victims’, Economic and Political Weekly, 15 August 1992, pp. 1705- 
1706.
102 This section is based on the Amnesty International Report unless otherwise indicated 
(Amnesty International 1988).
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collaborated with the PAC, engaging in arson, looting and killing. After the 
massacre, PAC trucks again carried the corpses to the Ganga canal to dump 
them. The number of casualties was long the subject of controversy between the 
state government and the residents of the village. It was finally ‘settled’ as 68 
deaths (Engineer 1988).1Q3
After the massacres in Hashimpura and in Maliana village on 22 and 23 May the 
violence began to subside. After the end of the April violence, Meerut 
Intelligence officers had recorded a wave of rumours among Hindu 
neighbourhoods that depicted a strong and aggressive constituency of Muslim 
‘extremists’ eager to fight the Hindus. The LIU Report had also noted that 
rumours were rife in Muslim localities about Hindu plans to ‘avenge’ the April 
killings within the holy month of Ramadan. Attacks targeting a religious 
community during its sacred month were meant to ‘trenchantly denigrate’ the 
Muslim community. 1Q4
After the massacre of Muslims in Hashimpura by the PAC on 22 May, however, 
the earlier reported Muslim ‘aggressiveness’ receded into the background as the 
violence took on a different character. It was now clear that state forces were 
directing violence against Muslims (Engineer 1987b). The Gian Prakash 
Committee, appointed by the UP state government to enquire into the April-May
103 A slightly different report of the Maliana massacre by Engineer (1987b) maintains that the 
PAC and the PAC-hired Chamars ransacked a liquor shop on the morning of 23 May. The PAC 
jawan  were drunk when they reached Maliana in the afternoon. Engineer’s more recent writing 
states that the PAC started firing on Muslims who had come out of the mosque after prayers 
(Engineer 1996).
1Q4 Meerut LIU Report.
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violence in Meerut, noted that workers of the Hindu nationalist organisations, 
which included the RSS and VHP, ran free in the city during the violence of May 
1987. They armed themselves with axes, knives and petrol bombs. The PAC 
jawan  abetted their killing sprees. The Inquiry’s Report also drew attention to 
the fact that, during the 10-day course of the violence, most atrocities occurred 
during the hours of curfew. 105 In the May violence, a curfew was imposed only 
in Muslim localities (ibid. 25). This meant that Muslims were perforce trapped 
inside their homes, waiting to be attacked by the PAC and the Hindus. Also, 
adequate relief and rations often did not reach the curfew-bound areas or were 
exclusively distributed to Hindu localities (Baneijee 1990: 61).
At the height of the rioting on 23 May the Maliana massacre took place. This 
was a final blow for the Muslim community, especially when corpses were found 
floating in the canal on the following day. My respondents told me that Muslims 
became demoralised and weakened in the face of the combined force of Hindus 
and the state. The role played by state security forces in securing a one-sided 
massacre of Muslim youth was clearly deeply troubling, and reinforced the idea 
for many Muslims that they were not, after all, anything like full rights-bearing 
citizens within the ‘secular’ Republic of India.
Abundant reports and accounts of the May violence make severe accusations of 
passive or active complicity by the police forces, and a conspicuous lack of 
determined action to protect Muslim households by the state government and
105 ‘Gian Prakash Committee Report on Meerut Riots-Extract-II’, Muslim India (Muslim India 
(New Delhi)), February 1988 (Government of Uttar Pradesh 1988).
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local administration (eg. Bose and Pachauri 1987). The most surprising 
descriptions of government inaction pertain to the withdrawal of contingent 
forces from Meerut at the beginning of May. Despite the fact that the month of 
Ramadan requires more forces in the city than usual, and especially considering 
that this was in a period immediately after the lifting of curfew at the end of 
April 1987, UP Chief Minister Veer Bahadur Singh ordered the withdrawal of the 
extra forces that had been stationed in Meerut city in the aftermath of the April 
violence. The reason given for their withdrawal was to help secure the rally 
organised for Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in Delhi on 16 May. Furthermore, 
the withdrawal of forces was undertaken despite the fact that local intelligence 
were warning the administration about stocks of illegal weapons and explosives, 
and about dangerous moves by militant organisations of both communities.106
After the April violence tension mounted once more throughout the city. There 
were strong rumours about the insurgency of both Hindu and Muslim groups. 
The local administration, however, implemented no counter-measures in the 
period preceding the violence, and instead took the contingent forces out of the 
city. After the eruption of renewed violence in May 1987, the Union Home 
Minister Buta Singh admitted that the administration had been caught ‘by 
surprise’ in the first place, and was not fully prepared to control the situation. 
The incompetence of the local administration was also compounded by the 
presence of top Congress Party state and union ministers during the violence. 
These included UP Chief Minister, Veer Bahadur Singh, the Union Minister for 
Urban Development, Mohsina Kidwai and Union Home Minister, Buta Singh.
106 Meerut LIU Report. Also, see Frontline, 30 May to 12 June 1987 (Frontline (Madras)).
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The Chief Minister, V.B. Singh, was actually resident in Meerut for two days at 
the height of the violence when the killings in Hashimpura took place. During 
their stays in the city none of these top officials was able to implement effective 
measures to abate the ongoing violence. The Chief Minister, particularly, was 
later accused of a lukewarm attitude concerning the PAC’s brutal conduct 
towards Muslims while he was staying in the city, with some suggesting that his 
political motive was to foment violence rather than control it.
Furthermore, the local Congress Party in Meerut city, with its elected Muslim 
MP, Mohsina Kidwai, did not function to control the situation but rather abetted 
the on-going violence. Congress politicians in the District Congress were 
entangled with a power struggle between groups divided on religious lines.10? 
Both sides were reportedly inciting their respective community’s militancy. 
Local Congress politicians accused Mohsina Kidwai of worsening the situation 
with her plea not to take stern action against Muslims on the grounds that it 
would ‘alienate the masses’. Mohsina Kidwai was confronted by local Congress 
politicians when she tried to enter Meerut during the violence, and indeed her 
entry was blocked by her Congress ‘colleagues’. Eventually she cancelled her 
visit to Meerut and did not go back to the city until normalcy returned. 
Unsurprisingly, differences between Kidwai and Chief Minister, V.B. Singh 
reportedly surfaced at this time.108 Deep divisions and conflicts within the 
District Congress Party also increasingly produced adverse effects upon the local 
administration’s handling of law and order on the ground.
1Q7 ‘Anguish Without End’, India Today, 15 August 1987, pp. 32-33 (India Today (New Delhi)).
108 Frontline, 30 May to 12 June 1987.
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Steven Wilkinson’s (2004) electoral incentive model does not address at length 
these more proximate factors at the local constituency level. Rather, his model 
directs attention mainly to state-level political calculations—between organised 
parties — to explain the occurrence or non-occurrence of ethnic violence. 
Wilkinson’s model is, therefore, less able to explain variations in patterns of 
violence at the sub-state level. Why, for example, during the anti-Muslim 
massacres in Gujarat in February to May in 2002, following the incident in 
Godhra on 27 February 2002, did many towns remain free from ethnic 
polarisation and direct communal violence (Shah 2007) while other towns, 
including Ahmadabad, witnessed an unprecedented scale of gruesome anti- 
Muslim killings? Why too did Ahmadabad suffer from greater violence than 
Surat before 1992 when two-party competition between Congress and the BJP 
governed state politics more generally?
The contribution of Ashutosh Varshney (2002) forces itself to the forefront at
this point. His focus is precisely on sub-state and city-level variations in the
incidence of ethnic violence, both of which he links to the density of
associational life across city-wide ethnic groups. I discuss Varshney’s civic
engagement model in the light of my research findings later in the thesis. For
the moment, let me say that in 1987 in Meerut, at a time of intense electoral
competition, pace Wilkinson, it clearly was the case that the District Congress
apparatus had come to define its future fortunes in terms of the ‘Hindu vote’.
There were, however, far deeper political divisions within the ruling Party in the
District Congress than a simple rational choice model of politics might suggest,
and this much was apparent when Mohsina Kidwai tried to resist the Party’s
orientation towards the Hindu Right. Kidwai wanted instead to offer security to
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her co-religious community in return for its votes. Significantly, ‘Hindu’ 
politicians within the Party rejected her efforts to trade Muslim votes for 
security, and, as we have seen, blocked Kidwai’s entry to the city. This helped to 
reinforce the image of the local Congress Party as an anti-minority party, or even 
as a Hindu party in power.
Internal conflicts among Congress politicians divided on ethnic lines no doubt 
prevented uniform, prompt and decisive actions on the part of the local 
administration, and thus worked to worsen the situation in April-May 1987. It is 
worth pointing out, even so, that matters might have been different. 
Notwithstanding the importance of state-level electoral considerations, local- 
level clashes between political rivals do matter and their outcomes are not 
wholly predictable, and it is here, I think, that the in-depth case study method 
adopted by Paul Brass (2003) comes into its own. Brass, indeed, points out that 
even within the ‘riot-prone’ city of Aligarh, violence is generally concentrated in 
some localities while others remain free of violence. The causal sequences 
leading to full-scale events of ethnic violence are explained by Brass with 
reference to a combination of the interests of political actors backed up by the 
‘institutionalised Riot System’ (IRS) and those of a compliant local 
administration. However, what Brass sometimes fails to notice is the intricate 
linkage between politics and the absence of violence. I will return to this.
Going back now to Meerut in 1987, Mohsina Kidwai, after having been pushed
out from the local Congress, did not fight back to protect Muslims but withdrew
and never returned to Meerut before the carnage came to an end. In the eyes of
the Muslim electorate, a Muslim MP from the constituency did nothing but
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allow Hindu attacks on their lives and properties. Rajiv Gandhi’s brief visit after 
the peak of the violence was considered by many Muslim respondents no better 
than Kidwai’s performance. He met some victims with a few messages and 
empty promises and returned quickly to Delhi.109 Muslim respondents 
unanimously recalled that there was disillusionment and a sense of betrayal 
about the role of Mohsina Kidwai, Rajiv Gandhi and the ruling Congress Party.
3.2.6 The economics o f violence
One of the most significant socio-economic dimensions of the May violence was 
the destruction of the economic base of Muslim artisans, particularly that of the 
booming textile industry at that time. The economic advancement among 
Muslim artisans in Meerut began at the end of the 1960s and the beginning of 
the 1970s. The economy of the textile industry particularly expanded because of 
the introduction of powerlooms in the early 1970s. Although the Indian 
economy as a whole went into a drastic downturn during that decade, the Ansari 
weaving industry continued to enjoy an economic boom even during the 
Emergency years.110 Economic advancement among artisan Muslims who had 
long been suffering from impoverishment became increasingly visible from the 
end of the 1970s.
109 Frontline, 13-26 June 1987.
110 Interview with an Ansari lawyer on 1 February 2004.
141
This phenomenon of economic advancement among the lower sections of 
Muslims was seen not only in Meerut but also in other cities in UP around the 
same period. Asghar Ali Engineer writes:
By the [19]80s a small section of Muslims in the north, especially those areas 
which were traditional centres of Muslim artisans like Meerut, Aligarh, 
Moradabad, Banaras, Azamgarh, etc. became prosperous by developing 
entrepreneurship on a small scale (Engineer 1992:1784).
Muslim prosperity in Meerut, as elsewhere, also seems to have been helped by 
migration to the Gulf from the 1970s. This too was largely based on their own 
skill sets, and was independent of government employment or other public 
resources, in which spheres Muslims were still often discriminated against 
(Chapter 4).
Some respondents, both Hindu and Muslim, linked the 1987 violence to the 
Ansari weavers’ rising challenge to Hindu traders in the textile industry. 
According to a Hindu textile union worker who used to work in the Hindu 
powerloom factory, successful Muslim weavers had been trying to advance into 
the direct textile trading, by creating a Muslim wholesale market. This was 
meant to break the conventional business structure of Hindu dominance in the 
textile industry of the city.111 The established Hindu traders and suppliers of raw 
materials perceived a threat to their profits from these new Muslim entrants into
111 Interview on 31 March 2003.
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the field of textile trade (Khan 1992: 465).112 Both handloom and powerloom 
factories suffered almost total destruction during the events of the violence in 
the 1980s. Handloom weaving practically died out after the 1982 violence, as 
buyers were afraid to come to Meerut for six months.u3 Ansari weaving 
facilities, particularly the new Ansari trading markets for yarn and textiles 
established in Gola Kuan and Ansar Gali, adjacent to Imylian, were also among 
the first targets for destruction during the violence in 1987. n4 The house 
searches conducted by the PAC symbolically concentrated on the localities of the 
Muslim weavers, Hashimpura and adjacent Imylian (see Map 3.2 in Appendix 
3.1). After the 1987 violence, Hindu boycotts continued in order to ensure the 
further loss of economy and social power of Muslim weavers. An Ansari 
powerloom factory owner told me:
The 1987 riots affected powerloom badly. Hindus thought that Muslim weavers 
started the riots. After that we suffered huge setback in not only everyday life but 
in business relations. Business with our Hindu counterparts was reduced, and 
supplies of raw materials were reduced. Hindus also raised its price and 
commission. It took about three years to recover and catch up the losses.n5
The textile industry in Meerut went into a long slump after the events of the 
violence, which continues to this day.
112 Interview with a Muslim (Ansari) secretary to Mr. Avtar Singh Bhadana, an incumbent
Congress MP at the time of interview. Mr. Bhadana had been elected in the 1999 Lok Sabha
election from the Meerut-Mawana constituency, on 8 February 2004. 
n3 Interview with Mr. Yusuf Qureshi on 18 March 2004. 
n4 Interview with a Hindu eyewitness on 3 February 2002.
“5 Interview on 7 August 2003.
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An equally important socio-economic dimension of the May violence was its 
geographic expansion to the entire city and surrounding villages. The 
‘conventional’ site of communal violence in Meerut was within the walls of the 
Old Town, which was predominantly populated by Muslims. The May violence, 
however, spread to entirely new areas of Hindu middle-class colonies such as 
Shastri nagar. This colony witnessed an intensive destruction of Muslim lives 
and households. Shastri nagar was among the earliest colonies developed by the 
UP government’s Meerut Development Agency (MDA), the central agency for 
the construction of residential colonies to accommodate migrants to the city. 
Shastri nagar quickly became a status symbol for those who aspired to upward 
mobility among both Hindu and Muslim groups. From the 1960s onwards, a few 
emerging middle-class Muslims wished to buy property outside the Old Town in 
the Hindu colonies. These Muslims, however, faced fierce opposition from 
Hindu residents and largely had to give up moving into those colonies.116 So, 
when Muslims started to live in Shastri nagar from the early 1980s, they were 
not all welcomed by Hindu residents. One Hindu respondent told me:
Muslims wanted to construct mosques in Shastri nagar. But Hindu residents did
not allow it. They said ‘No Pakistan in this area’.117
This comment unequivocally indicated the intolerant and unapologetic attitudes 
of Hindu middle-class residents. The violence in May 1987 spread to the Section 
4 and L-Block of Shastri nagar where Muslims had begun to live just before the
116 Interview with a Muslim property dealer on 3 August 2003 and others.
117 Interview with a Hindu retired academic on 13 April 2004.
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violence (see Map 3.3 in Appendix 3.1).118 The systematic destruction of 
Muslim-owned property indicated the ferocity of Hindu resentment against 
Muslims making substantial inroads into their new ‘posh’ localities. The new 
spatial dimension of the violence signified more extensive popular involvement 
in the violence than in any previous events of violence in the city. The large- 
scale violence in Shastri nagar implied greater involvement by the ostensibly 
civilised middle class in the kind of violence typically associated with the lower 
classes.
Both in Shastri nagar and in Hashimpura, geographic space became a marker of 
socio-economic relations between Muslims and Hindus. The impact of the 
violence could be seen in the displacement of Muslims both geographically and 
occupationally. Following Albert Hirschman (1995) the latter maybe seen as a 
case of ‘non-divisible conflict’ in which the economic resource could not be 
divisible between different ethnic groups, as symbolised by the displacement of 
the emerging Muslim entrepreneurial class from certain crucial areas of trade 
and business or from the physical terrain which housed a privileged class. ‘Non- 
divisible conflict’ signifies the contested areas of economic dominance in which 
Muslims were excluded from the economic share. More importantly, non- 
divisible conflict also implies the exclusion of Muslims not only economically but 
also socially and politically.
118 Interview on 3 August 2003 with a Hindu respondent who lost her Muslim sister-in-law in the 
Shastri nagar killing in 1987. Also, Communal Register (n.d.), a record of Hindu-Muslim 
incidents involving violence kept at the Medical College Police Station, Meerut (Government of 
Uttar Pradesh n.d.).
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The May violence also accelerated alterations in the fabric of Meerut, not least 
by the destruction of houses belonging to Muslims in Shastri nagar and 
elsewhere in order to achieve a nearly complete exclusion of the Muslim 
population there. There are currently very few Muslims residing in Shastri 
nagar; hence violence succeeded in allowing ethnic control over the area in 
favour of the majority community. In effect, this was ethnic ‘cleansing’. Non- 
divisible conflict might also be seen in the geographic polarisation between 
Hindus and Muslims in the city after the violence. Immediately after the 
violence, both Hindus and Muslims migrated from one locality to the other, 
seeking protection in areas where they were in the majority. This rearrangement 
of social space greatly helped to push the traditional boundaries between the two 
groups further apart, creating an ethnic enclave of the Muslim minority in a 
state of more isolation and segregation from the socio-economic mainstream. 
Muslims have not been able to build their houses in Hindu-dominated 
residential colonies, including Shastri nagar.n9 There are now very few mixed 
localities in the city. The ethnic polarisation in geographic space was completed, 
according to many Hindu and Muslim respondents, after the 1987 violence.
3.2.7 The politics o f sacred space and time
The intrusion of state agents into the sacred space and time of Muslims during 
Ramadan constituted one of the core events in the May 1987 violence. The 
search operations of the PAC were specifically conducted to interrupt the
u9 Interview with a Muslim property dealer on 3 August 2003.
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particularly important religious meal times during the fast of the Ramadan 
month. The control of sacred space and time is a significant motif of communal 
violence in south Asia, as elsewhere (Freitag 1980,1989; Das 1990; van der Veer 
1996 (1994)). Sandria Freitag argues that communities express and redefine 
themselves through collective activities in the public arena, which include 
religious ceremonials that form a symbolic expression of political power and 
cultural values (Freitag 1989: 30). Veena Das (1990) further explains how 
intrusions into the religious time and space of one group can prompt violent 
reactions by another, and can be generalised by the local administration into 
larger episodes of political-cum-communal violence.
The month of Ramadan consists of a series of specific events, such as reading 
and reciting the holy Quran collectively, many charitable activities for the poor 
and handicapped and special prayers in congregations. These religious activities 
and rituals are a ceremonial expression of ‘Islam’ in the public space (Freitag 
1989:27). If this public space is intruded upon, it violates the believers’ religion, 
dignity and pride. This is why contestations over public space between two 
adversarial religions often became major issues of communal violence. The 
continuing calls from the mosque during the house search that ‘Islam is in 
danger and Muslims should resist the police’ was evidence of a growing sense of 
crisis for Islam among Muslims. The calls also indicated that Muslims 
interpreted the search operations as state oppression of their religious identity, 
sacred time and space. Within the larger context of ‘Hindu agitation’ the 
desecration of Muslim religious symbols by the Hindu police and the PAC was 
metaphorically linked to Hindus’ attempts to build a temple in honour of a 
Hindu God-king, Ram, at Ayodhya.
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The humiliation of Muslims in Meerut was established most brutally by the acts 
of mass killing in May 1987. Axel Honneth points out in an article written as a 
book review on the German National Socialists’ extermination of the Jews 
(Holocaust) that the killing act implies ‘the degradation of entire collective’, and 
‘some aspects of humiliation will always inhere to the process of killing people’ 
(Honneth 1997:308). The crude and brutal act of selecting male Muslims to be 
taken to an isolated place where they were shot dead one by one and thrown into 
a canal amounts to a particularly cruel act of mass murder, and was described by 
many local observers and the press, precisely as a ‘Holocaust’ (eg. Engineer 
1987a).
The brutal act of terror appears to signify a state dominance over the existence, 
identity and religion of the minority community. The massacre of unarmed 
Muslims in Hashimpura and Maliana also calls to mind Giorgio Agamben’s 
(1998) account of‘homo sacer’ — an outlaw whose life could neither be accepted 
by the gods (in sacrifice) nor protected by men (against homicide). Agamben 
suggests an existence — a ‘bare life’ — that is stripped by the governing power of 
all recognition, rights and human dignity. Muslim victims’ accounts vividly 
indicate how the state came to confront them. An Ansari labourer told me of his 
arrest and beating in Hashimpura:
Our houses were attacked by Hindus who lived just behind us in Jaidevi nagar. 
They were throwing burning tyres and petrol. The PAC and police looted all the 
jewelleries and valuables (from our house) pretending a search operation. They 
attacked our house around 1:30 am and took us out on the road outside. The 
police and PAC started beating us badly while abusing and accusing us of creating 
the riots.,.1 still cannot forget how badly the police and the PAC beat me at the
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police station and at the roadside. After 1987, we live under constant fear of 
Hindus and the PAC. We have entered in the deep array of fear and insecurity.120
A Muslim Chisti (water carrier) school teacher further told me:
The Muslim minority does not get any justice from the administration. That is 
the major reason of fear and insecurity. For Muslims there is no law. Police is 
anti-Muslim. All police officers and constables are anti-Muslim. Even in 
everyday life, they are not good to Muslims. [They are] very cruel in their 
behaviour.121
In short, a profound sense of insecurity and fear emerged along with a 
recognition of Muslims’ permanently disadvantaged position as a minority:
I was arrested. How could I protect my family? I could not do anything. The 
police were so powerful.... During the riots, we felt like we were living in a 
different country. This country did not belong to us. Even the Hapur road 
seemed as though it was a border of Hindustan and Pakistan.122
3.3 Everyday Forms o f Violence
The idea that India no longer belonged to Meerut’s Muslims is a disturbing one, 
and later provided a platform for a regrouping within the political constituencies 
of Muslim Meerut. Extreme events matter, as both Veena Das and Agamben 
have reminded us. But so too does a steady accumulation of experiences,
120 Interview on 15 April 2002.
121 Interview on 15 April 2002.
122 Interview with an Ansari labourer on 15 April 2002.
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including discrimination and what might be called, after James Scott (1985), 
‘everyday violence’. Stanley Tambiah refers to Meerut as a city of recurrent 
violence, which was by now (in the late 1980s and early 1990s) in a ‘chronic’ 
cycle of violence (Tambiah 1996: 214). The collective violence no longer 
consisted of episodic and discontinuous events between semi-normal or peaceful 
periods but had become ‘an everyday and seemingly permanent state of affairs’ 
(ibid. 223). It is important for our understanding of the phenomenon of the 
repetitive cycle of violence, Tambiah suggests that:
we should first travel byways of ongoing social life and view the solidarities and 
the tensions of everyday existence in family and neighbourhood, the cycle of 
festivals and ceremonies in public places, the routines and stratagems and 
factional battles deployed in mass politics, the trials of urban coexistence (ibid.
215).
As Tambiah rightly points out, a visitor in Meerut at this time could not help but 
feel the everyday tensions between the two communities, or between localities of 
different ethnic concentration. Everyday tension and distance between the two 
communities were embodied in geographical and symbolical boundaries that 
segregated the Old Town from the rest of the city. From outside, the Old Town 
took on an appearance of a ‘Muslim bastion’ that occasionally came up in Hindu 
discourse. The very label, ‘Muslim bastion’, naturally symbolised the gulf that 
existed between the two communities and the sense of ‘Muslim otherness’ that 
was becoming embedded in many Hindu minds. By pointing out the 
boundaries, however, I do not mean that Meerut Old Town was closed off from 
the outside world and the wider culture around it. I found in the Old Town 
many Hindu merchants in the market, Hindu residents in mixed mohallas who
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naturally intermingled with their Muslim neighbours. Muslim residents in the 
Old Town also lived in a web of poisonous penetration by Hindu Right 
organisations that included the RSS. Once within the Old Town, however, one 
would have a sense of comforting self-contained entity, with mosques, 
madrasahs, hospitals and markets, separate from and independent of the 
outside world. This sense of separation might also come from an overwhelming 
presence of Islamic establishments within the Old Town.
Kathinka Froyestad’s ethnographic work in Kanpur describes the perception of 
Muslims among ordinary Hindus during the period preceding the demolition of 
the Babri Masjid in 1992. Froyestad’s study shows how deeply embedded was 
the conception of ‘Muslim Otherness’ in the minds of upper-caste Hindus 
(Froyestad 2000). Those upper-caste ‘city-dwellers, depend on business of 
various kinds and fluctuating success’. Their standard of living is ‘above the 
average, but below that of the elite in the city’, and they have a stereotypical 
image of Muslims who make up 20 percent of the city population of Kanpur city. 
These upper-caste Hindus, and perhaps also the middle and lower castes, 
perceive Muslims ‘as a homogeneous group of violent invaders, dirty illiterates, 
child-breeding fundamentalists and poor Pakistan loyalists’ (ibid. 1). Froyestad 
writes that Muslims were made into scapegoats for virtually everything that had 
gone wrong in India after 1947. Among these upper-caste Hindus, Islam is 
routinely referred to as an alien religion as it originated outside India. Muslims 
are not therefore acknowledged as rightful inhabitants of a Hindu rashtra.
During the May 1987 violence in Meerut, Hindu rage was expressed in many 
utterances of the police and the PAC jawans, practically all of whom were
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Hindu. ‘We have not come to put out the fire, but to kill all Muslims’, a police 
officer commented in Maliana on the day of massacre.123 Many eyewitnesses 
testified that the PAC and the police had indulged in all sorts of actions of terror 
with Hindu rioters. A Muslim eyewitness who lost his brother during the 
violence mentioned to me:
Police mentality is Hindu mentality. The police sometimes come in front of a 
Hindu mob to attack Muslims, just to shoot them. Or sometimes, waiting on the 
both sides of a Muslim area, until the Hindu mob’s attack is finished, and then 
come and arrest Muslims or kill them.12^
I often came across this notion of a ‘Hindu mentality’ during interviews with my 
Muslim respondents. It was somehow closely linked to eveiyday life and politics 
in Muslims’ mind. The expression was also linked to the May violence within 
the context of everyday politics. In the minds of many Muslim respondents, 
there seems to be no gap between everyday life and the collective violence that 
occasionally took place to damage more severely their ordinary lives. It was as if 
everyday and collective violence are linked in and through the same value 
system (Spencer 2003: 1573; Das 1996). Rumours based on Hindu-Muslim 
animosity, memories of Partition, menace of the RSS penetration with a piece of 
pork meat thrown into mosques or the brutal conduct of constables on the 
streets, for example, were frequently referred to in their narratives to explain the 
violence in May 1987.
123 ‘Reports (on testimony at Delhi tribunal in March 1988): Meerut 1987: Reflections on an 
inquiry*, Economic and Political Weekly, 16 April 1988, p. 770 (Balagopal 1988).
124 Interview on 3 August 2003.
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Muslim respondents interpreted the anti-Muslim violence of 1987 as an 
extension of these unpleasant encounters with state actors or with Hindu 
militant organisations. Particularly, many Muslim respondents repeatedly 
emphasised the strong presence of the VHP and the RSS in the city’s everyday 
life. In their minds these were closely associated with the event of the May 
violence. According to an Ansari factory owner:
The RSS and Bajrang Dal teach Hindus to hate Muslims and guide them to 
instigate violence. So riots continue. Progress of Muslims will be broken. We, 
Muslims, cannot think about business, but only first think about our security. 12s
Muslims were also still being blamed for Partition 40 years later. A successful 
Muslim businessman, an owner of the large musical instrument manufacturing 
company in Meerut, commented on this point:
So the memory of Mughal empire for 300 years is still vividly there in the Hindu 
psychology. They want to revenge that rule. They are the majority so they can do 
anything they want. Muslims are feeling that revenge, and both communities are 
conscious of this fact — the majority is now ruling. In everyday life, we feel this 
although we live peacefully and interact with each other with no problem in 
business and other scenes of life.126
There were many taunts from the police and the FAC jawan  during the violence 
that particularly revealed the Hindus’ fear and doubt about Muslims’ loyalty 
being pan-Islamic. One such remark was:
12s Interview on 5 December 2003.
126 Interview on 20 November 2003.
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You fellows applauded so much when Imran Khan was hitting sixes, now you face 
the consequence.127
Also, the police and PAC often used a metaphor of ‘Khalistan’: ‘We will not let 
another Khalistan here’.128 Khalistan was the name to be given to the new 
nation of Sikhs in Punjab that was the object of Sikh separatism. Here in this 
context of the 1987 violence in Meerut, it was used to symbolise the creation of 
another Pakistan for Muslims.
Many Muslim respondents blamed the Congress Party for the 1987 violence and 
the destruction of the mosque in December 1992. Muslims saw the influence of 
the state and the formal political institutions that supposedly protected them 
function instead to destroy their lives, livelihoods and accumulated, albeit small, 
capital. Perhaps most critically, the fact that the state paramilitary forces and 
the local administration intervened strongly on the side of the Hindu mobs must 
have had a significant bearing on their identity formation as ‘victims’. Following 
Amrita Basu (Basu 1997:435), I also want to suggest that it was precisely during 
and after the 1987 violence that we see significant transformations occurring in 
Muslim political agency. When Meerut Muslims identified Congress as one of 
the principal perpetrators of the 1987 violence they felt a radical sense of 
political isolation and betrayal. The identification of the state as aggressor did 
not take place without pain. Beneath a sense of frustration and resentment 
there was a deep sense of grievance against the state for its betrayal:
127 Imran Khan is a popular Pakistani cricket player. ‘Reports (on testimony at Delhi tribunal in 
March 1988): Meerut 1987: Reflections on an inquiry’, Economic andPolitical Weekly, 16 April 
1988, p. 770.
128 Ibid. above.
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I was taken to a police station outside the district and interrogated for 6-7 hours 
[during the 1987 violence]. The police wanted to get my connection with 
Pakistan. There was no reason for that.... I told them honestly that I had a 
brother in law in Pakistan, but he had died...we are Indians. I am an Indian and 
brought up in India, Meerut. Whole education is in India. At Partition in 1947, 
we opted by our own choice to stay here and live here, and refused to go to 
Pakistan. So we are living here by choice, choosing this country as our 
motherland. We have been throughout loyal and faithful to our motherland. 
India gave us everything, but Pakistan gave us nothing.12?
This comment, made in 2003 by a successful Muslim entrepreneur, indicates 
that experiences of violence were progressively shaping his subjectivity as a 
victim. More importantly, however, his remark underlines a renewed sense of 
his loyalty to India and his rightful claim to citizenship. It is both a cry for 
citizenship and a manifestation of a sense of being alien which had been 
imposed upon him and which he had wanted to eliminate all his life by 
emphasising his identity as an Indian. What I will call ‘post-violence strategies’ 
among Meerut Muslims can be seen in the first instance as an attempt to remove 
this remoteness, or to fill in the distance between Muslims and the rest of Indian 
society by proactively transforming themselves through appropriations of a 
more expansive citizenship.
12? Interview on 20 November 2003.
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3»4 Conclusion
As we have seen in the case of the May violence above, local causes based on 
everyday animosities were important in shaping local, specific forms of violence. 
They appeared in the geographic, spatial distribution and concentration as seen, 
for example, in Shastri nagar during the event of violence. On the other hand, 
the particular local context simultaneously reveals supra-local and timeless 
issues in a larger matrix of socio-political contestation between Hindus and 
Muslims. These issues seem to have included the relationship between state and 
community, the historical context of ethnic relations in north India and 
everyday politics concerning the contested areas of identity and ethnicity.
Concerning the observation of local actors on the micro level, Paul Brass’ work
as well as that of Wilkinson and Varshney, speaks very little of the Muslim factor
and its changing social organisation, education and employment at the local
level within the larger dynamics of the political economy of a city. Brass
emphasises the importance of the detailed ethnography of the structure of local
life. He examines the density of the Muslim population, labour market
competition between groups and various Hindu nationalist figures in several
localities in Aligarh. However, these detailed local factors are aimed solely at the
political calculation of‘the Brahmanical Hindu middle class as its leading actor’
(Pandey 1998:17). There is little, if any, examination as to how these Hindu
forces were countered by Muslims in Aligarh. Brass’ gaze, in other words, looks
down at the local details from the ‘grand project’ of the Hindu nationalists’
interests in electoral competition, in which Muslims in these localities are
confined to the assumed role of a community, victims or targets.
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The episodes of Muslim mass killing I have described in this chapter give rise to 
questions about why and how ‘democratic India’ allowed such gruesome events 
to take place. Following Stanley Tambiah’s insight, I want to underline here the 
fact that anti-Muslim violence does not take legitimated forms of violence such 
as class struggle or food riots (Tambiah 1996:317). Muslims were killed because 
they were Muslim; that is, their very identity as Muslims caused their deaths. 
Nothing more was required.
The principles of Indian secularism and plural democracy simply did not exist in 
Meerut at this juncture of Congress rule. I would argue, indeed, that the mass 
killing of Muslims in Meerut took place precisely as one consequence of a style 
of Congress governance which increasingly failed to recognise the democratic 
rights of non-Hindu groups. Muslims were not citizens protected by the popular 
sovereignty of the state under a regime of liberal democracy. Instead, they 
belonged to what Partha Chatteijee calls ‘political society’^ 0 but — in Meerut by 
the mid-1980s — without the support of their traditional political protector, the 
local Congress machine. Meerut’s Muslims had come to form a largely voiceless 
and powerless minority, even as they sought small crumbs of Congress 
patronage in return for acting as a vote bank. Worse, they did not have strong or 
autonomous local leaders to protect them at a time when north Indian politics 
was ‘communalised’ by Hindutva forces in the 1980s. Certainly they did not 
seem to enjoy the protections of‘civil society’ that Ashutosh Varshney highlights
*3° Political society exists between the state and ‘civil society’, which forms the domain of 
citizenship and civic and social organisations based on contractual agreements and consent. In 
contrast, ‘political society* works outside the framework of legality and constitutional norms, and 
its members, like low-status Muslims, are citizens only in a nominal sense (Chatteijee 2004:74).
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in his account of the geography of ethnic violence in India, and which 
presumably should be at the heart of the peace-building politics that I explore in 
the next part of this thesis.
This chapter concludes my account of why the position of Meerut’s Muslims 
became so tenuous in the 1980s that, to some degree, the anti-Muslim violence 
of 1987 became almost predictable, if not quite in the way that Varshney or 
Wilkinson would use that word. In the second part of the thesis I explore the 
contexts within, and means by which, new forms of Muslim political agency 
employed ‘post-1987’ sought the greater protection of Meerut’s Muslim 
communities through new strategies of economic accumulation and political 
alliance-making. Chapter Four provides an account of an upward economic 
mobility among low-status Muslims that became more rapid in the wake of the 
ethnic violence in 1987 and which led to new investments in education and 
household ‘human capital’. The partial conversion of this new capital into what I 
call the ‘new Muslim politics’ is the subject in turn of Chapters Five and Six. As 
ever, my aim is not just to understand why new forms of political alliance were 
struck (between Muslims and lower caste Hindus), but also how these identities 
were formed by active political agents and through important shifts in the 
idioms of ‘Muslim politics’.
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Chapter 4: Econom ic M obility and Social Organisation  
w ithin M eerut’s M uslim Com m unities
I found a new determination in the people of Hashimpura and Maliana. A 
determination to make a new beginning. People do not ask for monetary help, 
they ask for schools, training institutions and hospitals. Their determination to 
live and fight for a better life in the country of their choice has not been 
diminished by the bullets of the PAC. No one [is] migrating from these areas. 
Death and suffering hardened them but made them also more realistic. They do 
not talk in terms of revenge and violence: they say that they have suffered not 
only because of the communal and partisan attitude of the government but also 
because of the lack of education and poverty. They are determined to fight 
against educational and economic backwardness. They are less worried about 
what they have lost. They are more worried about what they are going to build. 
Life has lost all meaning for them, but they have not lost hope. There is anger 
against the police and administration but no bitterness against other 
communities. They have learned the meaning of communalism and secularism 
the hard way (Siddiqui 1988: 61).
4.1 Introduction
The anti-Muslim violence of April-May 1987 was both a low point, and in 
hindsight a turning point, in the post-Independence economic and political 
histories of Meerut’s Muslim communities. In the next two chapters I show in 
detail how new Muslim political leaders emerged in the late-i98os and 1990s 
who would seek the protection and advancement of Muslims in Meerut by novel 
means. Central to my story is the rapid movement away from the Congress
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Party and toward a political coalition that sought to unite low caste Hindus and 
Muslims against the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).
Before I consider these political developments, however, I first want to explore 
some important changes in the economic and social organization of Meerut’s 
Muslim communities through this same period. The article cited above was 
written by a journalist who visited Maliana village in June 1987 when persistent 
tensions and sporadic violence continued in Meerut and its environs. Siddiqui’s 
impressions about Muslim victim families in Maliana were echoed in my 
fieldwork findings from 2001 to 2004. My respondents, both Hindus and 
Muslims from different walks of life, pointed out to me again and again the 
remarkable efforts made by the Muslims for economic reconstruction and 
associated radical changes in their perception of education. After the violent 
events of 1987 many low-status Muslim families began to send their children, 
both boys and girls, to modern educational institutions. Sending children to 
secular educational institutions was a break from the past, not least because a 
majority of artisan Muslims neither had sufficient capital nor incentive to invest 
in modern schooling before the 1987 violence. This striking trend, however, 
became even more prevalent in the post-Ayodhya period. More generally, we 
see through the 1980s and 1990s a clear upswing in the economic fortunes of 
many Muslim families, particularly those of Qureshis — the butchers and meat- 
workers who for many decades had been subordinate to high-status Muslim 
groups like the Syeds, Sheikhs and Pathans, and who very often were despised 
by them.
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I begin by first considering ideas of status and stratification within India’s 
Muslim community and by drawing certain parallels with issues of stratification 
and mobility (through Sanskritization) within caste Hindu communities. I then 
focus on changes in the economic and social standing of the Qureshi community. 
These changes, most of which were positive for Qureshi households, began in 
the 1970s and were linked to changes in the organization of meat-related 
markets across India and internationally. Finally, I make use of household case 
studies to examine the manner and means by which economic wealth has been 
translated within the Qureshi community into human and social capital — both 
through investments in the education of children and in processes of 
Islamisation — and laid the foundation of some of the extraordinary political 
careers that I outline in Chapter Five. Crudely put, it is impossible to 
understand the new forms of political mobilisation that characterised ‘Muslim’ 
Meerut in the 1990s without first understanding something of the changing 
bases of power within that community in the 1980s.
4.2 Economic Mobility among Low-Status Muslims
There are a large number of sociological and anthropological studies of Hindu 
lower caste groups that began to climb the social ladder through processes of 
Sanskritisation (Cohn 1955; Lynch 1969; Rao 1979). Under the caste system, at 
least as it is traditionally described (as for example, by Dumont (1970)), status is 
determined not by economic position but by birth. The Brahmin stands higher 
than the Kshatriya or the Vaishya, the two castes (varnas) most likely to 
dominate local economies. Sanskritisation in turn signifies mobility along the
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axis of ritual status through emulation of the socio-cultural practices of these 
twice-born castes (Srinivas 1967: 67-68). Sanskritisation is a means by which 
the caste system can authorise status changes as a result of newly acquired 
economic power.
In comparison with the vast literature on social stratification and mobility 
among Hindus, the study of caste and social status among India’s Muslim 
communities has received much less attention. Muslim society embraces the 
proclaimed egalitarianism of Islam and denounces all distinctions based on 
birth and ancestry (Levy 1962 (1957): 155). Most scholars working on Muslim 
life in South Asia, however, take the view that there is a ranked social division 
that is to some extent comparable to the Hindu caste system (Ansari i960; 
Ahmed 1973; Madan 2001 (1972)).^  They argue that occupations within 
Muslim society are as hierarchically graded as they are in the Hindu caste 
system, and that they affect the status of the group members traditionally 
associated with any given job. It has also been observed that low status Muslims 
can make claims to social advancement through a secular route that leads them 
to seek to acquire wealth, education and political power (eg. Goodfriend 1983). 
Muslim society in Meerut seems to exemplify these more general patterns in the 
sense that it exhibits forms of social stratification based around an occupational
w  Concerning the contradiction between the Islamic egalitarian concept and the existence of 
caste in Muslim society, Imitiaz Ahmed takes the view that caste among the Muslims in India 
was a product of the Hindu influence and has been reinforced by the justification offered by 
Islamic law that addresses the idea of birth and descent as criteria of status (Ahmed 1973:30- 
31). In contrast to Ahmed’s position, Francis Robinson takes an ‘essentialist’ view that asserts 
ultimate values of Islam that continues to influence ordinary Muslims’ everyday life (see 
Robinson 1983).
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hierarchy (much as in the Hindu caste system). The primary rationale for 
ranking groups among Muslims is based on claims of foreign descent. High- 
ranking Muslims in Meerut are mainly composed of Syeds, Sheikhs, Moghals 
and Pathans, and their sub-groups. The Syeds are descendants of the Prophet 
and come first in the status hierarchy. They are followed by the Sheikhs, who 
are descendants of Arabs or Persians, the Moghals, who are Turks from Central 
Asia and the Pathans from north India or Afghanistan. Lower-status groups 
consist of Indian converts to Islam who often retain caste or occupational 
names. These groups, in other words, are not entitled to be known by their 
ancestry, but are known instead by their occupations.
Higher-status groups in some cases have a system of hypergamy^2 between the 
four main groups. The low-status groups, for their part, pursue a system of 
endogamy. High and low-status groups generally do not intermarry. Because of 
the fairly strict rule of endogamy among lower ranked groups, their social 
structure is in key respects characterised by a stronger sense of group identity 
and solidarity. Each occupational group or caste is an aggregate of different sub­
groups which are classified by various categories, including region of origin, 
occupation and other affinities. These sub-divisions usually form a unit of 
endogamy. Family lineage is thus maintained carefully and strictly in lower 
ranked Muslim groups (see also Benson 1983).
x32 Hypergamy is a marriage practice to seek a spouse of equal or higher socio-economic status or 
caste status than oneself. During my fieldwork, elite Muslim families often implied that 
hypergamy was used as the trading of daughters to families of both economic and social high- 
status. But I also came across cases in which upwardly-mobile wealthy Muslim families of the 
lower rank kept marrying their sons to higher-status family daughters through generations.
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A wide social distance can be observed between Meerut’s high- and low-status 
Muslims. Some of the traditional occupations of the latter category are 
considered ‘dirty’ or low status by other Muslims, in much the same way as the 
occupations of service castes are perceived as degrading by caste Hindus. 
Within each Muslim occupational group the same division of‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ 
occupations exists and works to control social boundaries (Singh lqgS).^  
Social distance among Muslim occupational groups is generally observed in 
terms of entry restrictions to a mosque built by another group. Group 
boundaries are also demarcated by residential locality. According to the Islamic 
principle of egalitarianism all Muslims are deemed to be of equal status. They 
should all be able to eat and attend mosque together. In practice, however, 
Muslim artisans in Meerut are not accepted as equals by high-status Muslims. 
Also, there seems to exist a subtle and arguably rather weak set of restrictions 
regarding inter-dining and social contacts between ‘clean’ and ‘d ir t/ 
occupational groups among the Meerut Muslims. This is observable, 
notwithstanding that my Muslim respondents anxiously deny that there is any 
community parallel with the ‘Hindu’ caste s y s t e m . ^
*33 Barth notes that there is an Islamic notion of pollution and a tendency to interpret the secular 
reality in terms of a polarity of purity and impurity among Pathans in the Swat valley in 
Pakistan. The pollution derives from physical processes including elimination, sexual 
intercourse and death.(Barth 1972 (1959): 17).
^4 Chris Fuller points out that in response to the Ayodhya crisis and the rising Hindu 
nationalism in the 1980s, Indian Muslims increasingly came to share the notion of a common 
Muslim identity which denies the existence of ‘Hindu’ caste. Fuller notes: ‘the notion of a 
common Muslim identity that is definitely not Hindu is a more and more vital determinant of 
Muslim ideas about caste — namely, that they do not have it — and about status ranking — 
which they do have, but not in the form of caste, unless it is negatively invoked to demean other 
Muslims’ (Fuller 1996: 20).
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High-status Muslims in Meerut form a minority of about 7.5 percent of the 
Muslim population. The fortunes of the Islamic gentry class have recently been 
on the wane, not least when compared to those of the Qureshis. Those who 
belong to the higher status and relatively better-off classes usually possess some 
land and property in rural parts of Meerut District or in other districts nearby, 
although their landholdings have become smaller and more segmented since the 
Zamindari Abolition Act in 1952. Landed estates have also decreased in size as 
a result of being divided among multiple inheritors over several generations. 
Many landed-class Muslims now find that their social position is secured most 
comfortably in the service sector, in government or in the professional sector. 
One descendant of a Nawab family told me:
After the Zam indari Act we sold the rem aining property and got income. In  this 
way we tried  to give good education to  our children. But we have no ta len t in 
business, we have no skill. Our family has had  very few m em bers in business. 
Now some are in teaching or in service in  the arm y or other kinds of civil 
services.135
There is sometimes a sense of immobility and a lack of dynamism among high- 
status Muslims in Meerut that parallels that depicted by Elizabeth Mann (1992) 
in her study of Muslims in Aligarh.
Most of Meerut’s lower status Muslims occupy a distinctive and socially separate 
economic sphere within the informal sector. These low-ranking Muslims are 
generally separated from Hindus and discriminated against in labour markets
135 Interview on 11 December 2003.
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because of their religion. Large sections of Muslim artisans are associated with 
low-paid manual labour and work in environments characterised by poor 
sanitation and health. Their economy is based on often minuscule household 
industries in which skills are passed down over generations. The main labour 
force generally consists of family members, some of whom are not paid (Ahmed 
1975; Romatet 1983; Chandavarkar 1994). Very few business establishments 
from the Muslim artisan industry are registered with the state administration.^
If the Muslim artisans suffer from discrimination they also take advantage of 
being in the informal sector to maximise their innovation potential. Highly 
skilled craftsmen traditionally take up those areas which are shunned by Hindus 
for fear of ritual pollution (Epstein 1962; Harriss-White 2002: 146). Their 
working world is regulated by rules, working ethics and an entrepreneurial spirit 
that are centred on their traditional skills (Epstein 1962: 33).137 There is a 
strong consciousness among Muslim artisans that they belong to specific 
occupational groups. There is also a degree of unspoken agreement among them 
about the need to refrain for the most part from entering the occupational zones 
of other groups. That said, in comparison to some Hindu caste groups, Muslim 
artisans do move fairly freely between occupational categories and between 
traditional and modern occupations. An increasing number of Muslims are 
diversifying their occupational orientation. Economic differentiation and a 
competitive market are encouraging the gradual dismantling of occupational
«6Interview at Meerut District Industries Centre on 28 March 2003.
J37 Meerut had the largest number of household industry and manufacturing industries in UP, 
followed by Bijnor and Varanasi, in the 1961 census. The household industry sector’s constant 
growth was mentioned in the 1991 census (Census of India 1961: 454; 1991, All India Town 
Directly).
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boundaries and hierarchies (Shah 1990: 111). This relatively fluid system of 
employment nonetheless takes shape within a wider economy that is quite rigid. 
Many, if not most, Muslim artisans are bound to Hindu traders who supply 
them with raw materials and who remain in charge of marketing the final 
products. These business structures and practices are barely regulated and 
many Muslims feel they are exploited by Hindu middlemen (Khan 1992: 456- 
466).
Significant economic mobility among the Muslims in Meerut has been apparent 
since the early 1970s, although it accelerated in the 1980s. The most dynamic 
economic development has been seen among Muslim artisans of the lower 
echelons.^8 These artisans consist of Ansari weavers, Saiffie blacksmiths and 
carpenters, Gaddi cattle raisers and milk suppliers and Qureshi butchers. These 
four groups roughly make up 85 percent of the Muslim population of the city 
(see Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
Table 4.1 Muslim population within the municipal area, 2001
Total Population Muslim Population (%)
1,074,229 515,629 48
Source: The population figure is from the Nagar Nigam (Municipal Corporation) office record
(Government of Uttar Pradesh 2001).
«8 Although I have only a small amount of interview data, it is most likely that as in other cities in 
western UP, Muslim economic growth was to a certain degree attributed to the stimulus of 
Persian Gulf remittances and exports to the Gulf countries in the 1970s and 1980s. For the case 
of Moradabad, where Muslims entered the business of exporting brassware in competition with 
Punjabi refugees, (see Hasan and Saberwal 1991 (1984): 218). For the case of Mumbai, see 
Hansen (2001:167-171).
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Table 4.2 An approximate proportion o f different Muslim  
communities within the Muslim population in Meerut
Muslim Communities (%)
Ansari (weavers) 50
Qureshi (butchers) 12.5
Saiffie (blacksmith) 12.5
Gaddis (milk suppliers) 10
Muslim gentry (Syed, Sheikh, Pathan) 7-5
Others 7-5
Source: The data is from Ansari, N. (1985) ‘Muslim Voluntaiy Institutions: Context of modernisation’, PhD. 
thesis (Chaudhuri Charan Singh Meerut University, Meerut: 1985), p. 58.
The Ansaris are again the largest group, forming half of the Muslim population 
and they were the first to climb the ladder of economic mobility. Among the 
other three groups, the Qureshis and Saiffies comprise 12.5 percent each, while 
the Gaddis make up about 10 percent of the Muslim population. The Ansaris 
were already quite active in city politics at the time of the 1989 General 
Elections. The Ansaris have far more white-collar workers in their ranks, 
including lawyers and doctors, than do the other lower status groups. On the 
other hand, the Qureshis, the last to secure economic advancement for 
themselves (in the 1980s), have arguably been the most dynamic among the four 
groups in terms of improving their livelihoods and social standing.
The hereditary occupation of Qureshis is trading in animals and meat. Qureshis 
are also associated with trade in non-flesh commodities, including cloths, fruits 
and vegetables. There is a wide range of occupations associated with animal 
flesh. These include the recycling of animal bone, controlling tanning, glue-
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making, making soap out of animal fat, hides and leather (eg. Harriss-White 
2002: 146). In the government slaughterhouse in Meerut large rooms are 
assigned to the processing of different parts of animal flesh. Dealing with each 
part creates new opportunities for employment. The occupations associated 
with meat seem to have been a last resort or substitute for occupational groups 
dealing with traded commodities. Some cattle traders shifted to butchering 
when the demand for farm cattle declined because of the introduction of 
tractors. Other Qureshis moved away from butchering because of the low 
income that this occupation generated prior to the i ^ o s . ^  The hereditary 
occupation of Qureshis is considered ‘dirty’ and is a stigmatised category of 
manual labour. It might be said that Qureshis rank roughly equal with converts 
among Hindu Scheduled Caste groups (Singh 1998).
Tirthankar Roy notes that Meerut had a meat trade and local slaughtering 
facilities as early as the mid 19th century, alongside Agra, Aligarh and Delhi (Roy 
1999:177). Contemporary evidence of this fact is to be found in the existence in 
Meerut of a wealthy Qureshi family whose traditional occupation was to supply 
rations including meat to the British troops headquartered in Meerut. The 
family migrated from Allahabad to Meerut when the British captured the Doab 
and established the large cantonment in Meerut in 1804. This family, locally 
known as the ‘Bhaiya-jf (brother) family, continued their traditional occupation
^9 Interview with Mr. Abdul Wahaf (Doulla), head of the Meerut government slaughterhouse on 
26 March 2004.
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as the main supplier of rations to the British and later became the government 
contractor, all of which brought them a huge fortune.1*0
In a locality called Billai Joli in the south end of the Old Town there used to be a 
large pond where people slaughtered cattle. The British provided walls and 
roofs to the site of slaughtering, and in this way the original slaughterhouse was 
established in Bani Sarae on the other side of the pond from Billai Joli in the 
mid-i9th century. The slaughterhouse was shifted to the present site in the south 
of Old Town along Hapur road in 1956.141 One Qureshi family, the Baxawalle, 
has traditionally controlled the everyday operations of the slaughterhouse over 
one hundred years in both the older and recent establishments. The present 
head, called Doulla, sits at the front of the slaughterhouse every morning to sell 
fresh meat. A customer of this family is unable to change his meat supplier to 
someone else. He would be threatened that he would not get any meat from the 
slaughterhouse if he changed his provider. In the same vein, no one would 
speak in front of Doulla or his many relations working in the slaughterhouse. 
These family members are called ‘Goonda Galdhi’, signifying a unified muscle 
power which is also widely associated with the image of the Qureshi community 
from outside.
ho The Bhaiya-ji family is mentioned in the Meerut Gazetteer as the largest landed proprietor in 
the entire District at the beginning of the 20th century (Nevill 1904). 
hi Interview with a Qureshi local historian on 19 March 2004.
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My interview data and the minutes of the Jamiat-ul-Qureshi (Qureshi 
Council),142 the political organisation among Qureshis, suggest that a majority of 
Qureshis had been long suffering from impoverishment and backward and 
isolated living circumstances before the 1980s. An Ansari factory owner told 
me:
Many Qureshi women came to Ansari handloom factories to take up a meagre job 
of winding or reeling yams. Many of their men were unemployed. They used to 
live in a mud house without a roof. Men would leave for the job for mango 
orchards in rural areas before summer months came. ...When I was a child, 
Muslims surrounding me treated a Qureshi like a Scheduled Caste. They were 
economically backward, dirty and not c i v i l i s e d . ^
A Qureshi political leader, Mr. Yusuf Qureshi, described his own community 
people:
...[W]e are Qassab [the Qureshis’ original name, meaning ‘cut’]. We are originally 
associated with this profession. Meat business is our traditional occupation. We 
were hated by people because we were very poor, backward in education...lower 
position in e c o n o m y .  ^ 4
The economic domain of the Qureshis before the 1980s was largely confined to 
domestic supply of their commodities, including meat, cattle, fruits and 
vegetables. Some fruit and vegetable vendors were mobile enough to sell goods
The Qureshi Council was established in 1927 by a few literate elite of the Bhaiya-ji family 
mentioned above and a few others from outside Meerut. The Council now has more than five 
million members, and is one of the largest organisations of its kind in India. Interview with Mr. 
Alifuddin Sabri Qureshi of the Bhaiya-ji family on 11 January 2004. The UP state president at 
the point of 2004 was Mr. Yusuf Qureshi, one of the key political figures in Meerut after 1989. 
^3 Interview on 6 March 2004.
^  Mr. Yusuf Qureshi on 18 March 2004.
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outside Meerut, but a large section of the meat trade depended on within-town 
consumption. Meat consumption in Meerut in the 1980s was much less than it 
is now.
Stagnation in the Qureshi economy largely came to an end when the export 
business of buffalo meat began in the 1970s. In the initial stages, countries 
buying Indian buffalo and sheep were limited to a few jurisdictions in the 
Middle East, including the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. After a 
decade, exports started to pick up pace, albeit some countries continued to ban 
Indian meat imports on ‘hygienic’ grounds. Most importantly, however, the 
genre of exporting products was expanded quickly from edible parts to all parts 
of the buffalo, including blood, intestines, bones, tails, ears and hooves. The 
demand mainly came from firms associated with the bio-chemical and medical 
fields, including those producing fertilisers, cosmetic products such as nail 
polish, and traditional medical products in Asian countries including China. 
The export business was very much confined to western UP and some other 
areas in north India. This was because buffalo meat, which was the main 
commodity, was produced only in Punjab, Rajastan, Haryana and western UP. 
Meerut and Aligarh Districts were the main producers of the so-called ‘best’ 
buffalo meat in India. Eastern UP produced much less buffalo. Other meat 
export centres in India were Mumbai in Maharashtra, West Bengal and some 
southern states like Tamil Nadu. Punjab and UP together came to hold a 60 
percent share of all meat exports from India.^5
145 Interview with a Hindu manager of the export firm owned by Dr. Kamil Qureshi in Delhi on 
22 January 2004.
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Because of the social stigma attached to dealing with animal flesh, Qureshis have 
faced less competition in their business than some other groups. They have thus 
been able to take advantage of new occupational niches and internationalisation 
in a way that has escaped other Muslims (cf. Bellwinkel-Schempp 1998). Since 
the mid-1980s Qureshis have been the leading economic group in Meerut 
Muslim society, while the Ansaris began to face a stagnant economy around the 
same time. As we shall see in the next chapter, and not coincidentally, Qureshis 
have since replaced Ansaris in the political life of Meerut’s Muslim community: 
indeed they have been a dominant force in local elections since 1993.
Each artisan class has a range of occupations or biradarisM6 In the case of 
Qureshis, working in the government slaughterhouse or at butchering are 
considered the lowest status jobs. Trading cattle is ranked highest since cattle 
traders in rural Meerut are known for their wealth and p o w e r . 1^  Those who 
aspire to higher status often shift to the trading of non-flesh commodities.
Qureshis are thus in practice an aggregate of different occupational groups. 
They are categorised and divided not only by occupational genre but also by 
territorial levels, structural orders and units of operation. The Qureshi butcher 
community (the (Q)Kassai/(Q)Kassab community) is considered to comprise 
the original inhabitants of the city, whose locality, Bani Sarae, is on the south 
edge of the Old Town. Many other Qureshis have come from outside Meerut
x46 Biradari is an occupational guild equivalent to caste.
*47 They are called Sheikh Vayapari, which implies high status with wealth and landowning. 
Interview with the principal of Faiz-a-am College on 19 March 2004. Also see Roy (1999:192- 
194).
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District and have settled in different parts of the city. They are identified by 
their occupation, through a binary distinction of rural or urban origin, and 
finally by the duration of their habitation in the city. These factors all form 
important status markers.
Let me give an example. There is a cluster of non-butcher Qureshis who have 
settled in a locality called Jali Kothi. These Qureshis are locally called 
‘Palledars’, literally meaning labourers engaged in loading and unloading goods, 
including animals and meat carried on their backs (cf. Deliege 1996). The 
Palledars have gone through an interesting path of occupational mobility. The 
older settlers of the Palledar group are now mostly associated with the 
manufacturing of westem-style brass musical instruments. These Palledars 
mostly came from a major pioneer music instrument export company founded 
by a Muslim family at the end of the 19th century in Jali Kothi. Qureshis 
associated with musical instrument manufacturing thus abandoned their 
hereditary occupation of butchering and selling meat. They learned new skills as 
workers in this company and eventually became independent manufacturers 
after the i970s.148
Another Palledar group is composed of more recent migrants from Mathura, 
Palwal, Moradabad and Farridabad Districts, who settled in Jali Kothi in the 
1970s. These Palledars control the scrap market and the recycling of physically 
polluting waste and scrap, including card, paper, metal, glass, rubber and
x48 A factory owner of manufacturing musical instruments from the Qureshi community in Jali 
Kothi, interviewed on 23 March 2004.
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plastics (cf. Harriss-White 2002: 144-146). Both the musical instrument 
business and the scrap market business have been flourishing in Meerut since 
the mid-1980s. The Palledar group is now one of the most successful economic 
groups in the city. Other occupations of the larger Qureshi community, 
including meat export and trading in clothes and other materials, have also been 
important in creating a rising economic class.
4.3 ‘Modern’ E ducation^
Thirty years ago western education was virtually a monopoly of high-status 
Muslims. Very few Muslims in the artisan class saw the need for a secular or 
more western education at this time. Most children were sent to Islamic 
institutions for a few years before leaving to focus on the learning of traditional 
skills (Ahmed 1981). Educational backwardness among Muslims can also be 
attributed to financial problems (Engineer 1980). Even if Muslim boys were 
sent to school for a modern education many of them dropped out around the 
10th grade (Jayaram 1990). They were often needed in the workforce of the 
traditional small-scale industries operated by their self-employed parents. A 
Qureshi clothes merchant who used to be associated with the meat business told 
me that:
^9 To clarify, I am well aware that Islam and Islamic forms of education are ‘modern’ in their 
own ways. It is common, nonetheless, for both Hindus and Muslims in Meerut to refer to 
(mainly) secular or Western forms of education, especially English-medium teaching, as 
‘modern’ in the sense I use here and elsewhere in this dissertation.
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I found education double-time useless. First, ten years of learning does not give 
any skill in business. There will be no chance for employment, as it is difficult for 
Muslims to get a job, especially in services and government employment. Second, 
ten years make them a late starter in business, which will make them backward. 
It is a waste of time and money.^0
The respondent’s comment indicates that Muslims with traditional skills saw
little tangible advantage in a modern education. Doulla, the head of the
slaughterhouse operation, also commented on this point:
[Before the meat export began], Qureshis who were associated with the meat 
business were not oriented to education. We were interested only in our 
business, and never thought that we were backward. There was no sense of 
inferiority. We were happy with our skills and traditional occupation until very 
recently.^1
I also met a Qureshi professor at Meerut College who was originally from 
Aligarh. His father, who had been interested in studying, and who visited one of 
the primary schools, was beaten by his father (my respondent’s grandfather) 
because of this. He told me:
Before the Zamindari Act, education was not regarded as good to save anybody 
[among his Qureshi community in Aligarh].^2
Across north India, Muslims’ lower attainment in education, and the markedly 
low proportion of Muslims going on to higher education, have been to a large 
degree associated with the occupational orientation of the majority of the
*5° Interview on 23 March 2004.
Interview with Doulla on 26 March 2004.
ls2 Interview on 6 February 2004.
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Muslim population, and thus with the dominance of artisanal classes (Ahmed, 
1981). For this reason, the Muslims tended to create a separate domain of 
education in isolation from mainstream educational institutions. The Indian 
Constitution encourages all minorities ‘to establish and administer educational 
institutions of their choice’ (Article 30 (1)), and there are many Muslim 
educational facilities in Meerut based on individual and mosque-related 
activities. Muslim children, particularly of poor families, have traditionally been 
sent to maktabs and madrasahs, the prime institutions for Islamic learning. 
These schools might provide a limited range of secular education options as well. 
However, after graduation from these schools, prospects for paid employment 
are generally very low, not least in prized public sector jobs where Muslims have 
faced differing degrees of discrimination (see Jeffrey et al. 2004).
In the last twenty years, however, there has been a significant change in 
attitudes towards modem education among Muslim artisans in Meerut. 
Aspirations to modern education, particularly that taught in English and higher 
education, have increased among most sections of the artisan class. The Shahar 
Kaji (religious judge) of Meemt commented:
After the violence in 1987 and again after the demolition [of the Babri Masjid] in 
1992, there was a remarkable increase in educational attainment among Muslims. 
As many as 25 to 30 percent of the Muslim population now send their children to 
modem educational institutions.^
A Muslim political advisor to Yusuf Qureshi told me:
>53 Interview with Mr. Zainur Rashedin, the assistant Shahar Kaji of Meerut on 13 February 
2004.
l8 l
Muslims are not against non-Muslims. We want to compete with them. We want 
to improve our lives to be able to stand in the same, equal position for 
competition. Muslims became more rational from emotional. We do not want to 
be called backward.15*
Yusuf Qureshi further commented in this respect:
The 1987 riots changed the consciousness and awareness of the Muslim 
community...After 1987, education has become the important vehicle in order to 
become equal to the Hindu community. Its purpose is to improve human quality. 
We want to claim that we are on the same plane [as Hindus]. We want to 
participate in this race, to obtain respect.155
Ansaris were the first to be interested in formal modem education of the type 
that would qualify their children for civil service examinations. Aspirations 
towards progress and mobility then spread widely among lower status Muslims, 
particularly among Qureshis. Yusuf Qureshi explained how an aspiration to 
education came about among the Qureshis. He emphasised the adverse effect of 
illiteracy in conducting the meat trade:
Ours [the meat business] is a humiliating job and there is no government support 
to help our business...there is no government subsidy. It is very demoralising to 
Qureshi workers. The police also tortured us.. .they treated us with hatred. Many 
Qureshi traders were looted [after prosperity came in the 1980s], but the police 
did not prepare the appropriate documents for these cases. We were illiterate so 
the police misbehaved with us. It was not possible for us to obtain the contract in 
order for us to sell meat in Delhi as we were not educated well. Being illiterate
x54 Interview on 18 March 2004.
x55 Mr. Yusuf Qureshi on 18 March 2004.
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means that entire business has to be done orally. Illiteracy negatively affects our 
business.^6
After the 1980s, Yusuf Qureshi continued, ‘prosperity made us realise we were 
backward, and we most regret being illiterate. We particularly realised the 
importance of higher education’.x57
The enrolment of Muslim children in English-medium schools increased 
steadily from the early 1990s onwards. I was impressed that every teacher, dean 
and administrator in the educational institutions I visited emphasised the rapid 
increase of Muslim children from the lower strata enrolling in school, especially 
in respect of girl children and their high academic achievement.^8 A Muslim ex- 
MLA told me:
Before 1992 Muslims were the “second-class” citizens. We thought that we were 
not able to get any government job since we were discriminated. After 1992, 
however, Muslims thought that the minority cannot flourish without education. 
Like Sikhs, they are very well e d u c a t e d .^9
Elizabeth Mann who interviewed a Qureshi who acquired wealth through the meat trade in 
Aligarh, described the same problem of illiteracy: ‘The more money he earned, the more 
paperwork he had to deal with. As he was illiterate, as, in his opinion, were most of his baradari 
[biradari], he was obliged to recruit help in dealing with the paperwork and in promoting his 
new projects. He believed he had been cheated several times by these business partners’ (Mann 
1992:128).
*57 Interview with Mr. Yusuf Qureshi on 18 March 2004.
*58 Interviews with teachers and deans of English-medium schools in Meerut including St. Maiy 
Academy, Godwin Public School, St. John Public School and St. Sophia Girls’ School.
J59 Interview with Mr. Abdul Hareem Khan, ex-MLA, on 20 February 2004.
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This orientation to investment in modern education has been seen not only in 
households that have successfully accumulated capital but also in families with 
little in the way of economic advantage. It seems to be the case that not just 
Qureshis but low-status Muslims in general are now prioritising modern 
education for their children, regardless of their level of economic 
advancement.160 Those who could afford would send their children to English- 
medium private institutions, while those who could not afford those schools 
would send their children to Hindi-medium government schools. In comparison 
with Hindu children, the attendance of Muslim children in English-medium 
schools was dismal, but teachers at every English-medium school I visited still 
noted a remarkable increase of Muslim children attending from the lower 
echelons of society (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
160 Interview with Mr. Zainur Rashedin, the assistant Shahar Kaji of Meerut on 13 February 
2004.
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Figure 4.1 M uslim  boys’ attendance at an English-m edium  school
(Class I)
Muslim  Students Non-M uslim  S tudents — %o f  M uslim  S tudent
Source: St. Mary Academy (for boys), Class One Admission Registers (St. Mary Academy n.d.).
Figure 4.2 Muslim boys’ attendance at an English-m edium  school 
(Class X)
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Source: St. Mary Academy, Class Ten Admission Registers (St. Mary Academy n.d.).
Another sea change in education is apparent in the number of Muslim girls 
being sent to modern educational institutions. The education of girls within 
Muslim artisan-class families was until recently limited to a domestic space of 
learning. A sizeable section of girls travelled to educated ladies’ residences to
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obtain an Islamic training, while others were taught in their own homes by 
female and senior members of the family (Ansari 1985). They learned to recite 
the Quran, write and read Urdu, and to observe various moral codes defining 
Islamic womanhood. It was generally considered that women did not require 
modern education but needed rather to learn the skills and knowledge required 
of an ideal housewife and housekeeper (Jeffrey et al., 2004). A rising trend of 
girls’ education in modern institutions indicates that expectations of Muslim 
womanhood are slowly changing. A school teacher in a convent school 
commented:
Sixty to seventy percent of Muslim girls are now admitted to modern schools. 
People who live from hand to mouth send their children to English-medium 
schools, and that includes girl children. This is based on the belief that we are 
improving our new generation by educating future mothers.161
According to several teachers in English-medium schools, the educational 
attainment of Muslim girls exceeded that of boys by 2000. Changing values 
brought about different expectations regarding a mother’s qualification. A 
mother should now be well educated, preferably in English, because only a 
mother is able to teach her children at home.162 Limited data regarding the 
rapidly increasing number of Muslim girl children in two of the most popular 
convent schools for girls is shown in the following table (see Table 4.3 and 
Figure 4.3).
161 Interview at Godwin Public School on 15 May 2004.
162 Interview with Mr. Dilshad Munna on 25 March 2004.
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Table 4.3 Muslim girl students in an English-medium school at the
10th class
Year Total number of students
Muslim
students (%)
2003 (1993 entry) 17 6 19 10.70
2002 (1992 entry) 169 9 530
Note: The school ranges from nursery to 12th class with about 2,000 students.
Source: Sophia Girls School, Class Ten Admission Registers (Sophia Girls School n.d.).
Figure 4.3 M uslim girls’ attendance at an English-m edium school
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In Meerut, more than a dozen Muslims have established English-medium 
schools for Muslim children. These schools usually have facilities from nursery 
grades through to the 12th class. Dilshad Munna is a Qureshi politician who 
became the president of the city Samajwadi Party ruling committee in 2003. 
When I met him, Munna ran a prosperous milk dairy firm from his home/office 
in Khairnagar gate in Jali Kothi. He established an English-medium school 
mainly for Muslim children in 2000. The school has classes from nursery to 8th
187
grade. The number of students dramatically increased from 90 in 2000 to 200 
in 2004. Munna commented on education among Muslims:
Muslims understand the importance of education. They are changing, 
understanding, and awareness is there. The English medium is necessary you 
would feel lower if you don’t. Well-educated means that this person has a means 
to get a good job, expand his scope for the future... speaking English is a social 
status kind of thing, a status symbol. English is needed for business; if you want 
to go to Delhi or outside Meerut, English is must.
Munna’s two children were sent to an English-medium public boarding school 
in Nainital. He saw his children only in the holidays. It was necessary to do this, 
he said, because no one in his family, and most especially their mother, could 
communicate with the children in English when they were back from school.l63
4.3.1 White-collar jobs
Behind this new orientation to modem education there are broader goals of 
progress and social mobility among Muslim artisan families, as voiced to me by 
many Muslim respondents including Qureshis and Ansaris. Accumulated 
wealth is being converted into symbolic and cultural capital at a later stage of 
household development (Osella and Osella 2000: 39). Those with educational 
attainments and high qualifications are clearly aiming for prestigious white- 
collar jobs, particularly in the government sector. This represents a drastic 
change in the occupational orientation of Muslim artisans, because their work
l63 Interview with Mr. Dilshad Munna on 25 March 2004.
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culture has traditionally associated inherited skills with a strong sense of 
community identity and pride. A majority of my respondents indicated their 
hope that one of their sons would leave skilled manual work and obtain a 
professional or white-collar job, particularly in the government sector. 
Concerning this point, I interviewed several Qureshis working in the Meerut 
government slaughterhouse. Based on the interviews I sketch out below 
something of the lives of two Qureshi workers:
1. The case of A, a worker in the slaughterhouse
A is a meat contractor. His business has a routine. He buys five to six buffalos 
at the weekly market and takes them to the Meerut slaughterhouse. Then he 
sells the meat to local shopkeepers. His family has been associated with this 
occupation for generations. He worked with his father for 15 years in this 
business. He now owns twelve buffalos and a milk dairy where he sells milk 
every morning. After selling milk he comes to the slaughterhouse. His profit 
amounts to about Rs.1,000 per day, which he thinks is veiy good. He also thinks 
that both his dairy and his meat-selling businesses are becoming increasingly 
profitable. In his view, the Qureshis are now the richest Muslims in Meerut. He 
has four sons and six daughters, all in higher education in English-medium 
schools. All of them want to go on to post-graduate level. If educated, his 
children would not be interested in the meat business, but he is happy with this. 
Future decisions are up to his children.
2. The case of B, an independent meat supplier
Another Qureshi worker at the slaughterhouse is a generation younger than A. B
is a supplier of flesh to a meat factory in Meerut. In this factory meat is frozen
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and packed and then sent to an export firm in Mumbai.l64 B started his career at 
the slaughterhouse at age 15. He was first employed in the de-boning of flesh 
and fats. It was a contract-based job. There were about 125 people in the same 
section, most of whom were Bihari migrants. They were very poor and willing to 
do this menial job. He stayed in this section for eight years, but all his co­
workers left their jobs during this period. Fifty of them changed their 
occupations and became fruit vendors or cloth merchants. B had an ambition to 
become an independent meat supplier. For this business he needed to acquire 
some initial capital, so he started a side business collecting different buffalo 
parts — brains, tongues, hearts, livers and tails — and selling them at a good 
price to soap manufacturers and others. In the mid-1990s it was relatively easy 
to collect and sell such things at a high price. This side business helped him to 
acquire enough capital to become a meat supplier. Fifteen out of 125 of his co­
workers became meat suppliers like him. B studied up to the 7th class. He was 
not fond of studying at school. His community, the Qureshi, did not like 
schools. His grandfather was a cattle trader and his father a hulya who checked 
the stolen buffalo at the slaughterhouse. B is remotely related to Doulla. B now 
wants all of his five children to have a higher education in English-medium 
schools, including his three daughters. He wants his sons to become meat 
exporters. Even if they do not achieve this goal, he wants all his children to stay 
in the meat business.
The stories of A and B are fairly typical of the lives of rapidly upwardly mobile 
Qureshi workers at the Meerut government slaughterhouse. Many have now
l64 This factory is owned by Shahid Akhlaq, then the Mayor of Meerut.
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started side-businesses such as meat shops or dairies. Their economic success 
has also opened up a number of new occupations within the same field of 
activity. For example, B became a meat supplier to meat export firms. The 
occupational genres of ‘meat supplier’ or ‘meat exporter’ did not exist 20 years 
ago. This means that there are now more chances for employment and 
economic success for the younger generation of Qureshis.
Education is considered to be the key to securing a different future from that of 
their ancestors. B saw the importance of his children having the ability to speak 
in English since, as he noted, meat exporting is an occupation that takes place in 
a global network. A said that he would be the last person in his family to be 
associated with the meat business. He expressed his wish that his children 
would go into a different field of trade, dealing with cloth or fruit but not with 
meat.
4.3.2 Changing social organisation among the Qureshi community
Socio-economic progress has had important impacts on social structures within 
the Qureshi community. The meat business, Kabari bazaar (scrap market), the 
clothes trade and the manufacturing of musical instruments are all thriving and 
seem to be working to reduce economic differentiation within the community. 
Spreading education also has the potential to create more coherence among 
Qureshi households (Beteille 1967).
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Accordingly, there have been some moves to unify different sub-groups within 
the community. A key example is that in the last 10 to 15 years there has been an 
increasing trend to intermarriage within the Palledar and Kassai communities. 
Originally these groups were strictly endogamous in order to maintain group 
boundaries. The Kassai group, the ‘authentic’ butcher group within the Qureshi, 
perceived themselves as original residents of Meerut city and thus in a higher 
position than the Palledars. The latter were composed of migrants and settled 
in the city at a later date (although the oldest sections of the Palledars’ 
settlement dated back to the 19th century). The Kassai group were more rigid 
about endogamy as they wished to maintain their perceived position of 
superiority. However, the strict boundaries of endogamy have become 
increasingly blurred in the 1980s and 1990s as each group’s politico-economic 
achievement was recognised by the other. In order to create more business and 
political opportunities, both groups had slowly but consistently begun 
collaborative efforts to bring households together as partners and allies. Dilshad 
Munna, a young Qureshi politician, has been especially active in advocating 
intermarriage between the Palledar and Kassai communities.
While most of the current Qureshi political leaders have so far come from the
Kassai butcher group, several political figures have also emerged among the
Palledars. Munna is one of them. Munna started his political career as a
member of the Municipal Corporation in 1989. Apart from becoming the
president of the city Samajwadi Party (SP) ruling committee in 2003, Munna
contested the Legislative Assembly election in 2002, gaining second position
behind the B JP candidate. This was largely because the Muslim vote was split
between Munna, another Qureshi candidate and an Ansari candidate. Munna
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was previously a promoting member of the Janata Dal, in one sense a precursor 
of the SP, and had helped the campaign of Haji Akhlaq, a Qureshi Janata Dal 
candidate from the Kassai group who was elected as a city MLA in 1993. Here 
politics became a unification factor as Munna worked for support from all 
sections of the Qureshi community. Munna was also offered business 
partnerships by members of the Kassai group who wanted his political power 
behind them to launch their businesses successfully. Munna in turn wanted 
their votes so as not to repeat the divisions that hurt his election chances in 
2002. He also wanted to unite a broader constituency of ‘backward’ class voters.
4.3.3 The Other Backward Classes (OBCs) category
Reservation quotas based on the backward status of religious minorities, 
including Muslims, have been a highly controversial issue since the colonial 
period. Muslims benefited from communal representation in the legislature and 
in civil service positions under British rule. These preferential policies were 
considered by Congress Party leaders, including Jawaharlal Nehru, to have 
formed one causal element leading up to the Partition of India and the 
communal carnage that followed it. They were an example of the British 
dividing India to rule over it. Partition renewed the commitment of many 
political leaders to construct a secular state that would not be compatible with 
reservations on the basis of religion (Bayly 1999: 268). As a result, Muslim 
reservations ended shortly after Independence. The Indian Constitution denied 
Muslims access to ‘compensatory discrimination’, in particular in the areas of 
university places and public service appointments. The Constitution requires the
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state to treat all citizens equally, with the notable exception of the Scheduled 
Castes and Tribes.
On the other hand, Article 346 of the Constitution provides for the appointment 
of a commission to investigate the conditions of the ‘socially and educationally 
backward classes’ that were placed outside the reservation quotas allocated to 
the Scheduled Castes and Tribes. The first Commission was appointed with 
Kaka Kalelkar as Chairman in 1953, and its report was submitted in March 1955. 
The report recommended reservation of jobs in the government and seats in 
educational institutions for 2,399 classes or communities listed as Backward. 
However, it was not implemented because the report invited dissent from 
several members of the Commission, including the chairman of the Commission 
himself who expressed doubt about the wisdom of using caste — in effect — as 
the main criterion of backwardness. Prime Minister Moraiji Desai appointed 
B.P. Mandal from Bihar to head a second Backward Classes Commission after 
the Janata government came to power in Delhi in 1977. The so-called Mandal 
Commission Report was presented to Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1980, but 
its main recommendations were not implemented by Gandhi or by her 
successor, Rajiv Gandhi (Srinivas 1997 (1996): xxvi-xxvii). When the National 
Front Government under V.P. Singh adopted some of the recommendations of 
the Mandal Report in 1990, lower status Muslims found for the first time that 
they were entitled to reservation quotas in central government jobs and state 
educational institutions. The list of Backward Classes prepared by the UP state
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government now included large sections of low-status Muslims, and most 
notably among them the Qureshis. l6s
By the time of my fieldwork, most low-status Muslims in Meerut were well 
aware that they were included in the OBCs category and thus were entitled to a 
number of benefits in the areas of education and employment. The fact of being 
part of the OBCs category seems to have provided low-status Muslims in Meerut 
with a further stimulus to gain higher and English-medium modern education. 
The demand for educational concessions became a major plank in the OBC 
movement (Beteille 1967:104). Muslim OBCs in Meerut still lag behind their 
Hindu counterparts in the attainment of education of the type required for civil 
service examinations. They are hence poorly represented in government jobs 
and white-collar occupations in general. But the number of Muslim children 
qualifying for competition for such prestigious jobs has steadily been increasing 
since the early 1990s.
There is now a strong notion of progress and a discourse of change among low- 
status Muslims in Meerut that is centred around the need for modem education 
and a desire for white-collar jobs. The Muslims came out of their isolated 
educational enclaves and began entering mainstream educational institutions. 
As Dilshad Munna commented, qualifications based on higher and English- 
medium education have become important markers of social status. This was 
not against Islamic teaching, I was told by many respondents. Key religious
l6s ‘Citizen’s Charter’, Backward Class Welfare Department, Meerut, 2002 (Government of Uttar 
Pradesh 2002).
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authorities in the city, including the Ulama (religious leader/priest) and the Kaji 
(religious judge), both of whom were experts on Islamic law, were by now 
encouraging modern and secular education for Muslims.166 Islam is not a rigid 
or static religion (Ahmed 1983).
4.4 Islamisation and Muslim Ethnicity
Although Muslims increasingly pursue social mobility through the new status 
criteria of modern education and white-collar jobs, a stratification system 
among Muslims according to Islamic codes exists in parallel to these new 
orientations. Indeed, Muslims seem to cross freely over a wider spectrum of 
status markers than do Hindus when pursuing higher status. Charles Iindholm 
(1986 (1976)) stresses the significance of historical context in analysing the 
presence of Muslim ‘caste’ relations, which, he suggests, are not an ‘ultimate and 
formal’ essence ruling Muslim life. Rather, under one circumstance Muslim 
‘caste’ may recede into the background and Islamic identity may appear with 
more salience, while under other circumstances the reverse may occur.
Frank Fanselow (1996) furthers Lindholm’s argument in his study of social 
stratification among Tamil Muslims. Fanselow’s study shows that an emphasis 
on caste-like stratification was made among those Muslim groups with a foreign 
lineage that gave them a prestigious position. However, for those groups 
‘without history*, or without a foreign lineage, stratification may become more 
aligned to secular values, the social capital of education, consumption and
166 Interview with Imam of Green Mosque in Khaimagar, on 21 November 2003.
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wealth. Fanselow’s study also shows that when two lower ranking Muslim 
groups came to be included in the list of Backward Classes — as a new category 
of Tamil-speaking Muslims as opposed to Urdu speaking Muslims — they 
dropped the use of their caste names; the difference between them was instead 
redefined in terms of different Islamic legal schools. Thus, caste was 
‘disinvented’ and the stratification system was rethought and worked through. 
The submergence of two separate caste identities was accompanied by the 
development of a more egalitarian Islamic discourse based on achieved rather 
than ascribed religiosity, challenging hierarchical institutions and practices of 
caste. Fanselow suggests that the undoing of the ties of political and economic 
dependence that linked the two groups generated new social forces, leading to 
greater degrees of unity and equality among Muslims based on a more 
egalitarian ideology. Muslim stratification, therefore, must be understood in 
historical terms and in the context of changing political and economic 
conditions.
Janet Benson (1983) further argues that Islamisation occurs more as a result of 
inter-ethnic competition than in response to an internal need to acquire social 
status. Benson takes the view that Muslims emphasise Islamic identity when 
they ‘face loss of power and status in a wider social system for status 
competition’ (ibid. 42). Her study of Muslims in urban and rural towns in 
Andhra Pradesh suggests that political changes and heightened Muslim 
insecurity have direct relevance to a continuing emphasis on Islamic identity. In 
other words, Islamisation may be understood as the modem formation of 
Muslim identity in the context of Hindu-Muslim conflict.
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My field data bear on this wider debate on the social organisation of Muslims in 
Meerut. As we shall see below, in Meerut city the social boundaries between 
Hindus and Muslims are clearly marked through various social attributes such 
as language, custom and attitude. Muslims differentiate themselves from 
Hindus by dress, religious activities and other cultural attributes. In the 
following sections I discuss Muslim ethnicity from two perspectives. I first 
explain the Islamisation process and markers of Muslim ethnicity. This 
explanation is followed by an ethnographic account that sketches out how this 
contested Muslim identity is actively pursued by low-status Muslims in the Old 
Town. I then introduce a more specific account of the Islamisation process 
within the Qureshi community, which is followed by a brief review of micro-level 
developments in the formation of a Muslim identity vis-a-vis Hindus after 
Partition.
4.4.1 Islamisation
The process of status claims among Muslims is based considerably on the 
concept of social mobility under Islamic religious codes. Social mobility is here 
pursued through ‘Islamisation’, in which a believer’s status is defined by his or 
her religiosity. Individual religiosity is judged by commitment to the purest 
standards of Islamic behaviour, adherence to Shariat (Islamic legal code), and 
certain ethic codes and moral behaviour. The ascendancy of social status with 
acquired economic or political power should also be legitimised through an 
individual’s ‘achieved religiosity’. The link between status and religion 
encourages, therefore, the process of Islamisation in the community. Francis
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Robinson emphasises that Islamisation has been steadily entering the local lives 
of Indian Muslims (Robinson 1983).
David Gilmartin (1989) provides a good example of Islamic egalitarianism in 
achieving social status in the light of one’s religiosity. In the Central Punjab 
(Muslim) Assembly election of 1934, a Hindu Lala (trader) who had converted to 
Islam, and who had written a popular biography of the Prophet, stood as a 
candidate in opposition to a retired Kashmiri civil servant and judge. Lala was 
perceived by local religious leaders ‘as a man of deep individual commitment to 
Islam; his candidacy thus symbolised the primary importance of direct, personal 
commitment to Islamic solidarity’(87-88). Lala’s perceived high religiosity 
eventually overcame his ethnic origin in the eyes of the voters and he won the 
election with the popular support of the urban Kashmiri population of Lahore. 
The underlying egalitarian concept of being a Muslim shown in this story is 
premised on the fact that the accident of birth is irrelevant in judging one’s 
religiosity. Rather, a person who embraces Islam out of conviction is seen as a 
better Muslim than others who follow it because it is their parents’ religion.167
4.4.2 Muslims in the Old Town
Let me now change scale. In contrast to the rapidly changing appearance of the 
northern half of the city, the walled city (the Old Town) in the south of the city
i67 T.N. Madan gives another case of a Brahmin convert. His ascriptive birth and behaviour as a 
Muslim meant that he was not seen as a ‘good Muslim’ by other Muslims. Madan shows that 
under certain circumstances the fact of birth does matter in determining a person’s religiosity 
and hence social status under Islam (Madan 2001 (1972): 238-239).
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appears to remain unchanged with a stable population and geographical 
structure. Muslims who live in the Old Town are proud of their sense of 
‘belonging’ to the city over ‘generations’. The nature of belonging is clear in the 
pattern of neighbourhood networks and tightly knit social enclaves within each 
mohalla. Residents prefer to dwell in mohallas with their kin or the same 
Biradari and to maintain ties of equal status. Therefore every mohalla has a 
dominant Biradari, and residents in each show tremendous loyalty to each 
other.
Being Muslim means — minimally — believing in a single God, attending Friday 
prayers when possible, observing major Muslim festivals (Muharram, Ramadan 
and Baqr Id) and referring to the Quran as the final authority. Muslims 
acknowledge the five pillars of Islam comprising creed, prayer, fasting, alms and 
pilgrimage (Robinson 1983: 185). A visitor cannot miss the existence of 
mosques, the major congregation point for Muslims, within the walled city. 
They are found in almost every corner of the Old Town with different colours, 
sizes and structures. The main mosque of the city, the Jama Masjid, is situated 
at the highest and most central point of the Old Town, overlooking the entire 
city. In principle, in each mohalla there must be a mosque for residents’ 
congregation five times a day and for Friday prayers. Indeed, in almost every 
mohalla a mosque has been built by a Biradari predominantly residing in the 
mohalla. Building a mosque for one’s community is a status symbol in 
accordance with the religious code. Mosques are a symbol of orthodox Islam, 
and their functions are closely connected with the everyday life of Muslims.
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Firstly, large mosques often run the madrasahs or other types of religious 
training institutions on their premises. The madrasahs are where a Muslim first 
begins to find his religious identity: ‘At the age four or five,’ according to a 
Qureshi politician, ‘when we start understanding the world, we begin to get 
religious teaching at a madrasah. That is when we come to know that we are 
Muslim. This is a very important stage, being born as a Muslim’.168 While 
western education has increasingly spread among the lower strata for the last 
twenty years, Islamic training does not seem to have lost its primaiy importance 
in the lives of Muslims. While there are some criticisms among the city’s 
Muslim elite that the madrasahs have contributed much to the ‘backwardness’ 
of the Muslim community as a whole, these traditional Islamic institutions 
continue to thrive in the city as the primary educational institutions for young 
Muslim children (cf. Jeffery et al. 2004).
Secondly, Muslims endeavour to increase their religiosity by fulfilling ‘religious 
and worldly duties’ through activities related to mosques. Madrasahs are run 
on donations from individuals in the surrounding locality. Funds are collected 
from Muslim households every month for maintaining the mosques and any 
educational institutions within the premises. There are no tuition fees for 
children. The madrasahs are most particularly for children belonging to the 
weaker and poorer sections of the community. Mosques also provide 
consultations to support the well-being of the congregation. Those consultations 
are usually by the religious leaders or elders of the mosque, and include 
arbitration based on Islamic law or supervision of life events including
168 Interview with Mr. Noor Ilahi on 5 May 2004.
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marriages and funerals. Mosques also maintain a burial fund for the poor or 
handicapped, as well as a dowry fund for fathers who cannot afford to provide a 
dowry to get their daughters married.
Among the older Muslim institutions in Meerut are several dargahs (saint’s 
tombs) and the Idgah, dating back to the 12th century, which mark the oldest 
evidence of the arrival of Islam in Meerut. The Idgah is the remains of the fort 
built by Qutubuddin Aibak, Muhammad Ghori’s general of who defeated 
Prithviraj Chauhan, the Hindu ruler of the region in 1192. The large area 
centred around the remains is now used as a place for public prayers. Mosques, 
madrasahs and other religious structures are the landmarks of Islam and the 
symbol of its survival in India. They serve in the everyday life of Muslims as a 
source of their identity, as well as a reference point to which they keep returning 
for solutions and encouragement. These religious establishments serve as an 
institutional support base for the well-being of the community. It is a domain 
which has largely been neglected by the state, and these establishments 
substitute for state institutions and explicitly function to forge solidarity among 
Muslims (Benson 1983).
On Fridays, and on the celebration day of the Id, streets in the Old Town are
filled with members of the congregation. On Ramadan month evenings the
market lanes are filled with joy and energy as the fast of the day is broken. On
the last day of Ramadan all the mosques are decorated like brides, with huge
crowds in brand new clothes waiting outside for the breaking of the fast. It is
followed by the Iftaar party, the major social event to celebrate the ending of the
Ramadan, which is held in individual homes and sometimes in public halls
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hosted by Muslim politicians. The vibrant and joyful time during Ramadan is 
when Muslims show their utmost religious pride and happiness in being a 
Muslim. Their religious zeal is expressed in renewed charitable activities, vigour 
in studying the Quran, as well as in long hours of recitation and prayers. These 
are all constitutive of the Islamisation process, pertaining to heightening 
individual religiosity in order to become ‘a good Muslim’.
Muslim appearance in Meerut is characterised at first glance by signs of Islamic
orthodoxy. The large majority of men wear the khurta pyjama, impeccably
starched and clean. Their faces are covered by a beard, and they wear their hair
very short with a white cap. The Islamic dress code seems to be more strictly
followed by those in the artisan class. High-status Muslims, on the other hand,
tend to be more relaxed about their religion in general. Those who are in a
modern profession, and who usually wear western clothes, change to the Islamic
dress code for prayers. Muslim women wear the burqa, a black outer garment
covering their body from head to toe when they go out of the house. Most of the
married women of the artisan class follow this Islamic dress code to show their
modesty and morality. On the other hand, young unmarried Muslim women of
all ranks often do not wear a burqa. When asked if they would wear the burqa
after marriage, a group of young ladies thought about it for a while, and said that
they would. Another practice among Muslim women is purdah, or female
seclusion, which is strictly followed by well-to-do and status-conscious families.
Seclusion avoids contact with unrelated males and prevents illicit sexual
relations, which are considered to destroy a family’s honour. There is the
ideology, in other words, that the control of female sexuality is the critical
measure for deciding the family’s honour (Benson 1983: 54). This kind of
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Muslim outlook appears to be an eloquent and self-conscious statement of their 
being part of the Islamic brotherhood.
Islamisation has also been encouraged by larger religious movements that had 
long been in existence in Meerut. Among them is the Islamic school of Deoband, 
founded in 1867 in Muzaffarnagar District in western UP. The school was 
established in the era of increasing competition between Muslims and Hindus in 
both the economic and the political domains after the weakening of Muslim 
power and the advent of British rule in the late 18th century. The Deoband 
school is ‘reformist’ in the sense that it created a movement in the colonial 
period to correct everyday life practices by following and stressing the 
importance of pristine texts. Its teaching found a large circle of supporters in 
north Indian towns dominated by Muslims, including Meerut, Delhi and Agra, 
particularly after the school adopted new methods of spreading its reformist 
teaching through cheap publications (Metcalf 1982). Metcalf summarises the 
essence of the Deoband school:
...emphasis on encouraging a range of ritual and personal behavioural practices 
linked to worship, dress, and everyday behavioural practices deemed central to 
shari'a [shariat] — divinely ordained morality and practices (Metcalf 2004:266).
The school’s reformist spirit is pretty much alive to this day. The number of 
students enrolling in it has been increasing and there are currently more than
3,000 students learning in the school (ibid.). The support base for the Deoband 
school in Meerut city is centred around the Ansari weavers’ community,
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although the Qureshi community has increasingly been involved in activities 
related to the school, as seen below. l69
The Deoband’s reformist movements have been even more widespread through 
various spin-off organisations, including the Tablighi Jama’at. The Tablighi 
aims to disseminate Islamic teachings away from the madrasah to a wider range 
of lay Muslims, including those who are illiterate, poor and marginalised. It 
encourages travel with a group of volunteers composed of different occupational 
groups to fulfil an Islamic obligation to faithful practices. The uniqueness of this 
movement is that it does not have any specific form of organisation. Its 
activities are based only on travelling in groups for a certain period of time, 
using dense networks among the faithful, not only in India but all over the globe. 
The movement has effectively brought Muslims from different divisions under 
one roof. The Tablighi conceptually created a Muslim community through its 
overarching goal of reshaping individual lives through collective activities while 
teaching certain ethical codes and moral behaviour.
4.4.3 The process o f Islamisation o f Qureshis
The Tablighi movement must be viewed as the primary agency of Islamisation 
among Qureshis in Meerut. According to an Ansari respondent who belonged to 
the Tablighi, about twenty percent of Muslims in Meerut were engaged in the
i69 Among many donors in the 19th century was a renowned Qureshi, Sheikh Ilahi Bakshi of 
Meerut, who became wealthy trading rations including meat with the British Army (Metcalf 
1982: 127). Ilahi Bakshi was one of the most successful founders of the Bhaiya-ji family 
mentioned above.
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activities of the Tablighi Jama’at. Qureshis formed the largest number of 
volunteers among the members. They were followed by Ansaris, and the rest 
were from other Muslim communities.^0 Of the seven names on the list of a 
Tablighi advisory committee in Meerut, three were Qureshi and the rest were 
Ansari, Sheikh and Syed. Haji Raes Qureshi, a scrap market owner in the Jali 
Kothi locality, was a Corporator in the Municipal Corporation at the time of my 
interview in 2004. His name was at the top of the list of advisory members. The 
organisation’s local activities were based in a mosque in the Jali Kothi 
neighbourhood. Every Friday night after prayer the committee members of the 
Tablighi Jama’at came together to review their activities and plan the coming 
week. The aim of this highly popular religious movement among Qureshis and 
other Muslim communities was again to promote and spread Islamisation 
among lay Muslims. The movement provided a powerful medium to elevate 
individual religiosity with its highly visible preaching and disseminating 
activities in the public sphere — in mosques, on the door-steps of Muslim 
households, or in streets. Local mosques were considered the most important 
religious public space as ‘decentralised centres of [,Jama’atis] activity’ (Mayaram 
1997: 229). These collective activities provided the Muslim community with a 
larger frame of reference in forging a common identity of Islam from the local to 
global context.
Another manifestation of the Islamisation process among Qureshis was seen in 
their efforts to claim a higher status and to establish their links to Arab lineage 
and history. According to Islamic codes status is based on foreign (Arab)
>7° An Ansari lawyer and an active member of the Tablighi Jama’at on 1 February 2004.
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ancestors, noble decent and occupational links to major Islamic events 
(Goodfriend 1983). One way for a community to claim a higher status was to 
change its last name. The butcher community, which used to be called Kas(s)ab 
or Kas(s)ai (also spelled Qassab or Qassai), adopted the new name, Qureshi, in 
the 1920s.1?1 It was in this decade, according to M.N. Srinivas, when there was 
an ‘all-around increase in caste-consciousness’ (Srinivas 1967: 78). Qureshis 
were said to be the tribe to which the Prophet Mohammed himself belonged. 
According to some respondents, a small section of Qureshis in Meerut began 
writing their new name in the 1950s. Many other Qureshis who told me the 
story of their Arab origin considered a person named Dr. R.A. Qureshi to be the 
original advocator of the new name:
Only 30 years before, Dr. R.A Qureshi in Shapeer Gate started writing his name, 
‘Qureshi’. He started among ‘Kassai’ [the butcher group] who had not been 
allowed to have this name. He had been fighting for this naming since then.1?2
A high-status Muslim retired lawyer and a friend of Dr. Qureshi told me:
Dr. Qureshi succeeded in proving that Qureshi people are related to Mahammad 
Bin Kasim [see below]. Dr. Qureshi started writing his last name ‘Qureshi’ and 
advocated this lineage from the 1 9 7 0 s . 3^
Another Qureshi respondent commented, ‘My father never wrote the name 
“Qureshi”, but I see many people now write this name. ... My daughter now
1?1 G. Ansari, who conducted fieldwork mainly in eastern UP, notes that the new name, Qureshi, 
adopted by Kassais started to appear in the 1920s in eastern UP (Ansari i960). 
w  Interview with a Qureshi textile merchant on 18 March 2004.
J73 Interview on 27 March 2004.
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writes her last name “Qureshi”. Her mother might have told her that our last 
name is Q uresh i’.1™ This respondent was in his mid-thirties. Another Qureshi 
respondent in his fifties, a manufacturer of gut sports rackets, told me that his 
father wrote his name ‘Sheikh Abdul Karim Q assab ’.1^  These cases show that 
there were perceived differences in status among Qureshis. It appears that 
initially only members of the Qureshi community who were literate and had a 
need to write their names on papers — for example, a contract of some kind — 
could adopt the new name. This apparently excluded a large number of manual 
labourers living on daily wages. The vast majority of these people had neither 
the qualifications nor the status to do so, although this has changed. According 
to Doulla, ‘Kassais are uneducated and Qureshis are educated people. Now all of 
us think that we are Qureshi’.1?6 My speculation is that the spread of the name 
Qureshi came to include Kassais, the butchers, only after the meat export 
business started to improve their economic fortunes in the 1980s.
Another way to claim the superior status of Arab lineage and to legitimise an 
Arabic origin, is to write a history. I came across a few books written in Urdu by 
Qureshi writers in Meerut and Delhi, most of whom were ‘family writers’ 
attempting to illuminate and legitimise a lineage, usually linked to an Arab 
origin. The local stories of this kind might be categorised into two story lines. 
The first is that the Qureshi ancestors originated from among the Islamic 
missionaries who had been invited to India and were under the protection of the
x74 Interview with a Qureshi office worker in the Social Welfare department in the district 
administration on 16 March 2004.
*75 Interview on 19 March 2004.
^  Interview with Doulla on 25 March 2004.
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Slave Dynasty in Delhi. The second storyline, which is more prevalent, related 
the Qureshi lineage to Mohammed Bin Kasim, the first invader from Arabia in 
the seventh century. Kasim’s army included men whose job was to supply 
soldiers with properly slaughtered (Halal) meat. After Kasim returned to 
Arabia, these men settled down in Sindh and took up their traditional skills, 
adopting the profession of butchering for the supply of properly slaughtered 
meat. This story is essentially the one which had been disseminated by the 
above-mentioned Dr. Qureshi. And this was the story which was most likely to 
be written in family history books in order to show the Arab origin of the family 
lineage. I have a translated family history book originally written in Urdu which 
tells the Bin Kasim story (Akbarabadi 1928).177 Some respondents, both non- 
Qureshi Muslim and Hindu, also pointed out that Qureshis used some Arabic 
words and vocabulary among themselves in daily life, as well as in business 
negotiations at cattle fairs and bazaars.
On the other hand, there were Qureshis who claimed more simply that Qureshis 
were Hindu converts who had adopted the occupation of selling meat. It was a 
widely accepted view that Qureshis’ original characteristic trait was skill in 
trading. Qureshis were generally regarded as very clever, shrewd and highly 
capable in business transactions and negotiations. The story goes on to say that 
the Qureshis and the Hindu Banias had the same origin. Some chose to be
1771 acquired the family book which had been owned by a Qureshi leather merchant while 
conducting interviews with him on 21,23,27 March and 2 April 2004.
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Muslim (Qureshi) and others to be Hindu (Gupta), but basically both of them 
were Banias, the core trading people.1?8
The process of name change within the Muslim community is a marker of status 
claims among Qureshis, but it must be also placed within a wider context of 
Islamisation involving both individuals and the community. Family history 
writing seeking to establish an Arab lineage is an important indication that the 
Islamisation process had long been taking place among common Qureshis.
The Qureshi Council (Jamiat-ul-Qureshi) also played a major role in claiming 
higher status and promoting Islamisation of the community. The Council was 
the political organ of the Qureshi community, and its activities were based on 
the teachings of the reformist Deobandi school. It, for example, promoted the 
movement to abolish dowry and excessive and luxurious life cycle celebrations, 
hence moving away from unlslamic (Hindu) practices and towards Islamisation. 
Another important feature of the Council’s activity was that, in asserting 
Qureshis’ economic, political and social rights, it significantly exemplified the 
link between religion and Qureshi politics. The Council’s conference minutes 
indicate how important the religious idiom is for the unification of the 
community for this political aim (All India Jamiat-ul-Qureshi 1975). 
Participants frequently used the religious idioms of Islam. Shahnawaz Khan, 
then Congress MP from the Meerut-Mawana constituency, for example, wrote in 
his letter accepting the invitation to the conference:
Interview with Doulla on 24 March 2004. Interview with the principal of Faiz-a-am College 
on 19 March 2004 and others.
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If we perform this task sincerely, then God will certainly help us, and the 
followers of Islam will be able to create a better social life. I welcome this step of 
Jamiat and pray for its success. I also pray that God will always help us in 
leading our life on the path of “sunnah” [the way and the manners of the 
Prophet].179
The unification of the Qureshi community was another important task taken on 
by the Qureshi Council. For this purpose, the Council incessantly stressed a 
common identity in order to override internal factionalism within the 
community. This was because the community was ‘divided into several 
segments. Yet they were endogamous, each of them thought to be superior to 
the other. They were at loggerheads with each other. So the Council aims at 
removing internal disputes from the segments and making the “biradari” as a 
unified unit’ (All India Jamiat-ul-Qureshi 1995).
The ‘oneness’ of the community was promoted by attempts to resolve issues of 
(endogamous) marriage and to encourage education. The Council advocated as 
its major plank inter-marriage for all income-level, occupational and regional 
groups. It was repeatedly mentioned in the ‘Souvenir,’ a minute of a conference 
in 1994, that all Qureshis were brothers whether they were labourers (Palledar), 
butchers (Kassai) or businessmen.180 The name ‘Qureshi’ had been officially 
adopted by the Council in its 1974 conference in Meerut. The new name itself 
meant an establishment of a clear label that socially and conceptually reified a 
large category of people (Eriksen 1993:90). This effect of self-identification was
179 ‘The Success of Conference against Dowry’, All India Jamiat-ul-Qureshi, 1975.
180 Interview on 19 March 2004 with a Qureshi respondent who attended several Qureshi 
Council conferences.
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farther strengthened when the new name obtained official recognition. This 
took place when the Other Backward Caste (OBC) certificate that the state 
government issued for various benefits came to carry the name ‘Qureshi’ in place 
of‘Kassai’, in the mid-1990s.181 According to the Secretaiy to the Commissioner 
of the Municipal Corporation, many Qureshi workers visited his office in order 
to change the name on the certificate to ‘Qureshi’.182 The official recognition of 
the new name constituted a significant medium for promoting a common 
identity among Qureshis. It is also important to note here that the process of 
identity transformation from Kassai to Qureshi simultaneously adhered to a 
growing global Islamic identity.
Another medium of Islamisation among Qureshis can be seen in the 
establishment of the Qureshi mosque.l83 The Qureshi mosque was situated in 
the middle of the Kassai heartland, Bani Sarae, at the south end of the Old Town 
(see Map 3.2). It had historically played a significant role as a symbol of the 
Kassai butcher community and its unification as a collective body. Its origin 
went back to the early decades of the 20th century when the head of the Meerut 
government slaughterhouse or ‘chaudhuri’ of the Kassai community, Mr. Abdul 
Wahaf or ‘Baxa’, Doulla’s great grandfather, started an initiative to help the 
poor, handicapped and widows by collecting money from customers at the 
slaughterhouse. It began in 1919 when the slaughterhouse shifted from Billai 
Joli to Bhumia Kapoor in the south, a short distance from the wall of the Old
181 Interview with a Qureshi office worker in the Social Welfare department in the district 
administration on 16 March 2004.
182 Interview with the secretary to Meerut Municipal Commissioner on 27 February 2004.
183 This section is based on my interview with Mr. Abdul Wahaf, Doulla, on 24 March 2004.
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Town. This initiative was a means of pursuing the higher religiosity among the 
Qureshi community. Baxa used his position as the collector of slaughter fees to 
charge simultaneously a separate fee to his customer for the poor. The fees were 
collected in the following way:
l anna184 (government slaughtering fee) + 1 anna (for the poor) = 2 anna for each 
head of cattle.185
After a decade of setting aside the fund for charity, however, Baxa found out that 
much of the money was unused because of the Islamic tradition of‘self-respect’ 
that prohibited asking for any advanced loans. The elders of the Qureshi 
community, including Baxa, then decided to establish their own mosque using 
the accumulated fund, as there was no mosque in the localities between Bani 
Sarae and Shorab Gate. The land was acquired in 1934 and the central part of 
the mosque was constructed in 1936. The mosque continued to expand after 
that and became the largest and most luxurious mosque in Meerut. However, in 
spite of its remarkable transformation in size, local people still referred to the 
mosque by its old name, ‘Kasai-walle Masjid\
I appreciated its enormity when I approached the site of the Qureshi mosque in 
a rickshaw. It was impossible to see the mosque in its entirety because of its 
size. I could only see large marble pillars standing along the road and the meat 
shops with carcasses of buffalo or goat hanging from their ceilings between the
l84Anna was the monetary unit before it changed to Rupees. One anna was equal to 6 pessa. One 
hundred pessa were equal to 1 rupee.
l85 At the point of 2004 the charge for the slaughtering was different according to the size the 
animal. Camel was Rs.100 per animal, buffalo, Rs. 45; baby buffalo, Rs. 20 and goat, Rs. 10.
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pillars. These shops were, of course, all run by Qureshi butchers. They were all 
located in the foundation level of the mosque. Beside these shops there was a 
long staircase leading to the wide courtyard on the upper level. The courtyard 
was surrounded by the large prayer room, which formed the main part of the 
mosque, with a pond creating a boundary between the space of a madrasah and 
the prayer room. There were also two towers from the top of which one could 
overlook the entire city.
Each time I visited Doulla’s house, which was located on a small lane across the 
road from the Qureshi mosque, I had to pass by the small crowd which gathered 
in front of the shops selling meat both raw and grilled. As soon as the crowd saw 
me getting off the rickshaw, the news that ‘the lady from London’ had appeared 
again in the locality spread with an incredible speed. By the time I reached 
Doulla’s house, in about two minutes, his family members already knew that I 
was coming. I still do not know how it was possible, but this speedy 
transmission of the news seemed to indicate an interesting aspect of the Qureshi 
community — its cohesiveness and of tightly-knit networks particularly within 
the home mohalla.
Collecting funds for the weak and poor became an important part of the
activities of the mosque. Doulla, the present chaudhuri of Baxawalle (his family
name), distributed the money to the people who came asking for a little help
every morning, sitting in front of the entrance to the slaughterhouse where his
great grandfather used to sit. Sometimes fathers came to ask for help for getting
their daughters married, as they could not pay a dowry. Another times the
handicapped came for some financial help. According to Doulla, those coming
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for help included non-Qureshi Muslims and Hindus. The Qureshi mosque also 
regularly sent financial support to the school related to the Deoband school in 
Muzzafarnagar District as an important component of its charitable activities.
After the meat export business started in the 1980s the size of the mosque fund 
dramatically increased. In 2004, Doulla and other members of the mosque 
committee decided to establish a girls’ inter-college within and adjacent to the 
mosque. The foundation part of the mosque was under renovation, being 
converted into space for administration offices for the new college. It would 
offer technical education, including tailoring and stitching, as well as modem 
subjects including English, Urdu and Hindi. Admission was free. The 
committee had begun acquiring property adjacent to the Qureshi mosque for the 
college buildings.
Several important observations could be made on the existence of the Qureshi 
mosque. First, the mosque was the symbol of religious life of the Kassai 
community. Being located in the Kassai heartland, it provided a holy space 
where Kassai residents offered namaz more than once every day, forming an 
important aspect of their religious and social life. The congregation activities 
genuinely cultivated a sense of one community. Second, the mosque also 
created a public arena which not only nurtured a sense of common identity 
internally among the Kassais but also helped to create an externally-projected 
collective identity of the one ‘cohesive’ Qureshi community. Third, building a 
mosque under the banner of a community was a strong status claim that
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effectively ‘topped’ the religious and social spheres of the Muslim world.186 The 
rapid expansion of the mosque in terms of its area and facilities, which was only 
possible because of the Qureshis’ growing income, naturally carried with it a 
strong sense of pride that their hereditary occupation had become an ‘export 
quality’. Fourth, it was a symbol of the linkage between religion and the 
economic activities of the Kassai community. The charitable activities of the 
mosque were based on an idea of philanthropy that linked the hereditary 
business of butchering to religious and social concerns. Apart of the earnings of 
Qureshi workers contributed, on one hand, to the expansion of the mosque 
which signified their religious life and identity, and, on the other, to the welfare 
of their community. It was the process of capital conversion to social work or 
public welfare that simultaneously nurtured a sense of self-respect, prestige and 
status. Fifth, the transfer of new economic wealth into circuits of Islamisation 
seems to have enhanced, again, not only a more coherent Qureshi identity, but 
also a larger Islamic identity. In other words, the mosque, a religious symbol 
and catalyst of religious acts, symbolised the claim of new Qureshi political 
leaders that ‘we are Islam, we are Muslim in the global society’, through which 
the community was no doubt politically constructed. This sense of ‘oneness’ 
provoked by a larger Islamic identity was an implicit but assertive baseline of 
Qureshi political activism (see following chapters). A Qureshi activist, whose 
nephew was the slaughterman in the Meerut government slaughterhouse, told 
me:
186 There were only a few mosques in Meerut symbolising the status mobility of a community like 
this one in Meerut — in particular, the Ansari and Rajput mosques. The latter was situated in 
the locality called ‘Chapaul Rajputani’, adjacent to Bani Sarae to the north.
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In Islam there is no biradari. Biradari exists only in India. Otherwise in Arab, 
all Muslims are brothers. They are one. There is consciousness of being a 
Muslim...Oneness. Haji Akhlaq [a Qureshi political leader] fuelled this feeling, 
community feeling we are one. Since Akhlaq came to politics, there are no riots. 
The victory of Haji Akhlaq was a symbol of all Muslims [being] united’.187
The political ascendancy of the Qureshi political leaders from the early 1990s 
will be discussed in the following chapters of Five and Six.
4.5 Resettlement after Partition
In the previous section I discussed how Meerut Muslims in general and the 
Qureshi community in particular pursued the Islamisation process. I suggested 
that the continuing emphasis on Islamic identity must be viewed not only as a 
process of social mobility in accordance with Islamic codes, but also as a means 
of creating a strong sense of Muslim identity within the context of Hindu- 
Muslim antagonism in a north-Indian town. The Islamisation process was 
therefore also encouraged by the particular development of Hindu-Muslim 
relations after Partition in north India. In the following section, I provide a brief 
account of how the larger history affected the everyday life of Meerut Muslims in 
such a way as to increasingly alienate them from the Hindus, and hence to 
constantly encourage and nurture the formation of a Muslim identity.
The post-independence political history of Muslims in north India cannot be 
properly discussed without including the impact of Partition in 1947. Partition
187 Interview on 23 April 2004.
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profoundly altered the foundation of livelihoods, security and socio-political life 
for Muslims in north India (eg. Hasan 1988). The social fabric of everyday life 
came to be more closely interwoven with a sense of alienation and distance from 
the rest of the society.
Upon the Partition of India at 12:00 am on 15 August 1947, many Muslims in 
Meerut felt that they ‘suddenly became foreigners’. Partition created a new 
society for Muslims in which they were suddenly treated as non-Indians and 
were expected to migrate to Pakistan. One manifestation of the new society was 
that the administration forced many Muslims to move out of their houses in 
order to create living space for incoming Hindu and Sikh refugees from West 
Pakistan.188 A Muslim lawyer told me that:
188 A massive rehabilitation effort was implemented by the Indian state to provide relief and help 
to settle the many millions of refugees who flowed in. Urvashi Bhutalia notes that there was one 
Thakur who offered help in this rehabilitation process for refugees in Meerut. As mentioned 
earlier, Meerut received the largest number of partition refugees. An untold story behind the 
state rehabilitation programme was that it was implemented by uprooting Muslims from their 
homes (Butalia 2001).
The reconstruction after land-mark events such as the partition of states, big earthquakes or 
other natural disasters accompanies a process of public ‘memorising practices’. The process 
which involves political actors is often a showcase for contemporary politics and political forces 
in power. In Meerut the ‘Hindu’ politics signified the reconstruction phase after Partition by 
uprooting Muslims from their households. An excellent study on the process of the ruling BJP’s 
official memorial construction after the earthquake in Kachchh in Gujarat in 2001 shows how 
little has changed since Partition in terms of the politics of Hindutva. The reconstruction phase 
demonstrates the same Hindutva agenda, subtle as it is, to exclude former Muslim and Harijans 
(Scheduled Castes) inhabitants from the new villages constructed by the Hindu Right on the site 
of the destruction in Kachchh (Simpson and Corbridge 2006).
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If we had known that Independence and Partition meant that we had to all leave 
our homes behind and move to Pakistan, nobody would have opted for 
Pakistan.18?
Muslims faced great fragmentation of their community after Partition. A 
majority of Muslim professionals, bureaucrats and businessmen of means left 
for Pakistan in a great exodus. Many remaining Muslims felt that they were 
‘reduced to an illiterate category’.190 This was part of the reason why Muslims in 
general came to be subjects of political decisions made largely by and for Hindus 
after Partition. In Meerut, the introduction of adult suffrage and majority rule 
transferred control of political patronage to Hindu hands with the symbolic 
dismissal of the Muslim chairman of the Municipal Board, Aijaz Hussain in 
1953.191 Political representation of Muslims was limited to a small number of 
Councillors elected in the 1964 Municipal election (see Chapter 2). The Muslim 
elite who remained in Meerut had never been very active in city politics. The 
fact that the Congress Party ticket had only been given to high-status Muslims 
from outside the district, and that Congress had never given the ticket to low- 
status Muslim politicians to contest the elections, seemed to have prevented the 
growth of local Muslim political leaders.
189 Interview with a retired Muslim court lawyer on 28 February 2004.
190 Interview with the same person above.
*9* Aijaz Hussain was the Chairman of the Municipal Board from 1942 to 1954. He was a 
descendant of general Khairandesh Khan from the era of Aurangzeb in the 17th century, who left 
a considerable legacy in the Old Town that included Khaimagar Gate and many elaborate 
Islamic buildings. This Muslim elite family dominated city politics since the 1870s for almost a 
century against the severe political battle between Muslim elites and the rising Hindu merchant 
classes backed up by the Hindu revivalism in the late 19th- century north India. Hussain was 
symbolic of political power and prestige of the old Muslim gentry class in Meerut (see Jha 1979).
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The conception of being an ‘alien’ was subjectively held to varying degrees 
among Meerut Muslims for a long period of time, if not indeed until today. 
Several writings by Muslim authors show that Indian Muslims established their 
identity as Indian only during the first Indo-Pak War in 1965. Balraj Puri writes:
The Indo-Pak war in 1965...was a war between two nation states which 
established, as nothing had done before, the position of India Muslims as part of 
the Indian nation (Puri 1993: 2143).
This was largely because many Muslims participated in and contributed to the 
war effort. At the same time, however, the Indo-Pak War of 1965 aroused a 
renewed sense of suspicion among many Hindus about Muslim loyalty to the 
Indian nation (Pandey 1999; Zakaria 2004). Hindus harboured the suspicion 
that many Indian Muslims were sympathetic towards Pakistan and wished for 
the country’s victory over India. Puri notes: ‘...most Muslims could not match 
the intensity of hatred of an average Hindu towards the national enemy’ (Puri 
1993: 2143). After 1965 a new generation of Muslim leaders reacted to Hindu 
suspicion by abandoning an apologetic attitude for the creation of Pakistan, and, 
according to Puri, by beginning to assert both an Indian and a Muslim identity. 
Many Muslims now began searching for their indigenous roots, while they also 
made clear that their interests were distinct from the Hindus’ through 
maintaining Muslim Personal Law and/or Urdu (ibid.). Their assertion of 
minority rights was in large part a response to the increasing danger to Muslims 
caused by the rise of communalism and violence in parts of north India in the 
1960s and 1970s.
220
4*5*1 Muslim politics vs. Hindu politics
At ground level in Meerut city, the new Muslim nation, Pakistan, appealed to 
many Muslims long after Partition as a longed-for destination for ultimate 
migration. Journeys between Meerut and Pakistan continued for nearly three 
decades. During this period, some settled in Pakistan and others returned to 
Meerut. The migration to Pakistan largely ceased, however, upon the break-up 
of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The latter was seen by many 
Muslims in Meerut as the collapse of Jinnah’s ‘two-nations theory5. The Muslim 
homeland, Pakistan, was no longer ‘safe’. After the birth of Bangladesh, 
Muslims in Meerut felt more finally settled in India. This was where they would 
build their homes, start businesses and send children to schools. Muslims came 
to identify India as their homeland.^2 Hindu nationalism, however, did not 
recede after the resettlement of Muslims. It rather gained new momentum from 
the two wars against Pakistan. Local political parties such as the Majlis Majlis- 
e-Mushawarat or the Muslim League in the 1970s developed to articulate 
separate Muslim interests. However, these communal parties did not survive for 
long in Meerut city politics. In contrast to Muslim communal organisations, 
Hindu Rightist organisations and political parties grew steadily, particularly 
with the support of the powerful Punjabi business sector in the city, whose 
economic presence was increasingly felt during the decade of the 1980s.
On the other hand there was little public provision to support educational 
institutions for Muslims. Almost all the Muslim educational facilities in Meerut
*9* Interview with a Muslim journalist on 10 February 2004.
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were based on private funding, derived from either wealthy individuals or 
religious institutions. The UP government neglected the need to build 
institutions for the education of Muslim children in Urdu (Brass 1997: 38). 
Until 2001, there had been no Urdu Department in universities located in 
Meerut city. There was also a strikingly small number of Muslim students in 
post-graduate level educational institutions, including Meerut College and 
Meerut University (see Ahmad 1993: 83-100).
In the increasingly fragile state of security in the 1980s, Muslims in Meerut 
began to move away from the Congress Party (see Chapters 3 and 5). 
Symbolically, a Congress Muslim politician, Manzoor Ahamad, publicly 
denounced the Party for instigating the 1982 violence and was expelled from it. 
The Party increasingly came to be seen as anti-Muslim and, eventually, as one of 
the instigators of the large-scale ethnic violence in the city in May 1987 (Chapter 
3). Congress was also held accountable for the demolition of the Babri Masjid in 
Ayodhya in December 1992. Many Muslims felt that they had been ‘stabbed in 
the backJl93 by the Congress Party when they saw the shocking desecration of 
their religious symbol on TV broadcasts.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has shown that extensive social mobility among Muslim artisans in 
Meerut works through a dense and cross-cutting assemblage of modern status
J93 Interview with Mr. Harish Pal, ex-MP on 25 April 2004.
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markers and efforts to achieve higher status through appeals to Islamic 
orthodoxy. I have suggested that Islamisation should be viewed as the 
manifestation of self-conscious efforts to maintain a Muslim ethnicity vis-a-vis 
the Hindus, given a political history in north India which has been framed to a 
large extent by ethnic antagonisms between Hindus and Muslims. I have also 
explained in some detail the constant process of Islamisation among Qureshis 
using different means of identity construction located in both the public and the 
private spheres. The Islamisation process is linked not only to Qureshi religious 
life but also to economic and political changes.
As Meerut’s Muslims discovered to their cost in the 1980s, however, maintaining 
a strong sense of Muslim identity, or worse, translating greater Muslim wealth 
into a politics of religious separatism was clearly not an effective means by 
which to secure protection against Hindu violence. To gain that security, 
Muslims in Meerut, as elsewhere in India in the 1990s, had to forge new political 
alliances — generally, in UP and Bihar, with Bahujan communities — in and 
through which their numerical weight could be translated into forms of political 
power at the city, state and national levels. My purpose in the next two chapters 
is to show precisely how these alliances were forged in Meerut — mainly by 
Qureshi politicians — and how this has helped once again to rework local 
Muslim conceptions of Islamic identity and Indian citizenship.
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Chapter 5: The New M uslim Politics in  M eerut, 1993— 
2004  — 1: Citizenship and Identity
Common men supported him  (Haji Akhlaq), especially poor sections of society. 
He was so powerful th a t the BJP was afraid of him. He pu t up a slogan o f ‘Peace 
and Trade’ in the public arena. He succeeded it. After Akhlaq became MLA, the  
city does not have any violence. In the  1993 election H indu votes were split, and 
alm ost all M uslims voted for him . Akhlaq corrected m ism anagem ent of w ater 
bill, provided blankets to the poor and gave sewing m achines to the  widows 
(M uslim taxation lawyer in M eerut: interview on 22 February 2004).
5.1 Introduction
Opportunities for social change for Meerut’s long-oppressed Muslims came 
amid moments of transition in India’s broader political structure from a single­
party to a multi-party system. Following the decisive defeat of the Congress 
Party in the General Elections of 1989 some radical shifts came about in terms of 
political configurations among different caste groups and communities. New 
political alignments among lower-caste parties also formed the critical 
foundation for a new direction in local Muslim politics. By the end of the 1980s 
it was clear that the Meerut Muslims had become far more aware than 
previously that their numbers were a commodity of political value. More 
importantly, new political leaders emerged among them who understood the 
meaning of India’s broader political changes and who could now advance 
growing political aspirations among ordinary Muslims in western Uttar Pradesh. 
These Muslim leaders took a cue from two key social changes on the ground:
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first, increasingly assertive social movements among underprivileged classes for 
equality and rights; and, second, new aspirations for upward mobility among 
low-status Muslims following the large-scale ethnic violence in Meerut of 1987 
and the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992. The first of these 
changes helped bring about the establishment of lower-caste political parties, 
and this in turn provided Muslim leaders with an incentive to mobilise 
ideological and institutional support networks in new ways.
This chapter and Chapter Six explore what I shall call the new Muslim politics in 
Meerut. I examine how responses of Meerut Muslims to Hindutva came to be 
expressed, and how they were transformed into a set of concrete strategies in the 
domain of formal politics. In previous chapters I have examined new 
aspirations to upward mobility among Meerut Muslims through essentially 
secular markers of status, albeit hand in hand with a strong sense of Muslim 
ethnicity. The latter was particularly expressed in the process of Islamisation 
(Chapter 4). The main argument of this chapter, and the one that follows it, is 
that the most striking features of the new Muslim politics in Meerut have been 
bound up with expressions of the duality of Muslim identity, at once civic and 
religious. These two identities are being expressed in the political field in ways 
that mutually feed into each other (rather than in opposition to one another).
In this chapter I examine electoral mobilisation by two key political 
entrepreneurs from the Qureshi community—Haji Akhlaq Qureshi and his son, 
Shahid Akhlaq — in the UP Legislative Assembly election of November 1993 and 
in the Lok Sabha election of May 2004 respectively. Both politicians achieved
remarkable victories with unprecedented support from the Muslim constituency.
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By tracing their innovative and imaginative strategies for electoral mobilisation, 
I explore how appeals to new civic identity were constructed on the basis of 
traditional religious identities. In the next chapter I show how the wider 
political party system in India has significantly helped to ‘induct’ new Muslim 
leaders into the political arena (Chandra 2004: 96), and how the direction and 
concrete strategy of Muslim politics changed within this larger political system. 
I also explore how these strategies worked in terms of controlling Hindu-Muslim 
violence in Meerut city.
5.2 Political Entrepreneurship o f Haji Akhlaq Qureshi
Muslim politics in Meerut in 1993 were in transition. It was a critical moment 
for the Meerut Muslims, who strongly felt the need for change in order to 
improve their livelihoods and security. After the violence of 1987 there was now 
an increasing desire for social reform and progress, which in turn was reflected 
in new investments in education and economic recovery. A multi-party political 
system now provided Muslims with the opportunity to strike new political 
alliance with various lower caste parties, while old alliances under the auspices 
of the Congress Party began to collapse. This was a point at which political 
entrepreneurs had an opportunity to create new visions of an improved (and 
more secure) social order.
Of course, structural changes in a polity do not always give rise to new forms of 
political entrepreneurship, and they certainly do not fully determine the forms 
in which such entrepreneurship are made flesh. Local circumstances matter,
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and this has clearly been the case among Meerut’s Muslim communities, where 
it was a new political agent, Akhlaq Qureshi^, who most obviously and rapidly 
grasped the opportunity and directed the transitional process with the support 
of the lower-caste parties. The political ascent of Haji Akhlaq from a virtually 
unknown politician to a Meerut city MLA was remarkable, and his son, Shahid, 
would succeed and further articulate his father’s political vision and direction a 
decade later. The most extraordinary aspect of the mobilisations prosecuted by 
both men was the promotion of a modern identity of citizenship and civic 
participation for Muslims in India’s larger civil and political societies. Key civil 
rights ideas were derived from the platform of the lower-caste political parties 
for which both politicians came to contest elections. Both Haji Akhlaq and 
Shahid Akhlaq used the institutional and ideological support of lower-caste (or 
subaltern) parties as a foundation for many of their secular and egalitarian 
appeals. Electoral mobilisations by father and son, however, clearly also aimed 
to win mass adherence based on some ‘traditionally’ shared symbols of Islam. 
Their discourses of integrative and participatory politics were juxtaposed with 
appeals to Muslim religious identity in the form of an ‘ethnic’ mobilisation. 
Although both political campaigns were organised on the basis of religious 
identifications of the Muslim electorate, they also took care to build a non­
fundamentalist platform. The Akhlaqs advocated and articulated a ‘religiously 
oriented civic project’, to adapt David Laitin’s phrase (Laitin 1986: 91), by 
creating a new political space in which it was possible to imagine the Muslim as 
a citizen of India.
x94 Akhlaq Qureshi is commonly called among people in Meerut with his title, ‘haji’ (see footnote 
234 below). I accordingly refer to him as Haji Akhlaq, in order to distinguish him from his son.
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5.2.1 The UP A ssem bly e lection  in the M eerut city constituency
The 1993 Assembly election was in many ways a watershed that produced a 
number o f‘surprises’ (Duncan 1997), setting the scene for a new era without the 
dominant presence in UP of the Indian National Congress. The secular parties, 
including the BSP and SP, took a common stance against communalism and the 
BJP. The BSP and the SP forged a successful coalition that greatly hindered the 
return of the BJP to power in UP (Hansen 1999: 198). The 1993 Assembly 
election was marked by a significant increase in voter turnout all over UP, and 
Meerut was no exception to this (see Figure 5.i).19s
Figure 5.1 Voter tu rn o u t for the Assembly elections in M eerut, 1952- 
2002
■ ■ N o n - v o t e r s  1 < Voters — Vot er  T u rn o u t (%)
1952 1957 1962 1967 1969 1974 1977 1980 1985 1989 1993 1996 2002
Source: The data for all elections is from the official reports published by the Election Commission of 
India, http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp (Election Commission of India Web 
page).
x95 The voter turnout in UP rose to 57 percent in 1993 compared with 49 percent in 1991. This 
election also marked a major improvement in voter participation compared with other Assembly 
elections in the 1980s. In 1980, it was 44.9 percent and in 1985, 45.7 percent (Duncan 1997: 
982).
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The enthusiasm with which Muslims voted, as well as their tactical voting in 
order to defeat the BJP candidate, were also noted features of this election (Pai 
2002). V.P. Singh, a political scientist and veteran watcher of Indian elections, 
also reports the outstanding enthusiasm that Muslims and lower caste groups 
demonstrated during the election in the Azamgarh Lok Sabha constituency in 
eastern UP. According to his observation, the enthusiasm of disadvantaged 
groups in casting their votes largely exceeded the efforts shown by the upper 
caste groups (Singh 1996:127). V.K. Rai notes that the most important factor of 
the 1993 Assembly election in UP was the phenomenon of tactical voting by 
Muslims and the effect of combining Yadav and the Scheduled Castes votes with 
Muslim votes (Rai 1999: 2404). The rising consciousness of Muslims was 
another marker of change in the landscape of Muslim politics.
In this election, both the BSP and SP achieved an impressive electoral 
performance and jointly took government office in UP. The Congress Party, on 
the other hand, was pushed out of the race. The election confirmed the decisive 
decline of the Congress Party, whose vote in UP fell sharply from 31.8 percent in 
1989 to 15.1 percent in 1993 (Yadav 1997:196).
In the Meerut city constituency the main contestants for the Assembly election
in 1993 were Laxmi Kant Vajpay for the BJP, Haji Akhlaq Qureshi for the Janata
Dal, Azalal Nawaz Khan for the SP, and Krishna Kumar Sharma for the Congress
Party. Vajpay was the incumbent MIA, having been elected in 1989. Azalal
Nawaz Khan was the son of Shahnawaz Khan, who had been the Congress MP
from the Meerut-Mawana constituency for three terms between the 1952 and
1971 General Elections. Pre-poll speculation focused on the Ansari vote, the
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Ansaris being the largest Muslim community and political rivals to the Qureshi. 
Ayuub Ansari, a Janata Dal contestant in the Assembly election of 1991, had 
been denied the ticket in this election, with Akhlaq instead successfully 
obtaining it. Ayuub Ansari became Akhlaq’s principal campaign officer in 
exchange for the latter’s support in the 1991 Assembly election. Some observers 
speculated that many Ansari votes would go to Khan instead of Akhlaq, and that 
the Muslim vote would be divided to the advantage of the BJP, as in many past 
elections.1^6
Contrary to all these speculations, there was no split in the Muslim vote. The 
post-poll analysis indicated that a majority of the Ansari vote went to Akhlaq. 
Neither the Congress Party, nor the SP (which fielded a Muslim candidate), 
succeeded in winning many Muslim votes, with virtually none going to the 
Congress.x97 To the surprise of many observers, the Hindu vote was divided 
between the BJP and the Congress Party, with the latter winning enough Hindu 
votes to defeat the BJP. The election results are shown in Table 5.1.
^6 Amor Ujjala, 23 November 1993 (Amar Ujjala (Meerut)). 
w A m ar Ujjala, 29 November 1993.
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Table 5.1 Election Results for Meerut city Legislative Assembly
constituency, 1993 (top five candidates)
Candidates Caste/Community Party Votes Polled
% of Total Valid 
Votes
Haji Akhlaq Qureshi Muslim Janata Dal 80,339 48.18
Laxmi Kant Vajpay 
Krishna Kumar
Brahmin BJP 74,842 44.88
Sharma Brahmin INC 7,522 4-51
Mohammad Ashraf Muslim ML 1,159 0.70
Ajmal Nawaz Khan Muslim SP 8 77 0-53
Source: Election Commission of India, State Election, 1993 to the Legislative Assembly of Uttar Pradesh, 
Constituency Summary, p. 202 of 216 (Election Commission of India 1993).
5.2.2 Haji Akhlaq Qureshi
Nonetheless, it was a close contest, with the Janata Dal winner receiving less 
than 4 percent more votes than the BJP runner-up. Harish Pal called it a 
remarkable election^8 because a lower ranking Muslim with virtually no 
political experience became the city MLA for the first time. Haji Akhlaq Qureshi 
was the first non-elite Muslim politician in Meerut’s history to win the Assembly 
seat. The election was marked by a very high voting rate, particularly among the 
Muslim electorate. A polling ag en ts  for the 1989 and 1993 elections at 
Saddique Nagar, a Muslim locality, stated:
298 Mr. Harish Pal was the winner of the 1989 Lok Sabha election from the Janata Dal in the
Meerut-Mawana constituency. Interview on 25 April 2004.
The polling agent was a political advisor to Mr. Yusuf Qureshi.
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We cannot prove this as there is no data with us. But I tell you tha t the  M uslim 
votes increased trem endously in this [1989] election, and further increased in the 
1993 election.200
According to him, voting rates among some of the city’s Muslim-populated 
neighbourhoods must have reached 60 percent. According to a Qureshi activist 
of the city Samajwadi Party, on the day of the election ‘even bed-ridden people 
went to vote for Haji Akhlaq. Many Muslim women came out to cast their 
votes’.201 Doulla, a Qureshi workers’ leader in the Meerut government 
slaughterhouse, recalled that:
It was a sea change. There was m ore awareness. M edia expanded its coverage on 
the elections, and consciousness among people increased.202
Haji Akhlaq, the victorious Qureshi candidate from the Janata Dal, first became 
a Municipal Councillor in 1989. Akhlaq had been a member of the city Congress 
Party since 1986 and came to join the newly-established Janata Dal in 1989. He 
thus had very little political experience prior to the 1993 election. At the time of 
the 1989 General Elections the Janata Dal was clearly seen among Meerut 
Muslims as a substitute for the Congress Party. The Janata Dal aimed to 
represent the classes discriminated-against by reserving for OBCs — including 
Muslims 27 percent of administrative posts, including in the prestigious Indian 
Administrative Service (IAS) and the Indian Police Service (IPS), as well as other 
government jobs and some educational places. By widening reservation to the
200 Interview on 18 March 2004.
201 Interview on 23 April 2004.
202 Interview on 14 May 2004.
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long-neglected OBCs, the National Front government of V.P. Singh made use of 
parts of the Mandal Report to transform this hitherto moribund bureaucratic 
category into ‘a vibrant and subjectively experienced political community, 
(Chandra 2004: 290). Haji Akhlaq structured and framed his mobilisation 
processes according to this new constituency, which joined the OBC and the 
Scheduled Caste communities to create a large section of Backward Classes.
Coming from a working-class family,2°3 Haji Akhlaq had little formal education. 
He was known as a shrewd businessman, itself a stereotypical image of the 
Qureshi community. At the time of his candidacy in 1993 his main occupation 
was selling buffalo meat to shopkeepers in Delhi and Meerut. He also ran a 
factory established by his brother which manufactured soap from animal fat. 
The factory was quite profitable and Akhlaq’s financial condition began 
improving around 1992.2°4 He had an extensive criminal record including a 
murder case associated with business rivalry. Many respondents remembered 
more than a few ‘shoot-outs’ in public places between Akhlaq and his business 
rivals, with Akhlaq typically accompanied by his son Shahid and other family 
members. His plebeian background, basic literacy and few political credentials 
represented a substantial break from earlier Muslim leadership. Akhlaq’s 
popularity among the Muslim masses in Meerut was largely drawn from his 
plebeian background and familiarity with the structures of their everyday life. In 
this sense, Akhlaq’s campaign ‘captured’ and made ‘explicit’ the popular voices 
that he had experienced as a lay Muslim (Chatteijee 1998 (1989): 209).
2°3 Akhlaq’s father sold meat in a small shop near Ghanta Ghar (Clock Tower) in the Old Town. 
2°4 A friend of Akhlaq’s from the Qureshi community, interview on 4 April 2004.
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Haji Akhlaq and other low-status Muslim leaders explicitly sought to build 
political alliances with the Chamars in the last quarter of the 1980s. These 
ambitious leaders recognized the implications of the Chamars forming their own 
political party, the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which started its networking 
activity in 1986 in Meerut. Akhlaq in particular conceived that wider 
opportunities for political power would open up if political alliances between 
low-status Muslims and Chamars could be realized. United as a political force, 
Muslims and Chamars would form well over 60 percent of the electorate of 
Meerut city Assembly constituency.
As early as 1987, at the height of a vicious period of communal violence, Akhlaq 
and other low-status Muslim leaders organised Peace Committee meetings and 
sought to talk with representatives from the Chamar community who were 
active in founding the BSP in Meerut. The meetings of Muslims and Chamars 
held during that year were symbolic of the decisive estrangement and departure 
of both communities from the Congress Party. Within an emerging context of 
assertive lower-caste politics, these meetings were intended to mould a new 
political solidarity among the underprivileged classes vis-a-vis the upper 
castes.2°5 The meetings also moved towards discussions of a peace settlement to 
end the Hindu-Muslim violence that was engulfing the city at the time. They 
were intended to facilitate inter-ethnic class solidarities against the upper castes, 
some of whom had hired Chamars and Valmikis as a fighting force against 
Muslims on occasions of communal violence in Meerut. A Corporator from the
2°5 Interview with a Valmiki Corporator of the Municipal Corporation on 27 February 2004 in 
Meerut. The Corporator had been involved in the organisation of the political alliance between 
the BSP supporters and the low-status Muslim leaders.
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Chamar community, who was one of the organisers of the BSP in 1987, 
mentioned to me:
During the [1987] riots M uslims and the Scheduled Caste leaders m et alm ost 
everyday for harnessing the feeling of bro therhood.... Lower categories of society 
are effective in riots. But now, the meetings between the  Scheduled Castes and 
Muslims paved a way of understanding. They are now brothers to each other. 
There have been no riots taking place after these m eetings.206
Two years later, at the Lok Sabha election of 1989, the Scheduled Castes in 
Meerut city voted for the Janata Dal en bloc. While the BSP was still in its 
formation stage in the city at this point, it is significant that the Scheduled Caste 
constituency identified itself with the newly formed lower-caste party, the 
Janata Dal, led by V.P. Singh. The Janata Dal mainly represented the interests 
of the middle and lower-middle agrarian castes. The Party’s candidate, Harish 
Pal, belonged to one of the most numerically important agrarian castes in 
Meerut District, the Gujjar community. Muslims also made a decisive move in 
shifting their allegiance from the Congress to the Janata Dal. Pal had a landslide 
victory against Mohsina Kidwai of the Congress Party, obtaining 58.47 percent 
of the total vote compared to 35.66 percent for Kidwai. Apart from the 1989 Lok 
Sabha election, the election of the Municipal Council in January 1989 was 
another landmark in terms of the beginnings of a new Muslim politics in 
Meerut. The Municipal election was the first held after more than a decade. 
Many of the new non-elite Muslim (Qureshi) politicians began their political
206 A Chamar Corporator of the Municipal Corporation and the main organiser of the BSP in 
Meerut, interview on 31 January 2004.
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careers with this e lec tio n .2°7 They were replacing the old elite Congress 
leadership on the ground. The election of a large number of Muslim Councillors 
may be seen as an indication of the new Muslim political identity that was 
emerging after the 1987 violence (see Table 5. 2).
Table 5.2 Percentage o f elected Muslim Corporators in Meerut 
Municipal government, 1974-2000
1974 1989 1995 2000
Total number of 
Corporators 36 30 71 71
Muslim Corporators 8 19 21 21
% of Muslim 
Corporators 22 63 30 30
Note: In 1994 Meerut Nagar Nigam (Municipal Corporation) was introduced as the population of the 
municipality was becoming over 1 million. Accordingly the number of seats of Corporators was increased 
from 30 to 71. The elected Muslim Corporators were coincidentally the same number, 21, at both the 1995 
and the 2000 elections.
Sources: For 1974, the figures are from Sadhana Chaturvedi, ‘Religious Minorities and Problem of Human 
Rights: A case study of Muslims in Meerut’, PhD. thesis (Chaudhuri Charan Singh Meerut University, 
Meerut: 1994) (Chaturvedi 1994). For 1989 onwards, the figures are from the record in the Municipal 
Corporation Office, Meerut (Government of Uttar Pradesh 2000).
Having been elected as a Councillor, Akhlaq joined the Janata Dal in 1989. 
While helping the Janata Dal’s formation process, Akhlaq expanded his 
networks to the Other Backward Caste and Scheduled Caste constituencies that 
formed the major support bases for the Janata Dal in 1989. During his time 
with the Party, Akhlaq built up substantial personal connections with its leading 
politicians in the city, including Harish Pal, the winner of the 1989 Lok Sabha
2°7 Yusuf Qureshi was not included in the list of Councillors in 1989. He became the president of 
the District Congress Committee in 1990 and remained in this position until 2003.
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election in Meerut, and Aran Jain, who became the Mayor of Meerut in the 1989 
Municipal election.
The political alliance between Muslims and the Scheduled Castes became 
stronger in the 1990s, particularly after the BJP came to power in UP following 
the General Elections in May 1991, and more so after the destruction of the 
Babri Masjid on 6 December 1992. On the other hand, the Janata Dal-led 
National Front government in the centre declared the adoption of the Mandal 
Commission Report in 1990. The substantial increase in reservation quotas for 
the Other Backward Classes invited increasingly intense caste violence against 
the Backward communities in UP (Pai 2002).
In the 1993 Assembly election, Akhlaq was able to make use of already well- 
established activist networks among the Chamars in every part of the district 
and beyond, and these formed the primary electoral resource for his electoral 
campaign. His ultimate victory was based largely on the support of the Chamar 
community, the core of the BSP, which comprised 11 percent of the city’s 
population. An example of such broader inter-ethnic networking was observed 
in an election rally held in the dense Muslim area of Gola Kuwan, at which point 
Haji Mastan, national president of Bharatiya-Dalit Minorities Security 
Mahasangh, addressed the audience:
If Dalits and M uslims are united, both can change th e  governm ent and we will be
able to rule soon both  the state and the  central governm ent.208
2o8Amar Ujjala, 29 November 1993.
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Mastan’s words were symbolic in that they asserted the overarching identity of 
the ‘Dalits’ (the Scheduled Castes). The term ‘Dalit’ is literally defined to include 
‘the oppressed, the weak or marginalised’ beyond the boundaries of caste, 
community or gender (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998: 3-4). Rajiv Kothari 
observes that the 1993 Assembly election saw the emergence of a new Dalit 
movement in India. Kothari remarks: ‘It is based on the solidarity of the poor 
and discriminated classes of the people, long held back and frustrated, its 
leadership divided and bought over, distanced from the masses and positions’ 
(Kothari 1996:149). The Dalits embraced a political platform that embodied 
civil rights, civic identity and political representation — concepts which would 
now guide the city’s new Muslim politics.
5.2.3 Religious institutions
Akhlaq also chose religious institutions in Meerut as a major location for 
political networking during his 1993 electoral campaign. Interestingly, Akhlaq 
had been imprisoned for a gunfight in 1986. During the time he spent in prison 
he began to support his fellow prisoners and after his release he continued to aid 
the poor and widows in need with money, food and sewing machines.2°9 These 
charitable activities were clearly intended to meet Islamic value standards so as 
to qualify him as a man of religious status. Akhlaq also used the mosques, the 
most popular religious establishments in the city. He organised large meetings 
with religious leaders of the city including Maulanas, Malvis (scholars of
2°9 Interview with a friend of Akhlaq’s from the Qureshi community, on 4 April 2004.
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Islamic teaching) and Shahar Kaji (religious judges), particularly inviting the 
weaker sections of the Muslim population, the poor and the illiterate, to address 
political issues with him. These activities were critical in establishing and 
expanding a range of informal networks among lay Muslims. They were even 
more critical in legitimising his social status in accordance with the Islamic 
value code.
In the Meerut Muslim world, therefore, religion and politics went hand in hand. 
It is important to explore the role of religion in politics in Meerut, and I do so by 
first looking at the case of the Mumbai Muslim world described by Thomas Blom 
Hansen (Hansen 2001:160-185). Hansen’s account of the relationship between 
religion and politics in Mumbai makes an interesting contrast to that prevailing 
in Meerut. The following section sheds light on the extent of the convergence 
between religion and politics in Meerut in comparison to what Hansen saw in 
Mumbai Muslim society.
5.2.4 Religion and politics in Mumbai
Thomas Blom Hansen suggests that Muslims in Mumbai were caught between 
two different political positions after the 1993 riots in that city. Muslims came 
to have an introverted and sometimes ‘conservative’ orientation towards 
internal purification by means of religious activities, on the one hand, while 
deploying an outwardly oriented political pragmatism which used a ‘plebeian’ 
style of political representation, on the other. Hansen observes that adherents 
of both positions tried to maintain a distinction between ‘politics and culture’.
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That is, Mumbai Muslims who wished to make purification efforts separated 
themselves from the wider society and particularly from ‘politics’, which was 
now dominated by those from the lower classes. Such Muslims, according to 
Hansen, sought their own legitimacy through a visible separation from politics. 
On the other hand, ‘plebeian politics’ was essentially derived from the political 
aspirations of local ‘dadas’ and goondas arising from Mumbai’s criminal world. 
These local heroes, and strong men from lower ranked Muslim groups, tended to 
belong to the Samaj wadi Party, which represented a wider plebeian identity for 
Mumbai Muslims. The Party denied the need for the backing of religious 
authorities or leading community figures (Hansen 2001:182). The supposedly 
apolitical religious population in Hansen’s Muslim world was mainly composed 
of the well-educated Muslim middle-class, or those who despised the 
domination of local politics by men with criminal records and a plebeian 
background. These religious leaders regarded politics as the work of the low 
classes or low castes, and by separating themselves from it they refused to 
sanction it.
Hansen notes, however, that a sharp separation between politics and culture is
‘impossible’, as both positions somehow maintain connections with or reliance
upon one another. Some prominent religious leaders or well-educated
individuals of religious organisations were, for example, backed by the
Samajwadi Party or affiliated with the Muslim League (ibid.). Hansen maintains
that ‘...any articulation of a sense of community inevitably was shot through by
political identifications’(ibid. 175). While Hansen is aware of ‘ambiguities’
around the distinction between culture and politics, his emphasis is still placed
on the projection of a dichotomy between politics and culture in Muslim society
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in Mumbai. This dichotomy also maps onto an observed chasm between a 
Muslim middle class engaged in the purification project (culture) and rising 
political entrepreneurs from the lower classes (politics). According to Hansen, 
the presence in local politics of local dadas and goondas was not registered in 
the mainstream network of the Mumbai Muslim community. Instead they 
proliferated through informal networks of kinship, business connections and 
patronage. Hansen maintains that:
The new prom inence of dadas  and A jla f Muslim  entrepreneurs in local politics 
has been articulated only to a lim ited extent w ithin the  netw ork of institutions, 
trusts, and associations th a t make up the cultural establishm ent of the M uslim 
community. Instead, m ost of these m en have established them selves and the ir 
credibility through extended kinship structures, biraderis [biradaris], and other 
inform al relations of trust, trade, and patronage. In  other words, they have 
em erged from  social environm ents whose ethos of action, violence and m ale 
honour are strikingly sim ilar to those tha t form th e  basis today of Shiv Sena's 
hold on popular neighbourhoods in o ther parts of the city (ibid. 181).
5.2.5 Coexistence o f religion and politics in Meerut
The two leading Qureshi politicians in Meerut clearly shared the same type of 
‘plebeian* background as key political leaders in Mumbai. They came from the 
labouring class and had criminal records. But while there was a chasm between 
middle-class Muslims and those in the lower classes in Meerut, the division did 
not translate into a split between religion and politics as it did in Mumbai. In 
contrast to the Mumbai case, both Haji Akhlaq and Shahid Akhlaq were well 
accepted by the mainstream religious establishment in Meerut, including those 
who formed the highest religious authority, such as the Maulanas, Malvis and
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Shahar Kaji. These religious leaders believed in the high religiosity of both 
politicians and considered them ‘men of religion’ — a synonym for higher status 
under an Islamic religious code that also legitimised their political power. The 
religious authorities not only believed in the religiosity of the Qureshi politicians 
but also supported their electoral campaigns.
Hansen describes the Tablighi Jama’at in Mumbai as one of the most important 
religious institutions in the city, one representing an inward-looking and 
radically anti-political position that pursued purification of the community’s 
inner life and unification of the different sects and interpretations of Islam (ibid. 
172). Hansen also describes the organisation as the hub of‘the educated Muslim 
middle class’ (ibid. 176). The Tablighi Jama’at in Meerut, on the other hand, 
contrasts strongly with its counterpart in Mumbai. It was headquartered in one 
of the mosques in Jali Kothi, the locality of Qureshi scrap market owners. The 
majority of the members of the Tablighi Jama’at were Qureshis and Ansaris, 
and its advisory committee included Haji Raes Qureshi, the owner of the largest 
scrap market in Meerut and a Corporator of the Municipal Corporation. Haji 
Raes was a highly respected figure in both the political and religious worlds and 
his reputation went beyond the religious divide — notwithstanding that he came 
from the Palledars (courier) group, which is considered even lower than Kassai 
(butcher) Qureshis. The Tablighi was functioning to unite disparate Muslim 
groups under both one roof and one Islamic tenet (Chapter 4), and as a resource 
that was being actively used by Qureshi politicians for political purposes. The 
Tablighi, therefore, provided Haji Akhlaq with an ideal space for his electoral
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campaign. He and his wife210 actively used this increasingly popular religious 
movement (see Appendix, no. 1-7). The Tablighi provided the Akhlaqs with a 
large public arena of religious crowds drawn from the dense networks of the 
faithful across sects, ranks and occupations.
I suggest, therefore, that the distinction between politics and religion that 
Hansen observed in Mumbai did not exist in quite the same form in Meerut. 
Religion and religious identity among Meerut Muslims formed an intrinsic part 
of the city’s new Muslim politics. Both Haji Akhlaq and Shahid Akhlaq Qureshi 
began their political careers by obtaining higher status under Islamic value 
codes and established themselves in the domains of both politics and religion 
(‘culture’ in Hansen’s term) to a much greater degree than their counterparts in 
Mumbai. Muslim political leaders who dominated local politics in 
contemporary Meerut, for that matter, all projected themselves as devoted 
Muslims. The majority possessed the title of ‘Haji’, the mark of high religiosity 
and status attached to those who had made a pilgrimage to Mecca. They knew 
that high individual religiosity attached to political power and needed to be 
recognised and legitimised by religious leaders in the city.
The mobilising forms of the two Qureshi politicians saliently revealed the 
reciprocity between politics and religion within which these politicians 
attempted to effect a new sense of active Muslim citizenship in India without 
compromising their religious identity. In order to achieve a new modern civic
210 Mrs. Akhlaq reportedly made speeches to Muslim women at gatherings in their homes and 
appealed for their support for her husband in the coming election. Interview with a Muslim 
academic, Professor Shahabbudin Ansari, on 14 January 2004.
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identity, in other words, traditional symbols and values were fully utilised as an 
essential part of the production of a new sense of self (see Appendix no. 8-10). 
The convergence of politics and religion was most distinctively seen in the 
physical appearance of Shahid Akhlaq, who projected himself as a pious Muslim 
during his electoral campaign in 2004 and who visibly juxtaposed his figure with 
the plane of the BSP’s secular and egalitarian appeals.
Jonathan Spencer’s reading of Hansen’s Muslim world in Mumbai (Spencer 
2007) brings us one step further forward. Spencer aptly calls the distinctively 
plebeian style of Muslim politics in Mumbai a ‘pluralising strategy’. Muslim 
politics, based on the ‘well-known criminal-political hybrid in urban India’, 
seeks to network with the outside world in a new style of urban politics. 
Spencer, on the other hand, regards the work of purification represented by the 
Tablighi as ‘counter-pluralism’. He takes a cautious view of Hansen’s separation 
of politics and the religious purification project among Mumbai Muslims. He 
sees the relationship between politics and religion not as separated but rather as 
intricately connected. Spencer claims that the new style of Muslim politics in 
Mumbai confounds the distinction between politics and religion as much as the 
genuinely ‘hybrid’ nature of new Muslim politics breaks barriers among different 
communities in the Muslim world (ibid. 161-162). Spencer suggests that no 
cultural group can live in an isolated, culturally ‘sealed bubble’ but must rather 
live in complex interactions with the outside world and perhaps with also the 
politics of the wider society.
Key religious establishments in Meerut endorsed the Muslims’ pluralising 
strategies by authorising and legitimising the new spaces and identities that
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were created and advocated by the two Qureshi politicians. These 
establishments helped to create a new notion of the Muslim community by 
providing a public articulation of Muslim identity on one hand, while on the 
other hand supporting the plebeian desire for upward mobility through 
investment in education and economic advancement.
5.2.6 Religiosity and secular organisations
It is important to note that Akhlaq’s ‘mobilising structure’ (McAdam et al.: 1997 
(1996): 141-151) was organised within the existing religious institutions of Islam 
at the informal level and that its primary component was an appeal to Muslim 
religious crowds. It is also important to note that Akhlaq made very little effort 
to network with secular organisations that included both Muslim and Hindu 
members. Business associations, Urdu poetry reading groups or informal Peace 
Committees, for example, were not part of his efforts to create building blocks 
for electoral campaign. One notable feature of Qureshi politics was that the 
Qureshi leaders consciously stayed away from ‘pseudo-secular’ institutions in 
civil society which might produce an image of an artificial Hindu-Muslim 
cordiality.211 The civic stance of Qureshi politics, as we see below, was mainly
211A BJP Municipal Corporator criticised Shahid Akhlaq for never paying obeisance at Hindu 
temples on the occasion of the Nauchandi Mela in Meerut. The Mela is a large annual festival 
that lasts for a month and is considered a symbol of communal harmony. Public figures 
including politicians paid tributes to both Hindu temples and Dargah of Bala Mian, a Muslim 
saint, irrespective of their religious background. This constituted an important public 
performance during the Mela. The BJP Corporator also mentioned that Shahid, when he was 
Mayor, left his seat when India’s national anthem, Vande Mataram, was sung before the 
Municipal Corporation session, interview with a BJP Corporator, 26 April 2004.
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derived from an alliance with secular institutions in the formal political setting, 
notably via the BSP and SP. At the informal level Qureshi politics did not cross 
ethnic boundaries and remained within the domain of the Muslim world.
It may be useful here to further examine Ashtosh Varshney’s (2002) ‘civic 
engagement’ arguments in order to understand the meaning of this particular 
aspect of Qureshi politics. The kinds of‘civic engagement’ and associational life 
which Varshney claims can forge peace between Hindus and Muslims are found 
in precisely those kinds of secular organisations that the Akhlaqs avoided. 
Varshney’s stress on the importance of an associational life that encourages 
interaction between Hindus and Muslim has strikingly little reference to 
political life in urban India. Steven Wilkinson rightly points out, in this regard, 
the methodological difficulty of singling out the effects of inter-ethnic contacts 
from the influence of all the other socio-economic and political factors that are 
likely to predispose a town to peace or violence. Wilkinson also argues that 
associational life may be more the result than the cause of communal peace, 
given that many societies with rich traditions of inter-ethnic associational life 
have experienced very high levels of ethnic violence (Wilkinson 2004: 53-56).
Paul Brass also questions the explanatory power of cultural contact and
associational life to control the level of ethnic violence in a town. Brass shows
how communal political mobilisations can be powerful enough to override all
inter-communal relations, associations and common actions to maintain or
restore peace when the administration and police fail to take action (see Brass
2003:27). In his more recent work, Brass refutes the idea of associational life in
controlling ethnic violence in reference to the 1982 violence in Meerut. He
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refers to the strike of the leading commercial and professional organisations of 
Meerut city, the Traders’ Association and the Bar Association, both dominated 
by Hindus, in protest against the decision of the District Magistrate to lock up 
the disputed site between the Hindu and Muslim protagonists in Shah Ghasa in 
the Old Town (Chapter 3). The members of these associations considered the 
sealing of the place illegal. This was during the explosive moment before full- 
scale rioting engulfed the Old Town in September 1982. According to Brass, the 
members of these organisations did not significantly help to reverse the on­
going ethnic polarisation. Those organisations’ strikes were instead mostly 
motivated by ‘Hindu’ passions of Hindu attorneys, and their interventions were 
‘unnecessary, provocative, and communal entirely on the side of the Hindu 
protagonists in the disputes’ (Brass 2007 (2004): 100).
In the light of the nature of Qureshi politics in Meerut, questioning the direct
relevance of the town’s associational life to communal peace does not appear to
make much sense. It might be more relevant to inquire about the location of
those associations in the town’s political geography—what kind of political roles
are assigned by political actors to these associations? How are they linked to the
political structure of a town and the relationship of those associations to real
politics? In other words, social capital theory must be engaged in the dialogue of
real politics and the power structure, which ultimately decide the levels of
communal violence of a town. In the style of politics developed among low-
status Muslims in Meerut, those ‘pseudo-secular’ organisations that were
detached from the city’s political life and the state structure were dismissed
altogether. In the context of a developing country where vast resources are
controlled by the state, those struggling to get ahead would not expect their life
247
chances to be boosted by relying on these non-state institutions (Kohli 1990: 
266). Rather, the obvious path to political power was to become a part of the 
state by maximising their cultural resources and obtaining better positions 
within the state structure for negotiating Muslim interests, including the 
maintenance of peace and security.
5.3 Electoral Mobilisation by Haji Akhlaq
Haji Akhlaq used as his main political rhetoric the image of himself as a ‘saviour 
of Muslims’ who would protect them from the B JP and the other Hindu Right 
forces, including in his view the PAC and the police. Thus, the growing threat 
from the B JP, as well as leading issues of security and survival facing the Meerut 
Muslims, were the major framing factors of his campaign. The image of a 
saviour reflected the popular demand arising from the Muslim masses for a 
particular type of political leadership. In my interviews it appeared to be a 
widely accepted view among Meerut Muslims:
M uslims looked for a goonda w ith money and muscle power, with which he could 
protect us from  the BJP.212
M uslims are the m inority and always scared of atrocities by Hindus. Haji Akhlaq 
came as a protector of M uslims from  Hindus. He was the only person for 
M uslims at tha t time. Goal was to defeat the B JP.213
212 A comment by a Muslim (Ansari) secretary to an incumbent Congress MP, Mr. Avtar Singh 
Bhadana at the time of interview on 8 February 2004.
213 Interview on 11 Januaiy 2004.
248
After the com munal violence of 1987, Muslims were in search of a strong m an 
physically, mentally and economically. Haji Akhlaq was a popular choice when 
elected. ...He was a symbol o f courage.214
Entire Muslims had fear after the destruction of the Babri [Masjid] and  the riots 
[in 1987]. Akhlaq had  been know n to  everyone in  th e  city because o f the m urder 
cases. Muslims believed th a t he was the only person who could save them . He 
was a wrestler tha t was the first im age...strong m an who can fear H indus and can 
fight for Muslims .21s
Muscle men and goondas were particularly needed to protect the election 
booths. According to a political advisor to the late Manzoor Ahamad:
In order to defeat the B JP, we vote for a winning candidate who is to  w in over the 
BJP candidate. In order to  defeat the BJP, m oney and muscle power are 
necessary. The BJP has w ell-organised goondas. They are trained  by the RSS. 
They disturb election meetings, capturing booths, threatening voters. They use 
weapons and will crash Muslims. ...One needs muscle power to protect his voters. 
It is the second qualification o f the Indian politician.216
Akhlaq’s political rhetoric in projecting himself as a saviour of Muslims was 
closely connected with Muslim collective memory of the 1987 violence. Akhlaq 
also consciously used the BJP card in relation to violence. He opened his 
election campaign, for example, with the statement:
214 A Muslim owner of an English-medium school. Interview on 28 January 2004. 
21s Interview on 4 April 2004.
216 Interview on 1 February 2004.
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I have got a ticket to  contest from peoples’ blessings and  love. I need your 
support to  win th is tim e — to make people free from fear which was created by 
the BJP.21?
M eerut people know  who started  the riots. Now these M eerut people w ant 
secular leadership.218
5.3.1 ‘Saviour o f Muslims’
Haji Akhlaq apparently succeeded in achieving these ‘distinctive role 
qualifications’ as a political leader (Bailey 1970: 26). His background helped 
him to attain this position. Most importantly, the ‘image’ that was created at his 
public performance enormously contributed to Akhlaq’s political rhetoric. 
Another contributing factor to the image of a saviour was derived from the 
specific strategies or political rhetoric he used in order to convince Muslims ‘that 
he could face and confront the Hindu communal forces.’21?
Akhlaq’s father was known as a petty criminal. After spending his youth without 
a stable job, Akhlaq entered the meat business aged about 32. He trained as a 
professional wrestler in his youth. After his imprisonment in 1986 his public 
appearances, often involving violence and gunfights, were increasingly geared 
towards his political ambitions. From this period of his life onwards Akhlaq 
appeared to have consciously created an image of himself as a protector of 
Muslims. He increasingly used his performance in the public arena, showing his
21?Amar Ujjala, 31 October 1993.
2l8Amar Ujjala, 1 November 1993.
219 Interview on 14 January 2004.
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muscle (gun), money and manpower. Akhlaq’s famous public performance in 
May 1991, when booth capturing by the BJP workers took place on the day of the 
election, was clearly a precursor for the election campaign in 1993. As a Muslim 
property dealer recalled:
Akhlaq took out a chair, stood on it with a rifle in his hand, screaming ‘Kill me. If 
you want to kill Muslims, kill me first, if you can’. It was at the intersection of 
Budhana Gate, a famous Hindu area. He was challenging Hindus, and he stood 
for Muslims.220
Akhlaq also used the occupational image of the Qureshi butcher community to 
his advantage. In India every occupation invokes a particular image framed by 
certain behavioural patterns, work ethic and sense of morality (Reiniche 1996). 
The image of the butcher is very much stereotyped. It was interesting to 
discover that a consistent image of this occupation was held by both Hindu and 
Muslim respondents of all walks of life. The consistent image of the Qureshis 
can be summarised as follows: They are aggressive and cold-hearted because 
they can kill big animals; they are clever and shrewd because they are perfect 
businessmen; they are muscle men, they have a tendency to fight, money- 
centred, using abusive language, hard working but uncultured and backward.
In contrast, the image of the Ansaris, for example, is that they are religious, 
industrious and better educated. The Qureshis and Ansaris are, therefore, 
supposed to have different work ethics deriving from their occupational
220 Interview on 26 November 2003.
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backgrounds. The Ansaris in general do not provoke an image of a goonda with 
muscle power, whereas the Qureshis do.
The image of a wrestler was also associated with Akhlaq. On the gate leading to 
the large house of Haji Akhlaq in Gudari Bazaar in the Old Town near Kotwali, 
there is a plate with his name on it which says ‘Akhlaq Palhan [Wrestler]’. Apart 
from being trained as a professional wrestler, this image was derived from his 
physical appearance. Akhlaq was then an imposing man, six feet tall and with a 
large body and face. People imagined that killing a big animal required these 
kinds of physical features, connecting the image of the Qureshis with that of 
muscle men. The Qureshi in general, however, were also known as a trading 
community consisting of shrewd money-makers. In people’s imaginations the 
two images of the Qureshi as animal killers and money-makers seemed to 
coexist without contradiction. Many respondents indicated that the sole aim of 
Qureshi politicians was to make money.221 Even politics was a means to achieve 
this aim. Haji Akhlaq, however, successfully transformed his ‘ascribed’ 
characteristics from his hereditary occupation and his ‘achieved’ roles attained 
through his life history into a means for political ascendancy.
It was also a widely accepted view that Akhlaq was a good orator. His words 
‘came to your thoughts and imagination’.222 With his communication skill, 
Akhlaq restated and articulated Muslims’ fears and grievances in a language that
221 Frederick Bailey points out that ‘in traditional Indian reckoning there was nothing heroic or 
admirable in the act of making money; it was a combination of undeserved luck and double- 
dealing’ (Bailey 1998: 94).
222 The quotes from Akhlaq’s speech cited in this section come from my interview with Professor 
Shahabbudin Ansari. Interview on 14 January 2004.
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could be understood by Muslim masses which were largely composed of low- 
income and illiterate groups. Muslim sentiments were magnified through 
Akhlaq’s speeches and slogans. His speeches in Urdu:
I am powerful. No communal element would dare to face me.
I put the glass of milk here on the ground. Nobody would put his feet over it 
because I put it there.
You, Muslims, said that Ayuub Ansari is a gentleman. He will do nothing. You 
again said that Akhlaq is a goonda. Then who do you want?
5.3.2 Appeals to civic identity
The most dramatic aspect of Akhlaq’s campaign was his appeal to a civic 
identity. It came through his famous slogan: ‘Neither hate nor riot, we shall 
promote love and trade’.223 It appeared strikingly secular and universal, 
particularly against the background of ongoing ethnic polarisation in the city. 
Although Akhlaq used anti-B JP rhetoric which drew on the collective memory of 
violence, his campaign was not staged exclusively for the Muslim electorate. 
During his election campaign he visited both Hindu and Muslim 
neighbourhoods in the city and appealed to elements within the Hindu 
electorate as well (see Appendix no. 11). Akhlaq was overtly against the BJP, but 
not against the city’s Hindu community:
223 The same interview on 14 January 2004.
253
In 1989, the BJP could win only talking about ‘Ram’. But now the BJP cannot 
make fools of the people of the city. The Hindu secular-minded people will also 
caste their votes for me.224
The slogan was at the same time a brilliant summation of popular sentiment 
among the Muslim electorate. It reflected the struggle of the Meerut Muslims to 
recover from the huge economic set-back caused by the 1987 violence, beyond 
which lay their vision to be integrated into the mainstream of Indian society 
(Chapter 4). The central idea of electoral mobilisation behind this slogan was an 
ideology or a set of beliefs that Muslims should open up and participate as 
citizens of India rather than as a separate and isolated ethnic minority.
Most of Akhlaq’s appeals to the Muslim masses were straightforwardly civic, 
even secular (see Appendix no. 12 and 13). He used Islamic symbols for his 
major constituency, the Muslim religious crowds, but his appeals were far from 
communal since he stayed away from the repertoires of the so-called ‘minority 
issues’22^  that had very little to do with the everyday life of lay Muslims (Shakir 
1980) (see Appendix no. 14 and 15). More importantly, his appeals were 
contextualised within the larger social movements of the lower-caste parties, 
particularly the Janata Dal, for which he was contesting the election. Akhlaq 
spoke in Urdu when he addressed the Muslim electorate because Urdu was an 
important cultural symbol among Muslims. Yet no specific appeal was made in 
terms of retaining Urdu as a symbol of separate Muslim identity. It was this 
subtlety of‘Muslimness’ in Akhlaq’s campaign which rather saliently pointed to
224 Amar Ujjala 1 November 1993.
22s These included issues related to Muslim Personal Law.
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a commitment to and an assertion of the ‘civic’ order that transcended the 
communal divide (see Appendix no. 16 and 17).
5.4 The Local Political Scene from 1994 to 2004
After the Assembly election in 1993, Muslim participation in elections became 
more enthusiastic. Every election at the municipal, state and national levels 
drew a high voting rate in Muslim localities, particularly those with a 
concentration of low-status Muslims. Muslim candidates in these elections were 
predominantly from the lower ranks, and particularly from the Qureshi 
community.226 Low-status Muslims, primarily Qureshis, had now established 
themselves as a new political force in city politics. On the other hand, there were 
very few higher-rank Muslims in the formal political scene of the city. Many 
high-status Muslims believed that the elections were for those in the lower ranks 
who wished to improve their status by voting. They saw no need to come out to 
the election booth and cast a vote. The voting rate among high status Muslims 
was declining as steadily, as was that of upper caste Hindus.22? The absence of a 
Muslim elite in Meerut city politics became increasingly salient after the 1990s. 
In some interviews, higher-status Muslims told of not being able to pay the 
deposit required to stand as a candidate.228
226 The increase in the participation of Muslims in the democratic process was a general trend at 
the all-India level (see Alam 1999: 757).
227Amar Ujjala, 11 May 2004.
228 Yaqoob Qureshi, the-then UP Minister under the SP government, publicly denounced 
Mayawati, the leader of the BSP, for requesting money from prospective candidates in exchange 
for tickets to contest elections, Amar Ujjala, 3 March 2004.
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The remarkable political ascendancy of the Qureshis did not necessarily mean, 
however, that other political forces in Meerut city were reduced to the sidelines. 
The BJP had been a strong contender for power in the city since 1989, supported 
by large numbers of trading castes and Punjabis. In the General Elections of 
1996, both Lok Sabha and Assembly seats were returned to the BJP. Laxmi Kant 
Vajpay of the BJP achieved a narrow victory over Haji Akhlaq contesting for the 
Samajwadi Party. 229 In the General Elections of 1998, the BJP maintained its 
position, and in 1999 a Gujjar candidate from the Congress Party won by a small 
margin from the runner-up, a BJP candidate (Tables 5.3 and 5.4).
229 The defeat was largely derived from the loss of the Scheduled Castes votes as the Samajwadi 
Party had split from its coalition partner, the BSP, prior to the election.
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Table 5.3 Election results for Meerut city Legislative Assembly
constituency, 1989 to 2002
%
of
Winnin
Ypnr ^ xear Political
% of
TAT. Total 
Wmner Valid
Second
Runne
Name
of
Second
% of
Total
Valid
Third
Runne
Name of 
Third 
Runner
Tot
al
Vali
Party Votes r Runner Votes r d
Vot
es
1989 BJP
Laxmi
Kant
Vajpay
37.32 JD AyuubAnsari 25.54 IND
Basir
Ahmad
16.
08
1993 JD
Haji
Akhlaq
Quresh
i
48.18 BJP
Laxmi
Kant
Vajpay
44-8
8 INC
Krishna
Kumar
Sharma
4.51
1996 BJP
Laxmi
Kant
Vajpay
49.0
2 SP
Haji
Akhlaq
Quresh
i
41.94 BSP
Yunus
Qureshi 516
200
2 BJP
Laxmi
Kant
Vajpay
42.0
2 SP
Dilshad
Ahmed
Munna
21.84 INC YusufQureshi
20.
23
Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.aso
Table 5.4 Election results for Meerut-Mawana Lok Sabha constituency, 1989- 
2004___________________________________________________________
Year
Winning
Political
Party
Winner
% of
Total
Valid
Votes
Second
Runner
Name of 
Second 
Runner
% of
Total
Valid
Votes
Third
Runner
Name
of
Third
Runner
% of
Total
Valid
Votes
1989 JD
Election
Harish Pal 58.47 INC MohsinaKidwai 35-66 BJP
Sangh
Pirya
Gautam
245
1991 counter­
manded
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1996 BJP Amar Pal Singh 48.66 JD
Mohamad
Afzal 22.33 BSP
Haji
Noor
Ilahi
16.36
1998 BJP Amar Pal Singh 42.22 SP
Jagveer
Singh 35-77 BSP
Arun
Kumar
Jain
1503
1999
2004
INC
BSP
Avtar Singh 
Bhadana
Mohammad
Shahid
Akhlaq
34-74
36.2
BJP
RLD
Amar Pal 
Singh
Malook
Nagar
31.4
26.26
BSP
JD(U)
Haji
Yaqoob
Qureshi
K.C.
Tyagi
30.53
23.97
Source: Election Commission of India, http://eci.nic.in/StatisticalReports/ElectionStatistics.asp
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5*5 The Lok Sabha Election in May 2004
A decade later, in the Lok Sabha election in 2004, Shahid Akhlaq, Haji Akhlaq’s 
son, contested for the BSP and again achieved a remarkable victory, with 
unprecedented support from the Muslim constituency. Shahid Akhlaq largely 
followed the example of his father’s principal ideologies and mobilisation 
resources in his electoral campaign. His principal resource was a political 
coalition with the Scheduled Castes, particularly the Chamars.
The General Elections of 2004 again saw a continuing upsurge in rates of 
participation among socially marginalised groups. The election also marked the 
significant advancement of OBC politics led by the SP and the BSP (Kumar and 
Palshikar 2004).23° The BJP, on the other hand, faced a dramatic defeat at the 
polls in 2004. The BJP had been the core party of the governing coalition in 
Delhi since 1998. Upon its defeat in 2004, a new coalition, the United 
Progressive Alliance (UPA), under the Prime Ministership of Dr. Manmohan 
Singh of the Indian National Congress, the major partner, took over in New 
Delhi.
In the Meerut-Mawana Lok Sabha constituency in 2004 the major contestants 
were all Hindus except for Shahid Akhlaq. The BJP did not stand for election as 
it had made a pre-election pact with the Janata Dal, whose candidate, K.C. 
Tyagi, finished in third place (see Table 5.5).
230 Yogendra Yadav, ‘Radical Shift in the Social Basis of Political Power’, The Hindu, 20 May 
2004 (Yadav 20 May 2004).
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Table 5.5 Election results for Meerut—Mawana Lok Sabha
constituency, 2004 (top five candidates)
Candidates Caste/Community Party
Votes
Polled
% of Total Valid 
Votes
Mohammad Shahid 
Qureshi Muslim BSP 252,518 36.20
Malook Nagar Gujjar RLD 183,182 26.26
K.C. Tyagi Tyagi JD(U) 167,221 23.97
K.K. Sharma Brahmin INC 65,914 9-45
Anil Rastogi Bania SHS 15058 2.16
Source: Election Commission of India,
http://eci.nic.in/archive/GE2004/States/index fs.htm (Election Commission of India 2004).
The BJP, represented by Tyagi, mainly focused on development issues and toned 
down communal appeals in this election (cf. van Dyke 2007). Although Shahid 
gained less than 40 percent of the total vote, the average voting percentage in 
the Muslim concentrated wards in the city was reportedly even higher than in 
the Lok Sabha election of 1999 and the Assembly election of 2002. The local 
newspaper commented that large scale of Muslim participation in Indian 
democracy was particularly remarkable in this election.^1
Shahid Akhlaq Qureshi was one of Haji Akhlaq’s five sons. He entered politics as 
the president of the Youth Janata Dal of Meerut city through the support of ex- 
MP, Harish Pal, in 1989. Shahid’s father began his political career in the same 
year as a Municipal Councillor. Shahid Akhlaq himself was too young to contest 
the Municipal election of that year. He was elected as the Mayor of Meerut in
231Amar Ujjala, 11 May 2004.
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2000 at the age of 30 and was a Member of Parliament in 2004 at the age of 34, 
both for the BSP. Shahid Akhlaq established one of the most successful meat 
packaging firms in Meerut in 1997. His firm worked in close connection with the 
Meerut government slaughterhouse, as did most Qureshi leaders from the 
Kassai (butcher) group. His political power was very much grounded on the 
wealth generated by the meat business, through which Shahid Akhlaq conducted 
numerous charitable activities for the poor and handicapped. For example, he 
has established a secondary school for Muslim children of low-income families. 
The school offered both secular and religious education without a fee.232 Those 
activities signified his Islamisation process and therefore qualified him as a man 
of religion, which again legitimised his political and economic power.
5.5.1 Electoral mobilisation o f Shahid Akhlaq in 2004
The distinctive style of electoral mobilisation of the current (as of April 2009) 
young MP representing the Meerut-Mawana Lok Sabha constituency is his 
striking image as a pious Muslim. Shahid Akhlaq strictly follows the Islamic 
dress code and always appears in the public arena wearing a white khurta, a cap 
and long beard (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4 below). Nowhere in his campaign is 
there an image of goonda or a ‘saviour of Muslims’ such as his father had 
created through his Pathan (warrior) dress. This might at least partially be 
explained by the absence of a BJP candidate in the Meerut constituency in this 
particular election.
232 Interview with the then Mayor, Mr. Shahid Akhlaq, on 17 August 2003.
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Some respondents told me that Shahid has several allegations of criminal 
misconduct against him, some of which still stand, including cases for ‘shoot- 
o u ts ’. ^  Shahid has, however, never been convicted in court. He has little 
education and spent his youth without a stable job. Despite his varied past, 
Shahid has been consciously building up his image of devotion by fulfilling 
religious duties since the mid-1990s (see Appendix no. 18). He achieved the 
most important duty, the pilgrimage to Mecca, at an early age, while his father 
did this much later in his life (see Appendix no. 19).234 Shahid frequently also 
visits religious establishments in Meerut in order to gain the acceptance of the 
leading religious circles in the city. He organises meetings with Maulanas and 
Malvis at almost every mosque in Meerut. The message that he attempts to get 
across is that he is a good and devoted Muslim who is modest and respectful to 
community e ld ers .235
Shahid Akhlaq’s appearance as a pious Muslim consciously not only stresses his 
Muslim identity but also underlines his upward mobility. Given his past record 
as a delinquent youth, the construction of the image of a devoted Muslim must
233 Although some people informed me of the allegations for criminal conducts, many more, and 
arguably most people of the religious circle in Meerut, including Malvis, consider of Shahid 
Akhlaq highly as a religious man. Shahid has also considerable following among the Muslim 
youth and elders, as I discuss in this section and in Chapter Six.
234 His father, Akhlaq Qureshi, was not able to make pilgrimage to Mecca until his old age and 
the reason was presumably that his economic status did not allow this very expensive journey. 
This meant that Akhlaq had been given the title of Haji quite recently. Those who have returned 
from pilgrimage to Mecca are respectfully called *haj? and the pilgrimage is a rite of passage to a 
higher status. It also marks a certain personal change, a shift in priorities to the things of the 
afterlife. The title ‘haji’ is a marker of middle-class status and financial stability (van der Veer, 
1996 (1994): 126-127). See also the discussion on religiosity in the later section in this chapter.
235 Interview with Doulla, the head of the government slaughter house, on 4 April 2004.
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have been a big leap, yet it is still the quickest way to appeal to the Muslim 
masses in the city. It is particularly useful in order to appeal to the religious 
crowds that have formed the core mobilising structures of Shahid’s electoral 
campaign. Shahid appears to have been mainly successful in changing his image 
from goonda to man of religion, particularly among the elders and religious 
leaders of the city.
These fundamental changes in Meerut’s new Muslim politics are thus revealed 
with more salience in Shahid’s campaign than in that of his father. This is 
because Shahid Akhlaq uses an elevated notion of Islam in order to reconcile 
Muslim identity with a wider civic identity. Below I examine Shahid Akhlaq’s 
election hoardings, which vividly show the contrast as well as the convergence of 
the two identities. I try to illuminate their visible effects, particularly on Muslim 
viewers (see Figures 5.2 and 5.3).
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Figure 5.2 The BSP election  hoard in g-i w ith Shahid Akhlaq in  2 0 0 4
ig^2^,WIsn‘^ 5^ *n4jrs<fl w  w -^wr k
^'^ j^ s f^f^nfgtfciij^ LgTj^ Hdi ■fir <^ »n n^tr
Wd7, fofrfl $ {U
Neither Hate Nor Riot: We Shall Promote Love and Trade.
All societies/castes/biradaris will receive respect. Entire regions will receive development. Vote for the 
honest and development-minded candidate.
Upon declaration, Mohamed Haji Shahid Akhlaq as a candidate of the BSP from the Meerut-Mawana Lok 
Sabha seat, Ms. Mayawati, people of Meerut feel immense happiness on this occasion. (Sponsored by the 
BSP, Meerut District.)
Source: Amar Ujjala, 14 April 2004.
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Figure 5.3 The BSP election  hoarding-2 in  2 0 0 4
Pna<^ cp f 14 arftoT 2003 %  f^ r  wr
t r r -3^ %  /*****% ,
3i-jqrfNf % frTTT fIMWd /
W F ^ l  w  ^ M f n r  ~ '
^ w 3TT%rrm y ^ ^ y )  
% , » .  ( 3 i t e r w w )  g ^ m
Long Live Bhart Ratam Baba Bhim Rao Ambedkar. BSP Zindabad. Greetings from Ambedkar Jayanti to 
all residents of Meerut region. Last year on April 14,2003, residents of Meerut presented a special gift to 
the followers of Dr. Bhim Rao Ambedkar — an Ambedkar statue in front of Metro Plaza. Yours. Haji 
Shahid Akhlaq.
Source: Amar Ujjala, 8 April 2004.
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One obvious visual effect of these hoardings is that the most marginalised 
groups in society, the Scheduled Castes, symbolised by the BSP, and the 
Muslims, symbolised by the sole figure of Shahid, are sharing a space under the 
banner of the BSP, which is aiming to seek control of the state in order to obtain 
not only material benefits but also to gain respect and dignity (Chandra 2000: 
27). The white figure of Shahid Akhlaq makes a striking contrast with the rest of 
the symbols of the BSP; the elephant, the BSP leaders of Dr. Ambedkar, Kanshi 
Ram and Mayawati. There is no cultural symbol for Muslims on these hoardings 
apart from the figure of Shahid Akhlaq. There is no image of Jinnah, for 
example. The slogans written on the hoardings always begin with the phrase 
‘Kanshi Ram Zindabad,’ ‘Ambedkar Zindabad and ‘Mayawati Zindabad (Live 
long in prosperity). Under these slogans are messages from Shahid to the 
electorate, which always underline his BSP candidacy rather than his Muslim 
identity. While Shahid uses the same slogan as his father: ‘Neither hate nor 
riot: we shall promote love and trade’, it is addressed not exclusively to the 
Muslim electorate but rather to the larger constituency of the BSP, the majority 
of which, to repeat, are Scheduled Caste groups. The slogan, derived from the 
electoral campaign on the unknown Muslim politician of a decade ago, has 
returned to the electoral scene and become a symbol of an inter-ethnic class 
coalition. It is obviously an advantage to use the slogan from his father’s very 
successful election campaign with which his constituents are familiar. Shahid’s 
adoption of this slogan, however, more importantly suggests that it is the 
legitimate voice of the oppressed and marginalised classes of both communities, 
capturing a new political culture in the age of popular democracy.
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5.5*2 The hoardings’ effects on Muslim viewers
Aijun Appadurai and Carol Breckenridge’s study of the ‘public sphere’ helps us 
to understand the meaning of these hoardings in greater depth. It is particularly 
helpful with regard to their focus on the readers’, viewers’ and spectators’ 
‘subjective experience of modern life’ (Appadurai and Breckenridge 1995: 5). 
The ‘public sphere’ refers to a set of arenas where viewers and image producers 
create an interacting effect that traverses public and private spaces, the 
community and the state, and ‘where everyday life is linked to the projects of the 
nation-state’. The public sphere is also an arena in which social groups of 
different class, ethnicity and gender constitute their identities through their 
experience of ‘viewing,’ ‘reading’ and ‘experimenting’ with various forms of 
public culture, in this case the hoardings (ibid. 3-4). Muslim spectators of 
Meerut’s political hoardings are ‘apt to consume’ the hoardings of the BSP 
according to their own expectations of modern life. Consumption is a 
productive work of imagination that draws attention to new forms of social 
identity.
The BSP hoardings appear to indicate what modern democratic politics could 
bring to Meerut Muslims through the images of Dr. Ambedkar, the champion of 
the Dalit cause, Kanshi Ram, the founder of the BSP and Mayawati, the 
successor to Kanshi Ram within the BSP. In addition to these figures, the slogan 
of each hoarding emphasises not only secular issues centred on development 
and equality, but also the fight for lost ethnic pride, dignity and respect. 
According to basic BSP ideology (Chandra 2000: 27), caste divisions, Hindu- 
Muslim differences, and rural-city differences are supposed to become non­
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existent as a broader body of the common people CBahujan) is formed. 
Everybody is entitled to an equal share of what modern democracy is able to 
offer. What the BSP embodies in these hoardings might be seen as ‘a newly 
humanised and individualised version of secularism’, to use Nicholas Dirks’ apt 
phrase. It seeks to express a ‘political utopia’ envisaged in the construction of a 
post-colonial nation-state undertaking a universalising project of cultural 
diversity (Dirks 2001:179).
The hoardings symbolise both a particular conception of modernity and the 
means to achieve it (Appadurai 1995). The aims of modernity here, or what 
modem life and values would bring about from the perspective of Muslim 
viewers, surely include upward mobility, inter-ethnic peace and equal 
opportunities, while the means to achieve these goals are political integration, 
democratic participation and the self-recognition embodied in leading BSP 
symbols. These images link spectators to a larger project of modern nation- 
building that attempts to forge an overarching civic identity of citizenship which 
promotes participation in the life of the nation. In this sense, the image makers, 
and particularly the viewers, come to be included in the modem nation-building 
project in and through their entitlements to citizenship.
At the same time, these hoardings are also the manifestation of a contested 
public sphere that corresponds to the divisive demands of class and ethnicity 
made on the nation-state. Modernity envisaged through entitled citizenship and 
civil rights is juxtaposed in the hoardings with an image of a Muslim politician 
that depicts the religious values of Islam. The sole Muslim figure could be 
linked in the viewers’ imagination to the claim for a separate identity for Indian
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Muslims and the collective memory of Partition, intertwined with images of 
communal strife, suffering and sacrifice; in a word, a memory of loss. This very 
image of Indian Muslims ultimately forms an antithesis to the claims of 
universality and citizenship of the modern nation-state, notwithstanding that 
Indian secularism makes room for claims to religiosity. The hoardings, in other 
words, reveal the most contradictory aspect of the universalising project of 
modern nation-building, caught in ‘the chasm between utopia and irrationality’ 
of cultural nationalism (Dirks 2001:179).
This juxtaposition of modern values and the religious values of Islam forms 
probably the most striking visual image in these hoardings. The symbolic 
juxtaposition also suggests an image of a reconciling convergence of the two 
worlds, expressed largely through the BSP’s language and symbols. The Muslim 
politician is a symbolic figure taking part in a larger nation-building project 
without losing his identity as a Muslim. The politician also appears to be a 
moderator in negotiating the contours of modern life, using the most user- 
friendly language of Islam for the Muslim masses in Meerut.236
Muslim women formed a significant proportion of the spectators of the 
hoardings and were key participants in the election process. A local newspaper
236 Owen Lynch maintains that the transition of the Jatavs in Agra towards a modern civic
identity went smoothly because the revolutionary message of Ambedkar was embedded in
religion, a Neo-Buddhism the foundation of which was its unequivocal rejection of Hinduism.
Lynch, rephrasing Geertz (1963) notes, ‘Buddhism...pours the new wine of political modernity
into the old bottles of religious tradition’. Ambedkar defined ‘the roles of Buddhism in virtually 
the same terms as those of a citizen of democratic India’. The inter-changeability of these two 
identities made it possible to appeal to both the traditional and the secular minded among the 
Jatavs, yet both worked for the same revolutionary goals (Lynch 1969:143) (Geertz 1963).
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reports that a large number of Muslim women attended a huge rally addressed 
by the BSP leader, Mayawati, in Victoria Park in Meerut on 4 May 2004. Those 
women, concealing their bodies with the long cape with cap and veil, all in black, 
the ‘b u r q a sat among male spectators under the scorching sun at noon with 
blue flags in their h a n d s .237 They also queued to vote on voting day.238 Muslim 
women in India formed the most segregated part of the Muslim population 
under the protective wall of Personal Law that governs Muslims’ own social 
norms and systems. Muslim women in seclusion from the public sphere 
symbolised the cultural autonomy of Muslims while being excluded from the 
dominant discourse of Indian nationalism and nation-building. In this sense 
Muslim women spectators, particularly from the lower strata, had previously 
been shut out from elections at least twice; by the Islamic norms of seclusion, 
‘purdah’, that confined them to the domestic living sp a ce ,239 and also by the fact 
that they had been placed outside the nationalist project and the state 
protection.
Significantly, many Muslim women attended the election rally by the BSP 
leader, Mayawati, and listened to the female political leader from the Chamar
237 Amar Ujjala, 5 May 2004.
238 The local newspaper says: ‘At polling booth no. 47 — despite the scorching heat and stuffy 
weather, one could see long queues of Muslim burqa clad women standing and waiting for their 
turn to caste vote. The similar enthusiasm is seen on a number of booths in Muslim dominating 
areas such as 78,79,80 (Hapur road); 64 (DN College), 65,66 and 117 (Podi Wada); 234,235 
and 236 (Tahsil (Kotwali)); including Tara Puri, Lisari Gate, Soharab Gate and Gudari Bazaar’, 
Amar Ujjala, 11 May 2004.
239 The life of Muslim women belonging to the Ansaris in Varanasi in eastern UP is vividly 
described in (Kumar 1995 (1988): 53-62).
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community and her call for solidarity among the oppressed.24° Muslim female 
spectators were eager to be part of ‘a citizen’s erotics to the utopian aspirations 
of the nation’ (Dirks 2001:180). ‘Erotics’ here corresponds to what Appadurai 
has elsewhere called the eroticism of men in their enthusiasm as spectators of 
cricket between India and Pakistan. The notion of erotics is linked to the 
nationalist passion that the cricket game produces among the male spectators, in 
whose body, according to Appadurai, cricket is ‘inscribed’ through playing in 
their youth. Cricket creates imagined communities through ‘the appropriation of 
agonistic bodily skills that can then further lend passion and purpose to the 
community so imagined’ (Appadurai 1995:45).
Muslim female spectators leapt over the barriers of Personal Law and the 
patriarchal power of male dominance in order to cease being ‘the Other’ within 
and to become ‘the feminist source of the nation’s power and virtue’ (Dirks 
2001: 180). The presence of the Muslim female gaze, consuming and 
experimenting with modernity as much as male spectators, seems to be 
demanding equal citizenship regardless of their gender. In other words, their 
presence, covered by their black burqas, was an attempt to claim inclusion in the 
Indian nationalist mission as fully entitled citizens, again without losing their 
identity as Muslims.
24° Mayawati’s success story of rising from the lowest strata of Indian society to become one of 
the most powerful politicians commanding ever expanding clout in the Indian polity today 
motivates women across the country irrespective of their economic, social or religious status 
(article commemorating Mayawati’s inclusion in the Forbes’list of the most powerful women in 
the world), The Hindustan Times, 30 September 2008 (The Hindustan Times (New Delhi)).
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Mukulika Baneijee (2007) has used ethnographic data from rural West Bengal 
to address the continuing increase in voter turnout in elections in India, 
particularly among the poorest and most socially disadvantaged, who are more 
likely to vote than those belonging to upper castes or upper classes. Vividly 
describing the enthusiasm and ‘suppressed excitement’ on election day — like 
that often seen at important festivals — Baneijee argues that people vote 
because the elections constitute something like sacred rituals for them. On the 
day of the election Muslim Syed women, for example, who hardly ever left their 
home, changed their everyday mill sari into a ‘proper’ handloom sari and hired 
an expensive bullock cart to go to the polls with a group of female voters in order 
to maintain their rules of purdah (ibid. 1557-1558). Many of Baneijee’s 
respondents perceived voting as a duty or ‘expression’ of citizenship. The 
elections provided those voters with an opportunity to prove their membership 
of the nation and confirm their status as citizens. A physical presentation of 
one’s body at the ballot box was ‘the ultimate validation of one’s identity as a 
citizen, above everything else...’ (ibid. 1560). The elections also provided an 
opportunity to exercise the right to vote ‘in a more appealing and dignified mode 
than merely claiming one’s rice ration’. The elections formed a rare occasion in 
which equality was brought to the real life of those villagers (ibid. 1560-1561).
Enthusiasm and excitement on election day in Meerut in 2004 had much 
resonance with that of Baneijee’s villagers in West Bengal. The sense of 
empowerment that the election brought to the Muslim electorate in Meerut, 
however, was particularly strong because the winning candidate was identified 
with the most marginalised sections of the Muslim electorate.
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5-5*3 The public spectacle o f procession
The integration of Muslims into the lower-caste civil rights movements, and the 
promotion of civic participation for Muslims, continued to be displayed in 
spectacles within the public arena during Shahid Akhlaq's election campaign. A 
local newspaper reports that after filing a nomination form for the electoral 
contest at the city office, Shahid Akhlaq went to Dr. Ambedkar’s statue outside 
the office and put garlands on it. Although idol worship is not allowed in Islam, 
Shahid put garlands on the Ambedkar statue while maintaining the dress code of 
a pious Muslim, wearing an immaculate white Khurta pyjama, cap and beard.2*1
The procession that took place after the formal nomination was also an 
impressive spectacle, and one that demonstrated that a Muslim candidate was 
standing for the lower-caste political party, the BSP (see Appendix no. 20). The 
procession comprised a large number of Muslim youths who had put BSP 
election signs on their faces, particularly on their cheeks. Many Muslim 
supporters in the procession were wearing blue scarves around their necks and 
blue caps on their heads.2*2 The colour blue is the symbol of the BSP, as seen in
241 Haji Akhlaq, as a City MLA, conducted a similar public performance in 1994 when the statue 
of Dr. Ambedkar was destroyed by Hindu protestors in Shergarhi, a periphery of Meerut, with 
two Dalit boys killed by police firing during the incident. Haji Akhlaq conducted the unveiling 
ceremony of the restored statue, which was symbolic of the ongoing alliance between the two 
communities, Amar Ujjala, 16 April 1994 (Pai 2002:192-219). There were increasing numbers 
of incidents of caste violence between the Backward Castes and the Scheduled Castes in UP like 
this one in Meerut during this period. These incidents, among others, led to the split between 
the BSP and SP forming the coalition government after the 1993 Assembly election with 
Mulayam Singh Yadav as Chief Minister (Duncan 1997; Pai 2000).
242 Amar Ujjala, 20 April 2004.
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the blue flags held by many spectators in the mass rally addressed by Shahid 
Akhlaq shown on the BSP Hoarding (see Figure 5.2).
It is notable that Shahid was not contesting the election merely for the Muslim 
cause but stood on the Dalit platform as well as for the wider cause of the 
‘Bahujan’, (the majority of the people). The fact that a Muslim represented a 
large section of Hindus through a caste-based political party implied profound 
changes within Muslim society and politics (and indeed in parts of Hindu 
society). Muslims had, of course, been participating in electoral politics under 
the Congress regime. The difference that this procession scene indicates, 
however, was a sense of‘actual’ participation as an equal partner with the BSP; 
Meerut Muslims were no longer a mere vote bank only tenuously incorporated 
into the regional or national power structure (Chandra 2000: 44). Also, there 
was a sense of proximity between the candidate and some of the Muslim 
supporters. This was derived in part from his plebeian background and young 
age, but also from a sense of ‘rightness’ that he would serve their cause as he was 
one of them. Although a sense of proximity between the candidate and the 
electorate varies enormously in every election, in this particular election it was 
striking for Muslims in comparison to the period under the Congress regime. 
Muslims participated in democracy under the Congress Party by casting a vote 
mostly for strangers whose social background rendered them distant and which 
made it difficult for them to understand the living realities and grievances of the 
Muslim masses (see Appendix no. 21). Since the end of Congress Party rule, 
Muslims had matured as an electorate, fully knowing the weight of their votes 
(Rai 1999; Alam 2004).
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5.5*4 The BSP banners o f civil rights
Shahid Akhlaq’s electoral campaign stressed the demand for the civil rights for 
Muslims as part of a broader Bahujan community (see Appendix no. 22 and 23). 
Shahid was mobilising the Muslim electorate under demands for reservation, 
development and education (see Appendix no. 24). In part, he was treating 
Muslims as equivalent to Dalits on the BSP platform, but he was also using the 
language of the BSP in his own imaginative style. For example, he used a poster 
of his father’s face talking to the electorate. The poster carried different 
messages written in different languages according to the viewers’ social 
background. In the localities of Meerut city where low-income and low-status 
Muslims concentrated, the poster said: ‘My son assures you that he will bring 
peace and harmony to this town. Please vote for my son’. It was written in Urdu. 
In the Scheduled Caste neighbourhoods in Meerut and Mawana, a rural 
periphery of Meerut, the same poster said: ‘My son protects your rights. Please 
vote for him’. It was written in Hindi. Muslim city dwellers, in a sensitive 
north-Indian city like Meerut, would generally prefer to see Urdu rather than 
Hindi, while the Scheduled Castes constituencies would naturally prefer Hindi. 
Likewise, while in rural constituencies issues of development were given 
priority, for city dwellers, those of security and social and economic well-being 
were placed within a generalised context of violence and threat. Accordingly, in 
urban centres, social harmony and the construction of a riot- and crime-free city 
were given p r io r i t y .  243
243 Mr. Yusuf Qureshi, a Qureshi political leader, mentioned to me. ‘the Hindu-Muslim divide is 
more sharply felt in the urban city than in rural areas’ (18 March 2004, Meerut). According to
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Shahid strategically addressed different sections of society with different 
messages and emphases, addressing urban and rural, upper caste Hindus and 
lower-castes and Muslims. Walking door to door to people’s homes in rural 
areas of the district, Shahid stressed his efforts to develop villages with similar 
infrastructure to that of urban areas (see Appendix no. 25). On the other hand, 
in his campaign in Meerut city Shahid changed his tone and promised that he 
would work for social harmony and release Meerut from the crime and fear that 
had engulfed the city over a long period of time.244 Shahid, therefore, 
extensively used the card of the 1987 violence for city dwellers. Mayawati in the 
above-mentioned huge rally in Meerut, also invoked the memory of the violence 
of 1987. Mayawati referred particularly to the massacre of Muslims by the PAC 
in Maliana village and sharply criticised the Congress Party for allowing it to 
happen.245 Shahid, for his part, said that the BSP was the only Party that could 
provide equal partnership for Muslims with respect and security. He repeatedly 
emphasised his claim that Meerut must be a riot-free city:
We will eradicate com m unalism  from  w estern U ttar Pradesh. My father, as a 
MLA from the city, worked to make M eerut a riot-free city. I have followed my 
father since I was elected as the Mayor and will continue my efforts to m ake this 
city riot free and  a symbol of development in w estern UP.246
Ashutosh Varshney, Hindu-Muslim violence in India is primarily an urban phenomenon since 
94 percent of the incidents took place in urban areas against only 3.6 percent in villages since 
1950 (Varshney 2002:103-107).
244 Amar Ujjala, 7 May 2004.
*45 Amar Ujjala, 5 May 2004.
246 Amar Ujjala, 6 May 2004.
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The collective memory of violence was also used to forge solidarity among 
Muslims, not least with the aim of bringing the Ansari community into the 
camp. On the last day of the election campaign, Shahid visited the localities of 
Hashimpura, Gola Kuwan and Maliana village. The first two of these localities 
were Ansari heartlands. Shahid spoke about the communal violence of 1987 and 
touched upon the role of the Congress Party and the PAC. Pre-poll estimates 
had predicted that the Ansari vote would go to the Congress Party.24? The 
Ansaris and Qureshis were known for their rivalry, as I have stated before. A 
young man from the Ansari community enthusiastically told me that the Mayor 
came and apologised for his conduct and misbehaviour in the past. The Mayor 
also apologised for not doing much work for this particular locality as the Mayor 
of the city. His speech started with:
First, we are M uslim and occupational identity [Biradari divisions] m ay come 
under [the overarching] M uslim identity. After the election, we can resolve issues 
between us, b u t now we should be united.248
Fragile relations had to be strengthened with apologies and promises with an 
emphasis on Muslim identity. It is worth noting that Shahid visited these Ansari 
localities on the last day of a campaign that had stretched over almost four 
months. It was critical to obtain the Ansari vote as it was still the largest Muslim 
community. He had visited other Muslim localities in the city during this period 
but had never been to Gola Kuwan. This shows the sensitivity of the relations 
between Qureshis and Ansaris. And this was exactly what his father had done a
247 Amar Ujjala, 5 May 2004.
248 Amar Ujjala, 14 May 2004.
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decade earlier. Haji Akhlaq did not come to these localities with his campaign 
until the last day of the election. In other Muslim areas of the city, Shahid’s 
speech emphasised a corporate identity among the entire Muslim community:
I have fought at the local level for my society [Muslim] and want to take this fight 
to Parliament. I would represent you [Muslims] in the Parliament. This is the 
only good for our “Kaum” [community]249 at present — do not forget this.2s°
On the day of voting it turned out that most Ansari votes were cast for Shahid. 
Many Ansaris changed their mind after Shahid’s speech in their locality and on 
their way to the booth on the following day. They voted for Shahid although 
many Ansaris were afraid of saying that they would do so. I also heard, while 
having tea with them, Ansari women saying, ‘we will vote for our candidate, our 
Mayor. Because he is Muslim’. According to two polling agents who stood by 
the booth checking the voters, the voting rates in Islamabad^1 went up to 80 
percent and the Ansaris and Saiffies (who were also reportedly against the 
Qureshis) voted for Shahid en bloc.252
5.5.5 Islam for Integration
The most remarkable feature of Shahid Akhlaq’s electoral mobilisation was that 
he reconciled the binary identity of Muslims in a broader interpretation of
249 The word ‘Kaum’can mean an occupational group, religion or community. In this speech, it 
seems to include all of these meanings to emphasise the oneness of the Muslim community.
250 Amar Ujjala, 8 May 2004.
251 Islamabad is the name of the ward that includes Gola Kuwan, Hashimpura and Imylian.
252 Interview with polling agents of the Islamabad ward on 14 May 2004.
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Islam. Shahid reinterpreted Islam in order to connect traditional religious 
identity with the modern identity of the nation-state. His notion of Islam 
seemingly pointed to an engagement with a wider Indian society and polity, 
while sustaining and further scrutinising individual religiosity as a Muslim. 
According to this interpretation, scrutinising individual religiosity as a Muslim 
did not contradict an emphasis on citizenship but rather promoted it as an 
integral demand for social, economic and political rights based on democratic 
equality (see Appendix no. 26-29).
During my interview with him, Shahid Akhlaq emphasised the acute need for 
Muslims to ‘return to Islam’. He told me that the sense of decline felt by many 
Muslims came from the fact that they had moved away from Islam, their 
religion. He underlined the importance of the religious education. He also 
stressed the need to adopt more Islamic ethics and morals in the daily lives such 
as charitable activities to help the poor and encouraged people to increase their 
personal religiosity through attendance at daily prayers (namaz) five times a day 
or by making a pilgrimage to Mecca.253
This inclusive usage of religion stands in sharp contrast to an earlier political 
discourse that aimed to assert separate rights and to emphasise Muslims’ 
difference from the rest of the society. This might be most saliently observed in 
the discourse of the Muslim leaders who had led the anti-Ayodhya agitation 
from the last half of the 1980s until its demolition in 1992. These Muslim 
leaders demanded the preservation of the Babri Masjid since ‘their pride and
253 Interview with the then Mayor, Mr. Shahid Akhlaq on 17 August 2003.
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self-esteem was bound up with the glorious past of the Mughal empire’ (van der 
Veer 1996 (1994): 9). In their view, the ‘facts’ of the empire and being part of the 
ruling power stood squarely opposite to the ‘fictions’ of Hindu mythology that 
said that Babur, the builder of the Mosque, had destroyed the Hindu temple, 
birthplace of a God-king, Ram. The exclusive discourse of Islamic religious 
nationalism invoking the memory of Partition significantly reinforced the 
confrontational mode between Hindus and Muslims, ultimately leading to the 
destruction of the Babri Masjid by the Hindu forces (Engineer 1992; Hasan 
1994).
A similar conception of religious separateness had emerged in the domain of 
local politics in Meerut during Basir Ahmad’s electoral mobilisation for the 
Muslim Majlis-e-Mushawarat in the Assembly election in 1969 (Chapter 2). 
Ahmad attempted to construct a Muslim community drawing on the separate 
cultural symbols of Islam, which were very much linked to the glory of the 
Muslim rule in the p a st.254 These symbols were a cultural symbol not only of 
Islam, but also, more importantly, of the conception of grandeur of Islamic 
political power. The idea of returning to the glorious past, which guaranteed the 
Muslim elite a life of prestige, to a large extent framed the discourse of 
conservative Muslim elite politics after Partition.
254 Islamic symbols included a flag with the motif of a star, moon and a camel. According to a 
Muslim political advisor to the late Manzoor Ahamad, the flag invoked an image of the camel 
taking the Muslim audience to Mecca or Medina, the centre of Islamic faith and the symbol of 
the larger Islamic world outside India, interview on 1 February 2004.
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Arguing why there were few Muslim liberals in India, Hamid Dalwai, a Muslim 
social reformer, wrote in 1968 that Indian Muslims believe that they form a 
perfect society and are superior to all other communities in India. According to 
Dalwai:
Indian M uslims resent being a m inority and still d ream  of spreading their faith 
throughout India or a t least of ruling India. They suffer from delusions of 
grandeur... (Dalwai 1968: 87).
Dalwai indicates that statements by Muslim political organisations such as the 
Jamaat-e-Islami and the Majlis-e-Mushawarat provided evidence that Muslim 
dissent was centred around their memory of the glorious past. Basir Ahmad 
Khan, on the other hand, founded the Muslim League in Meerut shortly after his 
defeat in the 1969 Assembly election. The Muslim League is a synonym in north 
India for the Muslim communalism that (supposedly) led to Partition. In the 
pre-Partition era the League had used religion as a principal tool in order to 
create a separate identity among Muslims. Khan’s discourse mirrored the 
undercurrent of Muslim politics after Partition which essentially evoked the past 
and inspired Muslims to want a separate nation exclusively for Muslims.
In contrast, both Shahid Akhlaq’s and his father’s religious discourse was 
remarkably universal and inclusive. Islam was interpreted not as the antithesis 
of Hinduism but as a force for promoting Muslim participation in the life of the 
nation (see Appendix no. 30 and 31). The Akhlaqs’ Islam addressed only the 
present and never referred back to the past. They never talked, for example, 
about the Mughal empire. Similarly, Shahid Akhlaq’s emphasis on contact with 
the wider community of believers did not imply or invoke the exclusive identity
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of Muslims whose loyalty was allegedly placed outside India. Shahid Akhlaq's 
reference to Global Islam by far transcended narrow and parochial conceptions 
of the modern nation-state. According to Peter van der Veer, the reference to 
religious symbols and centres of global Islam is anyway not monolithic, as 
cultural symbols for political mobilisation may be used in different forms and 
have different meanings according to the historical context (van der Veer 1993: 
33). Shahid simply referred to the long tradition of pan-Islamism as a means of 
providing a wider frame of reference for his Muslim brethren to help scrutinise 
their religiosity. Shahid emphasised Islam from the universal perspective as a 
catalyst for harmony, sincerity and honesty which would help Muslims to engage 
in wider Indian society and polity. Hence in his conception, religious identity 
was not placed in sharp opposition to the universal citizenship of a modern 
liberal democracy; rather it was understood as an important medium to help 
Muslims become ‘good Indian citizens’. It is important to note that Shahid 
Akhlaq’s usage of religion, which appeared outstandingly open, humanistic and 
universal, matched the needs and interests of a newly emerging Muslim 
consciousness in Meerut (see Appendix no. 32-34).
The changing consciousness of many low-status Muslims was vividly shown in a 
small incident that occurred during my fieldwork. I was interviewing a Qureshi 
respondent who used to belong to the Muslim League. On the second day of my 
interview, as soon as I reached his house, my respondent told me that his 
Muslim neighbours had gathered after I had left him the night before and asked 
him why a ‘foreign lady’ had been here and what he had told her. He said that 
one of his neighbours would come soon to meet me to ask what this was all 
about. It turned out that the neighbours were worried that I was a foreign agent
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of a terrorist group who had come to ask about his connection with the Muslim 
League. They worried that my respondent would give wrong information to this 
foreign agency about Indian Muslims and do some harm to the community. 
Given that this respondent had been affiliated with the League, he was not seen 
as trustworthy by his neighbours. When I was faced with his neighbours’ 
representative I felt his acute anxiety to avoid any trouble and to be a good 
citizen, a good member of the middle-class in Indians
Contact with the global Islamic community traditionally took the forms of 
pilgrimage to Mecca (Haji), the exchange of scholars, migration of Indian 
Muslims to Arab countries and financial support for educational institutions 
from these countries to India (van der Veer 1996 (1994): 115-116). These 
contacts have always been critical for Indian Muslims in providing a notion of 
religious community and hence are sources of nurturing religious identity (van 
der Veer 1993:33,1996 (1994)). Apart from these general contacts with Islamic 
centres, the local Qureshi community was also in a strong position (from the 
early-i98os) to contact the Islamic world through their meat export business. 
The life of local Qureshi butchers is thus placed in an interesting dialectic of 
religion and economy. The hereditary occupation of the Qureshis, slaughtering 
livestock cattle, is considered a religious act since they do so according to 
instructions in the holy Quran. It produces what is called ‘HalaV meat, the 
central item in the Islamic diet.2s6 The job of slaughtering animals is assigned to
255 Interviews on 18 and 19 March, 2004.
256 The method for producing ‘HalaV meat is to let all the blood run out of the body by cutting all
the veins in the neck while chanting the lines from the Holi Quran. The ‘Jhatka’ method, in
contrast, is to kill animals instantly so that the blood remains inside the body. Interview with
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a Qureshi family in the government slaughterhouse as a hereditary job for this 
particular family. The person who ‘cuts’ is required to have a recognised 
religiosity following Islamic codes of appearance and behaviour. He has to be 
religiously honest, faithful and pure. He has to offer a prayer five times a day, 
constantly read the Quran and keep the Islamic dress code of ‘Lungi’ (male 
skirt), small cap, short hair and beard. Before slaughtering each animal, this 
person chants: ‘Bismillaha Allha-O-Akbar’ th rice . 257 T he  product, Halal meat, 
connects the local Qureshi butcher community with the global Islamic world 
that follows an Islamic diet.
Qureshi exporters, butchers and all others associated with the meat export 
business in Meerut have directly or indirectly been in constant contact with the 
web of their counterparts, buyers and sellers of their meat products in these 
countries following the Islamic diet. A sense of belonging to the brotherhood of 
Islam must be constantly invoked and strengthened by these contacts through 
their occupation. Also, no matter how far their networks reach, the connection 
between Meerut Muslims and their counterparts is essentially generated 
through their following the same diet, culture and religion. Yusuf Qureshi, a 
Qureshi politician, lawyer and meat exporter, commented:
Dr. Nafee R. Khan, chief veterinary officer of the government slaughterhouse in Meerut on 23 
February 2004.
2s7 Interview with a member of the family assigned to performing the slaughtering. The 
respondent’s nephew was the current slaughterman in the slaughterhouse. According to this 
respondent, the ‘cutting person’ was the fourth generation over the time span of 150 years. 
Nonetheless, the status of the family was not particularly high. This respondent worked as a 
canteen manager for Shahid Akhlaq’s meat packaging factory in Meerut. Interview on 23 April 
2004.
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We feel comfortable with the export to  Arab countries because of the similarity of 
the  com m unity and religion. These countries are open to u s .2 8^
The meat export business, however, is only one of many points of contact for 
Meerut Muslims in the wider world of Islam. There are Muslim businessmen 
who go back and forth between the subcontinent and Arab countries, some of 
whom permanently migrated and settled there with their families. There are 
also other channels of contact with a wider Islamic society, including the 
Deobandhi reformist school for which Meerut Muslims have formed one of the 
most important funding sources since the colonial period. Most importantly, the 
influential Tablighi Jama’at, the offshoot of the Deobandhi which has aimed to 
forge the global identity of Islam, has actively been creating a web of contacts 
outside Meerut and India imbued with Islamic universalism. These contacts are 
a source of inspiration for Meerut Muslims in their pursuit of greater religiosity 
and reinforce their strong attachment to religious symbols and values that, in 
turn, keep strengthening the sense of belonging to Global Islam and a wider 
Muslim ethnicity.
5.6 Conclusion
Peter van der Veer’s work on religious nationalism in India (1996 (1994)) 
provides useful insights for understanding the convergence of‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’ identities seen in Shahid Akhlaq’s political mobilisations. Theories of
2s® Interview with Mr. Yusuf Qureshi on 18 March 2004.
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nationalism that assume a sharp dichotomy between the traditional community 
as ‘primordial’ and the wider framework of the nation as ‘modern’ have little 
purchase for explaining the electoral mobilisation of someone like Shahid 
Akhlaq. Van der Veer maintains that frameworks of religious tradition that long 
predated the colonial expansion still provide major sources for the construction 
of religious identity, and nationalism, in contemporary India. In both earlier 
times and in the present, in other words, religious identity is constructed with 
reference to similar sets of sources and/or resources.
As we have seen in this chapter, both Shahid and his father made remarkable 
efforts to create new imaginaries of what it meant to be a Muslim in post-1987 
Meerut. They did so both with reference to changing practices within Islam, and 
with regard to new possibilities for political involvement — and alliance-making 
— that were being presented to previously low-status Muslims, especially, in the 
changed political contexts of post-Congress Raj northern India. It is these 
contexts and practices that I want to explore further in Chapter Six.
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Chapter 6: The New M uslim Politics in  M eerut, 1993- 
2004  -  II: Negotiating New Alliances
N orth Indian M uslims have stoutly defied the widely prevalent trend  among 
ethnic-religious minorities to  form  their own political parties. Instead, they have 
opted for assimilative, integrative politics w ithin a broadly secular-pluralist 
framework. They would have a ‘voice’ ra ther than  ‘representation’. ...they opted 
for multi-ethnic, pluralist ‘m ainstream ’ parties, led by non-M uslims. That...is a 
tribute to the political m aturity of the com m unity and its devotion to an anti­
separatist identity. ...a strong current — one might call it ‘wave’ of social reform, 
m odernisation and redefinition of identities — is sweeping through India’s 
Muslim com m unity (Bidwai 2002).
6.1 Introduction
Praful Bidwai’s observations regarding the changing political landscape of 
north-Indian Muslims is useful for placing an understanding of the meanings of 
the new politics among the Meerut Muslims in broader context. Bidwai notes 
that the most distinctive and significant feature of the new Muslim politics 
across north India is the efforts now being made to forge a coalition between 
Muslim and non-Muslim political parties. Bidwai makes the further point that 
Muslims are seeking alliances with political parties with both secular and 
pluralist credentials. He also suggests that Muslim political interests can be 
harmed where Muslim political leaders simply pursue the immediate interests of 
their co-ethnies — recall the Majlis-e-Mushawarat or Muslim League in north 
India from Chapter Two.
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In the previous chapter I have examined the electoral mobilisations of Haji 
Akhlaq in 1993 and Shahid Akhlaq in 2004. 1 discussed how these mobilisations 
brought together new ideas of Muslim identity framed by aspirations for social 
reform and upward mobility among the Muslim masses in Meerut. As I have 
shown already, the dramatic change in the nature of political representation of 
Muslims in Meerut and the emergence of Qureshi political activism were due in 
large part to the rise of those secular parties mentioned by Bidwai, particularly 
the BSP and SP, which courted support from lower-caste constituencies. It is 
important, therefore, to now examine the role of these political parties and some 
aspects of the party structures that have contributed to the development of a 
new Muslim politics. I discuss the role of the BSP and the SP in the first section 
of this chapter. In the second section I explore the significance of the political 
ascendancy of the Qureshis from a perspective from within the Meerut Muslim 
world. I discuss the political ascendancy of the Qureshis vis-a-vis other Muslim 
communities, particularly the Ansaris. In the third section I discuss the political 
strategies of the Meerut Muslims more broadly and in relation to those of 
various Hindu lower caste groups.
6.2 Political Parties and the New Muslim Politics
According to Pradeep Chhibber and Irfan Nooruddin, changes in political party 
structure in post-Congress UP seem to indicate a more favourable setting for 
Muslim electors. The number of political parties that are represented in 
Parliament has increased, and this phenomenon of party fragmentation is most 
noticeable in the Hindi-speaking belt that includes Uttar Pradesh (Chhibber and
287
Nooruddin 1999:37). The area has close to a three party system while elsewhere 
in India the average is closer to two-and-a-half parties (ibid. 46). The three 
party system in UP consists of the BJP and its allies, the Congress, and various 
regional and caste-based parties (ibid. 48-49). Under the increasingly 
competitive situation of party fragmentation, every party has been compelled to 
form a coalition with other ethnic groups because no single group has a large 
enough electoral constituency to win the election on its own. The logic of 
electoral arithmetic compelled political parties, therefore, to court multi-class or 
multi-ethnic alliances to build up their strength in the political arena (van Dyke 
2007:131-134). No party could now possibly ignore the Muslims, forming as 
they do 18.5 percent of the UP population — second only to the Scheduled Castes 
that form 21 percent.259
Kanchan Chandra maintains that ‘post-Congress politics’ in Uttar Pradesh is 
best characterised as a politics that invokes ethnic identity (Chandra 1999). The 
BSP aims to include in its supporting constituencies different minorities that 
collectively constitute the Bahujan (majority) community. The Bahujan 
community consists of those who are not included in the three Hindu upper 
castes — that is, the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, Muslims, Backward 
Castes and Christians and Sikhs. The Party courts the electoral support of these 
communities by ‘inducting’ a candidate from each constituency and providing 
political representation.260 Incorporating elites from the target ethnic category 
and providing them with representation, therefore, is the key for the BSP to
259 Census of India, 2001 (Census of India 2001).
260 To contrast this with the Congress’ electoral strategy, which invoked ethnic identity more 
discreetly and never used the rhetoric of identity, see Chandra (2000).
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attract voters from new constituencies. The BSP has been cultivating and 
expanding new networks and constituencies. The Party, for example, no longer 
draws a sharp distinction between upper castes and others in UP where it has 
confidence in itself as a winning party (Chandra 2000:39). The Party began to 
allot tickets and party posts to upper castes, as for example in UP during the 
period of the General Elections of 2004, when the BSP put up seven Brahmin 
candidates. The Party forged the Dalit, Muslim and Brahmin coalition as its 
core strategy.261
The Samajwadi Party (SP) is a spin-off of the Janata Dal led by Mulayam Singh 
Yadav. The Party is a major driving force of middle-caste mobilisations in UP. 
For the SP, ethnic incorporation in exchange for representation is the key 
electoral strategy. The SP’s political community comprises all Muslims and the 
Backward Castes. It is still primarily defined by the religious identities of 
Hindus and Muslims. Muslims are treated as an internally homogeneous and 
cohesive religious minority. The Party highlights the threat and danger posed by 
the BJP and portrays itself as the only party committed to protecting the lives 
and security of Muslims (Chandra 1999: 76-77). In his campaign in the 1998 
General Elections, for example, Mulayam Singh Yadav frequently referred to the 
large-scale ethnic violence that followed the destruction of the Babri Masjid in 
1992.262 The SP attempts to keep the threat of the BJP alive and indeed the
261 India Today, 10 May 2004 (India Today (New Delhi)).
262 Mulayam Singh Yadav, then the UP Chief Minister, intervened with paramilitary forces to 
prevent Hindu militants from entering the disputed site of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in 
October 1990. The BJP withdrew its support from V.P. Singh government, leaving him without a 
majority, resulting in his losing his prime ministership. Mulayam Singh Yadav continues to use
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Party benefits greatly from the BJP’s Hindu communalism, which allows the SP 
to consolidate its support among Muslims (ibid. 78-79).
The gap between the upper castes and those in subordinate ethnic categories in 
the UP Council of Ministers narrowed dramatically in 1989, according to 
Chandra, when the Janata Dal government came to power in the state. Under a 
BSP or SP government, Muslim representation in the Council remained roughly 
the same as in the Congress government. However, because of competition for 
the Muslim vote between the two parties there was an ‘outbidding’ effect 
between them as each offered Muslims greater representation than the other. In 
1996, when the BSP and SP competed against each other, the percentage of 
Muslim MLAs in the SP doubled from 10 percent in 1993 to 20 percent.
The best prospects for Muslims in UP therefore paradoxically lay in competition 
between secular parties (ibid. 88-93). An important change was that individuals 
elected from each ethnic category could achieve power and representation. In 
order to succeed, parties must have the ability to incorporate office-seeking 
elites from the target ethnic category. In return, these new elites must mobilise 
their co-ethnic followers in order to increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis the 
dominant elites in the parties to which they seek entry (Chandra 2004: 102- 
103). These elites mobilise, for example, Muslims and Dalits as independent 
political forces. Furthermore, the need to ensure their political survival provides 
the elites with an incentive to be more responsive to their own ethnic category
his image as protector of the Muslim cause which he created on this occasion in his electoral 
battle.
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members than was the case for a previous generation of Muslim legislators 
elected from the Congress (ibid. 93).
Although it is not mentioned in Chandra’s study, those Muslim legislators 
inducted by the BSP and the SP in Meerut were significantly different from those 
under the Congress Party, as they were predominantly from the low caste 
(ethnic) categories. These were the categories that had been denied 
representation by the Congress Party.263 Ambitious Muslim leaders from the 
lower ranks were consistently inducted by the BSP and SP from the early 1990s 
in Meerut. It was remarkable that for all of these leaders these occasions 
marked their first lifetime opportunity. Following Haji Akhlaq for the Janata 
Dal, who became the first non-elite Muslim MLA in Meerut in 1993, Ayuub 
Ansari became the Mayor of Meerut from the BSP in 1995. Yaqoob Qureshi, 
younger brother of Yusuf Qureshi, shifted from the Congress Party to the BSP in 
the mid 1990s and became a deputy Mayor in 1997, subsequently contesting the 
General Elections for the BSP in 1999. He would become an MLA from the 
adjacent Kharkhauda constituency on a ticket of the BSP in 2002, and shortly 
after he was elected he shifted to the SP. Shahid Akhlaq became the Mayor of 
Meerut from the BSP in 2000, and then achieved national-level representation 
as a BSP MP in May 2004. These outstanding achievements in political 
representation have had enormous symbolic meaning for the Meerut Muslims’ 
aspirations for upward mobility.
263 The distribution pattern of tickets, which tended to focus on the lower strata must have been 
partially related to the economic affluence of the lower sections of the Muslim population in 
Meerut.
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6.3 The Political Ascendancy o f the Qureshis and the Ansaris
Before discussing the political strategies of the new Muslim leadership, I now 
turn to explore some of the social relations among Muslim communities in 
Meerut in order to examine the Qureshis’ political ascendancy within the context 
of the Meerut Muslim world. The BSP provided the Qureshis with the necessary 
framework to forge an inter-ethnic class coalition with the Chamars. This 
coalition opened up critical leeway for Qureshi political ascendancy. With this 
coalition, the Qureshis became the primary political force in Meerut, replacing 
the Ansaris who had been the leading economic and political force since the
1 9 7 0 s .264
Although the Qureshis’ rising economic fortunes led the way to their remarkable 
political rise, the change in the power structure within low-status Muslim society 
in Meerut cannot be explained only with reference to the economic advancement 
of the Qureshi community. The change was apparently more profound in its 
nature since it was grounded in the broader political changes that had taken 
place after Congress’ supremacy came to an end. Although the Ansari 
community in general had some privileges over other low-status Muslim 
communities in terms of obtaining patronage from the Congress Party—such as 
a licence to start a power-loom factory or the bus transportation business — the 
Ansaris could not obtain much political representation from the ruling Congress 
(see Chapter 2). After the 1990s, on the other hand, the Qureshis were able to
264 A Muslim school principal aptly expressed the shift from the Ansaris to the Qureshis: 
‘...money can lead to political supremacy, hegemony. Economic power brings you political 
power. It was Ansari and is now Qureshi’. Interview on 19 March 2004.
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take advantage of broader changes in the UP political system that yielded 
genuine opportunities for new political alliances directly linked to political 
representation. The major difference between the politics of the Qureshis and 
the Ansaris thus derives from the fact that the Qureshis have come to have the 
Indian party system on their side. That is to say, the Qureshis are aided by a 
new Indian party system that more fluidly incorporates new leaders of different 
ethnic minorities into its structures (Chandra 2004: 96).
Further, the Qureshi political leaders were not passively waiting for the BSP to 
come and induct them into its party structure. These leaders were rather 
proactively and creatively grasping the political opportunities that opened up for 
them (Chapter 5). Both the BSP and SP provided low-status Muslims, 
particularly the Qureshis, with not only an idea of representation but also the 
space for them to achieve office. The coalition between the Chamars and the 
Qureshis was also critically grounded in an historical proximity between the two 
communities. This demographic as well as sociological dimension brought them 
together as alliance partners in a way that did not exist for the Ansari 
community.
The inter-ethnic class coalition between the Qureshis and the Chamars can to 
some extent be attributed to the proximity of the two communities’ socio­
economic status and occupations. Qureshis and Chamars (both meat-eaters) 
lived in segregation from the rest of their communities. These two communities 
came to share, therefore, geographic space far enough from their Hindu 
brethren not to trouble them with the smell of meat being cooked in their 
homes. Chamars and Qureshis lived side by side for generations along the edge
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of the south walls of the Old Town and the outer edge of the city border in 
Meerut.26s Also, the two communities shared occupational proximity. Meat and 
skin constitute different parts of the same profession. The Ansaris in general, on 
the other hand, would not be able to have the same relationship with the 
Chamars since they did not share any of these common factors, especially 
occupation.
Another point relevant to the political rise of the Qureshis concerns the 
development of a community political consciousness oriented to power. This 
trait can be discerned in the conference minutes of the Qureshi Council (Jamiat- 
ul-Qureshi). The minutes of the Qureshi Council conference held in 1974 
particularly provide information about important features of the Qureshi 
political organisation. The conference was held in the Qureshi mosque in 
Meerut in November 1974. The principal aim of this conference was to adopt a 
resolution against the dowry system. The reasons for abolition seemed to lie in, 
among other things, the progressive and reformist spirit of the Qureshi leaders 
at that time under the influence of the Deobandhi reformist Islamic school. The 
conference minutes written in Urdu were compiled in a small pamphlet for the 
purpose of wider distribution. It indicated, on one hand, the importance of the 
religious idiom in Qureshi politics, which was ubiquitous throughout the entire 
proceedings. The minutes, on the other, also pointed to other significant 
political features of Qureshi discourse. They were particularly manifest in the
26s The physical proximity of the Qureshis and the Chamars was not unique in Meerut. Qureshis 
traditionally lived with the Scheduled Castes, particularly with the Valmikis and the Chamars all 
over India (interview with a Qureshi respondent, 4 April 2004). The allocation of space 
according to occupation, religion and recreation was an important element of traditional Indian 
city planning (Rao 1974:106).
2 9 4
concluding speech made by Dr. Kamil Qureshi, the Secretary of the Council and 
the owner of a large meat export firm based in Delhi:
From  meat, bones, horns and skin, huge export business is being run, and in 
crores of rupees. Some lakhs of rupees go to the G overnm ent of India. This 
com m unity besides this benefit to the nation, has come forward whenever any 
leader has given a call — be it Motilal Nehru, M ahatm a Gandhi, M aulana Aboul 
Kalam Azad, Dr. M uktar A hm ad Ansari and Pandid Jaw aharlal N ehru and Jazl 
Sahab (Shahnawaz Khan). Our youth have always come forward and supported 
these leaders. W hile closing my speech, I would say th a t now tim e has changed, 
and situation has changed. After June  1974 entire atm osphere of the country has 
changed. After all these changes you m ust also change. Your rights are written in 
the  Constitution of India. You can take your rights and you can take them  only 
through one path, i.e. education. Make it a public awareness. Educate as m any 
people as you can. Give your youth this ornam ent and  make a bright future of 
yours (All India Jamiat-ul-Qureshi 1975).
Dr. Qureshi’s remarks indicate that the essence of Qureshi politics lies for him in 
an emphasis on rights and an entitlement to equal opportunity, as well as on the 
need for the education of the younger generation and economic upliftment — 
while all these things must be based on the promotion of Islamic tenets and 
religiosity. His speech explicitly stresses the strong linkage with the central 
power, especially with the Congress leadership, including Jawaharlal Nehru. 
The conference minutes have as an appendix a lengthy sequence of letters from 
the President of India or Cabinet Ministers of the ruling Congress offering 
congratulatory addresses and support, which again evidences a strong power 
orientation on the part of the Qureshis. The minutes of the Qureshi Council over 
decades indicate that it has always been inviting a number of leading politicians 
from the ruling Party. In the 1995 conference in Nagapur, Maharashtra, the core
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group of participating politicians was actually the BJP (All India Jamiat-ul- 
Qureshi 1995), again indicating the pragmatism of some Qureshi leaders.
Given these broader political configurations, we should note that a political 
alliance between the Qureshis and the Chamars in Meerut indicates certain 
structural tensions within Muslim society in the city, as well as a measure of 
political realism. The alliance between the Qureshis and the Chamars has 
remained at the political level and has not extended to the social level or to 
shared cultural symbols. Yet efforts to effect a political alliance between the 
Qureshis and the Chamars in the city have a long history both in formal and 
grass-roots circles. There were, on the other hand, very few signs of political co­
operation among different Muslim communities that had autonomously been 
generated from within. The efforts to consolidate the Muslim community as a 
political force had generally come from larger political developments, such as 
the post-Emergency Lok Sabha election of 1977 when Muslims voted en bloc 
against the ruling Congress Party. Nonetheless small and sporadic initiatives to 
create an autonomous political force from within did emerge from individuals 
such as Yusuf Qureshi in 1980 or Dr. Wahid Qureshi in 1977, but both initiatives 
appeared to have set the foundation, after all, for the Qureshi-Chamar political 
alliance to unfold in the coming future (Chapter 2).
The Muslims in Meerut were by no means a homogeneous and monolithic 
community. They lived in a grid of different identities and loyalties including 
those of class and biradari that overlapped, competed and strengthened each 
other. Biradari identity has particularly been stressed in the domain of politics. 
These competing divisions gave rise to the challenge to create a coherent Muslim
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community for electoral mobilisation. In the context of this challenge, the 
growing threat of Hindu Right-wing organisations formed one of the most 
powerful bonding factors to politically unify Muslims as a consolidated force. A 
senior Muslim political leader commented: ‘Muslims are increasingly divided by 
biradari. Only we are united against the BJP’.266
6.4 Pragmatism vs. Identity and Political Representation
It is imperative to clarify at this point how this major theme of defeating the BJP 
came into the general picture of Muslim voting in the 2004 Lok Sabha election. 
For this purpose I now explore in more depth the relationship between the BSP, 
Shahid Akhlaq and Muslim voters in Meerut in the 2004 election. There was 
evidently an aspect of instrumentalism in Muslim voting patterns in the 2004 
Lok Sabha election. That is, there were many Muslim respondents who pointed 
out that their priority choice in the election was for a Muslim candidate who 
would most likely defeat the BJP. This indicated that Muslims placed their 
priority of choice on the ethnic background of the candidate rather than on 
political parties. The BSP, for example, came to be seen with less credibility 
among Muslims when the Party forged a coalition with the BJP on more than 
one occasion.26?
266 Interview with Hakim Saffudin on 25 November 2003.
2fi7 The BSP’s ‘flirtation’ with the BJP took place first from June to October 1995, then from 
March to September 1997 and finally from March to October 2002 (Chandra 1999: 73).
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The negative effect of the B JP-BSP combination was, for example, reflected in a 
small 4.7 percent of the Muslim vote caste for the BSP in 1996 (Chandra 1999: 
73; van Dyke 2007:130).268 There was also some criticism of Shahid and his 
family, as well of their alleged criminal records, although none of them have 
been convicted by the court. But those Muslims, including high-status Muslims 
who usually despised the Qureshis, tended to cast their vote for Shahid or other 
strong Qureshi (Muslim) candidates when it came to the election. This might 
lead us to think that it did not really matter if it was Shahid or the BSP, but the 
important thing for Muslim voters was that Shahid was Muslim and that he was 
most likely to defeat the BJP candidate.
All that said, I want to underline here that my strong sense of Muslim voting in 
2004 was that it went beyond instrumentalism and pragmatism. Muslim voters 
were significantly attracted to the BSP’s Bahujan ideology, which mainly 
consisted of calls for social justice, proportional representation/share in political 
power and more government resources. The BSP and SP were anti-BJP with 
secular slogans and a pro-minorities stance. These parties provided Muslims 
with space and opportunities for political representation. Political 
representation also denoted ideas of respect and dignity, which particularly 
appealed to low-status Muslims who had been marginalised and discriminated 
against as much politically, economically and socially as the Chamars and other 
north Indian Scheduled Caste communities.
268 Kanshi Ram, the founder of the BSP, however, knew that voters would often be attracted by a 
candidate from their own community. Ram also indicated that a ticket from the BSP would 
implicitly offer the large fixed vote of the Chamars in addition to the vote of the ethnic 
constituency from which the candidate originally came (Mendelsohn and Vicziany 1998:220).
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Another important aspect of Shahid Akhlaq’s electoral mobilisation was that he 
was widely accepted and identified as a pious Muslim among the Muslim 
community in Meerut. Shahid was largely regarded as a man of religion who 
could also protect and pursue Muslim interests on behalf of the Muslim 
electorate. Here arose the issues of Muslim identity and representation, which 
were particularly well articulated in the election campaign of Shahid Akhlaq, and 
which were also embodied in BSP hoardings in May 2004 (Chapter 5). Religious 
ideology and practice once again played a significant role in Muslim politics. By 
fulfilling religious duties the Qureshi leaders gained faith and respect from a 
larger Muslim community that included religious leaders in Meerut. Shahid and 
Yaqoob Qureshi, for example, both spent significant parts of their capital on 
religious occasions in the public arena, including huge Iftaar dinners at the end 
of Ramadan month. Those public events also formed an exhibition of their 
wealth and money power, which in itself formed an important political process, 
creating a particular social relation with the spectators. The exhibition, in short, 
offered an important opportunity to ensure their legitimised status and power in 
both religious and secular terms (cf. Osella and Osella 2000:127).
It is thus important to underline the fact that pragmatism has not formed the 
sole foundation of a new Muslim politics in Meerut. Both Shahid and Yaqoob 
were considered by many as protectors and saviours of the Muslim community. 
Yaqoob Qureshi, for example, openly murdered a notorious Qureshi Unani 
doctor who had been molesting local Muslim women in 1988. With this murder 
his popularity in his locality went up tremendously. Although many people 
witnessed the murder scene, no one presented themselves to police as a witness 
and Yaqoob was never arrested. Many Muslim women came to Yaqoob with
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gifts to show their gratitude for the elimination of this menace from the locality. 
Since the local administration and the police had not done anything to save 
these women, Yaqoob became a local hero not only for these women but for the 
entire Qureshi community. In the 1989 Municipal election Yaqoob was elected 
as a Councillor, using his popularity based on this incident. Muslim women in 
his ward in particular voted for him en bloc.269 The murder case might be seen 
as the basis of Yaqoob’s successful political career. There were also many 
Muslim respondents who thought strongly about the broader Muslim identity 
and representation that Shahid exemplified. Shahid Akhlaq brilliantly 
constructed an image of a Muslim representative who also believed in 
development and peace, and which benefitted everyone in the community.
6.5 Strategies o f the Meerut Muslims in the wider political
system
I now consider the changing course of Muslim politics in Meerut from a strategic 
point of view. Although political Muslim strategies in the city can be seen as 
expressions of dissent and struggle for survival in the face of Hindutva and the 
political forces that endorsed it, they were also characterised by a degree of 
compliance with existing political structures. When Meerut’s Muslims deserted 
the Congress Party they did not form separate ethnic-based parties, which most 
likely would have generated a Hindu backlash. Instead they moved to the
269 Interview with an Ansari factory owner on 28 November 2003, and with Doulla on 14 May 
2004.
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Janata Dal or BSP and largely endorsed the platforms of these parties, including 
the pursuit of civil rights by Dalit and other subaltern groups (Laitin 1986:107).
The public representations of claims by subordinate groups, James Scott tells us, 
nearly always have a strategic or dialogic dimension that influences the form 
they take (Scott 1990:92). Scott shows that there are three steps in ‘a gradient 
of radicalism in the interrogation of domination’. The least radical step is to 
criticise some of the dominant stratum for having violated the norms by which 
they claim to rule; the second is to accuse the entire stratum of failing to observe 
the principles of its rule; and the most radical step is to repudiate the very 
principles by which the dominant stratum justifies its dominance (ibid. 92). 
Strategic action from below will always and necessarily be addressed in 
compliance with the wider institutional framework so as to ensure that it will 
gain ‘a hearing’ from the authority above (ibid. 93). Muslims in Meerut followed 
suit and chose to take the least radical step; that is, to largely observe the ‘rules’ 
of the game albeit with a hidden transcript in mind for bending the system to 
become more favourable to them. In other words, the dissident group 
maximises or exploits the existing system as a valuable political resource in its 
social conflict rather than taking radical steps to challenge its veiy coordinates.
The strategies adopted by the Meerut Muslims in the public arena were those 
that would enable them to become an integral part of the majority game. In this 
sense the claim to active citizenship can be considered an expression of the 
Muslims’ strategy for becoming part of the game at the highest level, the Indian 
nation-state, albeit not as individuals but as a collective unit. According to the 
widely accepted definition by T.H. Marshall, citizenship means ‘full and equal
301
membership in a political community’ (Marshall 1964). It has an ‘integrative 
function’ to bring into its fold marginalised sections of the population under a 
wide and overarching identity. Citizens’ membership of the nation-state also 
assures entitlements to a share of national resources. Membership of a political 
community also signifies a wider identity that masks all other identities. 
Equality is, therefore, premised on erasing ascriptive inequalities and masking 
differences (of culture, caste and gender, etc.) in order to make them irrelevant 
to the exercise and enjoyment of the rights of citizenship (Roy 2001: 240).
At the second highest level, the Meerut Muslims adapted political configurations 
that predominated in mainstream Indian politics. That is, the Muslims played 
the game of pursuing OBC politics in alliance with the Dalits and Backward 
Castes. The accord between the Muslims and these lower-caste communities 
had been cemented by the political disposition of OBC leaders such as Mulayam 
Singh Yadav. The Meerut Muslims sought solidarity across their biradari 
divisions to form an ethnic bloc that could more effectively pursue political 
power and representation. But while complying with the game of the majority, 
the Meerut Muslims were also simultaneously negotiating cultural boundaries 
and reconciling a changing sense of Muslim identity. In the terminology of 
multiculturalism, this was a response of the Muslim minority community in 
order to negotiate the terms of integration when accepting the principles of 
state-imposed integration (Kymlicka 1998: 39). This negotiation between 
compliance with universal citizenship and sustenance of Muslim identity was, I 
suggest, the essence of a new Muslim politics in the public arena.
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It is important to note, however, that it was a ‘re-negotiation’ rather than a 
‘negotiation’ because the negotiation of cultural boundaries as well as the binaiy 
identity of being a Muslim and an Indian had always existed structurally for 
Indian Muslims. This issue occasionally appeared in the public discourse, most 
prominently perhaps in the Shah Bano affair in 1985 in the form of a 
contestation between Personal Law and the unified civil code. It would not be 
too mistaken to state that the public discourse about the Muslim community 
established by the Muslim leadership in post-independent India functioned to 
create almost a sole image of an ‘exclusive political and religious category’ 
(Hasan 1990: 53). The Shah Bano affair was also concluded in a way that 
reinforced this image, bringing conservative Muslim leaders to national-level 
prominence. Beneath such public discourse, however, we know very little as to 
how diverse Muslim communities have nurtured their self-images and self­
perceptions, or how they have tried to be both Muslim and Indian.
6.6 Negotiations o f a Binary Identity in the Political Life
The Qureshi leaders’ re-negotiation of religious and civic identities appeared to 
be more distinctively balanced between the two identities than that previously 
seen under an earlier Muslim leadership. The process increasingly appeared to 
be seen in different forms in the public arena, particularly after 2000. First, it 
was seen in a series of performances by Yaqoob Qureshi. The SP-led UP state 
government appointed Yaqoob Qureshi as the Minister of Minority Welfare in 
2002. His main responsibility was to improve the welfare of the minority 
communities in India. In this capacity, for example, Yaqoob took as many as
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8oo Muslims on a pilgrimage to Mecca in 2003, the largest number ever taken 
by the UP government.2?0 The Haji apparently constituted an important on­
going ‘nation-building’ project of constructing a Muslim community through 
this significant religious symbolism (van der Veer 1996 (1994): 127).
In the local public arena, on the other hand, Yaqoob Qureshi celebrated the 
victory of the Indian cricket team over Pakistan by distributing sweets in the 
neighbourhood, which was a Muslim, particularly Qureshi, heartland.2?1 Arjun 
Appadurai, in his article entitled ‘Playing with Modernity: The decolonisation of 
Indian cricket’ (Appadurai 1995) points out that cricket became an ideal focus of 
national attention and nationalist passion as ‘an emblem of Indian nationhood’ 
(ibid. 45). Cricket produces, according to Appadurai, ‘a confluence of lived 
interests...and consumers can share the excitement of Indianness without its 
many divisive scars’ (ibid. 46). Given this described significance attached to 
cricket in giving rise of nationalist passion, it is not hard to imagine that the 
game between India and Pakistan must have attracted overwhelming public 
attention in Meerut. And it is also understandable that given the historical 
antagonism between Hindus and Muslims in the city, the general understanding
2?° There was a dramatic increase in the numbers of pilgrims to Mecca from the 19th century 
onward. The haji had been organised by the state power since the 20th century because the 
British colonial government was concerned about anti-colonial Islamic influence. After 
independence state institutions took over the role of control and surveillance and the haji 
became a system of national pilgrimage to a transnational site (van der Veer, 1996 (1994): 127). 
Yaqoob Qureshi as the Minister of Minority Welfare was obviously in charge of the haji in UP 
under the SP government. The number of Haji pilgrims entitled to government subsidy has 
increased by 10,000 from 1 lakh (100,000) in 2005 to 1.1. lakh (110,000) for Haji 2006-II (the 
second phase of 2006), The Hindustan Times, 16 November 2006 (The Hindustan Times (New 
Delhi)).
^ A m ar Ujjala, 22 March 2004 (Amar Ujjala (Meerut)).
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among Hindus had been that Muslims in Meerut always celebrated when the 
Indian cricket team lost to the Pakistan team. This kind of Muslim reaction 
sometimes had led to tension in some localities in the past. The celebration by 
Yaqoob Qureshi, as the Minister of Minority Welfare in Lucknow, of the victory 
of the Indian team over Pakistan, therefore, was a public gesture of great social 
and political significance. On the other hand, Yaqoob Qureshi made a public 
statement that anyone who would bring him the head of the cartoonist who had 
drawn a cartoon of the Prophet would gain a Rs. 51 crore reward.2?2 This news 
attracted wide attention not only from Indian observers but also from the 
international community. A few weeks later, however, the same newspaper 
carried an article declaring that the Minister of Haji in UP, Yaqoob Qureshi, was 
in charge of the relief camp operations for the victims of the bomb blast in 
Varanasi in eastern UP that took place in early March 2006. The article 
describes Yaqoob visiting the camp and distributing relief goods to both Hindus 
and Muslims alike. These public performances showing him to be part of the 
Indian nation were always paralleled by a balancing act which underlined his 
specifically Muslim identity.
Another dimension of Muslim politics was using mainstream state institutions 
to make claims for equal civil rights. In this dimension Yusuf Qureshi, an elder 
brother of Yaqoob, played a central role. The families of Muslim victims’ in 
Maliana and Hashimpura have continued to pursue judicial proceedings since 
1987 in order to convict the 19 PAC constables who were most directly involved 
in the Hashimpura and Maliana incidents under criminal law. These accused
272 The Hindustan Times, 22 February 2006.
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include the commandant of the 44th battalion responsible for the mass killing at 
Maliana. They were accused of murder, attempted murder and destruction of 
evidence. However, none has been either prosecuted or convicted under 
criminal law .273 The UP state government ordered an inquiry by the Crime 
Branch Central Investigation Department (CBCID), whose report, submitted to 
the state government in 1994, was never made public.
In early June 2000,16 of the 19 accused surrendered in a group but quickly got 
bail. On this occasion, again they were neither suspended, arrested nor 
produced before the court. All of these accused have been active in their jobs 
with known postings and residential addresses. Charges against the 16 accused 
continued to fail until 2002. Yusuf Qureshi, as a lawyer-cum politician, has 
consistently been providing Muslim victims not only with moral support but also 
with funding and legal assistance. He has been assisting them throughout a 
process of appeal to the session court, to the High Court and to the Supreme 
Court (Rahman 2003). Finally, in 2002, a few months after the Mulayam Singh 
Yadav-led Samajwadi Party came to power in UP, the PAC pickets were removed 
from Meerut city. 2?4 The removal was attributable to Yaqoob Qureshi’s 
influence as the then-Minister of Minority Welfare of the state. The removal of 
the PAC had been one of the most important post-1987 demands among the
273 ‘Unpunished Guilty’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20 May 1989 (Editorial 1989). ‘The 
Police: No help for victims’, Economic and Political Weekly, 15 August 1992 (Editorial 1992). ‘Is 
There Any Hope of Justice?: Hashimpura (Meerut) killings by the PAC’, PUCL Bulletin, 2001 
(PUCL 2001).
274 ‘Justice Out of Sight’, Frontline, 7-20 May 2005 (Narrain 7-20 May 2005) (Frontline 
(Madras)).
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Meerut Muslims. Under the same Yadav government there was also a 
significant increase in the number of Muslims joining the police force. 2?5
In the domain of local politics these Muslim leaders empowered the Muslim 
masses at different levels. The areas of empowerment and their roles sometimes 
overlapped or contested, yet the process of empowerment also maintained the 
binary character of civil and Muslim identity. It seems to me that it was Yusuf 
Qureshi who was the catalyst in the grass-roots transformation of the Muslim 
masses. In 1986 Yusuf Qureshi became the chairman of the Faiz-a-am College, 
which had always been the central institution and opinion maker in terms of 
Muslim education in Meerut. After Yusuf came to this position the project of 
establishing more educational and cultural institutions for the Meerut Muslims 
seems to have begun. These institutions aimed at both secular and Islamic 
education. Yusuf upgraded the Faiz-a-am College to a degree college that now 
provides higher education to Muslim students, offering both graduate and post­
graduate degrees. The Faiz-a-am College was originally a boy’s college, but the 
higher education section became co-educational. The new university section 
included an Urdu department and Islamic teaching courses. Meerut University 
(for post-graduate degrees only) also started a new Urdu department while I was 
conducting my fieldwork. Yusuf Qureshi was also engaged in establishing a 
number of vocational schools for different professions for Muslim students from 
low-income families. The Qureshi mosque, the centre of the religious life of the 
Qureshi butcher community in Bani Sarae, for example, was constructing a new
275 The Hindustan Times, 10  M ay  2 0 0 7 .
307
vocational school for girls from poor families by buying up the surrounding 
properties.2?6 Yaqoob Qureshi was the treasurer of the mosque at that time.
Haji Raes, a well-respected Qureshi politician in Jali Kothi and the owner of the 
largest scrap market in Meerut, established two schools in Meerut. One of these, 
Millat Public School (English-medium), was established in 1990 with funding 
from the Minority Welfare Society, which has been set up late in 1987 with Haji 
Raes as president. The Millat public school became increasingly popular among 
Muslim children, with as many as 250 students enrolling in 2003. Another 
school that Raes was involved in running was the Madrasah-al-Qureshi Girls’ 
School, which belonged to the Madrasah Jamal-ul-Quran, an Islamic teaching 
institution established in 1924. The school provided girls from the Qureshi 
community with both religious and modern education in English, Urdu and 
Hindi. According to Raes, both schools had Hindu teachers. The parent 
organisations funded these schools, and there was no fee requirement for 
students. The funding was also supplemented by individual donations, but there 
was no governmental support.2??
These activities to strengthen the educational sector of the community informed 
both the political and religious life of the community. They aimed to strengthen 
religious ties and Muslim identity. They were also useful in that they 
demonstrated the power that adhered to those successful Muslim businessmen- 
cum-politicians. At the same time, these activities embodied Islamic charitable
276 Interview with Doulla, whose grandfather began raising funds to build the Qureshi mosque in
the 1930s. Interview on 24 March 2004.
277 Interview with Mr. Haji Raes on 2 December 2003.
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values. The religious leaders in the city, including Maulanas, Malvis and 
Imams, were assisting the politicians’ projects for educating the Muslim masses 
in their own capacity. These religious leaders were encouraging the Muslim 
masses, the sections of the most ‘emotional’ and ‘backward’ religious crowds, to 
understand the importance of modem education. The leaders preached that the 
holy Quran advocated the importance of a secular education (Chapter 4).2?8
These Muslim political leaders seemed to empower the Muslim community in a 
more general and profound sense. Muslims from the lower strata such as the 
Ansaris or the Qureshis, who could not obtain the benefits of state patronage 
under the Congress regime, could now go directly to the offices/homes of those 
Muslim leaders to claim their rights. On several occasions I saw fathers of the 
Ansari families with whom I was acquainted visiting Yusuf Qureshi’s office in 
Bani Sarae for his or for Yaqoob’s signature on their daughters’ OBC certificate. 
Their daughters were preparing for the entrance examination of the prestigious 
institutions for higher education. Bani Sarae — the locality of the Qureshi 
butcher community which had been one of the most impoverished and deserted 
areas of the Old Town — was now well-known among the local administration 
and media as a leading Muslim power centre.2?^  In this general process of 
empowering the Meerut Muslims, there was Shahid Akhlaq’s symbolic existence 
as the Mayor and now the MP of the city. He was taking a more top-down 
approach to constructing a Muslim community through political Islam. His role
2?8 Interview with Imam of Green Mosque in Khaimagar on 21 November 2003.
279 Conversation with one of my Hindu assistants.
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as a symbol of power was most saliently manifested in his efforts to control 
Hindu-Muslim violence in the city.
6.7 Shahid Akhlaq’s Control o f Hindu-Muslim Violence
During the period of his mayorship, Shahid Akhlaq with his Hindu and Muslim 
Corporators stopped a huge mob on the verge of full-fledged communal violence 
several times. In 2003 there was a series of incidents that could have developed 
into large-scale communal violence on 22 July, 21 September, on several 
occasions in October and on 3 and 17 November.280 Among them, an incident in 
Pilokheri in the south of the Old Town was the occasion of the most dramatic 
efforts by the Mayor and his Corporators to prevent an unruly mob from going 
on the rampage.
On 3 November 2003, following the murder of a Muslim by Hindu perpetrators, 
huge Muslim crowds gathered on the streets and started shouting slogans of 
revenge. The Muslims captured the body of the deceased and did not let the 
police approach it. Shahid Akhlaq, with his Hindu (BJP) and Muslim 
Corporators, made their way through the crowds, reached the spot and tried to 
control the mob. Shahid assured them that the culprit would be taken into 
custody. In other words, Shahid promised the Muslims that they would obtain 
justice under the rule of law. At this moment, another incident in a nearby 
factory occurred. There, a Muslim mob was pelting stones and trying to set it on
280 Interview with then Mayor, Mr. Shahid Akhlaq, on 17 August 2003. See also Dainik Jagran,
17 November 2003 CDainik Jagran (New Delhi)).
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fire. Fifty factory workers, of which 16 were Hindu were locked inside the 
factory. The Mayor and Corporators rushed to the site and tried to calm the 
mob and save the factory. The local newspaper article reports that while trying 
to control the situation, many local leaders, including the Mayor, got their 
khurtas torn off and even suffered minor injuries. But in the end these leaders 
succeeded in calming the mob, and the body of the victim was taken for post­
mortem by the police.281 This scene most pertinently demonstrates Shahid 
Akhlaq’s symbolic presence as a powerful Muslim leader who had the power, 
legitimised by the state authority, to intervene and control a huge angry mob.
It was the consolidated view among the high-ranking police officials, mostly 
Hindu, that I interviewed in the major cities in UP in 2001 that the Muslims 
generally reacted more strongly than the Hindus to national and local events 
that stimulated religious feelings because of their sense of vulnerability as a 
minority. The stronger their feeling of insecurity, the more acutely they felt the 
need for Muslim leadership at state and central government. A Muslim 
businessman who had lost his shop and his relatives during the 1987 violence 
said to me:
After the demolition, we thought that we need someone at the centre. Having a
Muslim Mayor at the top, we feel we have power... It helps us to develop our
business, bring up peace for us.282
281 Amar Ujjala, 3 November 2003.
282 Interview on 26 November 2003.
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It was the first time that the public saw Muslim leaders with their Hindu 
counterparts coming out onto the streets and directly controlling a riotous 
situation. They did so under the gaze of the Hindu administration and the 
police. The fact that Meerut had been relatively peaceful since Haji Akhlaq had 
become the city MLA was well recognised by members of both communities. 
Many observers pointed out that only because the Mayor was a Muslim was it 
possible to influence the mob and prevent large-scale violence. If this had not 
been the case, communal violence would definitely have ensued. This Muslim 
reaction demonstrates that if Muslims had the legitimised power of the state on 
their side, they would respond to the precipitating event in an entirely different 
way. The DIG Meerut, who was known for his high integrity and capacity to 
control a number of difficult riot situations in UP, told me in 2001:
For example, in UP we are having the Samajwadi Party, Mr. Yadav. After 1986 
somehow he was identified as pro-Muslim. So whenever the Samajwadi Party is 
in power, the Muslim community feels safer than when the BJP is in power. If the 
BJP is in power, Hindu people feel more comfortable. Pro-Muslim people would 
feel automatically and psychologically that this is not our government, and 
something wrong can happen at any time. ...Who is ruling at Delhi and the state 
of UP is very important for them. ...For example, in Meerut now there are two 
senior MLAs from the BJP, the Mayor from the Muslim community and the pro- 
Muslim party is also in power. So there is a balance of power. This makes 
Muslims feel a part of power. If Muslims are not represented properly in one 
local area, it becomes more vulnerable and tensions become high as far as local 
scenarios are concerned. Local scenario becomes much more important. A sense 
of participation of one community at the local level, state level and national level, 
influences communal configuration or tension of that particular area.2®3
283 Interview with Mr. Arum Kumar, Deputy Inspector General of Police, Meerut, 30 December 
2001.
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It is therefore imperative to consider the impact of having Muslim leaders in the 
power structure on the psychology of the Muslim masses when facing riotous 
situations. Seeing members of the community becoming a part of the state’s 
power structures seems to uplift the minority community from a previous sense 
of doomed insecurity which had formed the foundation of Muslim political 
consciousness and identity. As a consequence Muslims trust the administration 
to do justice to the community and not respond to anti-Muslim mobilisation by 
Hindus (see Brass 1997:253-259). The depth of the Akhlaqs’ understanding of 
Muslim psychology was well expressed in their famous slogan ‘Peace and Trade’. 
Shahid Akhlaq underlined his commitment to bring peace and to invite more 
trade and business to Meerut through this slogan. As a strong political leader, 
he needed to keep his word in order to be able to establish himself and maintain 
his credentials as a strong political leader of both Hindus and Muslims.
The scene of Shahid Akhlaq trying to control the riotous situation represented 
one of the ‘political spectacles’ in the public arena which constitute the peoples’ 
struggle for democracy and civil rights (Hansen 2001:229-230). It was a ‘realm 
of negotiation’ in which the Muslim crowd demanded social justice, recognition 
and legitimation of their identity as Muslims. Shahid Akhlaq was in this case an 
intermediary between the Muslim community and the state. He responded to 
his brethren using the political rhetoric of‘authentic religion’, pointing out that 
‘the criminals have no religion’. By assuring the Muslim crowds that the culprits 
would be taken into custody, Shahid displayed his legitimised power to negotiate 
with the state to bring the Muslims justice. His action was almost a state action 
that presupposed both a will and strategy (ibid.). He was simultaneously 
displaying to the Hindu administration his power over the minority community
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while consolidating his political position as a symbol of justice and power for the 
weaker sections of society (see Figure 6.1).
Figure 6.1 Shahid Akhlaq trying to persuade the mob not to fight, 
em phasizing religiosity in Pilokheri
Source: Amar Ujjala, 3 November 2003.
In the large office at his residence I saw Shahid sitting cordially with his Hindu 
BJP Corporators who came into his office as soon as I finished my interview with 
him. The BJP at the time constituted the second largest faction within the 
Municipal Corporation. This scene visibly impressed on me how much Shahid 
was now inside the power structure of the city. His reputation as a Mayor 
among the BJP and Muslim Corporators was not always positive. But his 
position in power made interactions between him and his counterparts more 
overt and transparent as these were brought up to the public level. The
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intentions of the ‘Muslim’ Mayor in the public arena were better communicated 
to other Corporators, including those of the BJP. In the same vein, the BJP and 
others were forced to bargain and work with Shahid Akhlaq on an equal level. 
Representing the Meerut Municipal Corporation, Shahid was now able to 
exercise his authority to instruct the local administration and police forces to 
control a riotous situation in a timely manner. Whether the ruling Party is pro- 
Muslim or pro-Hindu also to a great extent influences the response of the police 
forces. If it is a pro-Muslim government, the local police would intervene swiftly 
to protect Muslims (Wilkinson 2004; Brass 2003). Many Muslim respondents 
mentioned that since the early 1990s the local police were generally efficient and 
quick to take pre-emptive actions to prevent ethnic violence. Prior to 1993, 
Muslims had been outsiders as regards the power structure. Muslim voices had 
not often been heard and their claims for justice and equal treatment had been 
dismissed or ignored by the administration. But the situation had now 
dramatically changed. The District Magistrate (DM) and the Senior 
Superintendence of Police (SSP), for example, stand up to show their respect 
and honour to Shahid upon his entering a room. Shahid is now addressed by the 
DM and the SSP as ‘Sir’.
Equally important is that Shahid Akhlaq stands on a platform that represents 
key non-Muslim groups — namely large sections of Hindus from the Scheduled 
Castes. This fact apparently effectuates peace-making efforts, as the latter would 
not want to fight the Muslim community from which their political 
representatives have come. Kanchan Chandra argues that contrary to the 
conventional theory of ethnic party systems (eg. Horowitz 1985: 291), ethnic 
party systems in India may constitute an effective check on the escalation of
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ethnic violence in the long run (Chandra 1999: 88; 2000: 57; cf. Wilkinson 
2004). Ethnic parties keep searching for new allies, even among those that had 
been formerly excluded. According to Kanchan Chandra, ‘the electoral 
incentives of ethnically heterogeneous constituencies have led parties to switch 
from the strategy of demonising and excluding outsiders to the strategy of 
building bridges between included and excluded categories’ (Chandra 1999:84). 
No single group, therefore, would be permanently excluded from the political 
system. The BSP and SP made it possible to create new political alliances 
against the upper castes among Muslims, Dalits and Backward Castes. The BSP 
and SP, in other words, deflected the BJP’s efforts to construct a narrowly 
religious identity as the dominant category, and instead forged caste identities in 
order to create a political community.
The fluid political party system allowed different political configurations to 
emerge at ground level. The alliance among the Scheduled Castes, Other 
Backward Castes and Muslims that emerged in Meerut seems to have worked 
thus far to reduce Hindu-Muslim violence in Meerut. During ethnic violence, 
lower caste groups of both Hindus and Muslims formed the major fighting force 
hired by upper castes. In Meerut it was mainly the Valmikis (sweepers) and the 
Chamars who became the fighting forces during the large-scale violence in 1982 
and 1987 (Engineer 1991 (1984): 273-274; 1987b: 29). A Corporator of the 
Municipal government from the Chamar community told me:
Upper-caste politicians or political leaders give money to the Scheduled Castes 
and Muslims to become rioters for their own big benefit. The Scheduled Castes or 
Muslims were in the labourer class, working in Hindu leaders’ house 
construction. They belong to the low-income group and not well educated. So
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they follow their bosses’ instructions to fight. ...Positive thinking about each 
other nurtured in the meetings [between the Scheduled Castes and low-status 
Muslim leaders during the 1987 ethnic violence]. No riots take place after this. 
Upper-caste Hindus know that they [the Scheduled Castes and Muslims] would 
no longer obey their instructions.28*
After the formation of the BSP, very few Chamars and other Scheduled Caste 
groups were interested in being hired by the upper castes for ethnic violence.28s 
The political alliance among the Other Backward Castes meant that it was no 
longer possible for the upper castes to purchase the lower castes’ services to kill 
or damage members of another ethnic group who were now their allies in jointly 
promoting and protecting their political economy.
6.8 Conclusion
Shahid Akhlaq elevated the demand for citizenship initiated by Haji Akhlaq to a 
more holistic ideology by including at its core a reading of Islam. His broad and 
largely presentist interpretation of Islam encouraged Muslims to use their 
religion as a catalyst in becoming good citizens. Shahid used the power of 
religion to construct a modern sense of political community. His use of religion 
demonstrated that the religious identity of Islam could be constantly redefined 
as a resource for political mobilisation. The elevated notion of Islam as an 
integral part of citizenship also signified a site of negotiation of cultural 
boundaries and a reworking of Muslim identity.
28* Interview with a Chamar Corporator on 31 January 2004.
285 The same interview above.
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In her post-structuralist and anti-essentialist critique of Jurgen Habermas’ 
universalist conception of democracy, Chantal Mouffe (1995) argues that 
rationalist, liberal thinkers reduce politics to a calculus of interests, with 
individuals being presented as rational actors aiming to maximise their self- 
interests. Habermas, too, and more explicitly, suggests a model of a rational and 
universal consensus to be achieved by means of free discussion. These thinkers 
put aside or ignore disruptive issues such as antagonisms, passions, ‘everything 
that can lead to violence’ (ibid. 262), and believe that a rational agreement on 
principles (read ‘universal reason’) is enough to sediment pluralism among 
different political subjects in modern societies. Mouffe points out that the 
rationalist approach to reach ‘consensus’ without exclusion is almost always a 
creation of an ‘us’ which does not have a corresponding ‘them’. However, this is 
impossible because every identity is relational (ibid. 263). Mouffe argues that a 
simple denial of the dimension of antagonism between diverse groups does not 
make it disappear, and that a democratic approach therefore needs to come to 
terms with the ‘ineradicable’ character of antagonism. Mouffe also points out 
that the prime task of democratic politics is not to eliminate passions but to 
‘mobilise’ these passions in a way that promotes democratic designs with 
recognition and legitimation of social conflict (ibid.).
Mouffe’s conception of a democratic practice that acknowledges ineradicable 
nature of antagonism sheds light on one important dimension of the new 
Muslim politics in relation to democracy. The claim for citizenship among the 
Meerut Muslims, and the continuing negotiation of the boundaries of their 
identities as Indian Muslims, may be seen as a consequence of a democratic 
project that cannot eradicate power relations among diverse groups or
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antagonisms among those groups. The claim for citizenship among the Meerut 
Muslims is further seen as a democratic project that recognises these differences 
and social conflicts. The Muslims’ new democratic practices, in other words, 
have not been guided by a concept of ‘consensus’ based on ‘universal human 
nature’, but rather by a sense of vulnerability that has encouraged them to 
construct new ‘democratic’ identities for reasons of protection in a precarious 
and vulnerable democratic terrain.
This leads us to another important dimension of Muslim political strategy. 
Having in mind that the Hindu Right and the BJP might at any time return to 
power at state and central government, the Meerut Muslims appear to be 
preparing themselves by creating a system of ‘protective ingratiation’ (Scott 
1990: 89). That is, Muslim strategies are not limited to temporary remedies 
such as the removal of the PAC from Meerut city, or to increase representation 
of Muslims in the state police force, although both of these efforts are important. 
It rather points to far-sighted defensive planning to blunt a potential attack from 
a world peopled with hostile and brutal enemies. Ingratiation can help 
transform this dangerous world into a safer place by ‘depriving the potential 
antagonist of any pretext for aggression’.286
New and more active forms of political representation have transformed 
relationships between Muslims, the state and the judiciary, in Meerut as 
elsewhere in India. Prior to 1991, neither the state nor the law reflected or 
protected Muslims’ needs in Meerut. Yet less than fifteen years later, Shahid
286 Edward E. Jones, 1964, quoted in Scott, p. 89,6145.
319
Akhlaq, could stop a huge mob in the most dangerous moments of potential riot 
construction. The reduced level of ethnic violence in Meerut, however, is not 
only derived from the fact that powerful Muslim leaders are now part of the state 
structure. It is also to be accounted for through a different psychology of 
Muslims that yields an entirely new reaction to precipitant ethnic violence. 
Since Muslims now largely trust the administration, they are less minded to 
respond to provocations with the counter-mobilisation that were common prior 
to the 1990s. When the Muslims did not trust the administration they came out 
on the streets and fought to protect their religion, property and family 
themselves. This no longer seems to be required in Meerut.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
Hindu-Muslim relationships have formed a critical axis around which the 
political history of north India has evolved, in part, from the early modern 
period to the present day. The historical legacy of Muslim power over more than 
three hundred years in north India is still evident in a number of the features of 
cities and towns in Uttar Pradesh, Meerut included. The city is also 
characterised by some of the most contentious and dangerous Hindu-Muslim 
relations in the whole of India. The 1987 violence is still a living memoiy for 
many Meerut Muslims, particularly the mass killing of Muslims in the 
Hashimpura locality and in Maliana village by state forces. These and other 
events in the 1980s can be viewed as a form of ethnic cleansing in much the 
same way as the anti-Muslim violence in Gujarat in 2002 (following Godhra), 
albeit on a smaller scale.
7.2 Multiethnic Coalitions and the Reduction o f Violence
Against this background, the relative absence of Hindu-Muslim violence in 
Meerut during the critical and dangerous years around 1992, and afterwards, 
has formed a puzzle that this thesis has sought to address. My research findings 
demonstrate that a strategic alliance across the Hindu-Muslim divide, in which 
Muslims proactively allied with lower-caste Hindus, proved crucial in reducing
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levels of Hindu-Muslim violence after 1987-91. I accept Steven Wilkinson’s 
argument that state-level forms of electoral competition largely determine 
whether Hindu-Muslim violence breaks out, even in the most riot-prone towns 
(Wilkinson 2004: 57). I also agree with his argument that state governments 
which rely heavily on Muslim votes will implement significant measures to 
prevent possible ‘precipitating events’ turning into large-scale violence. This 
was apparent in Bihar under Lalu Prasad Yadav, and what has happened in 
Meerut bears out Wilkinson’s contention that large-scale mobilisations around a 
backward-caste identity — which was the basis for the Muslim-Scheduled 
Castes-Other Backward Castes alliance — tends, inter alia, to produce lower 
levels of Hindu-Muslim violence. It is as if north Indian politics has been 
following the course of events in such southern states as Kerala and Tamil Nadu, 
where high party fractionalisation forced successive state governments to 
prevent anti-minority mobilisations (save for those against Brahmins, perhaps), 
all of which resulted in low levels of Hindu-Muslim violence and relatively low 
levels of violence against subaltern castes (see Wilkinson 2004:172-203; cf. van 
Dyke 2007). The South has been moving North.
At the core of this dissertation, however, is not a macro political science model
of the type that can be found in Wilkinson (or in Varshney for that matter), but
rather an in-depth case study at the micro-level which is focused on Muslim
political agency and which insists on the continuing importance of locality.
Whether and how a mechanism for the reduction of violence emerges in any
given town or city depends to a significant degree on how local, non-state actors
respond to wider political changes at the state level. Local actors in Meerut
responded in definite and determinate ways to the opportunity structures of a
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wider system change that increasingly made possible new forms of (inter-ethnic) 
coalition politics after c.1990. It also needs to be clearly said, however, that 
large-scale Hindu-Muslim violence generally did not occur if Muslims did not 
react to provocative anti-minority events precipitated by Hindu nationalist 
organisations and individuals. At this point the mechanism of what Paul Brass 
calls ‘the institutionalised riot system’ ceased to function, and the state, local 
administration and police were not even required to intervene. Increasingly, 
Muslim political leaders resolved communal problems in Meerut on their own, 
without troubling the state forces.
Looking at the period of transition from 1989 to 1992, which was a period of
intense communal tension and violence in many parts of UP, we see much lower
levels of violence in Meerut than would seem to be predicted by models focused
on state-wide electoral considerations. According to Wilkinson, it was during
this period that Hindu nationalists instigated Hindu-Muslim violence through
provocative anti-Muslim mobilisations across UP in order to corral the floating
Hindu vote. The position of UP’s Muslims was not helped at this time by the
tendency of many politicians from the ruling Congress Party to court the ‘Hindu
vote’ in order to remain in power. This situation, in which the two leading
national parties competed for the Hindu vote, created a dangerous situation for
Muslims — a point well to the fore in Wilkinson’s model. Wilkinson notes that a
total of 33 riots took place in UP during this period, in which 295 people died,
with more than half of the riots taking place in constituencies in which the B JP
had been one of the two leading parties in the 1989 election (Wilkinson 2004:
49-5i)- This was exactly the case in Meerut, but, interestingly, the period ahead
of the 1989 General Elections passed rather peacefully with only a few small,
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sporadic violent incidents. The B JP finished in third place in Meerut, its defeat 
engineered by an alliance between large sections of Hindu lower-caste groups 
and Muslims. The winner was Harish Pal for the Janata Dal, with an 
overwhelming majority vote of 58.47 percent; the runner-up with 35.66 percent 
was Mohsina Kidwai for the Congress Party. The BJP gained just 2.45 percent of 
the vote. In the Assembly election of the same year the BJP seized power for the 
first time in Meerut since its inception (or re-branding) in 1980. It is possible 
that the BJP won because there was much less interest in the Assembly election 
as the Muslims’ electoral goals had already been largely fulfilled with the victory 
of Harish Pal in the Lok Sabha election. The low level of interest could also be 
derived from the fact that a large number of Muslim Councillors had been 
elected to the Municipal Council earlier in the year. Finally, Ayuub Ansari, the 
runner-up candidate for the Janata Dal in the Assembly election, was hardly the 
kind of political leader to consolidate the Muslim vote at this point.
After the 1989 elections, Meerut remained relatively peaceful through several 
tense years, with only intermittent incidents of skirmishes and sporadic killings, 
most notably in 1991. It is my belief that these incidents, or at least some of 
them, could have been attempts by Hindu nationalists to provoke counter­
mobilisations among Muslims with a view to igniting large-scale ethnic violence. 
This would fit in part with Paul Brass’ work on institutionalised riot systems. 
However, violence did not occur, mainly because Muslims did not react to these 
provocations — and this, I would suggest, is where this thesis adds significant 
value to existing work on ethnic violence in northern India. This also begins to 
explain why there was no Hindu-Muslim violence in Meerut at the time of the 
destruction of the Babri Masjid in December 1992. The national-level anti-
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Muslim provocation did not lead to large-scale ethnic violence in Meerut as it 
did in several other cities in UP. The presence of the Janata Dal in the 
Municipal government, solidarities based on a broad Bahujan identity among 
Muslims, Scheduled Castes and Other Backward Castes, and perhaps also the 
influence of Haji Akhlaq as a rising Muslim political leader, helped to control 
and contain the troubling situation facing the Muslim community in Meerut.
Many Muslim respondents recalled the impressively effective and timely 
intervention of the police and local administration after news came of the 
demolition of the Babri Masjid. 287 Some respondents also recalled that 
members of mo/iaZZa-level Peace Committees worked to control Muslim 
protesters coming out on the streets soon after the demolition. My respondents 
heard many elders of the Committee spread the word to those Muslim 
protesters: ‘The police are Hindu. The government is Hindu. There is no point 
in fighting. We cannot win’. The Muslims, in short, made a co-ordinated effort 
not to respond to Hindu provocations. Their agency here — as a group armed 
mainly with what James Scott calls ‘the weapons of the weak’ (Scott 1985) — was 
that of organised unresponsiveness, or assertive forms of self-control and 
community discipline. The only incident that saw the deaths of more than ten 
Muslims occurred during the election violence in May 1991. But this incident
287 From the side of the Meerut local administration there was an interview with Mr. Mukul 
Sinhal who was the Chief Development Officer in Meerut in December 1992. He told me how 
prepared the local administration was at that time in the building-up phase to the demolition of 
the Babri Masjid. He told me, ‘We knew some kind of final stage will come when tension built 
up due to the Babri Masjid agitation....We were very prepared in logistics, concrete assignment, 
contingency plans and mentally prepared. Concrete task had been assigned. We were...fully 
geared. We were able to stop everything within three hours’. Interview with Mr. Mukul Sinhal, 
District Magistrate in Kanpur on 16 January 2002.
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was a deliberate attack on Muslims by BJP workers, a killing spree on the very 
day of the election that was clearly aimed at countermanding the election itself, 
in order to stop Ayuub Ansari contesting — and winning — for the Janata Dal 
(Engineer 1992). Large-scale collective violence between Hindus and Muslims 
did not occur in Meerut city after 1987.
At the core of this dissertation is a demonstration of how some of the most 
despised segments in Indian society — low-status Muslims and low-caste 
Hindus — were mobilised amid new regimes of coalition politics to make Meerut 
a safer place for the poor of both main religious communities. I have shown in 
particular how Qureshi political activism successfully rallied a broader Muslim 
community behind a politics of vote-trading that in turn allowed Muslim 
political leaders to negotiate with mainly Hindu political parties in order to 
increase protection of Muslim livelihoods. In order to do this, the new Qureshi 
leadership, as I have also shown, had to forge a new sense for the Muslims in 
Meerut of what it meant to be both a Muslim and a citizen of India.
7.3 Religion and Democracy
Unlike in the case of the Mumbai Muslim community described by Thomas 
Blom Hansen (Hansen 2000, 2001), in Meerut religion and culture were not 
separate from politics, nor was there a dichotomous view of politics and religion. 
Rather, those cultural assets of the community were all endorsed in the sphere 
of formal politics in the pursuit of secular goals and helped to create a new 
democratic identity among the Muslim masses. Furthermore, religion was used
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as a critical cultural resource for creating a Muslim political community, 
legitimising the new political leadership and helping the largely illiterate Muslim 
masses to follow and understand the new social movements they directed. 
Religion plays a central role in social movements in India (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 1967; Lynch 1969; Barnett 1976; Juergensmeyer 1982) and the power 
of religion was used in Meerut to create a new Islamic identity as one response 
to the demands of modern politics (Eriksen 1993). A secular logic of citizenship 
was pursued in formal politics, but this was possible only because the major 
religious institutions and establishments provided support and legitimisation in 
terms which made sense to non-elite groups.
Although religion and religious identity played a substantial part in the electoral
mobilisations of 1993 and 2004, both mobilisations were very far from being
communal (in the sense here of being confrontational to other ethnic groups).
The two leading Qureshi politicians did not appeal to parochial, narrow,
separate group identities but rather opened up, so to speak, Islamic identity into
the new political identity of citizenship, in the process addressing the wider
interests of lower-caste groups as well as uncontroversial elements of the
dominant political discourse. There was thus little danger of provoking Hindu
communalism in return. Moreover, their message indicated that Islam and
citizenship were converging rather than being sharply demarcated. The
conversion was shown most saliently in the election campaign of Shahid Akhlaq,
in which Islam became a powerful medium to bridge a mainly Muslim identity
and a mainly civic identity. These two identities were reciprocally enhancing
each other, or indeed greatly overlapping each other. Shahid Akhlaq used Islam,
which in Meerut for many years had been a marker of difference and separate
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identity (not least with regard to Muslim rule in India, and Pakistan), as an 
effective tool to transform the Muslim masses into visibly ‘good citizens’ of 
India.
A more expansive vision of Islam was not, however, the sole factor to 
consolidating a Muslim political community in Meerut. The presence of militant 
Hindu forces in the city long after Partition also created a strong sense of unity 
among Muslims. This was clearly shown in the closing gap between high-status 
and low-status ajZa/Muslims in everyday Muslim life in Meerut. The ‘plebeian 
politics’ of the a/Za/(Qureshi) Muslims were first criticised and despised by the 
Muslim elite, as in Mumbai (Hansen 2001). This elite claimed that politics were 
coming increasingly into the hands of ‘outlaws’ and ‘criminals’, and hence had 
become ‘dirty’. When it came to the post-1987 elections, however, the same elite 
voted for these same Muslim plebeian leaders in order to defeat the BJP (and 
thus to protect themselves). I witnessed a few cases in which Shahid Akhlaq 
successfully convinced highly influential elite Muslim families to support him 
and the BSP during the pre-election period in May 2004.
The reengineering of Muslim identities in Meerut was also reflected in long-term
education projects initiated within the community. As I showed in Chapter
Four, more and more secular educational institutions were established in order
to produce Muslims qualified to become respected ‘citizens’ (Hansen 2000:259)
who would participate in the life of the nation on an equal basis with Hindus.
Those Muslim ‘citizens’ were also expected to bring about social reform within
the Muslim community. What was new about the situation in Meerut was that
the Qureshi and other Muslim political leaders endeavoured to establish not
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only secular but also religious institutions; they created a sort of cultural 
activism in which both Islamic and secular education were flourishing with the 
same aim — that of producing ‘good’ Muslim citizens. Islam was not seen as an 
obstruction to citizenship, or for that matter to the acquisition of more obviously 
secular markers of social status. Rather, religious qualifications were considered 
to be one critical asset for producing a well-respected and educated Muslim 
citizen. Religion, therefore, functioned as an important resource for the 
participation of ordinary Indians (Muslim and Hindu) in the workings of a 
secular democracy.
7.4 Being ‘Muslim’ in North India
An examination of the changing circumstances of low-status Muslims in Meerut 
reveals a community of the oppressed and marginalised who have long lived on 
the edge of two worlds, the old modem-state structure and the cultural world of 
an ‘alien’ religion. What I have called the ‘new Muslim politics’ should be 
understood as one part of broader repertoire of changes promoted by social 
movements among the weaker and long-disadvantaged groups to assert their 
rights and entitlements as citizens of India.
From the perspective of managing or eliminating ethnic differences and conflict, 
this study suggests a new insight into Muslim politics in north India. The 
integrative strategies among the Meerut Muslims appeared to be remarkably 
positive for the following two reasons. First, Muslim political mobilisation post- 
1987 in Meemt did not take a course that would pose a potential threat to the
329
existing framework of the sovereign state, as did Partition in 1947 or various 
demands for Azad (Free) Kashmir. Muslims demanded recognition within the 
framework of the Indian state. This must be accounted for, at least partially, by 
the workings of Indian democracy, including the party system more effectively 
incorporating the marginalised sections of society into the polity. Secondly, 
their integrative strategies within the system can be seen as evidence of 
Muslims’ commitment to and affirmation of the existing political system and the 
Indian state, rather than a compromise on the part of Muslims who otherwise 
might have wanted to pursue a separate political identity.288
This pragmatic use of democracy might prove to be especially viable in an age 
when global Islam is increasingly being read against the so-called ‘War on 
terror’. During my fieldwork I came across a few occasions where Meerut 
Muslims reacted rather sharply to news of a US-led invasion of Islamic countries 
to India’s west. Thus far, however, it remains the case that most of the Muslims 
I know in Meerut have stayed loyal to their goal of becoming ‘good’ middle-class 
citizens of India, perhaps in the process hiding some of their deeper anxieties 
about both the US and of being seen as a fifth column within India. Being 
‘Muslim’ in Meerut and across much of northern India is not easy, and the 
pragmatic desire for social reform and citizenship that I have documented here
288 Veena Das makes an insightful comparison between Muslims and Sikhs in Punjab in their 
approach to the state institutions. Das maintains that Muslims indicated their reliance on state 
institutions through their extensive use of the public arena as well as state agencies in their 
reaction to the Shah Bano verdict. The discourse of the Sikhs, on the other hand, who were 
associated with militant separatist movement, essentially facilitates ‘a self-conscious rejection’ of 
uses of state agencies. This example demonstrates the Muslim orientation towards inclusion 
rather than separation from the Indian state (Das 1995:116-117).
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doubtless coexists with more subterranean yearnings that are properly the 
subject of another thesis. The threat of violence against Muslims in Meerut 
remains a real one for many Muslims, even after almost twenty years of relative 
— and real — calm in the city. The vital work of becoming and scrutinising what 
it is to be Muslim in Meerut — of being safe, prosperous, educated, and pious — 
continues on an everyday basis. That work, that contested agency, is what I have 
tried my best to examine and discuss here, and to place against the backdrop of 
new forms of coalition politics in India since c.1990.
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Appendix: Excerpts from Interview Transcripts and Writings on  
Haji Akhlaq and Shahid Akhlaq Qureshi
1. Interview on 3 April 2004 with a cousin of Haji Akhlaq, who was actively
involved in the Tablighi as a volunteer:
[Talking about the Tablighi Jama’at], Volunteers make a group of minimum 11 
[people] under Aamir, the head, and go to different places, villages, towns, 
mohallas for 3 days, 10 days, 40 days or one year to preach to people on the 
importance of namaz. We visit people’s homes and tell them how one can be a 
good Muslim. We also organise meetings in the mosques where we [Jamaatis] 
were staying to tell the common people about the teachings of the Quran. We 
stay together in a mosque and we cook and sleep there, with ulamas, men, the 
common people. I have gone for a trip of the Tablighi five times so far. My 
cousin, Haji Akhlaq, had been a Jama’ati many times [there is no restriction 
about becoming a Jama’ati. One can be a Jama’ati for a week or a month, or 
several times in a week] and went home to home to spread Islamic teachings in 
Islamabad, Zakir colony, Rashid nagar, Kanch ka Pul and other mohallas in 
Meerut.
2. Interview with Mr. Haji Raes, Municipal Corporator, on 2 December 2003:
Haji Akhlaq was a Jama’ati in Jali Kothi, our locality, for a week. He came to 
know many Muslim religious leaders including ulamas and malvis through his 
activities as a Jama’ati. ... Akhlaq also spent his money to organise and finance 
the activities of the Tablighi if a mosque in a mohalla did not have enough funds 
to support ten Jama’atis for a week or for a month.289
3. Interview with a well-respected Muslim academic, Professor Shahabbudin 
Ansari, on 14 January 2004.
289 Shail Mayaram’s study of the Islamisation process among Meo Muslims in Haryana by the 
Tablighi Jama’at is useful for understanding the context of Haji Akhlaq’s activities in relation to 
the Tablighi. Mayaram, for example, writes, ‘Each member of the jama’at is responsible for 
paying for their own travel and share in the cooking, cleaning and washing...but hospitality is 
often extended locally by traders and other persons who might also contribute money towards 
the purchase of an Islamic centre and or mosque’ (Mayaram 1997,229).
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Tablighi Jama’at campaigned for Akhlaq. It is not a political organisation but it 
sometimes has a discreet political function. It is an organisation to propagate 
namaz for those who do not go to the mosque. Haji Akhlaq’s wife was a member 
and she used the Tablighi for her husband’s political campaign. It was significant 
since there was no history of woman Jama’ati [in Meerut]. What she did was that 
she went home to home with other women in Islamabad, Rashid nagar, Gola 
Kuwan, Bani Sarae and other localities to spread Islamic teachings among 
women, how to become a good Muslim.
4. Interview with the Hindu secretary to the Meerut Municipal Commissioner 
on 27 February 2004:
Haji Akhlaq used to be very famous for his Friday charity at the Qureshi Mosque 
in Bani Sarae and the one in Khair nagar. Akhlaq stood in the courtyard of these 
mosques and distributed money to whomsoever came to the mosques, Hindu or 
Muslim — both poor. Akhlaq also earned an image of pro-poor man even among 
Chamars.
5. Interview with a Qureshi textile merchant and a friend of Akhlaq’s on 4 April 
2004:
Haji Akhlaq helped many poor Muslims financially. He also used his position as a 
Ward Councillor [after 1989] to help people with the development work, like 
paving the roads and cleaning the drainage in Bani Sarae and Islamabad.
6. Interview with Mr. Rafik Ansari, Municipal Corporator on 3 April 2003:
During the 1993 election many Muslim households in different mohallas, which 
Haji Akhlaq and his wife had visited during the Tablighi Jama’at’s work, became 
his election campaign offices, like my house in Islamabad.
7. Interview with a Qureshi businessman and a friend of Shahar Kaji, (religious
judgej on 16 March 2004:
Haji Akhlaq was intelligent because he used his wealth for charity, for the poor in 
order to create his political support base.
8. Amar Ujjala, 11 April 2004:
During the on-going election campaign Shahid Akhlaq starts his typical day by 
offering early morning prayers (Fazir kiNamaz), and then he and his namazi or 
prayer fellows all visit nearby mohallas such as Karim Ali. They sit or stand at a
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friend’s house where neighbours start gathering. Shahid begins talking about the 
importance of the prayers (early morning prayers or Fazir ki Namaz) and the 
value of being a good pious Muslim. He goes on to stress the importance of being 
a good and honest Muslim who offers prayers five times everyday. Then, Shahid 
Akhlaq shifts his subject to the issues of development, how important it is to 
provide people with drinking water, regular electric supply and good paved roads.
9. My observation during the fieldwork in 2003-2004:
While he was the Mayor of the city, Shahid Akhlaq expanded the major 
intersections as part of the development or ‘beautification’ projects. These 
intersections included Batchar Park and Jali Kothi (see Map 3.1). The expansion 
was a routine job for the MDA (Meerut Development Authority), yet the newly 
installed pedestrian bridges or fences appear to show a degree of influence from 
Islamic architecture. It seemed to me that this was a marker of religious identity 
for Muslims in the public space as well as in a civic domain.
10. Interview with a BJP Corporator on 26 April 2004; and the Hindu secretary
to the Meerut Municipal Commissioner on 27 February 2004:
Mayor [Shahid Akhlaq] closes the Nagar Nigam [Municipal Corporation] office 
during prayer times on Fridays. We have to wait for the office to be reopened for 
the meetings which were postponed...’
u.A m ar Ujjala, 1 November 1993:
In November different Hindu organisations with the RSS and BJP organised fShri 
Bhagvat Katha' (religious reading) at Zim/Jim Khana Maidan in Meerut. In 
response to that Haji Akhlaq said, ‘I will not allow communal forces and the BJP 
to disturb peace in the city’.
Akhlaq condemned the allegations that people feared him. Akhlaq said, ‘I am 
visiting both Hindu and Muslim mohollas, and I will get their votes. Just the BJP 
is spoiling my image’.
‘Ajmal [SP] candidate and the Muslim League candidate will definitely eat my 
votes but I will get Hindu secular votes also’.
12.Amar Ujjala, 2 November 1993:
Haji Akhlaq promised the voters to bring more civic amenities to the city, saying 
that ‘Communalism is not only issue in the election. There are important issues 
like high court bench in Meerut [presumably about the PAC], weavers’ need for
separate mandi [market], development of scissors and sports goods 
manufacturing industry, and peace in our city*. ‘These issues cannot be tackled by 
a small councillor like me. That is why I am fighting the election to resolve other 
problems of the people of the city’.
13. Amar Ujjala, 6 May 2004:
Shahid Akhlaq said in his electoral campaign, ‘My father, ex-MLA Haji Akhlaq, 
fought for the ‘haq’290 of the poor, backward and weak. I have been following his 
path since I was elected as the Mayor of the city, and would like to carry this fight 
forward to fulfil the dreams of my father who wanted to see the development of 
the region and of all communities’.
14. Amar Ujjala, 29 November 1993:
On the day that Haji Akhlaq was declared elected, thanking the voters for their 
support the MLA said that ‘fighting communalism will be my first priority’. He 
also said, ‘My victory is the victory for secular forces’.
15. Interview with Professor Shahabbudin Ansari on 14 January 2004:
[Haji] Akhlaq was not communal although he openly said that he was a saviour of 
the Muslims and he would like to work as our protector.
16. Interview with Mr. Haji Raes on 2 December 2003:
...[Haji Akhlaq] was an aggressive and bold politician, but he served for poor 
people. He contested from the Lok Dal, which meant that all castes and 
communities supported Akhlaq. He served for all the people, not only for 
Muslims.
17. Interview with a retired Qureshi art teacher on 29 February 2004:
Haji Akhlaq gave a slogan, ‘Peace and Trade’ for all communities in Meerut. He 
helped the poor people, and worked for peace.
290 This Urdu word, ‘Haq’, literally means ‘right’, but it also involves/carries a more 
comprehensive sense of entitlement. This word, which frequently appeared in Shahid Akhlaq’ 
speeches and discourse, most likely came from Haji Akhlaq’s parlance. My Hindu research 
assistants who had done the translation work of these newspaper articles confirmed this point.
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18. Interview with one of the aides of Shahid Akhlaq from the Qureshi
community on 8 August 2009. This Qureshi man used to run a fruit cart and
now worked in Shahid Akhlaq’s office at his residence:
In 2004 [during the election campaign] he [Shahid Akhlaq] joined the Tablighi 
preaching activities. He sometimes also provided food to the Tablighi volunteers 
[Jama’atis] when they were staying in mosques near his house, like the Qureshi 
mosque or one in Gudari Bazaar. The Jama’atis do not eat at someone’s house. 
They only eat in the mosque, their preaching centre, and people living in the 
neighbourhood give food to them. As far as I remember, he has done this many 
times at least five to seven times in the past... Shahid is also well known for his 
Friday charity. He does not do this every Friday like his father, but he distributes 
clothes, food, money once a month after Friday prayer. Shahid also distributes a 
lot of these items on the last Friday of the Ramadan--holy month--to the poor 
after the prayer.
Shahid also gave donations to mosques in Meerut that included Qureshi mosque. 
When he was elected as the MP in 2004, he donated Rs. 50,000 to the Qureshi 
mosque and Rs. 10,000 to the mosques in Kanch ka Pul and Zakir Colony. 
Shahid also constructed pucca [paved] road in front of these mosques using his 
MP development fund.
19. Interview with a Qureshi textile merchant and a friend of Haji Akhlaq’s on 4 
April 2004:
Haji Akhlaq had been famous for going to Mecca with a group of people from his 
own mohalla, helping to finance those who could not afford going. Shahid 
inherited this very practice from his father. Since he became the Mayor of the city 
he went every year to Mecca with a large group of people in his mohalla. Shahid 
helped all of them, his supporters, in everyday life as well as in [financing] the trip 
to Mecca.
20. Amar Ujjala, 7 May 2004:
Shahid Akhlaq said to the reporter, ‘I have joined the BSP since the Party 
envisions an egalitarian society in India, in which all communities and castes are 
equal and respected. That is why I want to be part of the BSP project. I want to 
work for an egalitarian society’.
21. Amar Ujjala, 19 March 2004:
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Addressing a street corner meeting at Hapur Bus Stand Haji Shahid Akhlaq said, 
‘The land of Meerut has always been the mother of revolution. In the history, the 
people of Meerut were the first to rise against the slavery of the British to end it. 
Now on the coming 10 May one more revolution is going to take place. On that 
day the people of Meerut District will vote for a local candidate and would make 
sure the defeat of outside candidates. In the Revolution of 10 May 1857 the 
people of Meerut threw the British out of Meerut. The revolution would be 
repeated again on the coming 10 May 2004. But this time the people of Meerut 
would throw out outsider candidates. I am the worthy son of Meerut and I am 
sure the people of Meerut will not tolerate the insult of their son. After 
Independence outsider candidates had been imposed on Meerut city, and these 
candidates after winning the elections cheated upon the people of Meerut — not 
paying attention to the development of the District. But this time they will not 
allow doing so. This will not happen again this time. The people of Meerut will 
throw out all the outsider candidate at any cost’.
Shahid Akhlaq’s hoarding at Ghanta Ghar (clock tower) says,
‘Meerut Ke Awam ki Aawaz, Bahari Dekha Bar Bar Sathaniya hoga Abki Bar’.
The voice of the people of Meerut is that they have seen an outsider every time of 
the election repeatedly. However, they want to make win the local candidate this 
time.
Note: This hoarding was very popular and much talked about in tea stalls and 
other public spaces among both Muslims and Hindus, as well as in media circles. 
It was popular not only because people agreed with the issue of insider vs. 
outsider, but also because many people thought that Shahid Akhlaq was an 
important candidate as he was an insider (local) candidate. It is important to 
note that Shahid Akhlaq, through the issue of ‘insider and outsider’, referred to 
the common struggle of Hindus and Muslims against the British, unity of Hindus 
and Muslims during the first War of Independence, and to himself as a son of the 
soil. He also placed Meerut and himself within a larger history of the struggle for 
Independence or, to state it differently, the struggle to obtain a respectable place 
in contemporary India.291
22. Amar Ujjala, 20 April 2004:
2911 am grateful to Dr. Satendra Kumar, one of my research assistants, for this information.
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After filing his nomination in the City office, Shahid Akhlaq said to a journalist of 
the Amar Ujjala newspaper, ‘Baba Saheb [Dr. Ambedkar] was not only a Dalits 
sympathiser and champion of the poor but also the architect of the Indian 
Constitution which gives the right [haq] to vote and equality to each and every 
Indian citizen’.
23. Interview with the then-Mayor, Mr. Shahid Akhlaq, on 17 August 2003:
...Last 30 years our community was harassed, and their fundamental rights [haq] 
were not given. Ninety percent of the Muslims here are poor and do not know 
their fundamental rights [haq].
... Every single Muslim has right [haq] in the Constitution. I want to give this to 
them. I have done my best in establishing a school for the Muslim children from 
poor families.
24. Amar Ujjala, 3 May 2004:
An appeal to the people of Meerut by Shahid Akhlaq [election manifesto];
1) Title ‘Development of the entire region and respect for all communities and 
castes’;
2) A list of development projects that were carried out in the different parts of the 
city that included road pavement, cleaning of the drainage system, providing 
drinking water and so on;
3) A list of beautification projects in the city that included electrification, park 
construction, division and expansion of roads and the construction of the parking 
space;
4) His statement on how first his father and later himself consistently made 
conscious efforts to bring peace and communal harmony in the city after the 
communal riots in 1982 and 1987;
5) Campaign slogan, ‘No hate but we shall give love, no riots we shall give trade’;
6) His statement promising that he will make Meerut a highly modernised and 
environmentally sensitive city with more industries and new transportation 
systems.
25. Amar Ujjala, 28 April 2004:
In Megharajpur village in a political meeting during his election campaign Shahid 
Akhlaq said, ‘After winning the election the first thing I will do is to remove all the 
liquor shops from the neighbourhoods of the poor, backward, and Muslims. One
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of the major reasons for the poverty in these neighbourhoods is liquor since the 
poor and labourers spend their hard earned income on liquor every evening while 
their families keep waiting hungry at home. The second, I will set up schools in 
these neighbourhoods for the kids of poor’.
26. Interview with the then-Mayor, Mr. Shahid Akhlaq on 17 August 2003:
Modern western education has its own value while the essence of Islam is with 
Imam and Allah. Western education is good for business and science. Islamic 
education teaches to stay away from sins, and do the best for humanity. Whereas 
modern western education teaches crimes and problems of the society. I would 
think the combination [of both western and Islamic education] is the best.
27. Amar Ujjala, 9 May 2004:
In an interview given to the Amar Ujjala, Shahid Akhlaq said, ‘I am asking vote in 
the name of development and peace for all. I respect all religions and castes. I 
would like to stress that Islam teaches us to live with peace and love. I respect all 
Hindus and Muslims and would like to advocate the right [haq] of the poor, the 
weak, backwards and the most backwards, Dalits and Muslims. I want to be a 
pure secular leader like V.P. Singh.
28. Amar Ujjala, 4 May 2009:
During the candidates’ question-answer session in the city office of Amar Ujjala, 
in an emotional moment Shahid Akhlaq stressed, ‘I have worked for the 
education of Muslim children. I am running a public school, which is giving 
computer training and English education to Muslim kids from poor families’. 
Answering the question if he is first Muslim or Indian, Shahid Akhlaq said, ‘I am 
a Hindustani as well as a Muslim. These two are not contradictory and there is 
no need to put either one first. Both can go hand in hand together’.
29. Interview with Professor Shahabbudin Ansari on 14 January 2004:
Shahid is not representing only the Muslim. He tries to be a secular leader. He 
poses as Manzoor [Ahamad]. He is for the BSP. He is a religious man but not 
sectarian. He looks like a missionary Muslim, but it is for his personal life. He is 
a business man as well. He presents himself as a broad-minded, secular man. 
This is the requirement of contemporary India.
30. Dainik Prabhat, 30 April 2004:
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In Sardhana, in a political meeting at Idgah road in Mohalla Islamabad, Shahid 
Akhlaq said, ‘The basic reason of the Muslim backwardness is lack of education. 
The lack of education has made Muslims backward in all areas of life — politics 
and jobs. I would like to encourage the Muslim community to focus on the 
education for their children and stop spending a large amount of money for 
marriage. I would also like to stress the need for religious education along with 
modern-technological education. While modern education equips us with the 
contemporary life of trade and politics, religious education teaches us about our 
culture and history, and it shows us a path to live with peace and harmony. 
Religious education also teaches us to respect other religions and communities. 
Modern and religious education go together hand in hand, not separately.
31. Interview with Mr. Shahid Akhlaq on 17 August 2003:
[to my question that he was representing only the Muslim community], I am 
representing all communities and the poor people. I am honest to every 
community, and trying to send a message of humanity.
32. Interview with a highly educated young Ansari entrepreneur in the textile
industry on 7 August 2003:
In 1992 [the demolition of] Babri Masjid, people realised that in order to survive 
in India, we have to get good education, be in the administration, be in the 
mainstream. But this does not mean that we are shunning Islamic ideology and 
education. Western education is added to the category and broadening our 
vision.
33. Interview with a Muslim (Ansari) founder of an English-medium school in 
Meerut on 28 January 2004:
I had difficulty to send my children to English-medium public schools. They are 
so expensive, and the dress code of these schools [western-style uniform of 
blazers and skirts] does not match the Muslim way of life. But I wanted to have 
both English-medium and religious [Islamic] education for my children. So I 
established my own school using the space upstairs. Students wear their own 
(Muslim) clothes. It started with 22 students in 1993, boys and girls at the
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nursery level. Now [in 2004] there are about 200 students. We are also 
providing our students with the IT training.292
34. Interview with a Qureshi (a putative descendent of Arabic Qureshi) retired
tax official of the Nagar Nigam on 27 February 2004:
[Shahid Akhlaq] is a man of crores, his business is to supply meat. Before he 
became Mayor of the city, the BJP was dominant in the Municipal Corporation. 
Shahid Akhlaq is doing his job, helping the poor, financially supporting widows 
and solving city problems. Mayor is a religious man, open-minded and good 
fellow. If Mayor runs for the election, he deserves support.
292 Maintaining the Muslim dress code was the common practice in all English-medium schools 
established and run by Qureshi and non-Qureshi Muslims. Many of the school owners were 
simultaneously politicians. These included Mr. Dilshad Munna, Shahid Akhlaq and Hakim 
Saffudin, a renowned Unani doctor and the chairman of finance on the Municipal Board from 
1950 to 1971.
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